JUDGMENT AND ORDER : Vipul M. Pancholi, J. This appeal is filed under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent by the appellants - original petitioners against an order dated 19.07.2018 passed by the learned Single Judge in Special Civil Application No. 4765 of 2018 by which the learned Single Judge has dismissed the petition on the ground that the petitioners are having alternative statutory remedy available under Section 18 of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Securities Interest Act, 2002 (hereinafter referred to as "the SARFAESI Act"). 2. Heard learned Senior Counsel Mr.Deven Parikh assisted by learned advocates Mr. S.P. Majmudar and Mr. Shakti S. Jadeja for the appellants - petitioners and learned advocate Mr. S.S. Panesar for respondent No.1. 3. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants submitted that the respondents sanctioned credit facility of Rs. 105 crores in July, 2007 under Syndicate Bank consortium comprising of Syndicate Bank as lead Bank, Dena Bank, Union Bank of India and Axis Bank as member Banks under the consortium. Necessary documents were executed by the petitioners in favour of the Syndicate Bank consortium. Thereafter, the working capital limits was enhanced from Rs. 105 crores to Rs. 120 crores in July, 2011. Subsequently, the same was again enhanced from Rs. 120 crores to Rs. 170 crores in March, 2012. It is submitted that the case of the respondent Bank is that at the time of sanction of second revised credit facility, Dena Bank became the consortium leader and the name of consortium was changed to Dena Bank consortium. It is pointed out that the Dena Bank sanctioned credit facility of Rs. 114.50 crores to the petitioner company in October, 2012 and, thereafter, Dena Bank consortium agreed to enhance working capital limits from Rs. 170 crores to Rs. 205 crores. It is also pointed that on 25.06.2014, the respondent Banks had executed interse agreement under the consortium with respondent Dena Bank as consortium leader. 3.1 Learned Senior Counsel thereafter submitted that the respondent Banks issued demand notice under Section 13(2) of the SARFAESI Act in September and October, 2016. The petitioner Company submitted reply under Section 13(3)(A) of the SARFAESI Act. Thereafter, the respondent Dena Bank gave its reply to the objections of the petitioners vide its communication dated 31.12.2016 and other Banks have also submitted reply to the objections given by the petitioners. The petitioner Company submitted reply under Section 13(3)(A) of the SARFAESI Act. Thereafter, the respondent Dena Bank gave its reply to the objections of the petitioners vide its communication dated 31.12.2016 and other Banks have also submitted reply to the objections given by the petitioners. It is thereafter pointed out that the respondent Dena Bank on behalf of consortium took symbolic possession of some of the properties on 28.06.2018 and 29.06.2018 under Section 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act. 3.2 Learned Senior Counsel Mr. Parikh contends that the petitioners challenged the action of the respondents by filing a Securitisation Application being SA/253/2017 under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act before the Debt Recovery Tribunal II, Ahmedabad (DRT). It is pointed out that during the pendency of the said application, the respondent Dena Bank filed an application under Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act before the concerned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Mumbai, seeking assistance to take physical possession of the properties in question. On 23.01.2018, the concerned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Mumbai, passed an order and thereby allowed the application submitted by the respondent Bank. Therefore, the said action is also challenged by way of an amendment in the pending application before the DRT, Ahmedabad. 3.3 Learned Senior Counsel Mr. Parikh submitted that on 20.03.218, DRT, Ahmedabad, has returned the original Securitisation Application filed by the petitioners under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act to the petitioners for presenting the same before the DRT, Mumbai. The petitioners have, therefore, filed the captioned petition before this Court. It is submitted that the learned Single Judge, by the impugned order, dismissed the said petition on the ground that the petitioners have an alternative remedy of filing an appeal under Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act. The appellants - petitioners have, therefore, preferred this appeal. 3.4 Learned Senior Counsel assailed the impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge mainly on the ground that the DRT, Ahmedabad, has recorded specific finding that part of cause of action has arisen within the jurisdiction of DRT, Ahmedabad. However, out of five secured assets, four secured assets are situated at Mumbai, within the jurisdiction of DRTII at Mumbai and the concerned Chief Judicial Magistrate has passed an order under Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act and, therefore, it is convenient for the parties if Securitisation Application is filed before DRTII, Mumbai. However, out of five secured assets, four secured assets are situated at Mumbai, within the jurisdiction of DRTII at Mumbai and the concerned Chief Judicial Magistrate has passed an order under Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act and, therefore, it is convenient for the parties if Securitisation Application is filed before DRTII, Mumbai. Thus, it is contended that the DRT, Ahmedabad, though having territorial jurisdiction to entertain the application filed by the petitioners under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act, it has failed to exercise such jurisdiction and, therefore, the petitioners were justified in challenging the petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India before this Court. 3.5 Learned Senior Counsel would further contend that the order dated 20.03.2018 passed by the DRT, Ahmedabad, cannot be termed as 'order' within the meaning of Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act. It is contended that the DRT, Ahmedabad, has only returned the application for filing it before the DRTII, Mumbai, but DRT, Ahmedabad has not passed any order under Sections 17(3) and 17(4) of the SARFAESI Act. Thus, when there is no 'order' passed by the DRT, Ahmedabad, under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act, the appeal cannot be filed under Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act before the Appellate Forum. Thus, the learned Single Judge has committed an error while dismissing the petition on the ground that the petitioners are having alternative efficacious remedy under Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act. 3.6 In support of the aforesaid contentions, learned Senior Counsel has placed reliance upon the following decisions: (1) Sameer Singh Vs. Abdul Rab, (2015) 1 SCC 379 (2) Hari Vishnu Kamath Vs. Ahmad Ishaque, (1955) AIR SC 233 (3) Dhannalal Vs. Kalawatibai, (2002) 6 SCC 16 3.7 It is, therefore, urged that the impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge be set aside. 4. On the other hand, learned advocate Mr. S.S. Panesar appearing for the respondent Dena Bank, has supported the reasoning recorded by the learned Single Judge. It is submitted that the order dated 20.03.2018 passed by the DRT, Ahmedabad is challengeable before the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal under Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act. Thus, when the petitioners are having alternative efficacious statutory remedy available, the learned Single Judge has not committed any error while dismissing the petition on that ground. 4.1 Learned advocate Mr. Panesar has also submitted that dues of approximately Rs. Thus, when the petitioners are having alternative efficacious statutory remedy available, the learned Single Judge has not committed any error while dismissing the petition on that ground. 4.1 Learned advocate Mr. Panesar has also submitted that dues of approximately Rs. 425 crores are outstanding. 4.2 Learned advocate Mr. Panesar for the respondent Dena Bank has placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his submissions. (1) Standard Chartered Bank Vs. V. Noble Kumar and others, (2013) 9 SCC 620 (2) United Bank of India Vs. Satyawati Tondon and others, (2010) 8 SCC 110 (3) Authorized Officer, State Bank of Travancore and another vs. Mathew K.C., (2018) 3 SCC 85 4.3 It is therefore, urged that this appeal be dismissed. 5. We have heard learned advocates appearing for the parties and we have also gone through the material produced on record as well as the decisions upon which the reliance placed by the learned advocates. 6. It is revealed from the record that the petitioners have filed SA/253/2017 before the DRT, Ahmedabad, under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act. During the pendency of the said application, it was noticed by the DRT, Ahmedabad, that out of five secured assets, four secured assets are situated within the territorial jurisdiction of DRTII, Mumbai whereas one secured asset is situated at Surat within the jurisdiction of DRT, Ahmedabad. DRT, Ahmedabad, therefore, held that part of cause of action has arisen within the jurisdiction of the said Tribunal. However, looking to the other aspects i.e. the applicants and the respondent Banks are residing and carrying on business at Mumbai, loan transaction had also taken place at Mumbai, securitisation document has also created in favour of the respondent Bank by the petitioners - applicants at Mumbai, all the secured assets except property situated at Surat for which order under Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act is passed by the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Mumbai and original applications are also filed by the respondent Banks at DRT, Mumbai, it was observed by the DRT, Ahmedabad that it is convenient for all the parties that securitisation application should have been filed before the DRTII, Mumbai and, therefore, the application is returned to the petitioners - applicants for presentation to the proper forum at DRTII, Mumbai. 7. 7. At this stage, we would like to refer the relevant provisions contained in Sections 17 and 18 of the SARFAESI Act, which read as under : "17. Right to appeal (1) Any person (including borrower), aggrieved by any of the measures referred to in subsection (4) of section 13 taken by the secured creditor or his authorised officer under this Chapter, may make an application alongwith such fee, as may be prescribed to the Debts Recovery Tribunal having jurisdiction in the matter within forty-five days from the date on which such measure had been taken : PROVIDED that different fees may be prescribed for making the application by the borrower and the person other than the borrower. Explanation : For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that the communication of the reasons to the borrower by the secured creditor for not having accepted his representation or objection or the likely action of the secured creditor at the stage of communication of reasons to the borrower shall not entitle the person (including borrower) to make an application to the Debts Recovery Tribunal under this subsection. (2) The Debts Recovery Tribunal shall consider whether any of the measures referred to in subsection (4) of section 13 taken by the secured creditor for enforcement of security are in accordance with the provisions of this Act and the rules made thereunder. (3) If, the Debts Recovery Tribunal, after examining the facts and circumstances of the case and evidence produced by the parties, comes to the conclusion that any of the measures referred to in subsection (4) of section 13, taken by the secured creditor are not in accordance with the provisions of this Act and the rules made thereunder, and require restoration of the management of the business to the borrower or restoration of possession of the secured assets to the borrower, it may by order, declare the recourse to any one or more measures referred to in subsection (4) of section 13 taken by the secured creditors as invalid and restore the possession of the secured assets to the borrower or restore the management of the business to the borrower, as the case may be, and pass such order as it may consider appropriate and necessary in relation to any of the recourse taken by the secured creditor under subsection (4) of section 13. (4) If, the Debts Recovery Tribunal declares the recourse taken by a secured creditor under subsection (4) of section 13, is in accordance with the provisions of this Act and the rules made thereunder, then, notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, the secured creditor shall be entitled to take recourse to one or more of the measures specified under subsection (4) of section 13 to recover his secured debt. *** *** *** 18. Appeal to Appellate Tribunal (1) Any person aggrieved, by any order made by the Debts Recovery Tribunal under section 17, may prefer an appeal alongwith such fee, as may be prescribed to the Appellate Tribunal within thirty days from the date of receipt of the order of Debts Recovery Tribunal : PROVIDED that different fees may be prescribed for filing an appeal by the borrower or by the person other than the borrower : PROVIDED FURTHER that no appeal shall be entertained unless the borrower has deposited with the Appellate Tribunal fifty per cent. of the amount of debt due from him, as claimed by the secured creditors or determined by the Debts Recovery Tribunal, whichever is less: PROVIDED ALSO that the Appellate Tribunal may, for the reasons to be recorded in writing, reduce the amount to not less than twenty-five per cent. of debt referred to in the second proviso. (2) Save as otherwise provided in this Act, the Appellate Tribunal shall, as far as may be, dispose of the appeal in accordance with the provisions of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (51 of 1993) and rules made thereunder." 8. Keeping in view the aforesaid provisions, if the submissions canvassed by the learned Senior Counsel Mr. Parikh is examined, it is contended by him that the order dated 20.03.2018 passed by the DRT, Ahmedabad, cannot be termed as an order under Section 17 of the Act and, therefore, appeal under Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act cannot be said to be an efficacious statutory remedy. We are of the view that the said contention is misconceived because of the reason that while passing an order dated 20.03.2018, the DRT, Ahmedabad, has discussed in detail why the DRTII, Mumbai, is Forum convenient to all the parties. In Paragraph26 of the said order, DRT, Ahmedabad, has discussed about the same. We are of the view that the said contention is misconceived because of the reason that while passing an order dated 20.03.2018, the DRT, Ahmedabad, has discussed in detail why the DRTII, Mumbai, is Forum convenient to all the parties. In Paragraph26 of the said order, DRT, Ahmedabad, has discussed about the same. After considering the relevant aspects, the application is returned to the petitioners - applicants for filing it before the DRTII, Mumbai. Thus, in our view, the said order can be termed as an order, which can be challenged by filing an appeal under Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act before the Appellate Forum. Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act provides that any person aggrieved by an order made by the DRT under Section 17, may prefer an appeal to Appellate Tribunal within the stipulated time limit. 9. In the case of United Bank of India Vs. Satyawati Tondon and others, the Honourable Supreme Court has observed in Paragraph 42 as under : "42. There is another reason why the impugned order should be set aside. If respondent No.1 had any tangible grievance against the notice issued under Section 13(4) or action taken under Section 14, then she could have availed remedy by filing an application under Section 17(1). The expression 'any person' used in Section 17(1) is of wide import. It takes within its fold, not only the borrower but also guarantor or any other person who may be affected by the action taken under Section 13(4) or Section 14. Both, the Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal are empowered to pass interim orders under Sections 17 and 18 and are required to decide the matters within a fixed time schedule. It is thus evident that the remedies available to an aggrieved person under the SARFAESI Act are both expeditious and effective." 10. Thus, from the aforesaid decision, it can be said that the remedies available to an aggrieved person under the SARFAESI Act i.e. Sections 17 and 18 are expeditious and effective remedies. 11. In the case of Authorized Officer, State Bank of Travancore and another vs. Mathew K.C., the Honourable Supreme Court has observed in Paragraphs 7, 8, 10, 15 and 16 as under: "7. The Section 13(4) notice along with possession notice under Rule 8 was issued on 21-4-2015. 11. In the case of Authorized Officer, State Bank of Travancore and another vs. Mathew K.C., the Honourable Supreme Court has observed in Paragraphs 7, 8, 10, 15 and 16 as under: "7. The Section 13(4) notice along with possession notice under Rule 8 was issued on 21-4-2015. The remedy under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act was now available to the respondent if aggrieved. These developments were not brought on record or placed before the Court when the impugned interim order came to be passed on 24-4-2016. The writ petition was clearly not instituted bona fide, but patently to stall further action for recovery. There is no pleading why the remedy available under Section 17 of the Act before the Debts Recovery Tribunal was not efficacious and the compelling reasons for bypassing the same. Unfortunately, the High Court also did not dwell upon the same or record any special reasons for grant of interim relief by direction to deposit. 8. The Statement of Objects and Reasons of SARFAESI Act states that the banking and financial sector in the country was felt not to have a level playing field in comparison to other participants in the financial markets in the world. The financial institutions in India did not have the power to take possession of securities and sell them. The existing legal framework relating to commercial transactions had not kept pace with changing commercial practices and financial sector reforms resulting in tardy recovery of defaulting loans and mounting nonperforming assets of banks and financial institutions. Narasimhan Committee I and II as also the Andhyarujina Committee constituted by the Central Government Act had suggested enactment of new legislation for securitisation and empowering banks and financial institutions to take possession of securities and sell them without court intervention which would enable them to realise long term assets, manage problems of liquidity, asset liability mismatches and improve recovery. The proceedings under the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (hereinafter referred to as "the DRT Act") with passage of time, had become synonymous with those before regular courts affecting expeditious adjudication. All these aspects have not been kept in mind and considered before passing the impugned order. 9. *** *** *** 10. In Satyawati Tondon the High Court had restrained further proceedings under Section 13(4) of the Act. All these aspects have not been kept in mind and considered before passing the impugned order. 9. *** *** *** 10. In Satyawati Tondon the High Court had restrained further proceedings under Section 13(4) of the Act. Upon a detailed consideration of the statutory scheme under the SARFAESI Act, the availability of remedy to the aggrieved under Section 17 before the Tribunal and the appellate remedy under Section 18 before the Appellate Tribunal, the object and purpose of the legislation, it was observed that a writ petition ought not to be entertained in view of the alternate statutory remedy available holding : (SCC pp.123 & 128, paras 43 & 55) "43. Unfortunately, the High Court overlooked the settled law that the High Court will ordinarily not entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution if an effective remedy is available to the aggrieved person and that this Rule applies with greater rigour in matters involving recovery of taxes, cess, fees, other types of public money and the dues of banks and other financial institutions. In our view, while dealing with the petitions involving challenge to the action taken for recovery of the public dues, etc. the High Court must keep in mind that the legislations enacted by Parliament and State Legislatures for recovery of such dues are a code unto themselves inasmuch as they not only contain comprehensive procedure for recovery of the dues but also envisage Constitution of quasi-judicial bodies for redressal of the grievance of any aggrieved person. Therefore, in all such cases, the High Court must insist that before availing remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution, a person must exhaust the remedies available under the relevant statute." *** *** *** 15. It is the solemn duty of the Court to apply the correct law without waiting for an objection to be raised by a party, especially when the law stands well settled. Any departure, if permissible, has to be for reasons discussed, of the case falling under a defined exception, duly discussed after noticing the relevant law. In financial matters grant of exparte interim orders can have a deleterious effect and it is not sufficient to say that the aggrieved has the remedy to move for vacating the interim order. Loans by financial institutions are granted from public money generated at the tax payers expense. In financial matters grant of exparte interim orders can have a deleterious effect and it is not sufficient to say that the aggrieved has the remedy to move for vacating the interim order. Loans by financial institutions are granted from public money generated at the tax payers expense. Such loan does not become the property of the person taking the loan, but retains its character of public money given in a fiduciary capacity as entrustment by the public. Timely repayment also ensures liquidity to facilitate loan to another in need, by circulation of the money and cannot be permitted to be blocked by frivolous litigation by those who can afford the luxury of the same. The caution required, as expressed in Satyawati Tandon, has also not been kept in mind before passing the impugned interim order : "46. It must be remembered that stay of an action initiated by the State and/or its agencies/instrumentalities for recovery of taxes, cess, fees, etc. seriously impedes execution of projects of public importance and disables them from discharging their constitutional and legal obligations towards the citizens. In cases relating to recovery of the dues of banks, financial institutions and secured creditors, stay granted by the High Court would have serious adverse impact on the financial health of such bodies/ institutions, which (sic will) ultimately prove detrimental to the economy of the nation. Therefore, the High Court should be extremely careful and circumspect in exercising its discretion to grant stay in such matters. Of course, if the petitioner is able to show that its case falls within any of the exceptions carved out in Baburam Prakash Chandra Maheshwari v. Antarim Zila Parishad, Whirlpool Corpn. v. Registrar of Trade Marks and Harbanslal Sahnia v. Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd. and some other judgments, then the High Court may, after considering all the relevant parameters and public interest, pass an appropriate interim order." 16. The writ petition ought not to have been entertained and the interim order granted for the mere asking without assigning special reasons, and that too without even granting opportunity to the Appellant to contest the maintainability of the writ petition and failure to notice the subsequent developments in the interregnum. The opinion of the Division Bench that the counter affidavit having subsequently been filed, stay/modification could be sought of the interim order cannot be considered sufficient justification to have declined interference." 12. The opinion of the Division Bench that the counter affidavit having subsequently been filed, stay/modification could be sought of the interim order cannot be considered sufficient justification to have declined interference." 12. Thus, it is observed in the aforesaid decision rendered by the Honourable Supreme Court that the High Court will ordinarily not entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, if an effective remedy is available to the aggrieved person. Further, while dealing with the petitions involving challenge to the action taken for recovery of the public dues etc., the High Court must keep in mind that the legislations enacted by Parliament and State Legislatures for recovery of such dues are a code unto themselves inasmuch as they not only contain comprehensive procedure for recovery of the dues but also envisage constitution of quasi-judicial bodies for redressal of the grievance of any aggrieved person. Therefore, in all such cases, the High Court must insist that before availing remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution, a person must exhaust the remedies available under the relevant statue. 13. In the present case, the learned Single Judge has considered the relevant aspects and even the averments made in Paragraph 40 of the petition, and thereafter, observed that averment made in Paragraph 40 of the petition is without any details and, thereafter, declined to exercise the powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India on the ground of availability of statutory remedy. Therefore, we are of the view that no error is committed by the learned Single Judge. 14. In the case of Dhannalal Vs. Kalawatibai, the Honourable Supreme Court has held that plaintiff is dominus litis, that is, master of, or having dominion over, the case. He is the person who has carried and control of an action. In case of conflict of jurisdiction the choice ought to lie with the plaintiff to choose the forum best suited to him unless there be a rule of law excluding access to a forum of plaintiff's choice or permitting recourse to a forum will be opposed to public policy or will be an abuse of process of law. 15. Learned Senior Counsel Mr. 15. Learned Senior Counsel Mr. Parikh has relied upon this decision in support of his contention that when part of cause of action has arisen, within the jurisdiction of DRT, Ahmedabad, the petitioners have rightly filed the application before it and, therefore, the DRT, Ahmedabad, could not have returned the application for filing it before the DRTII, Mumbai. However, we are of the view that if the petitioners are aggrieved by the said order, statutory alternative remedy is available under Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act by filing an appeal before the Appellate Forum and, therefore, the learned Single Judge has rightly not entertained the petition. 16. In the case of Sameer Singh Vs. Abdul Rab, the Honourable Supreme Court has observed in Paragraphs20 to 22 as under : "20. The aforesaid authorities clearly spell out that the court has the authority to adjudicate all the questions pertaining to right, title or interest in the property arising between the parties. It also includes the claim of a stranger who apprehends dispossession or has already been dispossessed from the immovable property. The self contained Code, as has been emphasised by this Court, enjoins the executing court to adjudicate the lis and the purpose is to avoid multiplicity of proceedings. It is also so because prior to 1976 amendment the grievance was required to be agitated by filing a suit but after the amendment the entire enquiry has to be conducted by the executing court. Order XXI, Rule 101 provides for the determination of necessary issues. Rule 103 clearly stipulates that when an application is adjudicated upon under Rule 98 or Rule 100 the said order shall have the same force as if it were a decree. Thus, it is a deemed decree. If a Court declines to adjudicate on the ground that it does not have jurisdiction, the said order cannot earn the status of a decree. If an executing court only expresses its inability to adjudicate by stating that it lacks jurisdiction, then the status of the order has to be different. In the instant case the executing court has expressed an opinion that it has become functus officio and hence, it cannot initiate or launch any enquiry. If an executing court only expresses its inability to adjudicate by stating that it lacks jurisdiction, then the status of the order has to be different. In the instant case the executing court has expressed an opinion that it has become functus officio and hence, it cannot initiate or launch any enquiry. The appellants had invoked the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution assailing the order passed by the executing court on the foundation that it had failed to exercise the jurisdiction vested in it. The appellants had approached the High Court as per the dictum laid down by this Court in Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai and others. 21. Whether the executing court, in the obtaining circumstances, has correctly expressed the view that it has become functus officio or not and thereby it has jurisdiction or not, fundamentally pertains to rectification of a jurisdictional error. It is so as there has been no adjudication. If a subordinate court exercises its jurisdiction not vested in it by law or fails to exercise the jurisdiction so vested, the said order under Section 115 of the Code is revisable as has been held in Joy Chand Lal Babu v. Kamalaksha Chaudhary and others. The same principle has been reiterated in Keshardeo Chamria v. Radha Kissan Chamria and others and Chaube Jagdish Prasad and another v. Ganga Prasad Chaturvedi. Needless to emphasise, the said principle is well-settled. After the amendment of Section 115, C.P.C. w.e.f. 1.7.2002, the said power is exercised under Article 227 of the Constitution as per the principle laid down in Surya Dev Rai. Had the executing court apart from expressing the view that it had become functus officio had adjudicated the issues on merits, the question would have been different, for in that event there would have been an adjudication. 22. In view of the forgoing analysis, we conclude and hold that the High Court has fallen into error by opining that the decision rendered by the executing court is a decree and, therefore, an appeal should have been filed, and resultantly allow the appeal and set aside the impugned order. The High Court shall decide the matter as necessary under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The High Court shall decide the matter as necessary under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. As a long span of time has expired we would request the High Court to dispose of the matter within a period of three months. There shall be no order as to costs." 17. We cannot dispute the proposition of law laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court in the aforesaid decision. However, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, as discussed hereinabove, the said decision would not render any assistance to the appellants - petitioners. 18. In the case of Hari Vishnu Kamath Vs. Ahmad Ishaque, the Honourable Supreme Court has discussed in Paragraph21 about the conditions under which writ of Certiorari can lie. We cannot dispute the proposition of law laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court in the said decision. However, in the facts of the present case, when the statutory alternative remedy is available to the petitioners, the said decision would not render any assistance to the appellants. 19. In the present case, the appellants - petitioners are aggrieved by an order dated 20.03.2018 passed by the DRT, Ahmedabad, returning the securitisation application filed by the petitioners under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act. The said order can be challenged under Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act and, therefore, the learned Single Judge has rightly declined to exercise powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 20. In view of the aforesaid discussion and in view of the reasoning recorded by the learned Single Judge, we see no reason to interfere with the impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed. Consequently, Civil Application stands disposed of.