JUDGMENT : 1. Heard Mr. C. Lalramzauva, the learned senior counsel assisted by Mr. H. Lalramhluna, the learned counsel for the writ petitioner. Also Mr. A.K. Rokhum, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 and Mr. B. Lalramenga, the learned counsel for the respondent No. 3. 2. By this application under article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner has challenged the validity/legality of the rejection of his nomination vide Certificate of Scrutiny dated 5.4.2018 and also the Certificate of Election declaring the respondent No. 3 as duly elected as Member of the CADC for the 18-Fultuli MDC Constituency. 3. The petitioner had filed his nomination for the 18-Fultuli MDC Constituency for which he was proposed by Sh. Priyo Lai and seconded by Sh. Tengkhi Muni Tongchangya whose names are in the electoral roll for the said Constituency. However, on scrutiny of the nomination paper of the petitioner, the Returning Officer upon finding the seconder to be an employee under CADC rejected the nomination of the petitioner vide Certificate of Scrutiny dated 5.4.2018 and vide Certificate of Election dated 6.4.2018 declared the respondent No. 3 to be duly elected as MDC for the 18-Fultuli MDC Constituency. 4. The petitioner being aggrieved with the denial of contesting the said MDC Election for the 18-Fultuli MDC Constituency has approached this court for invoking writ jurisdiction under article 226 of the Constitution of India. 5. Appearing for the writ petitioner, Mr. C. Lalramzauva, the learned senior counsel has led me to the notification dated 23.3.2018 (Armexure 1) and the Certificate of Scrutiny dated 5.4.2018 (Annexure 3) and contends that the date for scrutinizing the nominations was fixed as 5.4.2018 and the Returning Officer upon scrutinizing the nomination paper of the petitioner, declared his nomination to be invalid on the ground that his seconder was an employee of the Chakma Autonomous District Council (CADC). The learned senior counsel then refers to rules 151(3), 151(4) and 153 of the Chakma Autonomous District Council (Constitution, Conduct of Business, etc.) Rules, 2002 (‘CCB Rules’) and contends that there is no provision for disqualifying a candidate from contesting the election for membership to the CADC on the ground that the seconder is an employee of the CADC. The learned senior counsel then refers to rules 151(3), 151(4) and 153 of the Chakma Autonomous District Council (Constitution, Conduct of Business, etc.) Rules, 2002 (‘CCB Rules’) and contends that there is no provision for disqualifying a candidate from contesting the election for membership to the CADC on the ground that the seconder is an employee of the CADC. He submits that so long as a person is included in the Electoral Roll of the Constituency and is not subject to any disqualification for being so included under the CCB Rules, he or she may subscribe as a proposer or seconder, however, only with the restriction that a proposer or seconder can propose or second for one candidate only. 6. The learned senior counsel referring to rules 193, 194 and 195 of the CCB Rules, submits that ordinarily, the remedy for the person aggrieved against the election of a ‘Returned Candidate’ is to file an election petition. However, the remedy against the rejection of a nomination on the ground that the seconder is a Government servant is not one of the grounds provided by the CCB Rules. Therefore, as no alternative remedy is available to the petitioner, he is before this Court through the present writ petition. He also refers to section 100(c) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 (‘Act of 1951’) and submits that unlike the CCB Rules, there is a provision for filing an election petition on the ground that the nomination was improperly rejected. However, as there is no similar provision in CCB Rules, this court has the jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition filed under article 226 of the Constitution. 7. Mr. C. Lalramzauva, the learned senior counsel further submits that the respondent No. 3 cannot be a ‘returned candidate’ within the meaning of the CCB Rules inasmuch as in terms of rule 193(e) of the same Rules, in order to be a ‘returned candidate’, the name of the candidate should have been published under the CCB Rules as duly elected. That the publication of the name of the elected candidate has to be done in the Official Gazette in terms of rules 143 and 182 of the CCB Rules. Therefore, mere issuance of Certificate of Election in favour of the respondent No. 3 cannot make him the elected candidate. That the publication of the name of the elected candidate has to be done in the Official Gazette in terms of rules 143 and 182 of the CCB Rules. Therefore, mere issuance of Certificate of Election in favour of the respondent No. 3 cannot make him the elected candidate. In support of his submission, the learned senior counsel relies upon the following Apex Court decisions (i) Raj Krushna Bose v. Binod Kanungo, AIR 1954 SC 202 . (ii) S.T. Muthusami v. K. Natarajan, (1988) 1 SCC 572 . 8. By referring to the case of Raj Krushna Bose(supra), the learned senior counsel submits that the Apex Court while considering the nomination proposed or seconded by Government servant in connection with the Act of 1951 held that a Government servant in so far as section 33(2) of the Act of 1951 is concerned, would be entitled to nominate or second candidate for election unless, he happens to fall in one of the three excluded categories. Also by referring to S.T. Muthusami(supra), the learned senior counsel submits that the Apex Court while dealing with the election process under the Tamil Nadu Panchayats Act, 1958 has held that the rules of election no doubt provided a remedy for settlement of election dispute by way of an election petition but, however, the same cannot have the effect of overriding the powers of the High Court under article 226 of the Constitution of India and, therefore, in the given circumstances, the interference of the High Court was justified. 9. Appearing for the respondent Nos. 1 and 2, the learned counsel Mr. A.K. Rokhum, submits that the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964 (‘CCS Conduct Rules, 1964’) has been adopted by the CADC. He submits that rule 5 of the CCS Conduct Rules, 1964 prohibits Government servant to be a member of, or be associated with any political party or any organization which takes part in politics. The prohibition includes taking part, subscribing in aid of, or assisting in any other manner or any political movement or activity. He further submits that in fact, not only the Government servant alone but his family members are as well required to abstain from being involved in any political activity. The prohibition includes taking part, subscribing in aid of, or assisting in any other manner or any political movement or activity. He further submits that in fact, not only the Government servant alone but his family members are as well required to abstain from being involved in any political activity. If the family member of a Government servant is unable to prevent a member of his family from taking part in any political activity, he or she is required to make a report to the Government through his or her controlling authority. In the instant case, the petitioner was found to be not qualified and his nomination to the membership of the CADC was declared invalid as his seconder was found and confirmed to be an employee under the CADC from the Acquiescence Roll that was maintained as on 31.3.2018. The same being in violation of rule 5 of the CCS Conduct Rules, 1964, the petitioner was rightly declared to be an invalid candidate. The learned counsel further submits that the writ petition is not maintainable in view of the prohibition made by rule 194 of the CCB Rules. He submits that the only recourse that the petitioner can take is by submitting an election petition under rule 195 of the same Rules. He further submits that the jurisdiction of a civil court has also been specifically barred by rule 224 of the CCB Rules. He also contends that Sh. Tengkhi Muni Tongchangya, the seconder to the nomination of the petitioner is a Muster Roll employee under the CADC. Though he was terminated from service but by virtue of an interim order on the writ petition filed by him, he is still working as on date and his name is very much in the Acquiescence Roll maintained by the Law and Judicial Branch of the CADC. Therefore, under the facts and circumstances, the writ petition is liable to be dismissed. 10. Mr. B. Lalramenga, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent No. 3 submits that his argument against the writ petition is two-fold, i.e., on maintainability and the other, on the rejection of the nomination of the writ petitioner. The learned counsel by referring to rule 194 of the CCB Rules submits that the grievance of the writ petitioner cannot be considered in a writ petition as there is a specific bar under the CCB Rules. The learned counsel by referring to rule 194 of the CCB Rules submits that the grievance of the writ petitioner cannot be considered in a writ petition as there is a specific bar under the CCB Rules. The respondent No. 3 having been issued a Certificate of Election in terms of rule 181(4) of the CCB Rules, he is the ‘returned candidate’ in terms of the CCB Rules. He further submits that the term ‘Election’ has been defined under rule 2(i) of the CCB Rules to mean an election to fill a seat or seats in the District Council. The word ‘Election’ will connote the entire process starting from the publication of election notification and culminating to the candidate being declared elected. Therefore, it would certainly include improper rejection of a nomination paper by the Returning Officer. Therefore, remedy lies in filing an election petition under rule 194 of the CCB Rules. He submits that when there is a statutory provision provided for filing an election petition, a writ petition under article 226 of the Constitution of India would not lie. In support of his submission, the learned counsel relies upon the cases of: (i) N.P. Ponnuswami v. Returning Officer, Namakkal Constituency, AIR 1952 SC 64 , (ii) Manda Jaganath v. K.S. Rathnam, (2004) 7 SCC 492 , and (iii) Shaji K. Joseph v. V. Viswanath, (2016) 4 SCC 429 . 11. Mr. B. Lalramenga, the learned counsel has also referred to sections 80, 80A and 81 of the Act of 1951 to contend that the High Court has been empowered to try an election petition under the said provisions in the mode and manner prescribed. There is clearly a bar for filing a writ petition under article 226 of the Constitution of India and likewise, since rule 194 of the CCB Rules provides for filing of an election petition, the present writ petition is not maintainable and should be dismissed. The learned counsel in so far as the rejection of the nomination of the writ petitioner is concerned, submits that rule 153(2)(a) as well as rule 151(3) of the CCB Rules by necessary implication would disqualify the writ petitioner on the ground that his seconder was an employee of the CADC. Therefore, the Returning Officer after ascertaining the employment status of the High Court seconder, rightly declared his nomination to be invalid. 12. Therefore, the Returning Officer after ascertaining the employment status of the High Court seconder, rightly declared his nomination to be invalid. 12. Giving a brief reply to the submissions made by the learned counsels for the respondents, Mr. C. Lalramzauva, the learned senior counsel submits that the decisions relied upon by the counsels for the respondents are with regard to the Act of 1951, whereas the present case is governed by the CCB Rules and, therefore, it is clearly distinguishable. He submits that the ground for filing an election petition as contained in section 100(e) of the Act of 1951 is absent in the CCB Rules and, therefore, this Court has the jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition. 13. I have heard the submissions advanced by the learned counsels for the rival parties and I have perused the materials available on record and the decisions relied upon by the parties. 14. From the submissions and stands taken by the rival parties, the issue to be decided is as to whether the nomination of the writ petitioner could have been rejected by the Returning Officer on the ground that the seconder was an employee of the CADC and whether, the writ petition will be maintainable in view of rule 194 of the CCB Rules. 15. For the sake of convenience, let us examine the second issue first in the light of the decisions relied upon by the rival parties. The Apex Court in the case of Raj Krushna Bose (supra) while examining the validity of the nomination proposed or second by Government servant also took into consideration as to whether the Apex Court under article 136 of the Constitution and the High Court under article 226 of the same Constitution would have the powers to interfere in the order passed by the Election Tribunal which by the enactment of the Legislature through the Act of 1951 (section 105) was to be conclusive and final. Answering the same in the negative, the Apex Court at paragraph No. 16 of the said judgment held as follows: “(16) Our power to make such an order was not questioned but it was said that when the Legislature states that the orders of a Tribunal under an Act like the one here shall be conclusive and final (section 105), then we should not interfere. It is sufficient to say that the powers conferred on us by article 136 of the Constitution and on the High Courts under article 226 cannot be taken away or whittled down by the legislature. So long as these powers remain, our discretion and that of the High Courts is unfettered.” 16. In the case of S.T. Muthusami (supra), the Apex Court examined as to whether it would be appropriate for the High Court in exercise of its powers under article 226 of the Constitution to interfere in the dispute raised on the election process, i.e., in connection with the allotment of symbol meant for election to the office of Chairman, Panchayat Union in the State of Tamil Nadu. The Apex Court held that though the Rules framed under the Tamil Nadu Panchayats Act, 1958 prescribed settlement of election dispute through an election petition, the same, however cannot have the effect of overriding the powers of the High Court under article 226 of the Constitution of India. But it would be appropriate for the High Court to consider as to whether in the given facts and circumstances of the case, invoking of its powers under article 226 of the Constitution was called for. 17. In the case of Manda Jaganath (supra), the Apex Court while considering the decision of the Returning Officer concerned to treat the official candidate of a political party as an independent candidate in view of the lacuna in the relevant columns of the form concerned and which was then interfered with by the High Court held that the free flow of the scheduled elections should be the paramount consideration. Unless the erroneous action of the Returning Officer which are amenable to correction in the writ jurisdiction of the Court should have the effect of interfering in the free flow of the scheduled election or hinder the progress of the election, the court under article 226 of the Constitution should not interfere with the order or the Returning Officer, the remedy for which lies in an election petition only. 18. 18. In the case of Shaji K. Joseph (supra), the Apex Court while examining the powers of the High Court under articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution with regard to interference in the election process relating to the election of a member to the Dental Council of India under the Dentists Act, 1948 held that the High Court was not right in interfering with the process of election especially when the process of election had started upon publication of the election programme and, more particularly, when an alternative remedy was available which was by way of referring the dispute to the Central Government. The Apex Court further observed that if the process of election is interfered with by the Court, possibly no election would be completed without the court's order. Very often, for frivolous reasons, candidates or others approach the courts and by virtue of interim orders, the election is delayed or cancelled and as such, the basic purpose of having election and getting an elected body to run the administration is frustrated. 19. Coming to the present case, it may be seen that the election for membership to the Chakma Autonomous District Council was notified on 23.3.2018. The scrutiny of the nomination was to be held on 5.04.2018. On the given date, the Returning Officer upon scrutinizing the nomination paper of the writ petitioner declared his nomination to be invalid. Chapter XIX of the CCB Rules reads as — “District Council Election: Decision on doubts and disputes as to the validity of the election”. For better appreciation of the relevant provisions under Chapter XIX, Rules 193,194 and 195 of the CCB Rules may be abstracted as follows: “193. Chapter XIX of the CCB Rules reads as — “District Council Election: Decision on doubts and disputes as to the validity of the election”. For better appreciation of the relevant provisions under Chapter XIX, Rules 193,194 and 195 of the CCB Rules may be abstracted as follows: “193. In this Chapter, unless the context otherwise requires,— (a) “agent” includes an election agent and any person who, on the trial of an election petition, is held by the Commissioner to have acted as an agent in connection with the election with the knowledge or consent of the candidate; (b) “candidate” means a person who has been or claims to have been duly nominated as a candidate at an election and includes a candidate who, with the election in prospect, has held himself out as a prospective candidate; (c) “costs” means all costs, charges and expenses incidental to a trial of election petition; (d) “electoral right” means the right of a person to stand or not to stand as, or to withdraw from being a candidate, or to vote or refrain from voting at an election; (e) “returned candidate” means a candidate whose name has been published under these Rules as duty elected. 194. Save as provided in rule 14 or in rule 145 no election shall be called in question except by an election petition presented in accordance with the provisions of the succeeding rules. 195. An election petition against any returned candidate may be presented to the Governor— (a) by any candidate or elector on any of the grounds specified in subrule (2), within sixty days from the date on which result of the election is published in the Official Gazette; Explanation : In this sub-rule, “elector” means a person who was entitled to vote at the election to which the election petition relates, whether he has voted at such election or not. (2) The petitioner may, if he so desires, in addition to calling in question the election of the returned candidate, claim for a declaration that he himself has been duly elected, but such declaration shall only be claimed on one or other of the following grounds: (a) that in fact the petitioner received majority of the valid votes; or (b) that, but for votes obtained for the returned candidate h by corrupt or illegal practices, the petitioner would have obtained a majority of the valid votes. (c) that the returned candidate was disqualified for being elected as such member. (3) An election petition shall be deemed to have been presented to the Governor when it is delivered to the Secretary to the Government,— (a) by the person making the petition; or (b) by the person authorised in writing in this behalf by the person making the petition, or (c) by registered post.” 20. A perusal of rule 194 as abstracted above would show that besides the exception provided, no election shall be called in question except by an election petition presented in accordance with the provision of the succeeding rules. Rule 195 of the CCB Rules provides that an election petition against any ‘Returned Candidate’ may be presented to the Governor on the grounds specified under sub-rule (2) of rule 195. Rule 195(2) as may be noticed, nowhere provides for filing an election petition on the ground that the nomination had been improperly rejected. The grievance of the petitioner likewise is that his nomination could not have been rejected by the Returning Officer only for the reason that the seconder was an employee of the CADC. The various judicial pronouncements made by the Apex Court as has been mentioned in the preceding paragraph would go to show that the High Court has not been precluded from entertaining the writ petition under article 226 of the Constitution. What has been held by the Apex Court is that the High Court in entertaining such writ petition in matters relating to election will have to exercise its discretion with due care and caution, depending on the facts and circumstances of the case and to correct errors committed by the Returning Officer while ensuring that the election process is not delayed. As has been noticed, the CCB Rules unlike the Act of 1951 has not provided for any ground to challenge the decision of the Returning Officer on the ground that the nomination was improperly rejected. Rule 195(2)(a) of the CCB Rules otherwise provides that the election petition may be presented on any of the grounds specified in sub-rule (2) of rule 195 of the CCB Rules. Sub-rule (2) of rule 195, nowhere provides for the ground which has been taken by the writ petitioner. 21. Rule 195(2)(a) of the CCB Rules otherwise provides that the election petition may be presented on any of the grounds specified in sub-rule (2) of rule 195 of the CCB Rules. Sub-rule (2) of rule 195, nowhere provides for the ground which has been taken by the writ petitioner. 21. In that view of the matter, I am of the considered view that the present writ petition falls under the exception as held by the Apex Court in the aforementioned decisions and, therefore, the same is maintainable. 22. Now let us examine as to whether the Returning Officer concerned could have rejected the nomination of the petitioner for the reasons assigned in the Certificate of Scrutiny dated 5.4.2018 (Annexure 3). In order to appreciate what the CCB Rules has provided for nomination of candidate, the relevant provisions, i.e., rules 151(2), 151(3) and 151(4) may be reproduced as follows: “151. (2) On the date or dates so appointed for filling of nomination papers by candidates, each candidate shall, either in person or by his proposer or seconder, between the hours of 11:00 O'clock in the forenoon and 3:00 O'clock in the afternoon, deliver to the Returning Officer or such other person as may be authorised in this behalf by the Returning Officer, nomination paper completed in the form prescribed in Appendix IV and subscribed by the candidate himself as assenting to the nomination and by two other persons referred to in sub-rule (3) of this rule as proposer and seconder. (3) Any person whose name is included in the electoral roll of the constituency and who is not subject to any disqualification for being so included under these Rules, may subscribe as proposer or seconder but no person shall be a proposer and seconder of more than one candidate. (4) Every nomination paper delivered under sub-rule (2) shall contain a declaration in writing subscribed by the candidate that the candidate has appointed or does thereby appoint as his election agent for the election either himself or some other person who is not disqualified under these Rules for such appointment and no candidate shall be deemed to be duly nominated unless such declaration is made on the nomination paper: Provided that notwithstanding the fact that more than one nomination paper have been presented by or on behalf of a candidate, only one such declaration by a candidate shall be necessary.” 23. As can be seen from what has been abstracted above, any person whose name is included in the Electoral Roll of the Constituency and who is not subject to any disqualification for being included as such, may subscribe as proposer or seconder. However, no person shall be a proposer and seconder of more than one candidate. The said provision nowhere prescribes as to who can or cannot be the proposer or seconder and as to who would qualify to be the same. It is, therefore, clear that the CCB Rules do not specifically provide that a Government servant will not qualify to be a proposer or a seconder. As contended by the learned counsel for the respondents, CCS Conduct Rules, 1964 have been adopted by the CADC and rule 5 of the said Rules prohibits participation of Government servant in politics and in election. Rule 5 of the CCS Conduct Rules may be gainfully reproduced as below: “5. Taking part in politics and elections.— (1) No Government servant shall be a member of, or be otherwise associated with, any political party or any organization which takes part in politics nor shall he take part in, subscribe in aid of, or assist in any other manner, any political movement or activity. (2) It shall be the duty of every Government servant to endeavour to prevent any member of his family from taking part in, subscribing in aid of, or assisting in any other manner any movement or activity which is, or tends directly or indirectly to be, subversive of the Government as by law established and where a Government servant is unable to prevent a member of his family from taking part in, or subscribing in aid of, or assisting in any other manner, any such movement or activity, he shall make a report to that effect to the Government. (3) If any question arises whether a party is a political party or whether any organization takes part in politics or whether any movement or activity falls within the scope of sub-rule (2), the decision of the Government thereon shall be final. (3) If any question arises whether a party is a political party or whether any organization takes part in politics or whether any movement or activity falls within the scope of sub-rule (2), the decision of the Government thereon shall be final. (4) No Government servant shall canvass or otherwise op interfere with, or use his influence in connection with or take part in an election to any Legislature or Local Authority: Provided that— (i) a Government servant qualified to vote at such election may exercise his right to vote, but where he does so, he shall give no indication of the manner in which he proposes to vote or has voted; (ii) a Government servant shall not be deemed to have contravened the provisions of this sub-rule by reason only that he assists in the conduct of an election in the due performance of a duty imposed on him by or under any law for the time being in force.” 24. As may be noticed from the above abstraction, there are certain restrictions for Government servant in taking part in politics and election. It may also be noticed that sub-rules (1) and (2) of rule 5 specifically prohibits a Government servant and his family members to participate or indulge themselves in any political movement or activity. The Apex Court in the case of Raj Krushna Bose (supra) held that unless a Government servant falls under the three excluded categories provided under section 33(2) of the Act of 1951 (at the relevant point of time), a Government servant can be the proposer or the seconder. 25. However, for the purpose of the present case, it may be noticed that rule 5 of the CCS Conduct Rules, 1964 clearly prohibits a Government servant from being associated with any political party or any organization which takes part in politics. Further, the Government servant is also prohibited to subscribe in aid of any political movement or activity or assist such movement or activity in any manner. The petitioner's seconder to his nomination is admittedly an employee of the CADC, though on Muster Roll basis. The Returning Officer upon making a verification from the Acquiescence Roll came to the conclusion that the seconder was an employee of the CADC and, therefore, his nomination was only invalid. The petitioner's seconder to his nomination is admittedly an employee of the CADC, though on Muster Roll basis. The Returning Officer upon making a verification from the Acquiescence Roll came to the conclusion that the seconder was an employee of the CADC and, therefore, his nomination was only invalid. It may further be noticed that the provisions of the CCS Conduct Rules, 1964 was not before the Apex Court when the case of Raj Krushna Bose (supra) was being considered and in fact, it could not have been, since the CCS Conduct Rules has only been framed in the year 1964. 26. Having regard to the provisions of CCS Conduct Rules and also the findings arrived at by the Returning Officer in declaring the nomination of the writ petitioner to be invalid, I am of the considered view that the exercise of discretionary powers conferred upon the High Court by article 226 of the Constitution of India in the given facts and circumstances of the case is not called for. The writ petition insofar as the first issue formulated is concerned is, therefore, found to be without any merit. In the result, the writ petition fails and the same is dismissed. 27. The interim order passed on 10.4.2018 also stands vacated. 28. With the above observations and directions, the writ petition stands disposed of. No cost.