JUDGMENT : Aggrieved by the decree and judgment in O.S.No.108 of 1998 of the Munsiff's Court, Vadakara and in A.S.No.92 of 2000 of the Additional District Court, Vadakara, the legal heirs of the original plaintiff along with some other supporting defendants came up with this second appeal. 2. The original suit was filed for partition of the plaint schedule property having an extent of 1 acre 36.75 cents. 3. The claim of the plaintiff is that his predecessor-in-interest one Chappila obtained leasehold right over the property under Ext.A1 in the year 1927. He has got three daughters by name Chirutha, Matha and Kalyani and they were in possession and enjoyment of the property along with other legal heirs. The demand for partition was not fructified, which has necessitated institution of the suit for partition. 4. The defendants entered appearance and contended inter alia that they have obtained exclusive right, title and interest over the property by virtue of Ext.B1 lease deed of the year 1944 through their mother Matha and subsequently, during her life time, she had asserted her right, title and interest over the property by giving 10 cents of property to one Kelappan in the year 1945 under Ext.B2. Subsequently, a partition was entered into between the legal heirs of Matha in the year 1989 and the property was separated. One of the share holders sold certain portion of the property under Ext.B10 to a stranger in the year 1997. It is also alleged that Ext.B6 purchase certificate was obtained in the name of defendant Nos.1 and 2 in the year 1977 and hence disputed and rejected the claim raised by the plaintiff. 5. The trial court dismissed the suit mainly on two reasons: that Ext.B1 is a fresh lease and not a renewal and secondly on the reason that the defendants have perfected title over the property by adverse possession and limitation. 6. In appeal, the first appellate court set aside the finding of adverse title by relying on the decision rendered by the Apex Court in Karnataka Board of Wakf v. Government of India and others (2004 KHC 1809), but found that Ext.B1 is a fresh lease and not a renewal and confirmed the decree and judgment of the trial court and dismissed the appeal and the suit. Aggrieved by the said decree and judgment, the legal heirs of the original plaintiff along with some other supporting defendants came up with this appeal. 7. The questions came up for consideration are: (a) Is it permissible to go into the question of intention of parties to a document when the language employed is clear and unambiguous without any lacuna and what is the rule of interpretation that can be applied under such circumstances? (b) What is the rule of interpretation that can be applied in Exts.A1 and B1 documents? (c) Is it permissible for a co-owner to claim adverse title unless there is clear ouster to the notice of others? (d) Whether equity rule of laches and acquiescence would come into play merely on non-participation of sharing of profits from co-ownership property and non-demand for partition for a pretty long period? (e) Whether an internal arrangement of partition by some of the share holders would ipso facto amount to notice to other co-owners unless there is exercise of ownership by the respective sharers by doing any act of possession/construction over the property capable of giving notice to others. (f) Whether the trial court and the first appellate court are justified in dismissing the suit? 8. Defendants 1 and 2 are the grandchildren of Matha, one of the daughter of Chappila. Admittedly, he was having three daughters by name Chirutha, Matha and Kalyani. The plaintiffs are litigating under Kalyani claiming to be the legal heirs of Kalyani. There is no much dispute regarding their status being the legal heirs of Kalyani. 9. The main dispute between the parties centered around the various documents executed pertaining to the subject matter of the suit right from Ext.A1 document of the year 1927 onwards. The contention raised by the plaintiff is that Ext.B1 is renewal of the original lease and not a fresh lease for which the appellants relied on the manner in which Ext.A1 document was executed. According to him, the very same manner was adopted while executing Ext.B1 document. Both the documents were named as “ozhu adharam” (lease deed). In both the documents, in the closing portion it is stated that the document is executed as “polichezhuth”. According to him, the very same manner was adopted while executing Ext.B1 document. Both the documents were named as “ozhu adharam” (lease deed). In both the documents, in the closing portion it is stated that the document is executed as “polichezhuth”. It was also contended that the recital contained in the document would show in clear terms that it is renewal of lease mainly on the reason that there is admission of existence of lease over the property held by the predecessor of Matha, viz. Chappila, the beneficiary under Ext.A1 document of the year 1927. It is further recited and admitted in the document the status of Matha as the person claiming under the original lessee under Ext.A1 document by stating that the original lease was held by Chappila and after his death it was continued by Matha in devolution. The incorporation of the word “devolution” (avakasavazhi) and the admission and recognition of the subsisting lease and the continuation of possession of the leasehold property as a lessee by Matha by way of devolution from the original lessee Chappila as recited in Ext.B1 document would show that it is not creation of a fresh lease but continuation of the lease in existence by the legal heirs of the original lessee Chappila. Though an attempt was made to show that in the document name of Matha alone was recorded as the legal heir of Chappila and that the document is created in favour of Matha alone excluding other legal heirs and hence in substance it is a fresh lease, it cannot be accepted. There cannot be any difference in the nature of document if it was entered with one of the legal heirs or two or more legal heirs, or with all the legal heirs, pertaining to a lease in existence after the death of original lessee. It is not at all the concern of the lessor who intended to or agreed to renew the lease by entering into an arrangement by way of renewal of the lease to find out all the legal heirs and to make them as parties to the renewal. It is not at all the concern of the lessor who intended to or agreed to renew the lease by entering into an arrangement by way of renewal of the lease to find out all the legal heirs and to make them as parties to the renewal. Whenever there is a recognition that it was in continuation of the existing lease by way of devolution and inheritance, who ever represented the matter in their capacity as the legal heir of the original lessee in the document would be representing all the legal heirs unless a contrary intention is evident from the document. 10. Yet another aspect was also brought to the notice of this Court that in the closing portion of the document it is stated as “polichezhuth” which, according to the learned counsel for the appellants, stands as renewal of lease. Reliance was placed on the following: (1) A Glossary of Judicial and Revenue Terms India Complied by Directors of the East Company - Page 420. (2) A Commentary on Malabar Law and Custom By Herbert Wigram (1882) - Page 200. (3) Malabar Law and Custom by Lewis Moore (1905) - Page 421. (4) A treatise on Malabar & Aliyasanthana Law by P.R. Sundara Iyer (1922) - Page 456. (5) A Handbook of Malabar Law and Usage By B. Govindan Nambiar - Page 128. (6) Malabar Manual by William Logan - Page 224. Their authority is well recognized by various decisions of the Madras High Court as well as our High Court. (See: Kiloth Chozhan Oydal Kurup and others v. Kirathwa Illath Narayanan Nambudri and another (AIR 1916 Madras 749); Palakkunnath Illath Govindan Nambudiri v. Ottathayil Moidin (ILR 1918 Madras 469); Shivaram Joisha v. Nagappaya and others (AIR 1936 Madras 149); Annakutty Moothan's sons Maniapa Moothan and others v. Ullattil Gopalan Nayar and another (AIR 1943 Madras 537) and Ravi Brahmadathan Nambooripad v. Devassy (AIR 1959 Kerala 36)). 11. There may not be any scope for quarrel with respect to the abovesaid proposition regarding the exact meaning of the word “polichezhuth”. It really stands for renewal of lease. So, it can be safely concluded that the expression “polichezhuth” stands not for creation of a fresh lease but for renewal. 11. There may not be any scope for quarrel with respect to the abovesaid proposition regarding the exact meaning of the word “polichezhuth”. It really stands for renewal of lease. So, it can be safely concluded that the expression “polichezhuth” stands not for creation of a fresh lease but for renewal. In both the documents, Exts.A1 and B1, the very style of contstruction was adopted naming the document as “ozhu adharam” and an amount of Rs.15/- and Rs.25/- respectively were received in terms of “ozhivu maryada”, which, according to the appellants, stands for renewal fees. 12. It is also brought to the notice of this Court that it is not permissible to go into the question of intention of parties while interpreting a document when the language is unambiguous and plain. (See Chunchun Jha v. Ebabat Ali and Another (1954 KHC 476); Muslim Educational Society v. Pariyayi (1986 KHC 298) and Sappani Mohamed Mohideen and Another v. R.V. Sethusubramania Pillai and others (1974 KHC 418).) It is now somewhat settled and became stagnant that the scope of enquiry of intention of parties would arise only when the language is not clear and when meaning of plain language would result in ambiguity or lacuna in the construction of the document. When there is no scope of lacuna or ambiguity, the interpretation to be adopted is by accepting the literal meaning what is available from the wording used and no scope of enquiry regarding the intention of party is permissible. In the present case, what is written regarding the acknowledgment of existing lease is clear and unambiguous and it is stated that the original leasehold right was with the mother and it is also made clear that the beneficiary under the document was holding possession of the leasehold premises by way of succession. So, the language employed is clear and unambiguous and hence, there cannot be any enquiry as to the intention of parties and what is done by the learned District Judge in that behalf is erroneous and cannot be sustained. 13. Needless to say that when it is established that Ext.B1 is a renewal of lease the status of the party would be as that of the lessee and it would continue so long as the said relationship exists. 13. Needless to say that when it is established that Ext.B1 is a renewal of lease the status of the party would be as that of the lessee and it would continue so long as the said relationship exists. The relationship can be terminated by the parties to the lease by exhausting the remedy as provided under the Transfer of Property Act or by one of the co-owners by exhausting the animus to hold the property in derogation of the right of other co-owners. The legal position is well settled that unless there is an ouster there cannot be any adverse possession by one co-owner against the other. Now the ouster pleaded and raised by the defendants is firstly based on Ext.B2 which, according to the defendants, is an assignment deed. But going through Ext.B2, it is well clear that it is only a lease and the nomenclature is stated as “charth” for a period of ten years. It is simply a lease given by one of the co-owners for a specified period and it cannot be stated as an assertion of exclusive right or ownership over the property. It may be at the best and at the most for the beneficial enjoyment of the property for and on behalf of all co-owners and nothing else can be attached to that document. So, it cannot be brought under the purview of clear ouster within the notice of other co-owners. 14. The other document relied on by the defendants is Ext.B4 assignment deed executed by Matha in the year 1967, but the document was executed in favour of her grandchildren, defendant Nos.1 and 2. It is an internal arrangement not capable of giving any notice of assertion of hostile animus to the other co-owners unless there is parting with possession of the property given under the document, any construction made therein or any action of ownership exercised by the beneficiary under the document over that property. No such case was advanced in the present case. So, it cannot be brought under the purview of ouster capable of giving notice to the other co-owners. 15. The third document relied on by the defendants is Ext.B7 partition deed of the year 1989 which is also an internal arrangement between the parties. No such case was advanced in the present case. So, it cannot be brought under the purview of ouster capable of giving notice to the other co-owners. 15. The third document relied on by the defendants is Ext.B7 partition deed of the year 1989 which is also an internal arrangement between the parties. Unless there is any specific separation of the property by constructing structure over it by the respective sharers giving notice of partition or assertion of their right over the property it cannot be brought under the purview of an ouster. 16. The next document relied on by the defendants is Ext.B6 purchase certificate. Admittedly, none of the parties were made as respondents or intermediaries in the proceedings and no document was produced to show that they were given notice before the issuance of Ext.B6 purchase certificate. Nothing was brought to the notice of this Court whether they were arrayed as parties or intermediaries and notice was served on them. It was contended by the learned counsel for the defendants that when there is grant of purchase certificate it would be a conclusive evidence showing title to the property. It is applicable only to strangers and not to co-owners. If the purchase certificate was obtained by one of the sharers or co-owners and it would enure to the benefit of all the co-owners, the legal proposition laid down in Ramakke and Others v. Gopi and Others ( 2011 (3) KHC 491 ) will not in any way improve the case advanced by the defendants herein. 17. Yet another decision was also brought to the notice of this Court that there should be pleading to the effect that the purchase certificate or right, if any, obtained under that document would enure to the benefit of all legal heirs in the plaint itself by relying on the decision in Viswambaran P.N. v. T.P. Sanu and Others ( 2018 (3) KHC 73 ). In answer to the same, learned counsel for the plaintiff brought to the notice of this Court paragraph 7(a) of the plaint that there is pleading to the effect that if any of the legal heirs had obtained any purchase certificate or document of pattayam it would go to the benefit of all the legal heirs including the plaintiff. 18. In answer to the same, learned counsel for the plaintiff brought to the notice of this Court paragraph 7(a) of the plaint that there is pleading to the effect that if any of the legal heirs had obtained any purchase certificate or document of pattayam it would go to the benefit of all the legal heirs including the plaintiff. 18. DW1 in the box had admitted that she is not holding any property adverse to the interest of any other person who is having right over the property, including the plaintiff. During cross examination, in page 14, she has even stated that she never refused or resisted their claim over the property. This admission would sufficiently show what actually she had possessed and her intention. It is self explanatory that she never intended to hold the property in derogation of the right of other persons. 19. The last document relied on by the defendants is Ext.B10 document of the year 1997. The suit was filed in the year 1998. So, the required period of twelve years from the date of ouster will not satisfy by the said document. It is also submitted that they have also executed another deed of assignment in favour of one Azeez in the year 1990, but that document was not produced. Even if it is assumed that such a document was executed, it will not satisfy the twelve year period from the date of its execution. It is now settled that equity rule of laches and acquiescence would not come into play on a mere non-participation in taking the profit out of the co-ownership property and it cannot be treated as an ouster and hence I am of the view that the concurrent finding made by both the trial court as well as the first appellate court is liable to be set aside as there are serious omissions to apply factual and legal issues in its proper perspective and hence the appeal is liable to be allowed, I do so, but without costs.