ORDER : Heard the learned counsels for the parties. 2. The petitioner’s husband late Mr. Muniswamappa was the purchaser of the land in question belonging to non SC/ST category from the persons/vendors belonging to SC/ST category and she has filed these writ petitions in this Court aggrieved by the order passed by the appellate authority below, namely, the Deputy Commissioner. The Deputy Commissioner set aside the sale of the land in question in favour of the husband of the petitioner at the request of the original grantee who belonged to SC/ST category and who sought the annulment of the sale in question in terms of S.4 of the Karnataka Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes (Prohibition of Transfer of Certain Lands) Act, 1978 (‘PTCL Act’ for short). 3. The issue is prima-facie covered by the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Vivek M. Hinduja & Others vs. M. Ashwatha & Ors. in Civil Appeal No. 2166/2009, decided on 06.12.2017. This Court following the aforesaid decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court has already disposed of one such petition filed by the purchasers belonging to non SC/ST category namely, W.P.No.24921/2009 (D.A. Chandrshekaraiah & Others vs. The Spl. Deputy Commissioner, Bangalore) on 03.09.2018. 4. The sales in favour of the non SC/ST persons in such case had admittedly taken place long ago and the action initiated for seeking annulment of those sales was initiated by the original grantee or their L.Rs. belonging to SC/ST in terms of S.4 of the ‘PTCL’ Act beyond 20 years. In some of the cases listed today before this Court, which are being disposed of by this order, though such an action was initiated before 20 years, namely around 15 years or so after the sale had taken place in the year 1970 and the action before the Asst. Commissioner was initiated in the year 1985, but the Asst. Commissioner rejected such prayer of the original grantee or their L.Rs., but however on a further appeal filed by the original grantee or their L.Rs. belonging to SC/ST category, the Appellate Authority namely, the Deputy Commissioner allowed such appeals and resumed the land in question in favour of SC/ST persons by the impugned order, which have been now passed almost 37 years of the original sale in the year 1970 and the present batch of writ petitions are filed in the year 2007 before this Court. So, in effect, the sale in question has been set aside by the competent authority much beyond the period of 20 years, which was held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid case of Vivek M. Hinduja to be unreasonably long period to annul such sales in question and set aside the same on the ground of S.4 of the ‘PTCL’ Act which was enacted to protect the rights of the persons belonging to SC/ST category, who are the original grantees or their L.Rs. 5. The relevant extract from the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Vivek M. Hinduja (supra) is quoted below for ready reference, in which the Hon’ble Supreme Court following its earlier view in 1984 [3] SCC 301 [Manchegowda and Ors. vs. State of Karnataka and Ors] and [2009] 12 SCC 193 [Sunkara Rajayalakshmi & Ors. vs. State of Karnataka]. “4. Arguments have been addressed before us at length on whether the present appellants had perfected their titles on the date of the coming into force of the Karnataka Act. We are not inclined to go into this question because the instant matters can be decided on an aspect settled by this Court in the case of Chhedi Lal Yadav and Ors. vs. Hari Kishore Yadav (D) Thr. Lrs. and Ors., and Nekkanti Rama Lakshmi vs. State of Karnataka and Anr. In these two decisions, one of which arose under the Karnataka Act, this Court has held that the authorities entrusted with the power to annul proceedings purported to have been made by the original grantees, must exercise their powers to do so, whether on an application, or suo motu, within a reasonable time since no time is prescribed by law for taking such action. In the decided cases, action had been initiated after about 20 to 25 years of the coming into force of the Karnataka Act. 5. In the present cases, it is undisputed that the action had been initiated after almost 20 years from the coming into force of the Karnataka Act. In principle, we do not see any reason why the delay in the present cases should be considered to be reasonable. There is no material difference between the period of delay in the present cases and he decided cases. 6. Relying on some observations in the case of Manchegowda and Ors. vs. State of Karnataka and Ors. In principle, we do not see any reason why the delay in the present cases should be considered to be reasonable. There is no material difference between the period of delay in the present cases and he decided cases. 6. Relying on some observations in the case of Manchegowda and Ors. vs. State of Karnataka and Ors. and Sunkara Rajayalakshmi & Ors. vs. State of Karnataka, Shri Sunil Fernandes, learned counsel on the respondents’ side submitted that the outer limit for initiating action should be 30 years. 7. We, however, find that the observations in those cases are not apposite and are made with reference to the period of prescription in respect of Government properties under the Limitation Act, 1963. 8. It was also submitted on behalf of the respondents that Section 4 of the Karnataka Act proprio vigore annuls a transfer made in contravention of itself. Therefore, it makes no difference if the proceedings are initiated even after 20 to 25 years. 9. We do not find it possible to accede to this submission. This Court in the case of Board of Trustees of Port of Kandla vs. Hargovind Jasraj and Anr, reiterated the necessity of an order of a competent Court or Tribunal before which the impugned order can be declared as null and void. The Court relied on the of quoted passage in Smith Vs. East Elloe Rural District Council which reads as under:- “…An order, even if not made in good faith, is still an act capable of legal consequences. It bears no brand of invalidity on its forehead. Unless the necessary proceedings are taken at law to establish the cause of invalidity and to get it quashed or otherwise upset, it will remain as effective for its ostensible purpose as the most impeccable of orders.’ [Smith Case, AC pp.769-70] [emphasis supplied] This must be equally true even where the brand of invalidity is plainly visible: for there also the order can effectively be resisted in law only by obtaining the decision of the Court. The necessity of recourse to the Court has been pointed out [sic] repeatedly in the House of Lords and Privy council without distinction between patent and latent defects [Ed. Wade and Forsyth in Administrative Law, 7th Edn. The necessity of recourse to the Court has been pointed out [sic] repeatedly in the House of Lords and Privy council without distinction between patent and latent defects [Ed. Wade and Forsyth in Administrative Law, 7th Edn. 1994].” In the case of Pune Municipal Corporation vs. State of Maharashtra, this Court reproduced the following observation with regard to the declaration of orders beyond the period of limitation as invalid: “39. Setting aside the decree passed by all the courts and referring to several cases, this Court held that if the party aggrieved by invalidity of the order intends to approach the Court for declaration that the order against him was inoperative, he must come before the Court within the period prescribed by limitation. ‘If the statutory time of limitation expires, the Court cannot give the declaration sought for’.” [emphasis supplied] 10. We are in respectful agreement with the aforesaid observations. It is, however, necessary to add that where limitation is not prescribed, the party ought to approach the competent Court or authority within reasonable time, beyond which no relief can be granted. As decided earlier, this principle would apply even to suo motu actions. 11. We find from the impugned judgments that the High Court has not given due regard to the period of time within which the action was taken in the present cases. The competent authorities in all these cases had declined relief to the respondents and had refused to annul the transfers. In the circumstances, the impugned judgment[s] and order[s] passed by the High Court are set aside. 12. Accordingly, the appeals are allowed.” 6. In view of the aforesaid binding legal precedent before this Court, this Court is of the clear opinion that since the Deputy Commissioner had erred in allowing the appeals filed by the original grantees or their L.Rs. and set aside the orders passed by the Asst. Commissioner who had rightly rejected the prayer of the grantees in annulling such sales in favour of the persons belonging to SC/ST category and therefore, the said orders passed by the Deputy Commissioner cannot be sustained and these writ petitions filed by the non SC/ST purchaser deserve to be allowed and the same are accordingly allowed and the impugned order passed by the Deputy Commissioner dated 29.05.2007 or other dates as the case may be are set aside. No costs.