JUDGMENT 1. The appellant (hereinafter referred as "plaintiff") has filed the present appeal being aggrieved by the judgment and decree dated 15.12.1999 passed by the First Additional District Judge, Mandsaur by which the civil suit has been dismissed. Facts of the case in short are as under : 2. The plaintiff filed the suit for the reliefs of declaration, permanent injunction, possession and damages for the property bearing Survey No. 790 (Area 0.031 are) (Old No. 1232 of 2002), situated at Mandsaur. The boundaries of the suit property described in the plaint are as under: "North - remaining land of Survey No. 790. South - Kailash Marg Bus Stand. East - Survey No. 791. West - Road from Bust Stand to Gandhi Square. Measurement of the land: length from east to west - 50 feet, width from north to south 50 feet.(50x50 square feet)" (Hereinafter referred as the "suit property") 3. According to pleadings in the plaint, the "suit property" as well as nearby land was initially owned by Late Ramteerath and his ancestors. That "suit property" 50x50 sq.ft. and nearby lands owned by the ancestors of Late Ramteerath namely Hukumchand Onkar, Smt. Judab Bai and Ganga Bai were given on lease to ancestors of defendants No. 6 to 18 namely Girdharilal on 10.9.1901. Late Ramteerath initiated proceedings for resumption of the aforesaid land under section 189 of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code' 1959 (hereinafter referred as "MPLR Code") before the Sub Divisional Officer, Mandsaur which was registered as Case No. 2/60xA/45. In the said case, the order of resumption dated 20.2.1968 was passed by the Revenue Commissioner in favour of Late Ramteerath in Appeal No. 109/66-67 which had been upheld by the Board of Revenue vide order dated 26.8.1968 in Case No. 91/3/68. In compliance of the aforesaid order, improvement and construction cost was deposited in the revenue Court by Late Ramteerath. 4. In order to protect their possession over the suit land and others lands Mandanlal, Maniklal, Laxmi Narayan and Smt. Badam Bai filed the suit for declaration and permanent injunction against Late Ramteerath and 4 others which was registered as Suit No. 739A/1996. Initially, the temporary injunction was granted in favour of the plaintiffs therein on 21.10.1976 which remained valid upto 14.5.1997. During pendency of the said suit, Late Ramteerath expired and the name of defendant No. 5 Mohd. Initially, the temporary injunction was granted in favour of the plaintiffs therein on 21.10.1976 which remained valid upto 14.5.1997. During pendency of the said suit, Late Ramteerath expired and the name of defendant No. 5 Mohd. Shafi was brought on record as his legal representative by virtue of Will dated 4.5.1977 executed by him. According to the plaintiff, defendant No. 5 colluded with defendants No. 1 to 4 and got disposed of the suit by way of compromise. He had no authority or right to enter into the compromise in respect of the suit land which was granted to him by Late Late Ramteerath by way of Will dated 4.5.1977. By judgement dated 14.5.1997, the suit has been decreed in favour of defendants No. 1 to 4 on the basis of compromise which came to the knowledge of plaintiff on 2.6.1997, hence, he filed the present suit on 23.6.1997. According to the plaintiff, by virtue of Will dated 4.5.1977, he had become the owner of the suit property. The defendant No. 5 was only made a legal representative to pursue the suit, who had no right to enter into a compromise against the interest of plaintiff. The suit was disposed of without following the provisions under Order 23 rule 3 (b) of the CPC, hence, the decree 14.5.1997 is liable to be declared void. The plaintiff has also claimed damages @ Rs. 16,500/- per year and also claimed reliefs of possession and permanent injunction. 5. After notice, the defendants No. 1 to 4 filed the written statement by submitting that they are in possession from the period of their ancestors viz Roopchand and defendants No. 6, 7 and Mangilal as Upkrushak i.e. the year 1949. Late Ramteerath did not initiate any proceedings against defendants No. 1 to 4 or their ancestors for resumption of land, hence, the said order is not binding on them. By virtue of Will, Mohd. Shafi had validly entered into an agreement and the trial Court has rightly disposed of the suit. Even otherwise, the defendants No. 1 to 4 have become Bhumiswami by virtue of provisions of MPLR Code which came into force w.e.f. 2.10.1959. By virtue of Will, Mohd. Shafi had validly entered into an agreement and the trial Court has rightly disposed of the suit. Even otherwise, the defendants No. 1 to 4 have become Bhumiswami by virtue of provisions of MPLR Code which came into force w.e.f. 2.10.1959. By way of specific pleading, it was pleaded that the Will was executed during the pendency of Civil Suit No. 739A/1996, therefore, the provisions of section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act would apply, and hence, the deed would not come under the purview of Will. The suit is not maintainable by virtue of sections 185, 189, 250 and 257 of MPLR Code. Late Ramteerath had expired on 4.12.1980, therefore, the present suit is barred by limitation. 6. The defendant No. 5 filed the written statement admitting the of Will dated 4.5.1977 in favour of plaintiff in respect of the suit land 50x50 sq.ft. He further submitted that the plaintiff did not obtain the possession at the relevant time hence he entered into compromise by virtue of rights given in the Will. He also admitted the possession of defendants No. 1 to 4 since 1949 over the suit land . He entered into the compromise leaving the land 140 x 140 sq.ft. given to him by way of same Will. 7. The defendants No. 6 to 18 also filed the written statement refuting the averments made in the plaint. They also denied the Will dated 4.5.1977 in favour of the plaintiff and they also challenged the order passed under section 189 in MPLR Code for want of necessary party i.e. Ramgopal, brother of Late Ramteerath. They also contested the suit on the ground that the land is situated within the territory of Municipal Council, therefore, the provisions of MPLR Code are not applicable. They also attacked the compromise entered between defendants No. 1 to 4 with defendant No. 5. They entered into compromise because the defendant No. 5 is international smuggler and due to his threat they entered into a compromise. 8. They also attacked the compromise entered between defendants No. 1 to 4 with defendant No. 5. They entered into compromise because the defendant No. 5 is international smuggler and due to his threat they entered into a compromise. 8. On the basis of pleadings, learned trial Court framed 8 issues for adjudication which are reproduced below : 1- D;k oknxzLr Hkwfe dk fnukad 4-5-1977 dks jke rhFkZ Lokeh Fkk \ 2- D;k mDr fnukad 4-5-1977 dks jkerhFkZ us fookfnr Hkwfe dh olh;r oknh ds i{k esa dh \ vr% oknh fookfnr Hkwfe dk Hkwfe Lokeh gS \ 3- D;k iz-Ø- 739&,@96 r`rh; O;- U;k- oxZ&1 eanlkSj ds izdj.k esa oknh vko';d i{kdkj Fkk ftls i{kdkj u cuk, tkus ls og izdj.k nqjfHklaf/k iw.kZ gksus ls mlesa dh xbZ fMØh 'kwU; gS \ 4- D;k oknh fookfnr Hkwfe ij dCtk u gksus ls izfroknhx.k ls xr rhu o"kZ dk gtkZuk 49]500@a#- izkIr djus dk vf/kdkjh gS \ 5- D;k oknh us oknewY; lgh djrs gq, lgh U;k; 'kqYd vnk fd;k gS \ 6- D;k Hkw&jktLo lafgrk dh /kkjk 257] 185] 189] 250 ds izdk'k esa ;g nkok bl U;k;ky; esa izpyu ;ksX; ugha gS \ 7- D;k nkok vof/k vUnj gS \ 8- D;k oknh dk ;g nkok eq[; :i ls dCtk dk gksus ls izR;korZu dh dk;Zokgh esa vkus ls izpyu ;ksX; ugha gS \ 9 lgk;rk ,oa O;; \** 9. In support of the plaint, the plaintiff examined himself as PW1, Laxmi Narayan as PW2 who identified the signature of Ramlal, witness of Will, Madanlal Sharma (Advocate) as PW3 who transcribed the Will on innstructions of Late Ramteerath. The plaintiff has got exhibited 48 documents as Exhibit P-1 to P-48. 10. The defendant No. 1 examined himself as DW1, defendant Nos. 8 to 17 examined Ratan Singh Mathur as DW2 and have got exhibited 43 documents as Exhibit D-1 to D-43. 11. Learned Additional District Judge while recording the findings on issue No. 1 has held that as on 4.5.1977, the Late Ramteerath was owner of the suit property and the ownership of defendants No. 6 to 18 has been disbelieved. The defendants No. 1 to 4 have not been found sub-lessee, but were found in possession from the period of their ancestors Roopchand as Upkrushak, but not as sub-lessee. They have been denied the title on the basis of adverse possession also. The defendants No. 1 to 4 have not been found sub-lessee, but were found in possession from the period of their ancestors Roopchand as Upkrushak, but not as sub-lessee. They have been denied the title on the basis of adverse possession also. While answering the issue No. 2, learned trial Judge has found the Will dated 4.5.1977 proved in favour of the plaintiff. The will was challenged by defendants No. 1 to 4 on various grounds like section 63 and 68 of the Indian Evidence Act, manipulation and correction etc. Learned Additional District Judge answered the issue No. 3 against the plaintiff that compromise decree is not void because the plaintiff was not party in the Civil Suit No. 739A/1996 and so far as to the declaration of the decree as void by virtue of collusion is concerned, it has been held that this Court is not having jurisdiction and the plaintiff ought to have filed the suit before the same Court who passed the decree, hence, the decree passed in Civil Suit No. 739A/1996 is binding on the plaintiff. While answering the issue No. 4 and 5, the learned Additional District Judge has found that the plaintiff has suffered the loss of Rs. 2,400/- per year. While answering the issues No. 6 and 8 the learned trial Court has held that the plaintiff is having right to obtain possession before the revenue authority as the jurisdiction of civil Court is barred under section 257 of the MPLR Code. While answering issue No. 7, learned Additional District Judge has held that the suit filed by the plaintiff is within limitation. Finally, vide judgement dated 15.12.1999 learned 1st Additional District Judge has dismissed the suit on the basis of findings given on issue No. 3, 6. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid judgement and decree, the plaintiff has filed the present first appeal before this Court. 12. The plaintiff has assailed the findings recorded on issue No. 3 and 6 mainly on the ground that learned Additional District Judge has committed grave error of facts and law as well in deciding these issues. He should to have held that the decree passed in Civil Suit No. 739- A/1996 is nullity having been passed in contravention of provisions of Order 23 rule 3(b) of the CPC and the same is not binding on the plaintiff as he was not party to it. He should to have held that the decree passed in Civil Suit No. 739- A/1996 is nullity having been passed in contravention of provisions of Order 23 rule 3(b) of the CPC and the same is not binding on the plaintiff as he was not party to it. Learned Additional District Judge has also committed an error of law as well as on fact while holding that the suit for possession filed by the plaintiff is barred under the provisions of section 257 of the MPLR Code, whereas the suit for possession based on the title is very much maintainable. The plaintiff is already having a decree of resumption by the revenue Court as the Will has been found proved. It is pertinent to mention here that none of the defendants have filed first appeal/cross-objection against the findings recorded against them. 13. Shri A.K. Sethi, learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the appellant has argued that the learned trial Court has committed grave error of law while dismissing the suit as not maintainable on the ground that the plaintiff ought to have filed the suit before the same Court who passed the judgement and decree because he is alleging that the same was obtained by fraud. He further submitted that in the Will dated 4.5.1997, Mohd. Shafi (defendant No. 5) was given the right to pursue the litigation started by Late Ramteerath, therefore, he had limited right to continue the suit proceedings for the interest of actual legal heir of Late Ramteerath. In decree, it is specifically mentioned that the defendant No. 5 is being appointed legal representative. The word "legal representative" as provided under Order 22 (3) and (4) is different from "legal heir". The legal heir can be a legal representative but not vice versa, is not there therefore, the defendant No. 5 Mohd. Shafi had no right to enter into a compromise with defendants No. 1 to 4 against the interest of plaintiff. Once, the trial Court has held that the plaintiff has proved the Will and he got the suit property of Late Ramteerath, then in this suit itself, the decree passed in Civil Suit No. 739A/1996 ought to have been declared void. 14. Shri A.K. Sethi, learned senior counsel has further argued that the learned trial Court has wrongly dismissed the suit by virtue of section 257of the MPLR Code. 14. Shri A.K. Sethi, learned senior counsel has further argued that the learned trial Court has wrongly dismissed the suit by virtue of section 257of the MPLR Code. Plaintiff filed the suit for the relief of declaration and permanent injunction The relief to the effect that the decree passed in earlier suit is void and not binding on him can be granted by the civil Court not by the Revenue Court. In support of his contention, he has placed reliance over the judgement passed by the apex Court in the case of Hukam Singh v State of M.P., reported in (2005) 10 SCC 124 in which the Supreme Court has held that for the suit for possession, declaration and permanent injunction is maintainable and the bar under section 57(2) of the MPLR Code would not come in the way. He has also placed reliance over the judgement passed by the full bench of this Court in case of Ramgopal v Chetu Batte : 1976 RN 146 = 1976 JLJ 278 = AIR 1976 MP 160 (FB) where the suit for possession, declaration and permanent injunction has been held to be maintainable. Shri Sethi submitted that as an abundant precaution, the plaintiff has also filed the first appeal challenging the judgement and decree passed in Civil Suit No. 739A/1966 and the same has been dismissed and against which second appeal has been filed but there would no requirement to argue in Second Appeal in the event of this first appeal being allowed. 15. Per Contra, Shri Sunil Jain, learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the respondents No.1 to 4 argued in support of the judgment and decree specially in respect of the findings recorded against the plaintiff. Shri Jain tried to assail the findings recorded in favour of the plaintiff in respect of the Will by way of oral submissions. According to Shri Jain, by virtue of amendment in Order 41 rule 22 of the CPC, the defendants are not required to file any cross-objection or appeal to assail the findings recorded against them. They are permitted to argue against the findings without filing any memorandum of objection in this very appeal. According to Shri Jain, by virtue of amendment in Order 41 rule 22 of the CPC, the defendants are not required to file any cross-objection or appeal to assail the findings recorded against them. They are permitted to argue against the findings without filing any memorandum of objection in this very appeal. In support of his contention, he has placed reliance over the judgement passed by the Supreme Court in the case of Ravindra Kumar Sharma v. State of of Assam, reported in AIR 1999 SC 3571 (Para 18 to 22). He further submitted that defendant No. 5 was given the absolute right by Late Ramteerath in Will dated 4.5.1997 in respect of the land Survey No. 790, therefore, he had right to enter into a compromise with defendant no. 1to 4 also. The plaintiff has utterly failed to prove the Will by which the suit land was said to have been given to him. According to him, the Will (Exhibit P-1) is in two parts and by virtue of section 88 of the Indian Succession Act, the later part shall prevail over the first part of the Will. The second part of the Will starts from para 8. In the second part, the suit land had already been given to defendant No. 5. In first part of the Will, the plaintiff has claimed title for the land area 2500 sq.f.t as per the map appended to the Will as furnishes to Schedule B, but there is no Schedule B in the Will, therefore, the learned trial Court has wrongly held that the plaintiff has proved the Will in respect of suit land 50x50 sq.ft. Shri Jain has placed reliance over the judgement passed by the apex Court in case of Banwarilal v. Chando Devi, reported in 1993(1) SCC 581 on the ground that no appeal lies under section 96(3) from the decree passed by the trial Court on consent of parties which implies that the decree is valid and binding on the parties. 16. After the amendment in the CPC, neither the appeal against the order recording compromise, nor remedy by way of filing the civil suit is available in the cases covered under rule 3A of Order 23. 16. After the amendment in the CPC, neither the appeal against the order recording compromise, nor remedy by way of filing the civil suit is available in the cases covered under rule 3A of Order 23. He further placed reliance over the judgement passed by this Court in case of Har Prasad v. Dhannulal, reported in 2017 RN 22 = 2007(1) MPLJ 337 in which this Court has held that the suit for ejectment of the occupancy tenant in the civil Court is not maintainable by virtue of the bar under section 257 (k) of the MPLR Code. He further placed reliance over the judgement passed in the case of Balwant Kaur v. Chanan Singh, reported in 2000(6) SCC 310 in which it has been held that the last clauses of the Will represents the latest intentions of the testator. In case of Anil Kak v. Kumari Shraddha, reported in AIR 2008 SC 2195 , the apex Court has held that the Will in question is in 2 parts and appendix not in existence at the time of execution of the Will, hence, the Will is surrounded by the suspicious circumstances. Refusal to grant probate is proper. He has further placed reliance over the judgement passed in the case of Bhagat Ram v. Suresh, reported in AIR 2004 SC 436 , on the point that codicil is also required to be proved with the same standard which is applicable for proving of the Will where neither the Registrar, nor the witnesses were called in the witness box to depose the attestation. The codicil cannot be said to have been proved. On the issue of legal representative respondent has placed reliance over the judgement passed in the case of Custdodian of branches of Banco National Ultramarino v. Nalini Bai Naique, reported 1989 Supp. 2 SCC 275, in which it has been held that the definition of legal representative is inclusive in character and its scope is wide and not confined to the legal heirs only. It includes heir as well as the person who represents the State even without title either as executor or administrator in possession of State of the deceased. 17. Shri Jain ld. It includes heir as well as the person who represents the State even without title either as executor or administrator in possession of State of the deceased. 17. Shri Jain ld. Sr counsel further submitted that in other civil suits filed by the other legal heirs of Late Ramteerath, the said Will has not been found proved, but those judgements have not been filed alongwith the application under Order 41 rule 27 of the CPC. Shri Jain further submitted that the defendant has filed an application under Order 41 rule 27 of the CPC in order to establish that the plaintiff is in fact is not Jagdish whose name is appearing in the Will. His actual name is Santosh and he is an imposer filed the suit in the name of Jagdish. An FIR has been registered against him and he is facing the trial, therefore, these documents are necessary for taken on record and the suit is liable to be remanded back on this ground alone. 18. In rejoinder, Shri Sethi, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant submitted that in absence of any cross-appeal, the defendants No. 1 to 4 are not permitted to assail the findings on the issues recorded in favour of the plaintiff. In support of his contention, he has placed reliance over the judgement passed in the case of Union of India v. Vijay Krishna Uniyal, reported in (2018)11 SCC 382 (para 45) in which it has been held that without filing formal cross-objection in the appeal, it is not open to the respondents to challenge the adverse findings recorded by the two Courts below. He has also placed reliance over the latest judgement of the apex Court passed in case of Biswajit Sukul v. Deo Chand Sarda and others, (Civil Appeal No. 9956/2018, decided on 25.9.2018) and also placed reliance over the latest judgement passed in the case of Banarsi and others v. Ram Phal, reported in (2003)9 SCC 606 (Para 10, 11 and 32), and the judgement passed by the apex Court in case of Laxman Tatyaba Kankate and Another v. Taramati Harishchandra Dhatrak, reported in 2011(1) MPLJ (SC) 317 (para 16). 19. Before adverting on other issues it would be proper to first answer the following issue : Whether without filing cross-objection the defendants can be permitted to argue against the findings recorded in favour of plaintiff ? 20. 19. Before adverting on other issues it would be proper to first answer the following issue : Whether without filing cross-objection the defendants can be permitted to argue against the findings recorded in favour of plaintiff ? 20. Shri Jain, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents argued that the learned Court has wrongly found the Will proved in favour of the plaintiff. and according to him the defendant can still challenge such findings without filling any separate appeal or cross-objection in this appeal. Shri Jain has placed heavy reliance over provisons the Order 41 rule 22 of the CPC, according to which any respondent, though he may not have appealed from any part of the decree may not only argue in support the decree but may also state that the finding against him in the Court appeal in respect of any issue ought to have been in his favour and may also take any cross-objection to the decree which he could have been taken by the appellant . In view of the aforesaid provisions of O.41-R.21 of CPC, if the defendant wants to assail any part of the decree, he is required to file a separate appeal or cross-objection in the appeal instituted by the appellant but in case he has not filed any appeal from any part of the decree even than he is permitted to support the decree and may also state that the finding against him in the Court below ought to have been answered in his favour . The apex Court in case of Ravindra Kumar Sharma (supra), has held that the cross-objection is wholly unnecessary in case adverse finding was to be attacked. Relevant portion of the aforesaid judgement is reproduced below: "18. In connection with Order 41 rule 22, CPC after the 1976 Amendment, we may first refer to the judgment of the Calcutta High Court in Nishambhu Jana vs. Sova Guha [(1982) 89 CWN 685]. In that case, Mookerjee,J. referred to the 54th report of the Law Commission (at p.295) (para 41.70) to the effect that Order 41 rule 22 gave two distinct rights to the respondent in the appeal. The first was the right to uphold the decree of the Court of first instance on any of the grounds which that Court decided against him. In that case the finding can be questioned by the respondent without filing cross-objections. The first was the right to uphold the decree of the Court of first instance on any of the grounds which that Court decided against him. In that case the finding can be questioned by the respondent without filing cross-objections. The Law Commission had accepted the correctness of the Full Bench of Madras High Court in Venkata Rao's case. The Commission had also accepted the view of the Calcutta High Court in Nrisingha Prosad Rakshit v. The Commissioners of Bhadreswar Muncipality that a cross-objection was wholly unnecessary in case the adverse finding was to be attacked. The Commission observed that the words "support the decree..." appeared to be strange and "what is meant is that he may support it by asserting that the ground decided against him should have been decided in his favour. It is desirable to make this clear". That is why the main part of Order 41 rule 22 was amended to reflect the principle in Venkata Rao's case as accepted in Chandre Prabhuji's case. 20. These recommendations of the Law Commission are reflected in the Statement of Objections and Reasons for the Amendment. They read as follows: "Rule 22(i.e.as it stood before 1976) gives two distinct rights to the respondent in appeal. The first is the right of upholding the decree of the Court of first instance on any of the grounds on which that Court decided against him; and the second right is that of taking any cross-objection to the decree which the respondent might have taken by way of appeal. In the first case, the respondent supports the decree and in the second case, he attacks the decree. The language of the rule, however, requires some modifications because a person cannot support a decree on a ground decided against him. What is meant is that he may support the decree by asserting that the matters decided against him should have been decided in his favour. The rule is being amended to make it clear. The language of the rule, however, requires some modifications because a person cannot support a decree on a ground decided against him. What is meant is that he may support the decree by asserting that the matters decided against him should have been decided in his favour. The rule is being amended to make it clear. An Explanation is also being added to Rule 22 empowering the respondent to file cross-objection in respect to a finding adverse to him notwithstanding that the ultimate decision is wholly or partly in his favour." Mookerjee, J. observed in Nishambhu Jana's case (see p.689) that "the amended rule 22 of Order 41 of the Code has not brought any substantial change in the settled principles of law" (i.e. as accepted in Venkata Rao's case) and clarified (p.691) that "it would be incorrect to hold that the Explanation now inserted by Act 104 of 1976 has made it obligatory to file cross-objections even when the respondent supports the decree by stating that the findings against him in the Court below in respect of any issue ought to have been in his favour. 21. A similar view was expressed by U.N.Bachawat, J. in Tej Kumar v. Purshottam [ AIR 1981 MP 55 ] that after the 1976 Amendment, it was not obligatory to file cross- objection against an adverse finding. The Explanation merely empowered the respondent to file cross-objections." 21. It is clear from the aforesaid judgement that the respondents in order to attack the adverse findings recorded against him by the Court below is not required to file cross-objection, but keeping in view peculiar facts of this case it was necessary for him to disclose at the time of admission of the appeal that he is going to challenge the adverse findings at the time of final hearing of the appeal. Normally, the appeal once admitted comes for final hearing after 5/10/15 years and after such long period if the respondent starts arguing against the findings recorded in favour of plaintiff then it would be a surprise for the appellant to give response to those arguments, therefore, if the respondent is interested in challenging the findings recorded against him, he is required to file at least his memo of objection in writing which may not be in the form of cross-objection or having status of appeal which is required to filed only when any part of the decree is under challenge by the respondents. 22. In case of Babulal Agrawal v. Smt. Jyoti, reported in AIR 2000 MP 83 , the Division Bench of this High Court has held that under order 41, rule 22, CPC cross-objection in lieu of cross appeal is permissible as also cross-objection is permissible against an adverse finding and the cross-objection which is merely against an adverse finding would not attract applicability of Art. 1-A but where the cross-objection is in lieu of cross appeal as contemplated by Order 41, rule 22 (1), CPC it would attract ad valorem Court-Fees under Art. 1-A .Para 20A and 21 are reproduce below : 20A. Under Order 41, rule 22, C.P.C. cross-objection in lieu of cross appeal is permissible as also cross-objection is permissible against an adverse finding. The Explanation added below Order 41, rule 22 was introduced by Amendment Act of 1976 with a specific purpose that cross-objection may be allowed to be filed even against adverse finding by the respondent who may have been successful on other findings of the Court below. The cross-objection which is merely against an adverse finding would not attract applicability of Art. 1-A but where the cross-objection is in lieu of cross appeal as contemplated by Order 41, rule 22 (1), C.P.C. it would attract ad valorem Court-Fees under Art. 1-A and omission of the words 'cross-objection ' in Art. 1-A would have no different legal effect . The cross-objection against adverse finding and cross-objection in lieu of cross appeal have thus to be treated differently for the purpose of court-fee. 21. The cross-objection against adverse finding and cross-objection in lieu of cross appeal have thus to be treated differently for the purpose of court-fee. 21. We are, therefore, of the considered view that the memorandum of cross-objection in so far as it challenges the adverse finding on legal necessity, order to support of the decree of dismissal of suit for specific performance is, on this additional ground, clearly maintainable and would not attract any payment of ad valorem court-fees. 23. In case of Choudhary Sahu (Dead) v. State of Bihar, reported in AIR 1982 SC 98 , the apex Court has held that while exercising the power under this O. 41 rule 21 or O. 41 rule 33 of CPC the Court should not lose sight of the other provisions of the Code itself nor the provisions of other laws, viz., the Law of Limitation or the Law of court-fees etc. Relevant portion is reproduced below : 4. The sole contention raised on behalf of the appellants in the various appeals is that in the absence of any appeal or cross-objection filed by the State of Bihar the Commissioner was not justified in reversing the finding in favour of the appellants, namely, the finding on the question of allotment of units or regarding the classification of land. This contention, as observed earlier, 'was raised before the High Court in the writ petition as well. The High Court, however, repelled the contention by applying the provisions of O. 41, R. 22. Reliance has also been placed by the State of Bihar on the provisions of O. 41, R. 33, C. P. C. in support of the order of the Commissioner. The High Court, however, did not rely upon O. 41, R. 33 and rest content by relying on provisions of O. 41. R. 22. 5. By R. 49 of the Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area and Acquisition of Surplus Land) Rules, 1963, O. 41; C. P. C. has been made applicable in disposing of the appeals under the Act. 6. We will first refer to the provisions of O. 41, R. 22. R. 22. 5. By R. 49 of the Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area and Acquisition of Surplus Land) Rules, 1963, O. 41; C. P. C. has been made applicable in disposing of the appeals under the Act. 6. We will first refer to the provisions of O. 41, R. 22. Insofar as it is material for the purposes of this case, it reads : "22.(1) Any respondent, though he may not have appealed from any part of the decree, may not only support the decree on any of the grounds decided against him in the Court below, but take any cross-objection to the decree which he could have taken by way of appeal, provided he has filed such objection in the appellate Court within one month from the date of service on him or his pleader of notice of the day fixed for hearing the appeal, or within such further time as the appellate Court may see fit to allow." 7. The first part of this rule authorises the respondent to support the decree not only on the grounds decided in his favour but also on any of the grounds decided against him in the Court below. The first part thus authorises the respondent only to support the decree. It does not authorise him to challenge the decree. If he wants to challenge the decree, he has to take recourse to the second part, that is, he has to file a cross-objection if he has not already filed an appeal against the decree. Admittedly, the State of Bihar had neither filed any appeal nor cross-objection. Obviously, therefore, on the strength of the first part of sub-cl. (1) of R. 22 of O. 41 the State of Bihar could only support the decree not only on the grounds decided in its favour but also on the grounds decided against it. The Commissioner however, has set aside the finding in favour of the appellant on the strength of O. 41, R. 22 (1). In our opinion this he could not do. 8. The only other Order on which the State of Bihar could rely upon is O. 41, R. 33, CPC. The High Court did not consider the provisions of O. 41, R. 33 as in its opinion the order of the Commissioner could be supported on the strength of O. 41, R. 22. 8. The only other Order on which the State of Bihar could rely upon is O. 41, R. 33, CPC. The High Court did not consider the provisions of O. 41, R. 33 as in its opinion the order of the Commissioner could be supported on the strength of O. 41, R. 22. In the view that we have taken regarding the applicability of O. 41, R. 22 it becomes pertinent to consider the applicability of O.41, R. 33, C. P. C. Insofar as material, it reads : "33. The appellate Court shall have power to pass any decree and make any order which ought to have been passed or made and to pass or make such further or other decree or, order, as the case may require, and this power may be exercised by the Court notwithstanding that the appeal is as to part only of the decree and may be exercised in favour of all or any of the respondents or parties, although such respondents or parties may not have filed any appeal or objection. Illustration.- A claims a sum of money as due to him from X or Y, and in a suit against both, obtains a decree against X X appeals and A and Y are respondent. The appellate Court decides in favour of X. It has power to pass a decree against Y." This rule is widely expressed and it must be applied with great caution. The object of this rule is to empower the appellate Court to do complete justice between the parties. Under this rule the Court has power to make a proper decree notwithstanding that the appeal is as to part only of the decree and such power may be exercised in favour of all or any of the parties even though they may not have filed an appeal or objection. 12. The object of this rule is to avoid contradictory and inconsistent decisions on the same questions in the same suit. As the power under this rule is in derogation of the general principle that a party cannot avoid a decree against him without filing an appeal or cross-objection, it must be exercised with care and caution. The rule does not confer an unrestricted right to re-open decrees which have become final merely because the appellate Court does not agree with the opinion of the Court appealed from. 13. The rule does not confer an unrestricted right to re-open decrees which have become final merely because the appellate Court does not agree with the opinion of the Court appealed from. 13. Ordinarily, the power conferred by this rule will be confined to those cases where as a result of interference in favour of the appellant further interference with the decree of the lower Court is rendered necessary in order to adjust the rights of the parties according to justice, equity and good conscience. While exercising the power under this rule the Court should not lose sight of the other provisions of the Code itself nor the provisions of other laws, viz., the Law of Limitation or the Law of Court-fees etc. 14. In these appeals the Collector on the basis of the material placed before him allowed certain units to the various appellants. In the absence of any appeal by the State of Bihar there was no justification for the Commissioner to have interfered with that finding in favour, of the appellants. The facts and circumstances of these appeals are not such in which it would be appropriate to exercise the power under O. 41, R. 33. The Commissioner as well as the High Court committed, a manifest error in reversing the finding regarding allotment of units to the various appellants in the absence of any appeal by the State of Bihar when the same had become final and rights off the State of Bihar had come to an end to that extent by not filing any appeal or cross-objection within the period of limitation. 24. That in case of Banarsi and others v. Ram Phal (supra), in which the apex Court has held that the first appellate Court ought to not to have while dismissing the appeal filed by the defendant-appellant before the modifying the decree in favour of the respondent in absence of cross-appeal or cross-objection. The interference by the first appellate Court has reduced the appellants to a situation worse than in what they would have been if they had not appealed. Para 22 is reproduced below : "22. For the foregoing reasons we are of the opinion that the first appellate Court ought not to have, while dismissing the appeals filed by the defendantappellants before it, modified the decree in favour of the respondent before it in the absence of cross-appeal or cross-objection. Para 22 is reproduced below : "22. For the foregoing reasons we are of the opinion that the first appellate Court ought not to have, while dismissing the appeals filed by the defendantappellants before it, modified the decree in favour of the respondent before it in the absence of cross-appeal or cross-objection. The interference by the first appellate Court has reduced the appellants to a situation worse than in what they would have been if they had not appealed. The High Court ought to have noticed this position of law and should have interfered to correct the error of law committed by the first appellate Court." 25. The similar view has been taken again by the apex Court in case of Union of India v. Vijay Krishna Uniyal (supra) and observed that permitting the respondent to assail the finding of the Court below on the issue of ownership of the property would be overlooked the cardinal principle that the Court would not ordinary make an order, direction or decree placing the party appealing to which in a position more disadvantageous than in what it would have been had if any appealed. Recently in the case of Biswajit Sukul (supra), the apex Court has held that the plaintiff in his first appeal did not challenged the finding of the trial Court recorded on the first part of the issue No. 4 because it was partly answered in his favour. The first appellate Court, therefore, could not examine the legality and accordingly all these findings in the plaintiff's appeal unless it was challenged by the defendant by filing crossobjection under Order 41 rule 22 of the CPC. Relevant portion of the aforesaid judgement is reproduced below: "17. The plaintiff in his first appeal did not challenge the finding of the trial Court recorded on the first part of issue No. 4 and rightly so because it was already answered by the trial Court in his favour. The first appellate Court, therefore, could not plaintiff's appeal unless it was challenged by the defendants by filing cross objection under Order 41 rule 22 of the Code in the appeal. 18) As mentioned above, the defendants though suffered the adverse finding on first part of issue No. 4 but did not file any cross-objection questioning its legality. The first appellate Court, therefore, could not plaintiff's appeal unless it was challenged by the defendants by filing cross objection under Order 41 rule 22 of the Code in the appeal. 18) As mentioned above, the defendants though suffered the adverse finding on first part of issue No. 4 but did not file any cross-objection questioning its legality. In the light of these admitted facts arising in the case, the first appellate Court had no the finding on first part of issue No. 4 in plaintiff's appeal and reverse it against the plaintiff. 19) Second, the High Court also committed the same mistake by not noticing the aforesaid jurisdictional error committed by the first appellate Court. The High Court, in plaintiff's revision again, went into the legality of the findings of first part of issue No. 4 on merits and affirmed the finding of the first appellate Court. This finding ought to have been set aside by the High Court only on the short ground that the First Appellate Court had no jurisdiction to examine it in plaintiff's appeal." 26. Therefore, in view of the above verdicts of the apex Court as well as of this High Court, the respondents/defendants No. 1 to 4 are not permitted to challenge the findings recorded in favour of the plaintiff in respect of the Will dated 4.5.1977, without filing any cross-objection in this appeal, hence, the issue framed above is answered against respondents No. 1 to 4 and in favour of the plaintiff. 27. Even otherwise, the defendants No. 1 to 4 who are beneficiary of the said Will are estopped from challenging the Will because on the basis of the same Will, the defendant No. 5 was brought as a legal representative of Ramteerth in the suit. He was given certain share in the properties of Late Ramteerath by virtue of Will. Since, the name of Mohd.Shafi came into the civil suit in place of Late Ramteerath by virtue of Will and thereafter, he entered into a compromise with the defendants No. 1 to 4 in respect of the suit property and the suit was disposed of in their favour, therefore, the defendants No.1 to 4 took indirect advantage of the Will, hence, they are estopped from challenging the validity of the Will in the suit. 28. 28. Now, the only issue which is required to be considered is to whether the plaintiff can challenge the decree passed in earlier suit on the basis of compromise by way of fresh suit or he ought to have challenge before the same Court who has passed the decree of compromise? 29. Undisputedly, the plaintiff was not a party in the C.S.No. 739-A/1996. When Late Late Ramteerath died during the pendency of the suit, the name of Mohd.Shafi was brought on record as legal representative by virtue of the Will dated 4.5.1977. Whether, Mohd. Shafi can enter into a compromise against the interest of plaintiff in C.S. No. 739-A/1996 would be considered later on in this judgement ? 30. Under Order 23 rule 3 of the CPC where it is proved to the satisfaction of the Court that the suit adjusted wholly or in part by any lawful agreement or compromise in writing and signed by the parties, the Court shall order such agreement, compromise or satisfaction to be recorded and shall pass the decree in accordance with law so far as it relates to the parties to the suit, therefore, if any decree is passed on the basis of compromise arrived at between the plaintiff and the defendant, it would be a decree between the parties in the suit. Under Order 43 rule 1A of the CPC, an appeal lies against the decree passed on compromise. The right of appeal has been given under Order 43 rule 1 A(2) to the party who challenged the record of a compromise to question the validity thereof while preferring an appeal against the decree. In the case of Banwari Lal v. Smt. Chando Devi (through L.R.) and another, reported in AIR1993 SC 1139 the apex Court has held as under : 13. When the amending Act introduced a proviso along with an explanation to rule 3 of O. 23 saying that where it is alleged by one party and denied by other that an adjustment or satisfaction has been arrived at, "the Court shall decide the question", the Court before which a petition of compromise is filed and which has recorded such compromise, has to decide the question whether an adjustment or satisfaction had been arrived at on basis of any lawful agreement. To make the enquiry in respect of validity of the agreement or the compromise more comprehensive, the explanation to the proviso says that an agreement or compromise "which is void or voidable under the Indian Contract Act ......" shall not be deemed to be lawful within the meaning of the said Rule. In view of the proviso read with the explanation, a Court which had entertained the petition of compromise has to examine whether the compromise was void or voidable under the Indian Contract Act. Even R. 1(m) of O. 43 has been deleted under which an appeal was maintainable against an order recording a compromise. As such a party challenging a compromise can file a petition under proviso to R. 3 of O. 23, or an appeal under S. 96(1) of the Code, in which he can now question the validity of the compromise in view of R. I A of O. 43 of the Code. 14. The application for exercise of power under proviso to R. 3 of O. 23 can be labelled under S. 151 of the Code but when by the amending Act specifically such power has been vested in the Court before which the petition of compromise had been filed, the power in appropriate cases has to be exercised under the said proviso to R. 3. It has been held by different High Courts that even after a compromise has been recorded, the Court concerned can entertain an application under S. 151 of the Code, questioning the legality or validity of the compromise. Reference in this connection may be made to the cases Smt. Tara Bai v. V. S. Krishnaswamy Rao, AIR 1985 Kar 270 ; S. G. Thimmappa v. T. Anantha, AIR 1986 Kar 1 , Bindeshwari Pd. Chaudhary v. Debendra Pd. Singh, AIR 1958 Pat 618 ; Mangal Mahton v. Behari Mahton, AIR 1964 Pat 483 and Sri Sri Iswar Gopal Jew v. Bhagwandas Shaw, AIR 1982 Cal 12 , where it has been held that application under S. 151 of the Code is maintainable. The Court before which it is alleged by one of the parties to the alleged compromise that no such compromise had been entered between the parties that Court has to decide whether the agreement or compromise in question was lawful and not void or voidable under the Indian Contract Act. The Court before which it is alleged by one of the parties to the alleged compromise that no such compromise had been entered between the parties that Court has to decide whether the agreement or compromise in question was lawful and not void or voidable under the Indian Contract Act. If the agreement or the compromise itself is fraudulent then it shall be deemed to be void within the meaning of the explanation to the proviso to R. 3 and as such not lawful. The learned Subordinate Judge was perfectly justified in entertaining the application filed on behalf of the appellant and considering the question as to whether there had been a lawful agreement or compromise on the basis of which the Court could have recorded such agreement or compromise on 27.2.1991. Having come to the conclusion on the material produced that the compromise was not lawful within the meaning of R. 3, there was no option left except to recall that order. 31.In the above case party in the suit after entering in the compromise filed an application for setting aside the decree and apex Court has held that such part can file appeal as well as application for setting aside decree before the same Court. 32. There is bar under section 96(3) that no appeal shall lie against a decree passed by the Court with the consent of parties. In case of Mahila Bhanwari Bai v. Kashmir Singh, reported in AIR 2009 MP 232 , the co-ordinate bench of this Court has held that where the parties who entered into a compromise had no power to enter into a compromise and the compromise had been entered into by playing fraud, such compromise and settlement is void, therefore, appeal against the award would be maintainable under section 96. In the aforesaid case, the division Bench Court has permitted the parties to file an appeal, but in the present case, admittedly, the plaintiff was not a party in the suit as well as in the compromise. In the case of Sneh Gupta v. Devi Sarup and others, reported in (2009)6 SCC 194 , the apex Court has held that Order 23 rule 3 of the CPC provides that the decree is not binding on such defendant who are not party thereto. The consent decree is merely an agreement between the parties with the seal of the Court. The consent decree is merely an agreement between the parties with the seal of the Court. In case of Santosh Kumar and another v. Hachchu and others, reported in AIR 2011 MP 21 , this Court has held that no guardian of defendant No. 4 was appointed by the Court and the suit was filed mentioning his uncle as guardian and compromise was recorded, therefore, such decree based on the compromise can be challenged by way of separate suit if the person is not a party to the decree and the decree is void. Relevant portion of the aforesaid judgement is reproduced below : "18. I am conscious the judgements passed by this Court and other High Courts to the effect that in view of the Order 23 Rule 3-A of the CPC, an independent suit is not maintainable to challenge a compromise decree, however, if a person is not a party to the decree and the decree is void, then certainly a suit is maintainable and the bar of Order 23 rule 3-A of the CPC would not be applicable in that case." 33. Therefore, the provisions of Order 23 rule 3-A and Order 41 rule 1-A(2) are applicable to those persons only who are party in the suit as well as to the compromise. Admittedly in the present case appellant was not party to the compromise certainly can institute a suit seeking declaration that the decree passed in C.S.NO.739A/1996 is void and not binding on him, therefore, the findings recorded by the trial Court on this issue are liable to be set aside. 34. Learned trial Court has held that the plaintiff is having rights over the property which was having by Late Ramteerath hence Mohd. Shafi was representing him before the trial Court in the pending C.S.No. 739-A/1996 and if any compromise is arrived by him as per law, the same would be binding on the plaintiff, despite he was not party to it. Learned Court came to the aforesaid conclusion only on the ground that Mohd. Shafi was representing him before the trial Court in the pending C.S.No. 739-A/1996 and if any compromise is arrived by him as per law, the same would be binding on the plaintiff, despite he was not party to it. Learned Court came to the aforesaid conclusion only on the ground that Mohd. Shafi was given authority through the Will to contest the suit on behalf of Late Ramteerath, hence, the decree is not void merely because the plaintiff was not party to it, therefore, the issue under consideration would be "whether in the pending suit, Mohd.Shafi was having authority by virtue of Will to enter into compromise with the defendants No. 1 to 4 (plaintiffs in the C.S. No. 739A/1996) and whether Mohd.Shafi was representing the plaintiff also and thus the decree passed in C.S. No. 739A/1996 is binding on the present plaintiff ? In order to decide this entire facts and circumstances are required to be reminiscences under which the C.S. No. 739A/1996 was filed. 35. Late Ramteerath being an owner of the land filed the application under section 189 of the MPLRC before the SDO for resumption of the other land along with the suit land. In a second appeal his claim was allowed by the Additional Commissioner and the same was affirmed by the Board of Revenue by order dated 26.8.1968 (Exhibit P-26). In this background, the defendants No. 1 to 4 along with others filed the Civil Suit No. 739A/1996 before the Civil Judge, Class-I, Mandsaur seeking relief of ownership and declaration that the order of resumption is not binding on them. Late Ramteerath was impleaded as one of the defendant No. 4 alongwith other co-owners (Exhibit P-29). During his lifetime Late Ramteerath filed the detail written statement (Exhibit P-30) denying the title of plaintiffs No. 1 to 4 (Defendant No. 1to4 in this appeal) in the said suit filed on 2.5.1977. Thereafter, he executed the Will on 4.5.1977 appointing Mohd.Shafi as legal representative to represent him in the pending civil suit proceedings. In para 2 of the Will he has specifically mentioned that Beni Singh, Fateh Singh, Mangilal etc. are in possession and he is contesting against them since last 34 years in the Court for obtaining possession. The order passed by the Board of Revenue for resumption of the land had become final but they filed the suit in the name of Madanlal etc. are in possession and he is contesting against them since last 34 years in the Court for obtaining possession. The order passed by the Board of Revenue for resumption of the land had become final but they filed the suit in the name of Madanlal etc. In para 3, he has also mentioned that in order to take possession legally from the Court, he labored for continuous 34 years, therefore, the intention of Late Ramteerath behind appointing Mohd.Shafi as legal representative was to obtain the possession from the plaintiffs there in. His intention was very clear in the Will that he was interested in taking possession of his land from plaintiffs and for which he appointed Mohd.Shafi as a legal representative. His intention was very clear in the Will that he was interested in taking possession of his land from plaintiffs and for which he appointed Mohd.Shafi as a legal representative. The contents of para 2, 3 and 4 are reproduced below: ^^2- ;g fd eSaus bl lEifRr dks tks eUnlkSj uxj ds e/; eksVj LVS.M ds ikl fLFkr gS ftls Bkdqj lk- ds ckx ds uke ls lEcksf/kr djrs gS bl lEifRr dks esjs fojks/kh cs.khflag] Qrsgflag] ekaxhyky vkfn ds dCts ls izkIr djus ds fy;s xr 34 o"kZ ls U;k;ky; esa yM+ jgk gw¡A esjs gd esa mDr Hkwfe buds dCts ls izkIr djus ,oa vftZr djus dk vkns'k Hkh l{ke jktLo U;k;ky; ls vfUre gks pqdk gSA ijUrq bUgkasus enu yky oxSjk dks esjs fo#) yM+us ds fy;s [kM+s dj fn, gS vkSj Lo;a Hkh fnokuh vihy esa yM+ jgs gSA eSaus vihy rjQ bl Hkwfe lEcUËkh reke izdj.kksa esa iSjoh djus ds fy;s vU; leLr dk;Zokgh ds fy;s eq[r;kj vke Jh egEen 'kQh firk gkth vCnqy jghe th fuoklh eUnlkSj dks fy[kdj jftLVMZ foys[k ds }kjk fu;r fd;k gSA esjs eq[r;kj vke dks tks vf/kdkj esjs }kjk iznku fd;k gS og esjh e`R;q ds ckn Hkh ;g ,y vkj ds leLr vf/kdkj Jh egEen 'kQh firk gkth vCnqy jghe th dks jgsxkA vr% blds fy;s eSa ;g fy[kdj vfËkdkj Jh egEen 'kQh firk gkth vCnqy jghe th dks nsrk gw¡A esjs thfor fLFkfr esa ;g esjs eq[r;kj vke dh gSfl;r ls dk;Z dks djsaxs e`R;q ds ckn esjs yhxy fjisztsUVsfVo cudj bu reke izdj.k eSa esjs LFkku ij i{kdkj cudj reke izdj.kksa dh iSjoh djk,xsA bl izdkj eSa ;gka Jh egEen 'kQh firk gkth vCnqy jghe dks mijksDr dk;Z ds gsrq viuh lEifRr esa bUVj esMy djus dk vf/kdkj nsrk gw¡A 3- ;g fd fdlh dkj.ko'k Jh egEen 'kQh firk gkth vCnqy jghe fdlh dkj.ko'k os bl dk;Z dks ugha dj lds ;k vU; dksbZ vM+pu iSnk gksos rks eSa budh lgk;rk o lg;ksx ds fy;s Jh calhyky firk vEckyky th xqIrk ,MoksdsV eUnlkSj dks bl dk;Z dks fofËklEer djus ds fy;s esjh e`R;q ds ckn vf/kÑr djrk gw¡ vkSj yhxt fjizstsUVsfVo buds vuqifLFkfr esa cukrk gw¡A 4- ;g fd eSus mDr lEifRr dks U;k;ky; esa fof/kor vtZu djus ds fy;s 34 o"kZ ls fujUrj ifjJe fd;k gS vkSj eq>s bldh fu%'kqYd dkuquh enn fujUrj Jh eksguyky th f}osnh lk- eUnlkSj ds }kjk feyrh jgh gSA buds lg;ksx ls eSa eUnlkSj dySDVjh mTtSu dfe'kujh] Xokfy;j jsosU;w cksMZ eUnlkSj fnokuh U;k;ky; vkfn esa dke;kc gksrk jgk gWwA esjk ;g vFkd ifjJe fu"Qy ugha tkos esjh tk;nkn esjs fojks/kh ls feydj esjs fj'rsnkj okfjl vkfn u"V ugh dj nsos bl izdkj esjs 34 o"kksZ dk ifjJe O;FkZ ugha tk,A bl dkj.k eSa vius fj'rsnkjksa dks esjs okfjl dh gSfl;r ls yhxy fjiztsUVsfVo cuus dk vf/kdkj ugha ns jgk gw¡ dsoy Jh egEen 'kQh ;k buds vuqifLFkfr eSa calhyky xqIrk gh esjs dkuwuu mRrjkf/kdkjh ¼,y-vkj-½ cudj iSjoh Jh eksguyky th f}osnh odhy lkgc ds lg;ksx ls djok,sxsA Jheku eksguyky f}osnh ds }kjk tks lg;ksx o enn eq>s nh gS og esjs yhxy fjiztsUVsfVo ¼,y-vkj-½ dks Hkh blh izdkj djrs jgsaxs ;g eq>s iqjk fo'okl ,oa Hkjkslk gSA** 36. Late Ramteerath gave 22,500 sq.ft. to Mohd. Shafi from his properties as reward for his services given to him, and in addition to it he was given right to contest the suit on behalf of Late Ramteerath. No authority was given to him to enter into compromise with the plaintiffs against the interest of actual owners of the property of Late Ramteerath. Needless to explain that the word "legal representative" is having different connotation from the word "legal heir" in the CPC . Under the provisions of Order 22 rules 3 and 4 of the CPC, the meaning of word "legal representative" is used. The name of Mohd.Shafi was brought on record of the civil suit as legal representative of Late Ramteerath. In case of Kalu Ram v. Charan Singh, reported in AIR 1994 Raj 31 , it has been held that Persons other than legal heir can also be legal representative. Even an intermiddler with the estate of deceased can also be allowed to represent estate for purpose of pending proceedings before Court. The decision as to who is legal representative for purpose of proceedings is necessarily limited for the purpose of carrying on the proceedings and cannot have effect of conferring of any right. of heirship to the estate of deceased. 6. Having given my careful consideration to the rival contentions raised before me, I am of the opinion that this Revision Petition merits acceptance. Section 2(11) of the CPC, which defines 'legal representative', makes it abundantly clear that the persons other than legal heir can also be legal representative. Even an intermiddler with the estate of deceased can also be allowed to represent the estate for the purpose of pending proceedings before the Court. It is true that all legal heirs are, ordinarily, also legal representatives, but the converse is not true. All legal representatives are not necessarily legal heirs as will. The decision as to who is the legal representative for the purpose of proceedings is necessarily limited for the purpose of carrying on the proceedings and cannot have the effect of conferring of any right of heirship to the estate of the deceased. The decision on this issue also does not operate res judicata on the question of heirship in the subsequent proceedings. The decision on this issue also does not operate res judicata on the question of heirship in the subsequent proceedings. In view of this settled position of law, it must be held that the enquiry into right to heirship is not the determining factor in deciding whether a person is or is not a legal representative for the purpose of proceedings before the Court. What is required to be considered is whether the person claiming to represent the estate of the deceased for the purpose of lis has sufficient interest in carrying on litigation and is not any imposter. In case of rival claimants, it may also be necessary to decide that out of the rival claimants, who really is the person entitled to represent the estate for the purpose of particular proceedings. Even that determination does not result in determination of inter se right to succeed to property to the deceased and that right has to be established in independent proceedings in accordance with law. 37. In case of Jaladi Suguna (Dead) through L. Rs. v. Satya Sai Central Trust and ors., reported in AIR 2008 SC 2866 , the Supreme Court has held as under : 10. Filing an application to bring the legal representatives on record, does not amount to bringing the legal representatives on record. When an LR application is filed, the Court should consider it and decide whether the persons named therein as the legal representatives, should be brought on record to represent the estate of the deceased. Until such decision by the Court, the persons claiming to be the legal representatives have no right to represent the estate of the deceased, nor prosecute or defend the case. If there is a dispute as to who is the legal representative, a decision should be rendered on such dispute. Only when the question of legal representative is determined by the Court and such legal representative is brought on record, it can be said that the estate of the deceased is represented. The determination as to who is the legal representative under Order 22 rule 5 will of course be for the limited purpose of representation of the estate of the deceased, for adjudication of that case. The determination as to who is the legal representative under Order 22 rule 5 will of course be for the limited purpose of representation of the estate of the deceased, for adjudication of that case. Such determination for such limited purpose will not confer on the person held to be the legal representative, any right to the property which is the subject matter of the suit, vis-a-vis other rival claimants to the es- tate of the deceased. (Emphasised supplied) 38. The name of legal representative recorded under Order 22 rules 3 and 4 of the CPC is only for the purpose of contesting the suit not as owner of the property, therefore, the Court below has wrongly held that Mohd. Shafi was representing the interest of plaintiff also in the suit and was competent to enter into the compromise. Hence, the finding recorded on issue No. 3 is hereby set aside. 39. The learned Court below has also non-suited the plaintiff on the ground that he is having right to obtain possession under section 189 of the MPLR Code. The relief to the effect that the decree passed in earlier suit is void and not binding on him can only be granted by the Civil Court not by the Revenue Court. The apex Court in the case of Hukam Singh v. State of M.P., reported in (2005) 10 SCC 124 , has held that for the suit for possession, declaration and permanent injunction is maintainable and the bar under section 57(2) of the MPLR Code would not come in the way. Full bench of this Court in case of Ramgopal v. Chetu Batte : 1976 RN 146 = 1976 JLJ 278 = AIR 1976 MP 160 (FB) has also retreated the suit possession, declaration and permanent injunction is be maintainable. The plaintiff who sought the relief declaratory in nature for which only the civil Court is competent to grant. The relief of possession was the consequential relief, therefore, learned Court below has wrongly held that the plaintiff can approach the revenue Court under section 189 of the CPC1 for obtaining possession from the defendants No. 1 to 4. 40. In view of the above findings, pending applications are also disposed of as under : I.A. No. 53/2016, an application under Order 41rule 27 of the CPC has been filed by the respondents for taking additional documentary evidence on record. 40. In view of the above findings, pending applications are also disposed of as under : I.A. No. 53/2016, an application under Order 41rule 27 of the CPC has been filed by the respondents for taking additional documentary evidence on record. I.A. No. 54/2016, an application under Order 6 rule 17 of the CPC has also been filed by the respondent seeking amendment in the written statement. Aforesaid two applications have been filed in order to establish that the plaintiff is not Jagdishchandra Gupta in whose favour the Will in question was executed. His real name is Santosh Kumar Gupta s/o Ramchandra Gupta but filed appeal in the name of Jagdishchandra Gupta. That respondent No. 2 himself appeared as witness before the trial Court and admitted that the plaintiff Jagdish was also known to him as Santosh and alongwith Commission when he came to his house then he came to know that Santosh is actually planitiff Jagdish. In view of this admission made by respondents No. 2 this issue is not liable to be considered in this appeal, hence, both the applications are rejected. The appellant has filed an application under section 340 of the CrPC seeking appropriate action against respondent No. 2 for swearing false affidavit and commiting contempt of this Court. According to the appellant, the respondent No. 2 has filed an application under Order 6 rule 17 and Order 41 rule 27 disputing his identity contrary to his own statement made before the Court, therefore, he submitted a false affidavit. Since, the aforesaid two applications have been rejected and the fact remains that one criminal case is pending against the present appellant on the same charges, therefore, it would not be proper to decide the application under section 340 of the CrPC in this appeal because any finding recorded may give adverse effect in the trial, hence, this application (I.A. No. 2848/2016) is also rejected. 41. In view of the above, judgement and decree dated 15.12.1999 is hereby set aside so far as it relates to the findings recorded against issue No. 3, 8 and 9. The suit is liable to be decreed in favour of the plaintiff . The appeal stands allowed with following terms: 1. 41. In view of the above, judgement and decree dated 15.12.1999 is hereby set aside so far as it relates to the findings recorded against issue No. 3, 8 and 9. The suit is liable to be decreed in favour of the plaintiff . The appeal stands allowed with following terms: 1. The judgement and decree passed in C.S.No. 739-A/1996 on basis of compromise between defendants No. 1 to 4 with defendant No. 5 is herby declared void and not binding on the plaintiff. 2. As per the contents of the Will Mohd.Shafi had no right to enter into compromise with the defendants No. 1 to 4. 3. The plaintiff is entitled to take possession from defendants No. 1 to 4 hence the are directed to hand over the possession of the suit land 50X50 sqr fit to the plaintiff within the period of 2 months from today. 4. The decree in respect of compensation of Rs. 7,200/- is her by maintained. No order as to cost. Decree be drawn.