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Gujarat High Court · body

2018 DIGILAW 981 (GUJ)

HAMIRBHAI NAGABHAI MARU v. DIVISIONAL CONTROLLER

2018-08-10

K.M.THAKER

body2018
ORDER : 1. Heard Mr. Rajyaguru, learned advocate for the petitioners and Mr. Joshi, learned advocate for the respondent. 2. Rule. Rule returnable forthwith. Mr.Joshi, learned advocate for the respondent has waived service of Rule and at the request of learned advocate for the petitioners and with consent of learned advocate for the respondent, the petitions are heard for final order today. 3. The facts, issues and rival contentions involved in captioned 3 petitions are almost identical. The respondent in said 3 petitions is also common, learned advocates have put forward similar and common contentions for their respective clients, for captioned 3 petitions. Therefore, the petitions are heard together and decided by this common order. 4. In Special Civil Application No.19340 of 2016, the petitioner (original claimant before learned Labour Court) has challenged the award dated 21.9.2016 passed by learned Labour Court in Reference (LCJ) No.34 of 2013 whereas in Special Civil Application No.19341 of 2016, the petitioner (original claimant before learned Labour Court) has challenged the award dated 21.9.2016 passed by learned Labour Court in Reference (LCJ) No.33 of 2013 and in Special Civil Application No.19342 of 2016, the petitioner (original claimant before learned Labour Court) has challenged the award dated 16.9.2016 passed by learned Labour Court in Reference (LCJ) No.15 of 2014. By impugned awards, learned Labour Court rejected the reference cases instituted at the behest of present petitioners. 5. So far as the factual backdrop involved in reference cases are concerned, it has emerged that the respondent engaged present petitioners on fixed pay and fixed period basis for tenure of 5 years. The petitioners were engaged as Conductors. The petitioners were informed that on appraisal for performance of 2 years, their case will be considered for appointment on long term basis. During above mentioned period of 5 years, the petitioners were on duty when the bus were checked by Checking Squad. It came to the notice of the Checking Squad that the claimants had not issued tickets to some passengers, though the passengers had paid the fare. The Checking Squad reported the said incident to the Competent Authority. Upon being informed about the said incident, the Competent Authority issued notices. The petitioners herein submitted their reply in response to the show cause notice. The Checking Squad reported the said incident to the Competent Authority. Upon being informed about the said incident, the Competent Authority issued notices. The petitioners herein submitted their reply in response to the show cause notice. It appears that thereafter without granting effective opportunity of hearing – to lead evidence and to defend their case the corporation terminated services of the petitioners. It has emerged from the record that in Reference No.34 of 2013 the date of incident is 13.5.2011 (tickets were not issued to 7 passengers) and the notice was issued on 21.6.2011 and the order of termination followed on 13.7.2011 whereas Reference No.33 of 2013 the date of incident is 26.2.2011 (ticket was not issued to 1 passenger) and the notice was issued on 12.7.2011 and termination followed on 17.8.2011. In Reference No.15 of 2014 the date of incident is 1.3.2011 (tickets were not issued to 3 passengers in one group) where notice was issued on 21.6.2011 and termination followed on 13.7.2011. 6. Feeling aggrieved by the said penalty orders present petitioner raised industrial dispute. Before the learned Labour Court the claimants filed statement of claim wherein they mentioned the details about their appointment, about the incident in question, about the notice and termination order. In the backdrop of above mentioned facts, the petitioners herein challenged the termination order on the ground that the termination order was by way of penalty and the said penalty was imposed without granting opportunity of hearing inasmuch as the corporation did not conduct domestic enquiry in accordance with applicable rules and arbitrarily terminated their services. On the said allegation the claimants demanded that they should be reinstated in service with all benefits. 7. The opponent corporation opposed the reference and the demand. The corporation claimed that the claimants were engaged on fixed pay and for fixed period basis and that, therefore, question of conducting domestic enquiry did not arise. The corporation also claimed that the appointment order contained specific condition that the service of the appointee can be terminated without notice and that the action of the corporation is in accordance with the terms and conditions of the appointment. The corporation also claimed that the claimants had indulged in misconduct and that during the statement before the officer of the corporation, they had admitted the misconduct viz. The corporation also claimed that the claimants had indulged in misconduct and that during the statement before the officer of the corporation, they had admitted the misconduct viz. not issuing tickets after receiving fares and that, therefore, there was no reason or justification to continue the claimants in service of the corporation. On such premise the corporation opposed the demand of the claimants (present petitioners) and submitted that the reference may be rejected. 8. When the parties completed their pleadings, the learned Labour Court received evidence from both sides. 9. After the parties closed their evidence the learned Labour Court heard rival submissions. Upon completion of the proceedings, learned Labour Court the considered material on record. The learned Labour Court heavily relieved on the appointment order and in light of the clause under the appointment orders (which provide that service of the appointee can be terminated without notice) the learned Labour Court reached to the conclusion that the termination order was in accordance with the terms of appointment and that, therefore, the said order cannot be quashed. On such conclusion the learned Labour Court rejected the reference. 10. Learned advocate for the petitioners assailed the awards and submitted that the corporation terminated the service of the claimant without granting opportunity of hearing and in violation of principles of natural justice. He submitted that the services of the claimants came to be terminated for alleged misconduct and that, therefore, the services could not have been terminated without granting opportunity of hearing and without following principles of natural justice. He submitted that such arbitrary action by the corporation in violation of principles of natural justice should have been set aside by the learned Labour Court. 11. Learned advocate for the respondent corporation supported the award and opposed the submission by learned advocate for the petitioners. Learned advocate for the corporation vehemently contended that there is specific clause in the appointment order which prescribes that the service of the appointee can be terminated without notice. Mr.Joshi, learned advocate for the corporation emphasised that at the relevant time the petitioners were a fixed term appointee and that they were engaged for fixed tenure i.e. for 5 years on fixed salary basis and that they were not regular and permanent employees and their appointments were not in accordance with the procedure prescribed by the regulations of the corporation. He submitted that the service of a person who is engaged on such fixed term and fixed basis can be terminated by the corporation as per the terms of the appointment and that, therefore, the learned Labour Court has approved the said action and the said right of the corporation and consequently rejected the reference. According to learned advocate for the respondent corporation, there is no error in the award and that, therefore, the petitions should be rejected. 12. I have considered rival submissions as well as the material available on record and the award impugned in present petitions. 13. Factual background is not in dispute. It is not in dispute that the petitioners herein came to be engaged by the corporation on fixed term and fixed pay basis. It is also not in dispute that their term and tenure commenced in February 2010. It is also not in dispute that within short period i.e. within about 34 months, allegation about misconduct came to be levelled against the petitioners. It has emerged from the record that when the claimants were on duty and aboard their respective bus, the Checking Squad noticed that the petitioners had, in their respective bus, not issued tickets to some passengers. The irregularities which the Checking Squad noticed in respect of all three claimants are summarised and mentioned above. The Checking Squad reported the said incident to the Competent Authority. The Competent Authority issued a show cause notice to the claimants. The claimants submitted their reply. Thereafter without granting opportunity of hearing and without conducting departmental enquiry in accordance with applicable rules and/or in accordance with the principles of natural justice, the corporation abruptly terminated services of the claimants vide above mentioned order. 14. The question which, therefore, arose before the learned Labour Court and which actually should have been addressed by the Court is that whether the action of the corporation was legal, just and proper and whether orders, which are penal in nature and effect could have been passed without conducting enquiry. 15. At the outset, it is relevant to note that the corporation, undisputedly, terminated the service of the claimants on ground of misconduct i.e. on the allegation that the claimants did not issue tickets to the passengers though received fare from the passengers. 15. At the outset, it is relevant to note that the corporation, undisputedly, terminated the service of the claimants on ground of misconduct i.e. on the allegation that the claimants did not issue tickets to the passengers though received fare from the passengers. Thus, the termination of the petitioners' service and the orders passed by the corporation are penal in nature and in effect. Any order which is penal in nature and in effect and termination of service by way of penalty / punishment should not be and cannot be passed without granting effective and principles of natural justice should be diligently followed. 16. However, in present case, the corporation did not conduct enquiry in accordance with the procedure prescribed under its Rules and/or in accordance with the principles of natural justice. Instead, the corporation adopted a shortcut by taking recourse under clause 7 of the appointment order and terminated the petitioners' service without granting opportunity to the petitioners to lead evidence and defend their case. 17. As mentioned above, the corporation heavily relied on the terms of the appointment, more particularly clause 7 of the appointment order. 18. The said condition of appointment order prescribe that the service of the appointee can be terminated without notice. 19. By invoking the said provision the corporation terminated services of the claimants without granting effective and real opportunity of hearing and defence. 20. It is not in dispute that the regular and formal chargesheet was not issued. It is also not in dispute that domestic enquiry (or any enquiry) in accordance with the applicable rules and/or in accordance with the principles of natural justice was not conducted and opportunity of hearing and defence was not given to the employee. Of course, the corporation would contend that a notice calling for explanation was issued. 21. In light of the reasons and explanation by the corporation, in support of its action, it is necessary to note, at this stage, that the learned Labour Court accepted the submission by the corporation viz. that clause 7 empowered the corporation to terminate the service without conducting domestic enquiry and even without notice. 22. In this context, it is relevant to note that if the services of the claimants had not been terminated for alleged misconduct, then, perhaps, the corporation's reply and submission would have carried some weight. that clause 7 empowered the corporation to terminate the service without conducting domestic enquiry and even without notice. 22. In this context, it is relevant to note that if the services of the claimants had not been terminated for alleged misconduct, then, perhaps, the corporation's reply and submission would have carried some weight. The said clause 7 can be and could have been invoked if the services were not terminated for and on ground of alleged misconduct. 23. However, in present case, it is an undisputed position that the services of the claimants came to be terminated for alleged misconduct viz. not issuing tickets after receiving fare from the passengers. 24. The said action is prescribed misconduct, according to the rules of the corporation. Differently put, the termination of the petitioners' service is a penal action so far as the claimants are concerned. 25. It is relevant to note that on two grounds the termination of the petitioners' service cannot be considered illegal retrenchment and would not fall under Section 2(oo) of the Act. First, because the services of the claimants came to be terminated by way of penalty (for alleged misconduct). When service is terminated by way of penal action for proved misconduct it would not tantamount to misconduct. Second, in light of the fact that the claimants were engaged on fixed period basis and that their appointment would, therefore, be covered under clause (bb) of section 2(oo). Of course, it is true that said clause (bb) would not and cannot come to the rescue of present respondent in light of the fact that the service did not end on completion of fixed period but came to be terminated earlier and prematurely and before expiry of specified term. Therefore, the termination of the petitioners' service cannot get protection under clause (bb) of section 2(oo) of the Act. However, it would still not tantamount to 'illegal' retrenchment because at the time when the services of the claimants came to be terminated, they had, undisputedly, not completed continuous service of 240 days or 12 months. In present case breach of section 25F is not committed and breach of section 25G or section 25H is not established. Under the circumstances, the petitioners' termination cannot be termed 'illegal' retrenchment. 26. In present case breach of section 25F is not committed and breach of section 25G or section 25H is not established. Under the circumstances, the petitioners' termination cannot be termed 'illegal' retrenchment. 26. However, when it is an undisputed position that the petitioners' service came to be terminated for alleged misconduct, then in that event the corporation could not have invoked clause 7 of the appointment order and could not have terminated services of the petitioners without conducting enquiry and without granting real and effective opportunity of hearing and defence. 27. From the award, it has emerged that the learned Labour Court, in light of clause 7 of the appointment order, formed an opinion that the corporation could have terminated services of the claimants without conducting enquiry because clause 7 authorised the corporation to terminate service without notice. 28. The learned Labour Court has observed that the claimants had accepted the appointment order along with all conditions. Meaning thereby the claimants also accepted the condition that their service can be terminated without notice and that, therefore, they cannot make any grievance with regard to domestic enquiry, opportunity of hearing and principles of natural justice. 29. The learned Labour Court also seems to have been influenced by the corporation's reply that the claimants had given statement before the officer of the corporation wherein they admitted the lapse on their part. 30. In this background, the learned Labour Court did not find any illegality and irregularity of the corporation's action. 31. It is relevant to note that the claim of the corporation that one officer of the corporation had recorded statement of claim who was not proved before the learned Labour Court. It appears that the corporation, probably, merely placed on record the statement. However, the said statement and its contents are not proved in accordance with law before the learned Labour Court. The concerned officer who allegedly recorded the statements was not examined. Further, the said statement was, undisputedly, not recorded during proceedings of the domestic enquiry. 32. The regulation of the corporation prescribe detailed procedure for conducting enquiry. The said procedure is, undisputedly, not followed in case of present petitioners. 33. The concerned officer who allegedly recorded the statements was not examined. Further, the said statement was, undisputedly, not recorded during proceedings of the domestic enquiry. 32. The regulation of the corporation prescribe detailed procedure for conducting enquiry. The said procedure is, undisputedly, not followed in case of present petitioners. 33. In this background, what is required to be kept in focus is that when the services of the claimants undisputedly came to be terminated for alleged misconduct, the requirement of opportunity of hearing and requirement of principles of natural justice ought to have been read into the appointment order by the learned Labour Court. 34. When termination order is undisputedly penal order in nature and in effect, the requirement to comply principles of natural justice cannot be negatived and cannot be discarded {D.K. Yadav vs. J.M.A. Industries Ltd. [ (1993) 3 SCC 259 ]}. 35. Further, clause 7 in the appointment order which confer arbitrary powers to the corporation to terminate services of the appointee, even on allegation of misconduct, without granting opportunity of hearing is against public policy and against section 23 of the Contract Act and such condition in appointment order cannot be sustained or the requirement of opportunity of hearing and principles of natural justice must be read into such provision in the appointment order {Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Ltd. And Another vs. Brojo Nath Ganguly and Another ( AIR 1986 SC 1571 )}, wherein Hon'ble Apex Court observed, inter alia, that: “97. The said Rules as also the earlier rules of 1970 were accepted by the contesting Respondents without demur. Here again they had no real choice before them. They had risen higher in the hierarchy of the Corporation. If they had refused to accept the said Rules it would have resulted in termination of their services' and the consequent anxiety, harassment and uncertainty of finding alternative employment. 98. Rule 9(i) confers upon the Corporation the power to terminate the service of a permanent employee by giving him three months' notice in writing or in lieu thereof to pay him the equivalent of three months' basic pay and dearness allowance. 98. Rule 9(i) confers upon the Corporation the power to terminate the service of a permanent employee by giving him three months' notice in writing or in lieu thereof to pay him the equivalent of three months' basic pay and dearness allowance. A similar regulation framed by the West Bengal State Electricity Board was described by this Court in West Bengal State Electricity Board v. Desh Bandhu Ghosh, (1985) 3 SCC 116 : ( AIR 1985 SC 722 ) (at page 118) (of SCC : (at p. 723 of AIR) as: "...a naked 'hire and fire' rule, the time for banishing which altogether from employer employee relationship is fast approaching. Its only parallel is to be found in the Henry VIII clause so familiar to administrative lawyers." As all lawyers may not be familiar with administrative law, we may as well explain that "the Henry VIII clause" is a provision occasionally found in legislation conferring delegated legislative power, giving the delegate the power to amend the delegating Act in order to bring that Act into full operation or otherwise by Order to remove any difficulty, and at times giving power to modify the provisions of other Acts also. The Committee on Ministers' Powers in its report submitted in 1932 (Cmd. 4060) pointed out that such a provision had been nicknamed the Henry VIII clause" because "that King is regarded popularly as the impersonation of executive autocracy". The Committee's Report (at page 61) criticised these clauses as a temptation to slipshod work in the preparation of bills and recommended that such provisions should be used only where they were justified before Parliament on compelling grounds. Legislation enacted by Parliament in the United Kingdom after 1932 does not show that this recommendation had any particular effect. 99. No apter description of Rule 9(i) can be given than to call it "the Henry VIII Clause". It confers absolute and arbitrary power upon the Corporation. It does not even state who on behalf of the Corporation is to exercise that power. It was submitted on behalf of the Appellants that it would be the Board of Directors. The impugned letters of termination, however, do not refer to any resolution or decision of the Board and even if they did, it would be irrelevant to the validity of Rule 9(i). It was submitted on behalf of the Appellants that it would be the Board of Directors. The impugned letters of termination, however, do not refer to any resolution or decision of the Board and even if they did, it would be irrelevant to the validity of Rule 9(i). There are no guidelines whatever laid down to indicate in what circumstances the power given by Rule 9(i) is to be exercised by the Corporation. No opportunity whatever of a hearing is at all to be afforded to the permanent employee whose service is being terminated in the exercise of this power. It was urged that the Board of Directors would not exercise. this power arbitrarily , or capriciously as it consists of responsible and highly placed persons. This submission ignores the fact that however highly placed a person may be, he must necessarily possess human frailties. It also overlooks the wellknown saying of Lord Acton, which has now almost become a maxim, in the Appendix to his "Historical Essays and Studies", that " power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely." As we have pointed out earlier, the said Rules provide for four different modes in which the services of a permanent employee can be terminated earlier than his attaining the age of superannuation, namely, R. 9(i), R. 9(ii), subcl. (iv) of Cl. (b) of R. 36 read with R. 38 and R. 37. Under R. 9(ii) the termination of service is to be on the ground of "services no longer required in the interest of the Company." Subcl. (iv) of Cl. (v) of R. 36 read with R. 38 provides for dismissal on the ground of misconduct. Rule 37 provides for, termination of service at any time without any notice if the employee is found guilty of any of the acts mentioned in that Rule. Rule 9(i) is the only Rule which does not state in what circumstances the power conferred by that Rule is to be exercised. Thus, even where the Corporation could proceed under Rule 36 and dismiss an employee on the ground of misconduct after holding a regular disciplinary inquiry, it is free to resort instead to R. 9(i) in order to avoid the hustle of an inquiry. Rule 9(i) thus confers an absolute, arbitrary and unguided power upon the Corporation. Thus, even where the Corporation could proceed under Rule 36 and dismiss an employee on the ground of misconduct after holding a regular disciplinary inquiry, it is free to resort instead to R. 9(i) in order to avoid the hustle of an inquiry. Rule 9(i) thus confers an absolute, arbitrary and unguided power upon the Corporation. It violates one of the two great rules of natural justice the audi alteram partem rule. It is not only in cases to which Art. 14 applies that the rules of natural justice come into play. As pointed out in Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel, (1985) 3 SCC 398 (at page 463) : ( AIR 1985 SC 1416 at p. 1451). "The principles of natural justice are not the creation of Art. 14. Art. 14 is not their begetter but their constitutional guardian." That case has traced in some detail the origin and development of the concept of principles of natural justice and of the audi alteram partem rule (at pages 463-480) (of (1985) 3 SCC : (at pp. 1451-1463 of AIR) They apply in diverse situations and not only to cases of State action. As pointed out by 0. Chinnappa, Reddy, J., in Swadeshi Cotton Mills v. Union of India, (1981) 2 SCR 533 , 591 : ( AIR 1981 SC 818 , 846-47) they are implicit in every decisionmaking function, whether judicial or quasijudicial or administrative. Undoubtedly, in certain circumstances the principles of natural justice can be modified and, in exceptional cases, can even be excluded as pointed out in Tulsiram Patel's case ( AIR 1985 SC 1416 ). Rule 9(i), however, is not covered by any of the situations which would justify the total exclusion of the audi alteram partem rule. 100. The power conferred by Rule 9(i) is not only arbitrary but is also discriminatory for it enables the Corporation to discriminate between employee and employee. It can pick up one employee and apply to him clause (i) of Rule 9. It can pick up another employed and apply to him clause (ii) of Rule 9. It can pick up yet another employee and apply to him subclause (iv) of clause (b) of Rule 36 read with Rule 38 and to yet another employee it can apply Rule 37. It can pick up another employed and apply to him clause (ii) of Rule 9. It can pick up yet another employee and apply to him subclause (iv) of clause (b) of Rule 36 read with Rule 38 and to yet another employee it can apply Rule 37. All this the Corporation can do when the same circumstances exist as would justify the Corporation in holding under Rule 38 a regular disciplinary inquiry into the alleged misconduct of the employee. Both the contesting Respondents had, in fact, been asked to submit their explanation to the charges made against them. Sengupta had been informed that a disciplinary inquiry was proposed to be held in his case. The charges made against both the Respondents were such that a disciplinary inquiry could easily have been held. It was, however, not held but instead resort was had to Rule 9(i). 101. The Corporation is a large organization. It has offices in various parts of West Bengal, Bihar and Assam as shown by the said Rules, and possibly in other States also. The said Rules form part of the contract of employment between the Corporation and its employees who are not workmen. These employees had no powerful workmen's Union to support them They had no voice in the framing of the said Rules. They had no choice but to accept the said Rules as part of their contract of employment. There is gross disparity between the Corporation and its employees, whether they be workmen or officers. The Corporation can afford to dispense with the services of an officer. It will find hundreds of others to take his place but an officer cannot afford to lose his job because if he does so, there are not hundreds of jobs waiting for him. A clause such as clause (i) of Rule 9 is against right and reason. It is wholly unconscionable. It has been entered into between parties between whom there is gross inequality of bargaining power. Rule 9(i) is a term of the contract between the Corporation and all its officers. It affects a large number of persons and it squarely falls within the principle formulated by us above. Several statutory authorities have a clause similar to Rule 9(i) in their contracts of employment. As appears from the decided cases, the West Bengal State Electricity Board and Air India International have it. It affects a large number of persons and it squarely falls within the principle formulated by us above. Several statutory authorities have a clause similar to Rule 9(i) in their contracts of employment. As appears from the decided cases, the West Bengal State Electricity Board and Air India International have it. Several Government companies apart from the Corporation (which is the First Appellant before us) must be having it. There are 970 Government companies with paid-up capital of Rs. 16,414.9 crores as stated in the written arguments submitted on behalf of the Union of India. The Government and its agencies and instrumentalities constitute the largest employer in the country. A clause such as Rule 9(i) in a contract of employment affecting large sections of the public is harmful and injurious to the public interest for it tends to create a sense of insecurity in the minds of those to whom it applies and consequently it is against public good. Such a clause, therefore, is opposed to public policy and being opposed to public policy, it is void under section 23 of the Indian Contract Act. 102. It was, however, submitted on behalf of the Appellants that this was a contract entered into by the Corporation like any other contract entered into by it in the course of its trading activities and the Court, therefore, ought not to interfere with it. It is not possible for us to equate employees with goods which can be bought and sold. It is equally not possible for us to equate a contract of employment with a mercantile transaction between, two businessmen and much less to do so when the contract of employment is between a powerful employer and a weak employee. 103. It was also submitted on behalf of the Appellants that Rule 9(i) was supported by mutuality inasmuch as it conferred an equal right upon both the parties, for under it just as the employer could terminate the employee's service by giving him three months' notice or by paying him three months' basic pay and dearness allowance in lieu thereof, the employee could leave the service by giving three months' notice and when he failed to give such notice, the Corporation could deduct an equivalent amount from whatever may be payable to him. It is true that there is mutuality in clause 9(i) the same mutuality as in a contract between the lion and the lamb that both will be free to roam about in the jungle and each will be at liberty to devour the other. When one considers the unequal position of the Corporation and its employees, the argument of mutuality becomes laughable. 104. The contesting Respondents could, therefore, have filed a civil suit for a declaration that the termination of their service was contrary to law on the ground that the said Rule 9(i) was void. In such a suit, however, they would have got a declaration and possibly damages for wrongful termination of service but the civil court could not have ordered reinstatement as it would have amounted to granting specific performance of a contract of personal service. As the Corporation is "the State", they, therefore. adopted the far more efficacious remedy of filing a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. 105. As the Corporation is "the State" within the meaning of Article 12, it was amenable to the writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226. It is now well established that an instrumentality or agency of the State being "the State" under Article 12 of the Constitution is subject to the Constitutional limitations, and its actions are State actions and must be judged in the fight of the Fundamental Rights guaranteed by Part III of the Constitution (see, for instance, Sukhdev Singh v. Bhagatram Sardar Singh Raghuvanshi, ( AIR 1975 SC 1331 ). The International Airport Authority's case ( AIR 1979 SC 1628 ) and Ajay Hasia's case ( AIR 1981 SC 487 )). The actions of an instrumentality or agency of the State must, therefore, be in conformity with Art. 14 of the Constitution. The progression of the judicial concept of Art. 14 from a prohibition against discriminatory class legislation to an invalidating factor for any discriminatory or arbitrary State action has been traced in Tulsiram Patel's case (1985) 3 SCC 398 (at pages 473-476): ( AIR 1985 SC 1416 at pp. 1458-1460). The progression of the judicial concept of Art. 14 from a prohibition against discriminatory class legislation to an invalidating factor for any discriminatory or arbitrary State action has been traced in Tulsiram Patel's case (1985) 3 SCC 398 (at pages 473-476): ( AIR 1985 SC 1416 at pp. 1458-1460). The principles of natural justice have now come to be recognized as being a part of the Constitutional guarantee contained in Art. 14, In Tulsiram Patel's case this Court said (at page 476 of SCC : (at P. 1460 of AIR) : "The principles of natural justice have thus come to be recognized as being a part of the guarantee contained in Article 14 because of the new and dynamic interpretation given by this Court to the concept of equality which is the subject matter of that Article. Shortly put, the syllogism runs thus : violation of a rule of natural justice results in arbitrariness which is the same as discrimination; where discrimination is the result of State action, it is violation of Article 14; therefore, a violation of a principle of natural justice by a State action is a violation of Article 14. Article 14, however, is not the sole repository of the principles of natural justice. What it does is to guarantee that any law or State action violating them will be struck down. The principles of natural justice, however, apply not only to legislation and State action but also where any tribunal, authority or body of men, not coming within the definition of 'State' in Article 12, is charged with the duty of deciding a matter." “106. As pointed out above, Rule 9(i) is both arbitrary and unreasonable and it also wholly ignores and sets aside the audi alteram partem rule it, therefore, violates Art. 14 of the Constitution.” 36. Unfortunately, the learned Labour Court failed to examine the case from the said perspective. 37. When the corporation claimed that the services of the claimants came to be terminated on account of their alleged conduct which is in nature of misconduct, then the learned Labour Court ought to have called upon the corporation to prove the allegation. Unfortunately, the learned Labour Court failed to examine the case from the said perspective. 37. When the corporation claimed that the services of the claimants came to be terminated on account of their alleged conduct which is in nature of misconduct, then the learned Labour Court ought to have called upon the corporation to prove the allegation. Without requiring the corporation to prove the charge, the learned Labour Court found it convenient to rely on clause 7 and on that basis the learned Court approved the corporation's action of terminating the claimants' services without enquiry and without examining whether the charge is proved or not and whether opportunity of defence was granted or not. 38. For above mentioned reasons, the award challenged in present petitions cannot be sustained. 39. The case requires reconsideration by the learned Labour Court wherein the corporation should get an opportunity to prove the allegation and the workmen should also get fair opportunity to defend their case against the allegation i.e. not issuing tickets after receiving fare from the passengers. 40. For the said purpose, it is necessary that the proceedings should be remanded to the learned Labour Court for fresh consideration. 41. The observations by the learned Labour Court that in light of clause 7 in the appointment order, the corporation is not obliged to follow and comply the principles of natural justice and to grant opportunity of hearing and defence to the petitioners during domestic enquiry is not sustainable in light of the observations by Hon'ble Apex Court in above mentioned two decisions. Therefore, following order is passed. 42. The impugned awards are set aside. The proceedings of Reference (LCJ) Nos.33/2013, 24/2013 and 15/2014 are remanded to the learned Labour Court for fresh hearing and fresh consideration. The learned Labour Court shall, after granting opportunity of hearing to both sides, pass fresh award in accordance with law and without being influenced by the award challenged in present petitions. With the aforesaid clarifications, directions and observations, the petitions are partly allowed. Rule is made absolute to the aforesaid extent. Petitions are partly allowed.