JUDGMENT : RAVI KRISHAN KAPUR, J 1. This appeal is directed against the judgment and order of conviction dated 30.06.2006 and 01.07.2006 passed by the Learned Additional Sessions Judge, 3rd Court, Nadia, Krishnanagar in Sessions Trial No.V (September)15 arising out of Sessions Case No.14(08)15 convicting the appellant under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code and sentencing him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 10 years and to pay fine of Rs.50,000 and in default, to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a further period of 6 months. 2. The case of the prosecution originated in an information lodged by the prosecutrix (PW-1) that on 22.04.2012 at around 9.15 pm while she went out to the pukurghat for performing nature’s call, the appellant pushed her to the ground, gagged her and committed rape against her will and even though the prosecutrix tried to resist she could not prevent the appellant from committing the crime. Thereafter, the prosecutrix raised an alarm and recognised the appellant with a torch which she was carrying. The prosecutrix identified the appellant as a member of the locality. Thereupon hearing her shouting, the husband of the prosecutrix and others rushed to the place of occurrence but the appellant fled away. It was further stated in the complaint lodged with the police authorities that the appellant was identified by the prosecutrix’s husband and others too. 3. Upon receipt of the complaint, on 23.08.2012 the police initiated PS Case No.941/12 dated 23.08.2012 under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code and on completion of investigation, a charge sheet was submitted against the appellant on 22.10.2014. Subsequently, on 24.09.2015 a charge was framed against the appellant under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code. The appellant pleaded not guilty. 4. In the course of the trial, the prosecution examined as many as eight witnesses including the prosecutrix being PW-1. The appellant was examined under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and claimed to be innocent but declined to adduce any evidence in defence. At the conclusion of the trial, by his judgment and order the Trial Judge convicted and sentenced the appellant. 5. Hence the present appeal. 6. Mr. Milon Mukherjee, Senior Advocate for the appellant strenuously argued that in convicting the appellant the Trial Court committed errors both in law and regarding the facts of the case. At the conclusion of the trial, by his judgment and order the Trial Judge convicted and sentenced the appellant. 5. Hence the present appeal. 6. Mr. Milon Mukherjee, Senior Advocate for the appellant strenuously argued that in convicting the appellant the Trial Court committed errors both in law and regarding the facts of the case. He submitted that the entire case of the prosecution was based on slippery evidence and there were prevaricating statements of all the witnesses. He submitted that in the absence of proper corroboration of the prosecution version of the alleged offence it would be unsafe to sustain the case of the prosecution. He submitted that, the entire story of the prosecution that at 9.55 pm when the prosecutrix went to answer nature’s call the appellant was waiting for her and committed rape was unbelievable and unsubstantiated from the very inception of the case. He submitted that, the First Information Report was never formally adduced in evidence. He further submitted that, the two important witnesses being the doctor and the Magistrate were never examined. He also submitted that there was nothing in the medical evidence which would substantiate the fact that rape had been committed against the prosecutrix. He further submitted that the alleged source of identification of the appellant i.e. the torch was never handed over to the Investigating Officer. He submitted that it was unbelievable that after being sexually attacked the prosecutrix along with her husband travelled for 10 kilometres on that very same night to personally lodged the First Information Report. He submitted that the entire case of the de facto complainant was based on an improbable story. In substance, he submitted that the entire case of the prosecution was unnatural, filled with inconsistencies, improbable and the conviction and the sentence ought not to be sustained. 7. Before addressing the issues which arise for consideration in the instant appeal it is vital to appreciate the entire evidence of the witnesses in this proceeding. PW-1 (Defacto complainant and prosecutrix). She is the de facto complainant and the victim in the instant case. She lodged the instant complaint against the appellant. She identified the appellant in Court. She could not remember the exact time of the incident but did mention that the incident took place in 2012 at about 9 to 9.30 pm at the bank of a pond near to a house. She lodged the instant complaint against the appellant. She identified the appellant in Court. She could not remember the exact time of the incident but did mention that the incident took place in 2012 at about 9 to 9.30 pm at the bank of a pond near to a house. She stated that she had gone there to attend nature’s call. She stated that at that point of time the appellant came there and caught hold of her and embraced her and when she focused the light through her torch he caught hold of her mouth and caused her to lie on the ground and then raped her and he fled away. Thereafter, she screamed when her husband came to the place of occurrence. She categorically stated in her deposition that her husband did not see the accused person and that she told her husband about the incident. She identified her signature in the First Information Report. She stated that the FIR was written by her brother-in-law Aajabas Mondal. She made her statement before the Magistrate and she identified her signature in the statement recorded by the Magistrate. She further deposed that she had handed over her apparels that were worn when the incident occurred to the Investigating Officer of the case. She identified her signature in the seizure list prepared by the Investigation Officer. She further deposed that the police took her to the hospital for medical treatment. She identified the injury report and she deposed that she knew the appellant who was present in the Court on that day. In cross-examination, she deposed that she was the second wife of her husband who had two adult sons from the first wife. She deposed that she and her family which included her husband and her two sons resided together in the same house. She gave a description of the location of the house and the place of occurrence of the incident took place. She described that there was a village road situated adjacent on the western side of the house. She stated that there were many houses on both the sides of the road. She further deposed that she had to cross the road to go to the place of occurrence. She deposed that there were a tea stall and machcha made of bamboo on the road and the villagers were generally present close to the place of occurrence. She stated that there were many houses on both the sides of the road. She further deposed that she had to cross the road to go to the place of occurrence. She deposed that there were a tea stall and machcha made of bamboo on the road and the villagers were generally present close to the place of occurrence. She deposed that there was a privy close to her house which had since been demolished. She said that she was married for 9 years but did not have any child out of wedlock. She deposed that she was earlier married but her previous husband had expired. She deposed that there were bushes on the bank of the said pond where the incident occurred. She deposed that she had informed the Magistrate that she had taken a torch at that time of going to the place of occurrence with the help of the torch during the incident. She deposed that she did not hand over the torch to the police. She deposed that at the time of the incident there was a scuffle for approximately five minutes between her and the appellant at the place of occurrence. She deposed that she sustained one abrasion on her left hand but did not sustain any type of injury whatsoever on other parts of her body. She deposed that she did show the abrasion on her left hand to the doctor at the time of the medical examination. She deposed that she handed over the wearing apparels at the time of occurrence of the incident at the police station. She deposed that she had taken the wearing apparels in a bag to the police station. She deposed that the wearing apparels were stained with the semen of the appellant. She deposed that after the incident she had met the police the next morning in Krishnanagar. She further deposed that she met the police subsequently after 3 days. She deposed that she showed the police the place of occurrence and that after the rape she had screamed and her husband had arrived at the place of occurrence. She deposed that except her husband no other villager or relative had come to the place of occurrence. In cross-examination, she categorically deposed that the appellant had filed a case against her husband and her brother-in-law on the allegation that he was assaulted by them. She deposed that except her husband no other villager or relative had come to the place of occurrence. In cross-examination, she categorically deposed that the appellant had filed a case against her husband and her brother-in-law on the allegation that he was assaulted by them. She deposed that it was not a fact that she had been forced to go before the Magistrate. She deposed that it was not a fact that she had not been raped. She deposed that it was not a fact that she had given false evidence at the behest of her husband. She deposed that she had not filed a false case. She deposed that she had taken a bedana to the place of occurrence but she had not given the same to the police. PW-2 (Marfat Mondal) is the husband of the prosecutrix. He deposed that he could not remember the exact date of the incident but the same had happened around 2012, two days after Roja. He deposed that the incident took place around 9/9.30 pm at the bank of the pond. He deposed that at that time the prosecutrix had gone to attend to nature’s call alone. He deposed that he had heard her screaming and had rushed to the place of occurrence where he saw the prosecutrix lying and found the accused person fleeing from the side. He deposed that at that point of time he came to know that the prosecutrix had been raped on the ground by the appellant. He deposed that he had immediately taken the prosecutrix back to his house. He deposed that on the very same night he had taken the de facto complainant to lodge the First Information Report at the police station. He identified the appellant who was present in the Court and he also identified his signature on the seizure list which was marked as Exhibit-3/1. In cross-examination, he deposed that he was at his house at the time of the incident. He deposed that his brothers and the entire family resided in the same house. He deposed that at the time of the incident his brothers and his family members were also present in the house. He deposed that after hearing the prosecutrix scream he did not call any other person and had visited the place of occurrence alone. He deposed that his brothers and the entire family resided in the same house. He deposed that at the time of the incident his brothers and his family members were also present in the house. He deposed that after hearing the prosecutrix scream he did not call any other person and had visited the place of occurrence alone. He deposed that there were bushes by the side of the place of occurrence. He deposed that upon arrival at the place of occurrence he saw the victim lying on the ground and saw the appellant flee away from there. He deposed that he was questioned as to why the appellant had fled away from the side. On arrival, at the place of occurrence, he saw the prosecutrix lying on the ground and her wearing apparels in a scattered condition. He deposed that it took approximately 3 to 4 minutes to rush from his house to the place of occurrence. He deposed that there was a village road situated on the western side of the house. He deposed that from the place of occurrence he had taken his wife holding her hand back to the house. On arrival at his house, all the members of his family had seen the prosecutrix. His neighbours and also the co-sharers had seen the prosecutrix on that very same night. He deposed that he had met the police after the incident and thereafter during investigation he had also met the police. He deposed that he had not informed the panchayat members of the incident. He deposed that it was not a fact that the appellant had lodged a case on that date against him and his son complaining of an assault against the appellant. He deposed that it was not a fact that he had given any false evidence in this case. PW-3 (Susthir Mondal). He deposed that he knew the victim. He also knew the appellant and identified the appellant in Court. He deposed that on 23.08.2012 at about 10.30 pm when he returned to his house he had seen the prosecutrix weeping and asked to her what had happened. He deposed that the prosecutrix had told him that the appellant had raped her at the bank of the pond. He also knew the appellant and identified the appellant in Court. He deposed that on 23.08.2012 at about 10.30 pm when he returned to his house he had seen the prosecutrix weeping and asked to her what had happened. He deposed that the prosecutrix had told him that the appellant had raped her at the bank of the pond. He deposed that at that time she had gone to the pond to attend nature’s call and the appellant had assaulted her on her back and then the prosecutrix fell down on the ground and the appellant raped her. In cross-examination, he deposed that police had asked him about the incident. He deposed that it was not a fact that he had given any false evidence in these proceedings. He deposed that it was not a fact that he had not stated to the police that he had returned home from bethua and had seen the prosecutrix weeping when she informed him that she had been raped by the appellant when she had gone to attend nature’s call. PW-4 (Aajabas Mondal). He deposed that he knew the prosecutrix. He was the scribe and had deposed that he knew the parties. He identified the appellant. He deposed that he had written the complaint as per the instructions of the victim and he had signed the same. He identified his signature which is marked as Exhibit-1/1. He deposed that on 22.08.2012 at about 21.00/21.30 hours he had found the victim weeping at home when he asked her about the incident. He deposed that he was told by the prosecutrix when she had gone to the bank of the pond to attend nature’s call the appellant had raped her. He deposed that the appellant had embraced her and raped her. He deposed that the police had seized her wearing apparels in his presence and identified his signature on the seizure list which was marked as Exhibit-3/2. In cross-examination, he deposed that he was known as Kele. He deposed that PW-2 is his cousin. He deposed that his house is adjacent to the house of his cousin. He deposed that he had never spoken to the police about the incident. He deposed that it was not a fact that he had not told the police that he had found the prosecutrix weeping at her house and asked her what had happened. He deposed that his house is adjacent to the house of his cousin. He deposed that he had never spoken to the police about the incident. He deposed that it was not a fact that he had not told the police that he had found the prosecutrix weeping at her house and asked her what had happened. He deposed that he had signed on the seizure list. He identified both the victim and the appellant. He deposed that the appellant had lodged a case against him. PW-5 (Hakim Mondal). He deposed that he knew the prosecutrix and the appellant. He deposed that on 22.08.2012 at around 9/9.30 pm he had heard cries from the home of the prosecutrix. Upon hearing the same he had visited the home of the prosecutrix and was told by the prosecutrix that she had been raped by the appellant. He deposed that the prosecutrix did not tell him anything more. In cross-examination, he deposed that the police had not questioned him during investigation. He deposed that on 22.08.2012 at about 9/9.30 pm after hearing screaming from the house of the victim he had visited the home of the prosecutrix and was told about the incident. He deposed that he is a cousin of the husband of the prosecutrix. He deposed that he did not see any independent witnesses at the home of the prosecutrix. He deposed that there was a village road at the back of the home of the prosecutrix. He deposed that there were many ponds at the back of the village road. He deposed that it was not a fact that he had been tutored to give false evidence in this proceeding. PW-6 (Aminur Islam). He was the Recording Officer and the SI at Nakshipara Police Station. He received the First Information Report. He identified his endorsement and signature in the FIR which was marked Exhibit-1/2. He started the case on the basis of the complaint and had filled up the formal FIR. He deposed that he had identified the formal FIR and deposed that he had filled up and signed the same. PW-7 (S. Saha Mondal). He deposed that he was the last Investigating Officer of this case. He deposed that he took up the charge of investigation on 04.11.2013. He deposed that he further examined the de facto complainant and recorded her statement. PW-7 (S. Saha Mondal). He deposed that he was the last Investigating Officer of this case. He deposed that he took up the charge of investigation on 04.11.2013. He deposed that he further examined the de facto complainant and recorded her statement. He deposed that he had sent the appellant to the hospital for medical examination. He collected the potency report of the appellant which was marked as Exhibit-6. He thereafter submitted a charge sheet against the appellant under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code. In cross-examination, he deposed that the prosecutrix had told him that at 20.30 hours an incident of rape had taken place. He deposed that the prosecutrix had further told him that she had taken one torch at the time of going to the place of occurrence. It was on the basis of the torchlight that the prosecutrix had identified the appellant. He deposed that after going through the case diary he submitted a charge sheet against the appellant. He deposed that it was not a fact that he had not properly investigated the case before submitting the charge sheet. PW-8 (Prasenjit Kar). He deposed that he was posted as a Sub-Inspector at Nakashipara Police Station. He had taken up the investigation of the case as per the order of the Officer-in-Charge. He deposed that during investigation he had visited the place of occurrence and prepared a rough sketch map plan with an index. He identified his signature in the sketch map plan which was marked as Exhibit-7. He thereafter recorded the statement of the available witnesses and sent the prosecutrix for examination to the hospital. He had collected the injury report which was marked Exhibit-4/1. He had seized the vaginal swab and wearing apparels of the prosecutrix. He identified his signature in the seizure list which was prepared and signed by him and marked as Exhibit-8. He sent the victim to Court for recording her statement under Section 164 of the Cr.P.C. He also conducted the raid to arrest the appellant but could not arrest him. On 30.10.2013 he was transferred and he handed over the Case Diary to the concerned Officer-in-Charge for further investigation. In cross-examination, he deposed that he did not prepare any search list. He did not know whether the appellant had been granted anticipatory bail. He further deposed that he had not obtained the FSL report. On 30.10.2013 he was transferred and he handed over the Case Diary to the concerned Officer-in-Charge for further investigation. In cross-examination, he deposed that he did not prepare any search list. He did not know whether the appellant had been granted anticipatory bail. He further deposed that he had not obtained the FSL report. He deposed that he had visited the place of occurrence at around 1.45 hours on 23.08.2012 and prepared a sketch map with an index at the place of occurrence. He deposed that he had not used any scale at the time of preparing the sketch map. He deposed that he had not taken any photograph of the place of occurrence. He deposed that he had not made any seizure from the place of occurrence. He deposed that it was not a fact that the prosecutrix had told him that she had gone with a torch at the place of occurrence and identified the appellant with the torchlight. He deposed that it was not a fact that the witness Susthir Mondal did not tell him that on 23.08.2012 at about 10.30 hours he returned to his house and saw the prosecutrix weeping and the prosecutrix told him that she had gone to the bank of the pond to attend nature’s call when the appellant hit her from the back and she fell down on the ground and then was raped. He further deposed that it was not a fact that Aajbus Mondal the witness did not tell him that on 22.08.2012 at about 9/9.30 pm the prosecutrix was weeping in her house when he had asked what had happened. He deposed that it was not a fact that his investigation was perfunctory. 8. In his examination under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the appellant basically denied any of the allegations and suggestions which were put to him. 9. In addition to the case of the prosecution, the following evidence was adduced and proved by the prosecution being Exhibit-1 the written complaint; Exhibit-2 the statement of the victim duly recorded under Section 164; Exhibit-3 the seizure list dated 23.08.2012 as regards seizure of the wearing apparels; Exhibit-4 the medical report of the victim; Exhibit-5 the formal FIR; Exhibit-6 the medical report of the appellant; Exhibit-7 the sketch map of the place of occurrence; and Exhibit-8 being the seizure list of the vaginal swab. 10. 10. In State of Punjab Vs. Gurmit Singh, (1996) 2 SCC 384 it was held that “21. Of late, crime against women in general and rape in particular is on the increase. It is an irony that while we are celebrating women’s rights in all spheres, we show little or no concern for her honour. It is a sad reflection on the attitude of indifference of the society towards the violation of human dignity of the victims of sex crimes. We must remember that a rapist not only violates the victim’s privacy and personal integrity, but inevitably causes serious psychological as well as physical harm in the process. Rape is not merely a physical assault it is often destructive of the whole personality of the victim. A murderer destroys the physical body of his victim, a rapist degrades the very soul of the helpless female. The court, therefore, shoulder a great responsibility while trying an accused on charges of rape. They must deal with such cases with utmost sensitivity. The courts should examine the broader probabilities of a case and not get swayed by minor contradictions or insignificant discrepancies in the statement of the prosecutrix, which are not of a fatal nature, to throw out an otherwise reliable prosecution case. If evidence of the prosecutrix inspires confidence, it must be relied upon without seeking corroboration of her statement in material particulars. If for some reason the court finds it difficult to place implicit reliance on her testimony, it may look for evidence which may lend assurance to her testimony of corroboration required in the case of an accomplice. The testimony of the prosecutrix must be appreciated in the background of the entire case and the trial court must be alive to its responsibility and be sensitive while dealing with cases involving sexual molestations”. 11. Similar views have been expressed in repeated pronouncements of the Supreme Court of India including in Dinesh alias Buddha vs. State of Rajasthan, (2006) 3 SCC 771 when the Hon’ble Court said this “6. Sexual violence apart from being a dehumanising act is an unlawful intrusion on the right of privacy and sanctity of a female. It is a serious blow to her supreme honour and offends her self-esteem and dignity-it degrades and humiliates the victim and where the victim is a helpless innocent child or a minor, it leaves behind a traumatic experience. Sexual violence apart from being a dehumanising act is an unlawful intrusion on the right of privacy and sanctity of a female. It is a serious blow to her supreme honour and offends her self-esteem and dignity-it degrades and humiliates the victim and where the victim is a helpless innocent child or a minor, it leaves behind a traumatic experience. A rapist not only causes physical injuries but more indelibly leaves a scar on the most cherished possession of a woman i.e. her dignity, honour, reputation and not the least her chastity. Rape is not only a crime against the person of a woman, it is a crime against the entire society. It destroys, as noted by this Court in Bodhisattwa Gautam v. Subhra Chakraborty, (1996) 1 SCC 490 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 133 : AIR 1996 SC 922 , the entire psychology of a woman and pushes her into deep emotional crisis. It is a crime against basic human rights, and is also violative of the victim’s most cherished fundamental right, namely, the right to life contained in Article 21 of the Constitution. The courts are, therefore, expected to deal with cases of sexual crime against women with utmost sensitivity. Such cases need to be dealt with sternly and severely. A socially sensitised judge, in our opinion, is a better statutory armour in cases of crime against women than long clauses of penal provisions, containing complex exceptions and provisos.” 12. The case of the prosecution primarily rests on the testimony of the prosecutrix (PW-1). The prosecution has tried to seek corroboration from the testimony of the husband of the prosecutrix (PW-2) and the relatives to whom the prosecutrix narrated the incident soon after commission of the incident. It has been repeatedly reiterated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India that “ 11. It is well settled that a prosecutrix complaining of having been a victim of the offence of rape is not an accomplice after the crime. There is no rule of law that her testimony cannot be acted without corroboration in material particulars. Her testimony has to be appreciated on the principle of probabilities just as the testimony of any other witness; a high degree of probability having been shown to exist in view of the subject-matter being a criminal charge. There is no rule of law that her testimony cannot be acted without corroboration in material particulars. Her testimony has to be appreciated on the principle of probabilities just as the testimony of any other witness; a high degree of probability having been shown to exist in view of the subject-matter being a criminal charge. However, if the court of facts may find it difficult to accept the version of the prosecutrix on its face value, it may search for evidence, direct or circumstantial, which would lend assurance to her testimony.” (State of Rajasthan Vs. N.K., (2000) 5 SCC 30 ) 13. Moreover in Ranjit Hazarika Vs. State of Assam, (1998) 8 SCC 635 it has been held as follows: “8. Corroborative evidence is not an imperative component of judicial credence in every case of rape. Corroboration as a condition for judicial reliance on the testimony of the prosecutrix is not a requirement of law but a guidance of prudence under given circumstances. It must not be overlooked that a woman or a girl subjected to sexual assault is not an accomplice to the crime but is a victim of another person’s lust and it is improper and undesirable to test her evidence with a certain amount of suspicion, treating her as if she were an accomplice. Inferences have to be drawn from a given set of facts and circumstances with realistic diversity and not dead uniformity lest that type of rigidity in the shape of rule of law is introduced through a new form of testimonial tyranny making justice a casualty. Courts cannot cling to a fossil formula and insist upon corroboration even if, taken as a whole, the case spoken of by the victim of sex crime strikes the judicial mind as probable.” 14. Furthermore in, Raju vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2008) 15 SCC 133 it has been held as follows: “10. It is a basic principle that ordinarily the evidence of a prosecutrix should not be suspected and should be believed, more so as her statement has to be evaluated on a par with that of an injured witness and if the evidence is reliable, no corroboration is necessary. It is a basic principle that ordinarily the evidence of a prosecutrix should not be suspected and should be believed, more so as her statement has to be evaluated on a par with that of an injured witness and if the evidence is reliable, no corroboration is necessary. Undoubtedly, the aforesaid observations must carry the greatest weight and we respectfully agree with them, but at the same time they cannot be universally and mechanically applied to the facts of every case of sexual assault which comes before the court.” 15. I find no substance in the argument made on behalf of the appellant that the FIR had not been formally exhibited in these proceedings. In his deposition PW-4 categorically identified the signature in the FIR which was marked as Exhibit-1/1. He deposed that the FIR was written as per the instruction of the prosecutrix and he had signed the same. The prosecutrix herself had identified her signature in the FIR and identified the same which was marked as Exhibit-1. PW-6 the SubInspector had also identified the endorsement and the signature made in the FIR. He had submitted that the formal FIR was filled up and signed by him. In the circumstances, this argument made on behalf of the appellant is rejected. 16. It is the case of the prosecutrix that, at around 9/9.30 pm she had visited a pukur for performing nature’s call when the appellant had pushed her to the ground, gagged her face and committed rape against her will. She said that she was carrying a torch light and could identify the face of the appellant. It appears that the place of occurrence was full of bushes. This fact was corroborated both by PW-1 and PW-2 in their evidence. In fact, the prosecutrix had also deposed that there was a scuffle for five minutes between her and the appellant and she had tried to resist the appellant. However, she only sustained one abrasion on her left hand and did not sustain any other injury. This was not only the evidence of PW-1 but a fact which was substantiated from the medical report being Exhibit-4. Significantly, no medical report nor any doctor was examined by the prosecution nor adduced in evidence. The only medical report was the potency test of the appellant which per se proves nothing. Furthermore, no FSR report was tendered as evidence. 17. Significantly, no medical report nor any doctor was examined by the prosecution nor adduced in evidence. The only medical report was the potency test of the appellant which per se proves nothing. Furthermore, no FSR report was tendered as evidence. 17. There is another strange feature to the evidence of the prosecutrix (PW-1). She deposed that the place of occurrence was very close to the tea stall and the macha made of bamboo on the road where the villagers usually gossip. However, it was only her husband who had come to the place of occurrence after hearing her screaming and shouting. From the evidence of the prosecutrix and her husband, it is strange that there were no third parties who arrived at the place of occurrence. This is all the more startling keeping in mind that the place of occurrence was in the vicinity of many homes. 18. Furthermore, the prosecutrix had deposed that she identified the face of the appellant by focusing a torchlight on the face but she had not mentioned any such torchlight in her statement before the Magistrate. Strangely enough, no torchlight was seized by the investigating authority. 19. Next, the oral evidence of the prosecutrix was that her husband had not seen the appellant but her husband had deposed that he had seen the appellant fleeing away from the place of occurrence. The evidence of PW-3, PW-4 and PW-5 who are all relatives of the prosecutrix is clearly hearsay insofar as identification of the appellant is concerned and no reliance ought to be placed on the same. 20. Furthermore, PW-1 had deposed that the appellant had filed one case against her husband and her brother-in-law on the basis that they had assaulted him. It is true that the defence did not adduce any evidence of the particulars case of the filed by the appellant both against the prosecutrix husband and his cousin (PW-4) but the factum of such cases pending and having been filed was categorically admitted by the prosecutrix (PW-1) and her husband’s cousin (PW-4). 21. There was no medical evidence that there was any kind of penetrative assault on the prosecutrix. Her wearing apparel was never sent for examination and in any event no report of there being any semen on the wearing apparel of the prosecutrix was proved by forensic evidence. 22. 21. There was no medical evidence that there was any kind of penetrative assault on the prosecutrix. Her wearing apparel was never sent for examination and in any event no report of there being any semen on the wearing apparel of the prosecutrix was proved by forensic evidence. 22. I also find it difficult to believe the truthfulness of the version of the prosecutrix. Her narration of the incident becomes basically infirm on account of being contradicted by the evidence of the other witnesses. The defence had in the cross-examination of PW-1 given a suggestion of false implication. It is not necessary for the defence to prove beyond reasonable doubt the truth of such suggestion. However, both PW-1 and PW-4 admitted that there was a case filed by the appellant and this is sufficient in my opinion to improbabalize the case of the prosecution and raise the doubt of false implication. 23. In the light of the aforesaid facts, there is a significant part of the story of the prosecutrix which is not corroborated by the medical evidence nor by the evidence of the other witnesses. The evidence of the prosecution including the version of the prosecutrix does not inspire confidence and is not of sterling quality. There are numerous facts morefully discussed hereinabove which improbabalizes the case of the prosecution. All the aforesaid factors cast a serious doubt on the case of the prosecution. Unfortunately, the broad probabilities of the case were not considered in the impugned judgment. The evidence of the victim/prosecutrix and her husband (PW-2) are improbable and unreliable to say the least and there are significant improbabilities. The story of the prosecution is based on assumptions, surmises and conjectures. (Sham Singh Vs. The State of Haryana, AIR (2018) SC 3976. 24. There is a presumption of innocence in all criminal trials and the onus is on the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused is guilty of the offence charged. “The question in turn raises a fundamental issue of penal policy: how far is it permissible, for the purpose of securing the conviction of the guilty, to run the risk of innocent persons being convicted?” (The Proof Of Guilt by Glanville Williams at page 154). In Raju Vs. State of M.P., (2008) 15 SCC 133 it was held as follows: “11. In Raju Vs. State of M.P., (2008) 15 SCC 133 it was held as follows: “11. It cannot be lost sight of that rape causes the greatest distress and humiliation to the victim but at the same time a false allegation of rape can cause equal distress, humiliation and damage to the accused as well. The accused must also be protected against the possibility of false implication, particularly where a large number of accused are involved. It must, further, be borne in mind that the broad principle is that an injured witness was present at the time when the incident happened and that ordinarily such a witness would not tell a lie as to the actual assailants, but there is no presumption or any basis for assuming that the statement of such a witness is always correct or without any embellishment or exaggeration.” (emphasis added) 25. I am fully aware of the fact that any irregularity or defect in an investigation by itself cannot be made a ground for acquitting the accused [ (2002) 3 SCC 57 at para 8, (1999) 9 SCC 525 at para 8]. It is also well settled that minor discrepancies and variations in the evidence of witnesses ought not to obliterate or otherwise acceptable evidence. It is true that corroboration of evidence with mathematical niceties ought not to be expected in criminal cases. (State of Uttar Pradesh Vs. M.K. Anthony, (1985) 1 SCC 505 at para 10, Prabhu Dayal Vs. State of Rajasthan, (2018) 8 SCC 127 at paras 18 to 21). However, notwithstanding the aforesaid well settled principles I am of the opinion that there are various factors in the case of the prosecution which cast a serious doubt about the genuineness of the case of the prosecutrix and that she had been raped by the appellant. In view of such deficiencies and loose ends pointed out in the case of the prosecution and taking a holistic approach, I am not minded to uphold the conviction. 26. I, therefore, am of the opinion that the appellant is certainly entitled to the benefit of the doubt. I am of the view that the prosecution has failed to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt. 27. I, therefore, set aside the conviction of the appellant under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code and allow the appeal. The appellant is acquitted of the charge framed against him. I am of the view that the prosecution has failed to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt. 27. I, therefore, set aside the conviction of the appellant under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code and allow the appeal. The appellant is acquitted of the charge framed against him. He shall set at liberty if not required to be detained in connection with any other offence. 28. A copy of the judgment along with the Lower Court Records be sent back to the Court below at once. A certified copy of this order, if applied for, be given to the parties on a priority basis upon compliance with all necessary formalities. Joymalya Bagchi, J. : I agree.