JUDGMENT : P. SOMARAJAN, J. 1. Aggrieved by the judgment dated 14.7.2009, in A.S. No. 72/2005 on the file of Sub Court, Thiruvananthapuram, and the judgment dated 6.4.2005 in O.S. No. 253/2001 of the Munsiff's Court, Thiruvananthapuram, the first defendant and the legal heirs of second defendant came up with this second appeal. 2. The suit is one for declaration of title over immovable property, recovery of possession and enjoyment. The defendants contested the suit disputing the title of plaintiffs over the immovable property. Both the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court found that the plaintiffs have got title over the immovable property scheduled in the plaint and granted a decree of declaration of title and recovery of possession of the property. 3. Aggrieved by the said decree and judgment, the first defendant and the legal heirs of the second defendant came up with this second appeal mainly on the reason that the decree passed by the Trial Court as well as the First Appellate Court are null and void in view of the proposition laid down by the Apex Court in M/s. East India Corporation Ltd. vs. Shree Meenakshi Mills Ltd. AIR 1991 SC 1094 and by a Full Bench of this court in Kuruvilla Abraham vs. John, 1995 (1) KLT 161 .The contention is that the building is situated in a place wherein Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act 1965 (for short ‘the Kerala Act’) made applicable and that the Civil Court is incompetent due to lack of jurisdiction to deal with the matter. 4. The questions came up for consideration are: (1) Whether a Civil Court is incompetent to pass a decree of declaration of title and recovery of possession due to lack of jurisdiction in respect of a subject matter which would come under the purview of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 and whether the decree would be a nullity in view of the non-obstante clause under S.11 of the said Act in view of the decision of the Apex Court in M/s. East India Corporation Ltd. vs. Shree Meenakshi Mills Ltd. AIR 1991 SC 1094 and a Full Bench decision of this Court in Kuruvilla Abraham vs. John, 1995 (1) KLT 161 ? (2) Whether it is permissible to agitate the disputed question of title and recovery of possession before a Civil Court in respect of a subject matter which would come under the purview of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 before approaching the Tribunal constituted under the said Act in view of the non-obstante clause under Section 11 therein? (3) Is the Civil Court incompetent to pass a decree of recovery of possession with respect to a subject matter which would come under the purview of S.11(1) of the said Act? If so, what would be the effect of S.34 of the Specific Relief Act in a suit for declaration of title when the person out of possession of the property sought to be declared? (4) Whether the trial court and the first appellate court are justified in granting a decree of declaration of title and recovery of possession? 5. The Apex Court in East India Corporation Ltd. case (supra) had considered the impact of non-obstante clause incorporated under Section 10(1) of Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control), Act (for short T.N. Act) and the jurisdiction of the Tribunal constituted under the Special Enactment/Rent Control Legislation held as follows: “8. What is stated in the second proviso to S.10(1) is the sole circumstance in which the Civil Court is invested with jurisdiction in matters of eviction. But this jurisdiction cannot be invoked otherwise than as stipulated in the second proviso. This means that the condition precedent to the exercise of jurisdiction by a Civil Court is that the tenant should have denied the title of the landlord or claimed right of permanent tenancy and the Controller should, on such denial or claim by the tenant, reach a decision whether such denial or claim is bona fide. Upon such decision, the Controller must record a finding to that effect. In that event, the landlord is entitled to sue for eviction of the tenant in a Civil Court. Where these conditions are satisfied, the Civil Court will have jurisdiction to pass a decree for eviction on any of the grounds mentioned in S.10 or Ss.14 to 16, notwithstanding that the Court has found that the tenant's denial of the landlor's title that does not involve forfeiture of the lease, or, his claim of right of permanent tenancy is unfounded. Except to this limited extent, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court in matters of eviction of a tenant is completely barred and the jurisdiction in such matters is vested in the tribunals set up under the statute. 9. Significantly, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court can be invoked only where the Controller comes to a decision, and record a finding, that the denial or claim by the tenant, as aforesaid, is bona-fide. If the Controller were to come to the opposite conclusion, no question of invoking the jurisdiction of the Civil Court would arise. But the decision of the Controller is concerned solely with the bona fides, and not the correctness or validity of the denial or claim, for these difficult questions of title are by the statute reserved for decision by the appropriate Civil Court which is the more competent forum in such matters. (See the principle discussed in Magiti Sasamal vs. Pandab Bissoi, (1962) 3 SCR 673 : AIR 1962 SC 547 . In such an event, the Civil Court will become competent to pass a decree for eviction on any of the grounds mentioned in S.10 or Ss 14 to 16. On the other hand, if the decision of the Controller is that the tenants denial or claim is not bona fide, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court cannot be invoked by the landlord and the Controller will then be the competent authority to order eviction, after affording the parties a reasonable opportunity of being heard, on any one of the grounds specified under the statute, including the ground that the tenant has, without bona fide, denied the landlord's title or claimed right of permanent tenancy. What is significant is that the decision of the Controller, duly recorded by him, as regards the bona fide denial or claim by the tenant is the condition precedent to the invocation of power of the Civil Court. Any suit instituted by the landlord for eviction of a tenant from a building falling within the ambit of the Act, otherwise than as stipulated by the section is, therefore, incompetent for lack of jurisdiction of the Court and any decree of the Court in such a suit is null and void and of no effect.” 6. Section 10(1) of T.N. Act is extracted below for reference: “10. Section 10(1) of T.N. Act is extracted below for reference: “10. Eviction of tenants: (1) A tenant shall not be evicted whether in execution of a decree or otherwise except in accordance with the provisions of this section or section 14 to 16: Provided that nothing contained in the said sections shall apply to a tenant whose landlord is the Government: Provided further that where the tenant denies the title of the landlord or claims right of permanent tenancy, the Controller shall decide whether the denial or claims is bona fide and if he records a finding to that effect, the landlord shall be entitled to sue for eviction of the tenant in a civil Court and the Court may pass a decree for eviction on any of the grounds mentioned in the said sections, notwithstanding that the Court finds that such denial does not involve forfeiture of the lease or that the claim is unfounded.” 7. Section 10(1) of T.N. Act is pari materia with that of Section 11(1) of Kerala Act. Section 11(1) of the Kerala Act is extracted below for reference: “11. Eviction of tenants: (1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law or contract a tenant shall not be evicted, whether in execution of a decree or otherwise, except in accordance with the provisions of this Act: Provided that nothing contained in this section shall apply to a tenant whose landlord is the State Government or the Central Government or other public authority notified under this Act: Provided further that where the tenant denies the title of the landlord or claims right of permanent tenancy, the Rent Control Court shall decide whether the denial or claim is bona fide and if it records a finding to that effect, the landlord shall be entitled to sue for eviction of the tenant in a Civil Court and such Court may pass a decree for eviction on any of the grounds mentioned in this section, notwithstanding that the Court finds that such denial does not involve forfeiture of the lease or that the claim is unfounded.” (Emphasis supplied) 8. The non-obstante clause takes away the jurisdiction vested with the Civil Court in the matter of eviction of tenants, irrespective of what is contained in any other law or contract, and no tenant shall be evicted except in accordance with the provisions of the Kerala Act. The non-obstante clause takes away the jurisdiction vested with the Civil Court in the matter of eviction of tenants, irrespective of what is contained in any other law or contract, and no tenant shall be evicted except in accordance with the provisions of the Kerala Act. But, it could be seen from Section 11(1) of the Kerala Act that the restriction embodied under the non-obstante clause is confined to the expression “a tenant shall not be evicted.” Only matters dealing with eviction of tenants alone can be brought under the purview of Section 11(1) of the Kerala Act by virtue of the non-obstante clause incorporated therein. A decree for eviction passed by a Civil Court, hence cannot be executed, by virtue of the non-obstante clause. Consequently, the decree for eviction of tenant would stand as a nullity. In Kuruvila Abraham's case (supra) a Full Bench of this Court followed the proposition laid down in M/s East India Corporation Ltd. case (supra) and held that decree for eviction of a tenant would stand as a nullity due to lack of jurisdiction with the Civil Court in view of the non-obstante clause under Section 11(1) of Kerala Act. 9. But, when there is disputed title and when it was agitated in a Civil Court and a composite decree declaring the title of landlord over the property was passed, there cannot be any operation of non-obstante clause under Section 11(1) of the Kerala Act. Even after the constitution of special enactment, the Rent Control Legislation, and the incorporation of non-obstante clause under Section 11(1) of the Kerala Act, what is brought under the purview of Section 11(1) is confined only to restriction from “evicting the tenant.” That does not mean that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to adjudicate the disputed title of subject of the lease. Hence, when there is a composite decree declaring the title of landlord over the property or recovery of possession or eviction of tenant, that portion of decree which would fall within the purview of Section 11(1) of the Kerala Act alone would stand as a nullity due to lack of jurisdiction. Hence, when there is a composite decree declaring the title of landlord over the property or recovery of possession or eviction of tenant, that portion of decree which would fall within the purview of Section 11(1) of the Kerala Act alone would stand as a nullity due to lack of jurisdiction. The other part of the decree dealing with the title of landlord or right to recover possession except the portion which would fall within the purview of Section 11(1) of the Kerala Act would be valid and enforceable and the legal proposition laid down in M/s. East India Corporation Ltd. case (supra) and Kuruvilla Abraham's case (supra) cannot be applied. 10. The next question came up for consideration is whether the party should exhaust the remedy provided under Section 11(1) of the Kerala Act before approaching the Civil Court for adjudicating the disputed question of denial of title or claim of right of permanent tenancy. Second proviso to Section 11(1) of the Kerala Act was incorporated as a precautionary measure to address the claim of permanent tenancy or denial of title in a Rent Control Petition whenever it was raised so as to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and the jurisdiction to deal with the said question is left out to the Civil Court by empowering the Tribunal constituted under Rent Control legislation to find out whether it is bona-fide or not and to proceed with the matter when it is found to be not bona-fide. When it is found to be bona-fide the Tribunal constituted under the Act is ceased to have jurisdiction to proceed further in the matter, and the landlord will be entitled to sue for eviction of the tenant in a Civil Court. Then the Civil Court will have the same powers vested with the Tribunal under Section 11 of the Kerala Act to order eviction on any of the grounds enumerated therein. Then the Civil Court, besides its jurisdiction to adjudicate the disputed title/denial of title or the right of permanent tenancy or any civil dispute attached to the subject matter, can exercise the jurisdiction vested with the Tribunal constituted under the special enactment/Rent Control legislation for passing an order of eviction/decree on any of the grounds enumerated under Section 11 of the Kerala Act. Then it enjoys both the jurisdiction of Civil Court and the jurisdiction to order eviction on any of the grounds under Section 11 of the Kerala Act vested with a tribunal constituted under the special enactment/Rent Control legislation. The jurisdiction vested with the Civil Court in adjudicating disputed title or claim of permanent tenancy is not taken away by virtue of Section 11(1) of the Kerala Act. Simply for the reason that an alternative recourse to address the issue relating to denial of title or permanent tenancy incorporated under Section 11(1) of the Kerala Act it cannot be said that the jurisdiction vested with the Civil Court to adjudicate the said issue has been taken away. Since second proviso to Section 11(1) is a protective alternative measure to address issues relating to denial of title or permanent tenancy in a Rent Control Petition, it will not take away the right of party to seek civil remedy by instituting a suit for declaration of disputed title or recovery of possession. The only embargo is confined to in evicting a tenant either in execution of a decree or otherwise except in accordance with the provision in the special enactment/Rent Control legislation that does not mean that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to deal with disputed title or claim of permanent tenancy. So, it is not at all necessary that the landlord should at first exhaust the remedy under Section 11 of the Kerala Act when there is disputed question of title or claim of permanent tenancy. 11. Then comes the next question whether a decree of recovery of possession would amount to a decree of eviction of tenant and what would be the legal position when it intakes a decree to evict the tenant from 'the building' as defined under the Kerala Act on proving the existence of a tenancy or a lease arrangement and whether the Civil Court is incompetent to pass a decree of recovery of possession merely on the ground that it would sometimes intake a decree for eviction of tenant also. 12. The mandate under Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act assumes importance at this juncture. The proviso to Section 34 mandates that no court shall make any declaration of title where the plaintiff being able to seek further relief than a mere declaration of title, omits to do so. 12. The mandate under Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act assumes importance at this juncture. The proviso to Section 34 mandates that no court shall make any declaration of title where the plaintiff being able to seek further relief than a mere declaration of title, omits to do so. When the plaintiff is not in possession of the disputed property, it is mandatory that there should be a relief for recovery of possession without which no declaration of disputed title can be granted, and hence there cannot be any restriction for incorporating a relief of recovery of possession in a suit for declaration of title of plaintiff. A decree of recovery of possession and declaration of title, hence cannot be severed as the former is dependent on the later without which the later will not survive when the plaintiff able to ask for such a relief and cannot be granted by virtue of the principle embodied under Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act. Needless to say that Section 11(1) of the Kerala Act would come into play only when it is established the status of the defendant as a tenant pertaining to the ‘building’ as defined under the Kerala Act. It is by virtue of Section 74 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act future lease/tenancy on land is prohibited after the commencement of the said Act. So when there is a lease arrangement or tenancy over a ‘building’ as defined under the Kerala Act and when there is such a finding by the Civil Court in a suit for recovery of possession or declaration, the decree cannot be executed to the extent it would fall under the sweep of Section 11(1) of the Kerala Act and the decree to that extent would stand as non executable and the legal proposition laid down in M/s East India Corporation Ltd. case (supra) and Kuruvilla Abraham's case (supra) would come into play. 13. In the instant case, what is involved is a composite decree declaring the plaintiffs' title over the plaint schedule property, granting recovery of possession by directing the defendant to vacate the plaint schedule premises within two months and also granting a permanent prohibitory injunction and there is a specific finding that there is no landlord-tenant relationship between the plaintiffs and the defendants by the First Appellate Court. Nothing was brought to the notice of this court in order to have a contrary view in the matter and as such the decree granting recovery of possession and declaring the title of plaintiffs over the property would not fall under the purview of Section 11(1) of the Kerala Act. The legal proposition laid down in M/s East India Corporation Ltd. case (supra) and Kuruvilla Abraham's case (supra), hence cannot be applied in the factual situation involved in the case. The appeal fails. 14. The appeal is dismissed. No order as to cost.