JUDGMENT AND ORDER : S.G. Shah, J. Heard learned advocate Mr. Mishra for the appellant and Mr. Manish Bhatt, learned Senior Counsel appearing with Mrs. Mauna M. Bhatt, learned advocate for the concerned respondent. Perused the record. 2. Considering the provision of Section 30 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 (hereinafter referred to as "the W.C. Act" for short), it would be necessary to frame substantial question of law since the appeal is already admitted long back in the year 2001 i.e. before 17 years. On verification of record and considering details, the substantial question of law would arise thus: "Whether Commissioner can rely upon documents which are not proved on record?" 3. The appellant herein is an original claimant whereas respondents are original opponents before Commissioner under the W.C. Act and Labour Court of Bhavnagar in non-fatal workman compensation case No. 9/1998. The appellant has preferred such application under the W.C. Act claiming Rs. 2,32,828- 50 Paisa towards compensation from the opponents contending that he received injuries when he was working in the factory of the opponents. It is his case that on 27.12.1997 when he was working on the machine in the factory of the opponent, another employee had used a hammer to hit the iron pipe, during such hammering because of the piece of iron, hit the eyes of the appellant and he received serious injuries on his left eye. 4. However, respondents have defended such claim petition by filing a small reply at Exh.7 in two pages only that appellant was not a workman as per the W.C. Act, more particularly, considering the definition of workman provided in Section 2(h) and 2(e) of the Act. 5. During trial, appellant has produced all relevant documentary evidence regarding his treatment and after effect, however, at present, when appeal is against dismissal of claim by the Commissioner considering that there is no evidence to confirm that the appellant was serving in the factory of the opponent, though, evidence regarding injury is material to decide the quantum of compensation, initially, we have to scrutinize the evidence for the confirmation that whether appellant was able to establish that he was working with the respondent and that he has received the injuries out of and during the course of his employment or not. 6. 6. The scrutiny of record shows that to prove that appellant was workman of the opponent/respondent, the appellant has examined few witnesses. 7. Pw-1 is the appellant himself at Exh.16. In his deposition, he has categorically deposed that how he has been injured and that he has received statutory notice and referred affidavit of his witnesses. He was cross examined by the opponent, wherein, according to the opponent, he confirms that there is no name in attendance register of the opponent; so also the name of the other employees, who he has referred as Champak @ Sampat and Kishan Dev. Therefore, it is submitted by the respondent that except bare words by the claimant that he was serving with the opponent in his deposition there is nothing clear and certain to prove that he was in the service of the opponent. 8. The appellant has also examined one Jodhabhai Sandhabhai at Exh.22 as PW-2, who identified his affidavit which is now produced on record at Exh.23 and submits that he has signed such affidavit. It is his say that he was eye witnesses to the incident of accident as narrated by the appellant that how the appellant was injured and that how he has helped him in his treatment. In his cross examination, he confirms that he does not know when he was serving with the opponent and also confirmed that security contractor was one Zala but he also admits that he has served there only for a month. 9. The appellant has also examined one Jamalbhai Bachbhai Mahetar as PW-3 at Exh. 24, who was milkman in that area and he also deposed on oath before the tribunal that on 27.12.1997, he shown the appellant sitting in a car from his factory with injuries and identified the appellant that he was serving in the factory of the respondent. He was cross examined wherein nothing could be brought on record by the opponent. 10. The appellant has also examined one Manubhai Satarbhai as PW-4 at Exh.26. He supports the case of the appellant confirming that the appellant had received injuries on 27.12.1997 in factory of the opponent because he was also serving there. He was cross examined wherein nothing could be brought on record by the opponent. 10. The appellant has also examined one Manubhai Satarbhai as PW-4 at Exh.26. He supports the case of the appellant confirming that the appellant had received injuries on 27.12.1997 in factory of the opponent because he was also serving there. However, since he was unable to disclose the name of all the persons working with him in factory of the opponent, he was also cross examined but there is nothing in his cross examination to prove anything against the appellant. 11. As against that, the respondents have examined one Deval Harshal Zala at Exh.29 who was serving as Manager of the respondent. In his deposition, he strictly denies that appellant - claimant was ever serving with the opponent. He was cross examined at length wherein he has confirmed that there is no evidence with the claimant to confirm that he was serving in the factory of the opponent at the relevant time. 12. Opponents have also produced on record several documentary evidence in the form of register of wages and presence of its employees. However, record shows that though such registers are produced on record and though it is referred in the deposition of witness, Deval Harshal Zala, it has not been exhibited on record and, thereby practically, they are not on record. It is also evident from the record that though witness has tried to say that he is maintaining such registers, he has not identified writing in such registers and did not confirm that such registers are being written by him. It is also clear from such documentary evidence read with deposition of the witness of the opponent that even if we believe that such registers were in existence and genuine on the date of accident, then, there is a contradiction, inasmuch as, it is specifically admitted by the witness that he has joined the services with the opponent from 25.10.1997, the accident has taken place on 27.12.1997. Whereas, the registers are from the month of April, 1997 and, therefore, if witness is saying that he is maintaining such register, it becomes clear that witness has no personal knowledge about the register so far as entry prior to November, 1997 is concerned. Whereas, the registers are from the month of April, 1997 and, therefore, if witness is saying that he is maintaining such register, it becomes clear that witness has no personal knowledge about the register so far as entry prior to November, 1997 is concerned. Therefore, if witness wants to say that register maintained by himself, means he has written the register, then also, he is telling lie because writing of the register is almost of the same person from all the months from April, 1997 till February, 1998 or otherwise, if it is not maintained by the witness but maintained by somebody else, then, such person has not been examined nor any of the person whose signature is alleged to be endorsed on revenue stamp as receipt of salary was not examined. On the contrary, when appellant has examined two witnesses whose name were found in such register though it was inquired with such witness that whether his name is there in the register or not, it was not clarified from such witness that whether he has put his hands while accepting the salaries as disclosed in such registers and thereby, such registers are the only real and genuine registers. But in any case, when such registers are not exhibited on record and thereby, non-admission of any evidence may be because it is not properly proved, then, documents though available in paper book, cannot be relied upon. Unfortunately, the total concentration of the opponent is on such documentary evidence, when it is vehemently submitted that when such documentary evidence is produced on record, there is no error in the impugned judgment. However, the opponent has failed to realize that production of documents is different than proving and admitting a document in evidence. I do not find out either in the Rojkam or on original document to confirm that it was ever admitted in evidence in accordance with law. Therefore, only production of documents and its reference in deposition is not sufficient to admit such document in evidence, more particularly, when as discussed hereinabove, the witness who examined by the opponent cannot prove such document since such documents were prior to his joining the respondent as Manager. There is no other evidence adduced by the opponent. Therefore, only production of documents and its reference in deposition is not sufficient to admit such document in evidence, more particularly, when as discussed hereinabove, the witness who examined by the opponent cannot prove such document since such documents were prior to his joining the respondent as Manager. There is no other evidence adduced by the opponent. On the contrary, though affidavit of one Harisinh Zala has been produced on record at mark 15/1, the opponent has failed to examine him as witness though it was admitted that said Zala was security guard and, thereby, he was able to depose and disclose about the incident. Though such affidavit cannot be relied upon, a glance to it as scrutiny of register at mark 12/1 and 12/2 makes it clear that even if such affidavit produced on record by the opponent themselves, said security guard has not dare to state on oath that either claimant was not serving with the opponent or that there was no such incident at all. Therefore, if at all said person was security guard, he would have certainly disclosed something about the incident but when he is not examined and when he has not disclosed anything about the incident, there is reason to believe that opponents are taking a chance to avoid their liability to pay compensation probably because they have not insured such risk. 13. Therefore, the Commissioner under W.C. Act has miserably erred in relying upon the registers which are not proved on record which amounts to material irregularity as well as illegality and, therefore, there is reason to interfere with in such award when there are ample oral evidence by different persons confirming that deceased was working in the factory of opponent and that he has received injuries out of and during the course of his employment. 14. There is one another reason in favour of the appellant to hold that respondents are taking chance to get rid off such responsibility when appellant has served a statutory notice dated 13.4.1999 and when such notice duly served upon the respondent and when copy of such notice as well as its acknowledgment are produced and proved on record at Exhs.18 and 19. It is clear that respondents have never responded to such notice by denying that appellant was never in their service as they have done in their Written Statement and they also remain silent during their evidence so far as contents of such notice and their non-response is concerned. 15. Therefore, it is to be believed that practically opponents does not have any defence at all when they received statutory notice to pay compensation at the earliest or to face a proceeding wherein there is possibility of imposing penalty upto 50% with interest and when such fact is categorically disclosed in para 5 of such notice at Exh.18. Therefore, the defence taken before the Commissioner in petition before it is nothing but an after thought only and unfortunately opponent could not prove such defence during their evidence though they came forward with story that appellant was never working under him. Thereby, there is material irregularity committed by the Commissioner under the W.C. Act in relying upon documents which are not proved in accordance with law and discarding oral evidence; so also the documentary evidence in the form of statutory notice and medical evidence. 16. Thus when it is settled legal position that documents which are not proved cannot be relied upon and when Commissioner has relied upon such unproved documents, the question raised in para 2 above needs to be answered clearly that Commissioner under the W.C. Act cannot rely upon documents which are not proved on record and thereby when it is clear on record that Commissioner has relied upon such documents which are not proved, there is substantial question of law which results in favour of appellant. 17. Thereby, though facts and circumstances are very much clear as stated hereinabove, the respondents have relied upon several decisions though there is no substance in their defence. However, when defendants have referred such decisions at par, I have no option but to refer it hereunder: - [1] Lakshminarayana Shetty v. Shantha, (2003) 9 SCC 190 , wherein in an order form only, Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that if deceased fall down while doing the work of painting a house undergoing by himself under a contract, he do not fall within the domain of W.C. Act. It is difficult to realize that how and why such judgment is concerned with the present case, when factual details are altogether a different, inasmuch as, in the reported case, the victim himself was assigned a work of contract basis and, therefore, he cannot be considered as a workman of his own when he was doing the work on contract basis. Therefore, such judgment would not help the opponent to get rid off from their liability. [2] Gottumukkala Appala Narasimha Raju v. National Insurance Co. Ltd., (2007) 13 SCC 446 , wherein also the facts are quite different, inasmuch as, after vehicular accident, wife has come forward with a case that his husband was employed by her as a workman when Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that in absence of any specific contract, it is wholly absurd to say that husband would be a workman of his wife and more particularly when there is no documentary proof to establish a contract of employee between husband and wife. However, this is a judgment based upon particular facts and circumstances before the Court and, thereby, it does not lay down a law so as to hold that to prove the relationship of employer and employee a written contract is must. The scrutiny of judgment shows that in-fact there are several other infirmity in the story of the claimant so as to decide the matter against them and, therefore, this judgment would also not rescue the opponent. [3] Om Prakamsh Batish v. Ranjit @ Ranbir Kaur, (2008) 12 SCC 212 , wherein it is held that entering into realm of appreciation of evidence adduced by the appellant per se is out of bound for an appellate court which is concerned with the determination of a substantial question of law pursuant to provision of Section 30 of the W.C. Act. However, in the present case, when Commissioner has relied upon the documents which are otherwise not proved on record it cannot be said that this Court has re-appreciated the evidence but it is certainly a material question of law to verify that whether documents relied upon by the Court are properly proved on record or not. However, in the present case, when Commissioner has relied upon the documents which are otherwise not proved on record it cannot be said that this Court has re-appreciated the evidence but it is certainly a material question of law to verify that whether documents relied upon by the Court are properly proved on record or not. In addition to such legal proposition, factual position between the Hon'ble Supreme Court was such that workman was employee for a limited period for carrying out repair works in a residential house when Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that same does not fall within the provisions of the Act to describe him as workman. With due respect, last line of para 25 of such judgment when reads that "even otherwise, working in a residential house does not satisfy the requirement of law." Therefore, this judgment would not help the respondent to get rid off from their liability when present appellant was not working at residence but was working in factory. [4] Golla Ranjanna v. Divisional Manager, (2017) 1 SCC 45 , Hon'ble Supreme Court held that under the W.C. Act, Commissioner is the last authority on facts and in view of this limited jurisdiction, exercise by the High Court is not in consonance with Section 30 of the Act. However, it cannot be ignored that for arriving at such conclusion also, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has categorically observed that parliament restricted scope of appeals u/s. 30 only to substantial question of law, this being welfare legislature. So far as facts are concerned, such proposition cannot be completed in general terms because practically what is the dispute before the Hon'ble Supreme Court and what is the outcome of such dispute is more material rather than some observation on such issue. So far as facts are concerned, such proposition cannot be completed in general terms because practically what is the dispute before the Hon'ble Supreme Court and what is the outcome of such dispute is more material rather than some observation on such issue. Therefore, if we peruse the factual details the issue before the Hon'ble Supreme Court was regarding determination of disability of workman when Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that it is purely a question of fact and as per Section 4(1)(e)(ii) only a qualified medical practitioner has to access permanent disability and, thereby, when insurance company did not contend that assessment of disability was not based on evidence or it was perverse or that doctor who assessed disability was not qualified and when Commissioner has awarded amount based upon such disability determined by the qualified doctor, it was held that High Court was not justified in interfering with order passed by the Commissioner in an appeal preferred by the insurance company contending that Commissioner who reduced the disability percentage while calculating quantum of compensation. With this reference, Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that High Court has no jurisdiction, considering the provisions of Section 30 to re-appreciate the evidence. However, in the present case, there is no question of re-appreciation of evidence though evidence needs to be discussed but the real issue and question of law involved in this matter is with reference to relying upon the documentary evidence which is not proved on record. Thereby, the question of law involved in this matter, as disclosed in starting of this judgment is to the effect that whether Commissioner can rely upon the documents on record without it is being admitted in evidence in accordance with Indian Evidence Act, 1877. It is an undisputed fact that presence and wage registers though produced on record, they are not proved in accordance with law and, thereby, not admitted in evidence and, therefore, it was not exhibited but remained on record as mark 12/1 and 12/2 only. However, when Commissioner has relied upon such documents, the real issue is certainly a question of law that whether non-exhibited i.e. unproved documents can be relied upon? 18. However, when Commissioner has relied upon such documents, the real issue is certainly a question of law that whether non-exhibited i.e. unproved documents can be relied upon? 18. Though it can be said that appeal under W.C. Act is maintainable only if any substantial question of law is involved at appellate stage, the fact remains that in the present case, the substantial question of law is certainly involved as discussed hereinabove. However, with reference to the judgments based upon Section 30 of the Act, though such judgments are confirming that absence of substantial question of law, the appeal is not permissible, the scrutiny of all such judgments practically confirms that whenever High Court has modified the judgment of the Commissioner awarding compensation in favour of the victim of incident without framing question of law and simply by describing the factual determination by the Commissioner modified the award and, thereby, when the judgment of the Commissioner has been interfered on factual determination by the High Court, Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that such appeals are not maintainable when question of law is not involved when High Court has re-appreciated the evidence. 19. However, some of the judgments which are discussed hereinabove makes it clear that when either the Commissioner or the high court has failed to award compensation to the claimant, considering the nature, legislature being beneficial for the victims of accident, Hon'ble the Supreme Court has held that victims are entitled to compensation and in all such appeal there is no clarity or reference of Section 30 of the Act that such appeals are not maintainable. 20. The decision in the case of Maghar Singh v. Jashwant Singh, (1998) 9 SCC 134 is by 3 judges of Hon'ble Supreme Court wherein such larger bench was dealing with the dismissal of claim petition by the Commissioner on the ground that the appellant had failed to prove that he was in employment of the respondent at the relevant point of time and had sustained the injuries in the course of employment, while dismissing his claim. Hon'ble Supreme Court has considered the fact that the respondent - employer had taken the victim to the hospital after he sustained injuries and held that Commissioner has overlooked such facts and that there is no reason to believe that victim would wrongly point a finger at the respondent as his employer. Hon'ble Supreme Court has considered the fact that the respondent - employer had taken the victim to the hospital after he sustained injuries and held that Commissioner has overlooked such facts and that there is no reason to believe that victim would wrongly point a finger at the respondent as his employer. Thereby, while confirming the liability of the employer to pay compensation, Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that it is not unusual for the employer not to issue a letter of appointment or make entries in the register regarding payment of salary to avoid certain legal consequences. Therefore, only because there is no reference of the employer to take the victim at hospital in medical papers, when witness of the claimant as well as claimant have stated on oath before the Commissioner that manager of the respondent has taken him to the hospital of Dr. Malaviya and in cross examination, when such evidence was neither rebutted nor disproved by cogent and reliable evidence, there is reason to believe that such 4 witnesses i.e. claimant at Exh.16, Jodhabhai at Exh.22, Jamalbhai at Exh.24 and Munnabhai at Exh.26, against Manager Devalbhai who was referred by all above witnesses as a person who has taken the victim in hospital, though he has stated on oath that on the date of incident, he was in Ahmedabad; he did not bother to prove his Alibi. Though he (Manager of the Respondent - Devalbhai) has stated that he is having the evidence to prove that he was in Ahmedabad, he has audacity to say that he will produce such evidence if Court asks for it. This is really surprising piece of deposition that he will produce such evidence if Court asks for it, otherwise he will remain silent, more particularly, even in cross examination, when he reconfirmed that he has not produced such evidence and, therefore, there is no need of either the Court or other side to ask for such evidence but it is for the witnesses to produce evidence on record if at all it is available with him. Therefore, if witness once discloses that he has evidence to prove that he was in Ahmedabad but failed to produce it though it was confirmed in his cross examination that he has not produced such evidence, it is his duty to produce such evidence on record rather than stating that he will produce such evidence if Court's ask for it. Therefore, there is reason to believe that witness Devalbhai being Manager of the respondent who has taken the victim to the hospital is not telling the truth, more particularly, when he even failed to identify the witness Munnabhai who was certainly serving under him since his name is there in the register referred hereinabove and the fact is admitted by the Manager. Therefore, his deposition cannot be believed as gospel truth. 21. One more thing is also clear and certain that though salary register and presence register are from the month of April, 1997 and though witness was not in service of the respondent till October, 1997, he has audacity to say that handwriting in the registers are of his own in entire register which is certainly not possible when he was not in service at all. Therefore, on one hand, such registers are not proved on record and on the other hand, respondent's witness is not trust-worthy. Therefore, relying upon the decision by full bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court it can be held that there is ample evidence to prove that deceased was serving with the respondent. 22. In the case of Harijan Mangri Siddakka v. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., (2008) 16 SCC 115 , on the contrary Hon'ble Supreme Court has remanded the matter back when there is no discussion of factual details as to whether there was any connection with the death and the use of the vehicle which confirms that though appeal is not maintainable in absence of substantial question of law even Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that discussion of factual details is must and, therefore, it cannot be said that no appeal is maintainable against Commissioner's award under the Act. 23. In the case of Jaya Biswal v. Branch Manager, Iffco Tokio General Insurance Co. 23. In the case of Jaya Biswal v. Branch Manager, Iffco Tokio General Insurance Co. Ltd., (2016) 11 SCC 201 , Hon'ble Supreme Court has practically re-appreciated the evidence for coming to altogether a different decision than the Commissioner under the Act for the conclusion that victim was injured in accident arising out of and in the course of his employment. Therefore, it cannot be said that factual details are not to be examined. 24. Whereas in the case of Rajesh Kumar @ Raju v. Yudhvir Singh, (2008) 7 SCC 305 , Hon'ble Supreme Court has considered that which document is to be considered as admissible in evidence when particular certificate was not proved on record in accordance with the provisions of Evidence Act. Thereby, though disability certificate was produced on record disclosing the disability to the tune of 60%, when such certificate was not proved on record, and thereby when tribunal and High Court has considered disability as 30% only, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has upheld such determination. Thereby, it is settled legal position that inadmissible document cannot be relied upon. 25. Whereas, in the present case, the record shows that there is ample evidence by different witnesses who have deposed before the Court on oath that they have seen the incident wherein the appellant was injured which resulted into loss of sight of one eye. There is ample evidence on record by the appellant himself that how he has been injured, result of the incident, its treatment and ultimately loss of vision which has been certified by the Civil Surgeon. Therefore, there is no reason to discard such evidence on oath before the Commissioner, more particularly, when respondents have not only failed to rebut such evidence but also failed to prove by their independent evidence that the appellant was not serving in their factory or that he had never received injuries as alleged; so also its result. On the contrary, the respondents have concentrated their defence on limited point that victim - appellant was not their workman and to prove such fact they simply relied upon some documents which they could not prove on record and, thereby, they could not prove that the appellant - victim was not in their services, when they could not disprove the incident and its result. In other words, there is no sufficient evidence on record by the respondent/s to confirm that no incident has taken place at all though for such submission, respondents are relied upon their defence only, that since appellant was not in their services, there is no question of happening of any such incident. However, when 3 witnesses have categorically deposed before the Court that they have witnessed the incident taking place as alleged by the applicant and that Manager had managed to shift the appellant to the Hospital, such evidence cannot be ignored. It is also clear that the Manager had failed to disclose his evidence to prove that he was not available in the city on the date of incident. 26. In view of above facts and circumstances, now it becomes clear that claimant has received injuries during the course of employment and, therefore, he is entitled to compensation from the employer irrespective of proof on record by him to show that his name is in the salary register or presence register since such registers are not proved on record and since larger bench of Hon'ble Supreme Court has confirmed in the case of Maghar Singh that it is not unusual for the employer not to issue a letter of appointment or make entries in the register regarding payment of salary to avoid certain legal consequences. 27. Then come to the question of quantum of compensation that may be awarded to the claimant. Considering the fact that incident is of the year 1997, I do not see any reason to remand the matter back with a conclusion that the appellant is entitled to compensation under W.C. Act for determination by the Commissioner regarding quantum of compensation and, therefore, when Record and Proceedings is available before this Court and, thereby, when all relevant material is on hand, it would be appropriate to consider the quantum of compensation and to pass appropriate orders in this appeal only. 28. 28. For the quantum of compensation of claimant, as in addition to oral evidence which is discussed herein and wherein all the witnesses have disclosed that how the incident has taken place and what are the injuries received by the employer, produced on record several documentary evidence which are as under: - School leaving certificate of the claimant at Exh.17 disclosing the Date of Birth of the Appellant as 14.6.1964 whereby age of the claimant on the date of incident would be 32 years and 6 months. Statutory notice dated 11.4.1998 at Exh.18 Postal receipt of above notice dated 11.4.1998 at Exh.19 Acknowledgment receipt of above notice dated 11.4.1998 at Exh.20 Complaint filed by the appellant against the respondent u/Ss.303, 504, 506(1) of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 at Exh.21 29. The treatment papers are at mark 10/1 to 11 and disability certificate issued by Civil Hospital i.e. at mark 10/15 which shows that iron piece has damaged the left eye of the claimant and, thereby appellant is 100% blind by left eye. Thereby, he has lost his vision of one eye. When all other documents are referred by the appellant and all other witnesses in their deposition and when there is no evidence to rebut such evidence, there is no reason to discard it. Therefore, considering the loss of vision of one eye, as per Schedule 1 of W.C. Act, the permanent partial disablement would be 30% (Item at Sr. No.26) regarding loss of vision of one eye without complication or disablement of eye part and the other being normal. Therefore, when salary of the appellant was Rs. 75/- per day and, thereby, Rs. 1,875/- per month, though appellant has claimed Rs. 2,250/-, considering weekly off, the actual monthly income of the appellant would be Rs. 1,875/-. Therefore, compensation for permanent partial disability would be as provided in Section 4(c) of the Act. Thereby, initially an amount equal to 60% of the monthly wages of the injured claimant is to be multiplied by the relevant factor in case of permanent total disablement and in case of permanent partial disablement, an amount of compensation would be equal to the percentage of loss of earning capacity caused by that injured of the compensation which would have been payable in the case of permanent total disablement as specified in Section 4(b). For the purpose, the calculation would be considered on the date of incident i.e. 27.12.1997 i.e. after the amendment in 1995, hence, 60% of monthly salary being Rs. 1,125/- is to be multiplied by relevant factor as per Schedule (iv) being 201.66, which equals to Rs. 2,26,867-50 Paisa. Thereby, for partial disablement upto 30%, the appellant is entitled to 30% of such amount which would be Rs. 68,060.25 Paisa. In absence of any other cogent and reliable evidence for medical expenses etc., there is no reason to award any such amount on such ground. 30. However, in view of the above facts and circumstances, the appellant is entitled to Rs. 68,060-25 Paisa towards compensation with 12% interest from the date of accident being 27.12.1997. 31. Similarly considering the facts and circumstances emerging from the record, when respondents have failed to pay the amount of compensation at the relevant time when it becomes due and when tried to avoid their liability to pay the same for all these two decades, claimant is entitled to 50% of the amount of compensation as penalty as provided under the Statute. 32. Present appeal is allowed in aforesaid terms. Record & Proceedings be sent back to the concerned Court at the earliest.