JUDGMENT 1. This appeal has been preferred by the appellant against the judgment dated 25.9.2008 passed in Sessions Trial No. 29/2009 by learned Additional Judge to the Court of First Additional Sessions Judge, Khandwa whereby the appellant was held guilty of commission of offence punishable under sections 302 and 450 of IPC and was convicted and sentenced to undergo life imprisonment with fine of Rs. 500/- and R.I. for five years with fine of Rs. 100/- with default stipulation respectively. 2. The prosecution story in short is that on 9.9.2008 at about 7.30 pm complainant Parwati Bai (PW1) was sitting with deceased Dashrath and her son Ankit (PW4) in her house. At this time appellant-accused came to her house where he started abusing the deceased Dasrath, and asked as to why he abused his wife. Thereafter, appellant-accused started using filthy language and assaulted the deceased Dashrath with knife. Deceased Dashrath received injuries over the stomach. Appellant-accused inflicted incised wound in the stomach of deceased Dashrath. Deceased Dashrath cried for help then Sunil (PW2) and Kundan (PW3) came on the spot, then appellant-accused inflicted injuries on them and ran away. Deceased Dashrath was admitted at Primary Health Centre, Pandhana where he was found dead. Sunil (PW2) and Kundan (PW3) were also examined by Dr. Sanjay Parashar (PW14) vide medical report Ex. P-14 and P-15. Parwati Bai (PW1) lodged first information report in the police Station-Pandhana. Dr. H.L. Borasiya (PW15) performed autopsy of the deceased Dashrath vide Ex. P/16-A. Investigation was started. Investigating Officer Town Inspector Ashok Tiwari PW16 issued notice under section 175 of CrPC to the witnesses to remain present during Lash Panchanama . Notice is Ex. P-1. He prepared Lash Panchanama vide Ex. P/2. During investigation appellant-accused was arrested. His statement under section 27 of the Evidence Act was also recorded. On the basis of memorandum vide Ex. P-5 knife was seized from the possession of the appellant-accused vide Ex. P-6. Plain soil and red soil was also seized from the spot vide Ex. P-9. Patwari Kamalchand (PW10) prepared spot map Ex. P-10. Statements of witnesses under section 161 of CrPC were recorded. After completion of the investigation challan was filed. 3. Learned trial Judge thereafter framed charges. Appellant-accused abjured his guilt during trail and pleaded that he has been falsely implicated in the case. 4. P-9. Patwari Kamalchand (PW10) prepared spot map Ex. P-10. Statements of witnesses under section 161 of CrPC were recorded. After completion of the investigation challan was filed. 3. Learned trial Judge thereafter framed charges. Appellant-accused abjured his guilt during trail and pleaded that he has been falsely implicated in the case. 4. Prosecution examined 16 witnesses and no witness was examined by the appellant-accused during trial. The trial Court found that the appellant-accused was guilty of commission of offence punishable under sections 302 and 450 of IPC and awarded sentence of life imprisonment. 5. It is contended by learned counsel for the appellant-accused that trial Judge has failed to appreciate the evidence on record in its proper perspective which has resulted in miscarriage of justice. Seizure of the articles was not proved. There are many omissions and contradictions in the statements of Parwati Bai (PW1), Sunil (PW2), Kundan (PW3), Ankit (PW4) and other witnesses. So the offence under section 302 is not made out because there was no intention of the appellant to commit murder. So learned trial Court has committed error by convicting the appellant-accused. The defence version ought to have been accepted by learned trial judge, so the impugned judgment of conviction and sentence passed by learned Sessions Judge deserves to be quashed. 6. Learned Government Advocate supports the case of prosecution and contends that the judgment passed by the learned trial judge is just and proper and does not warrant any interference. 7. Now the question which arises for consideration first is that whether the appellant caused death of the deceased and inflicted injuries by sharp weapon to Sunil (PW2) and Kundan (PW3) and also entered in the house of complainant. 8. Dr. H.L. Borasiya, (PW15) who performed postmortem of the deceased Dashrath and prepared postmortem report Ex. 7. Now the question which arises for consideration first is that whether the appellant caused death of the deceased and inflicted injuries by sharp weapon to Sunil (PW2) and Kundan (PW3) and also entered in the house of complainant. 8. Dr. H.L. Borasiya, (PW15) who performed postmortem of the deceased Dashrath and prepared postmortem report Ex. P/16-A deposed before the trial Judge on 16/04/2009 that he found following injuries on the stomach of the deceased Dashrath : 1- 'ko ,d iq#"k dk Fkk ftldh mez djhc 38 o"kZ Fkh tks rxM+k iq"V O;fDr Fkk] tks 'kjhj ij lQsn vk/kh ckag dh cfu;ku igus Fkk ftlds isV ij VkWfoy fyiVh Fkh rFkk flysVh dyj dk isaV o Øhe dyj dk vaMjfo;j igus FkkA vk¡[ks can Fkh datfDVkbok isy Fkk dkWfuZ;k lw[kh ,oa /kqa/kyh Fkh I;wfiy Mk;ysaVsM ,oa fLFkj FkkA 'kjhj ij e`R;q i'pkr dh vdM+u ekStwn FkhA tks Åijh ,oa fupys fgLls ij FkhA 2- 'kjhj ij pksV ,d Hkksadk gqvk LVsc ?kko tks isV ds ck¡;h rjQ ifly;ksa ds uhps fLFkr Fkk ftldk vkdkj 2 bap × 1 bap × 4 bap FkkA 3- [kksiMh] diky] D'kks:dk LoLFk Fkh] flYyh efLr"d es:jTtw LoLFk ,oa isy FksA inkZ] ilyh] dkseyl iqiql] daB 'okluyh nkfguk isiMk cka;k isiMk] isfjvkWu LoLFk ,oa isy FksA gn; ds nksuksa pascj [kkyh FksA 4- mnj esa inkZ] vkarksa dh f>Yyh] eqga] xzkluyh] xzfluh LoLFk ,oa isy FkhA 5- isV ds vanj v/kipk gqvk [kk| inkFkZ FkkA NksVh vkar esa v/kipk [kk| inkFkZ FkkA cMh vkar esa ey ,oa xSl dh cncw FkhA 6- ;Ñr] xqnkZ LoLFk ,oa isy FkkA 7- Iyhgkesa dVk gqvk ?kko vkxs dh rjQ Fkk] ftldk vkdkj 1 × 1@3 × 1@4 bap FkkA 8- ew=k'k; ,oa Hkhrjh ckgjh tUksfUnz; LoLFk FkhA 9- Åij crkbZ xbZ pksV e`R;q iwoZ dh Fkh ,oa l[r /kkjnkj gfFk;kj ls igq¡pkbZ xbZ Fkh] xaHkhj izÑfr dh FkhA 10- ijh{k.k ds le; cfu;ku] vaMjfo;j] isaV VkWfoy dks izkIr dj lhYM iSd fd;k Fkk vkSj iqfyl vkj{kd dks lkSaik FkkA He opined that the injuries are ante-mortem in nature and caused by hard and cutting object. Injuries were sufficient to cause death. Thus it is clear that the deceased Dashrath suffered a homicidal death vide Ex. P/16-A. 9. Dr. Injuries were sufficient to cause death. Thus it is clear that the deceased Dashrath suffered a homicidal death vide Ex. P/16-A. 9. Dr. Sanjay Parashar (PW14) who examined Sunil (PW2) and Kundan (PW3) deposed that he found following injuries on the body of the injured : lquhy& 1- [kjksap] ftldk vkdkj 1 bap × 1@2 bap tks nkfgus da/ks ij fLFkr Fkh] ykfyek fy, FkhA dqnau& 1- [kjksap tks nkfguh dksguh ij Fkh] ftldk vkdkj ½ bap × ½½ bap Fkk tks yky jax fy, FkkA 2- [kjksap] ftldk vkdkj ½ bap × ½ bap Fkk] tks nkfgus ?kqVus ij fLFkr Fkh] yky jax fy, FkhA 1 There is no cross-examination of this witness, so it is evident that injuries was found on the body of Sunil (PW2) and Kundan (PW3) on 9.9.2008. 10. Parwati Bai (PW1) stated in her deposition that she was sitting in her house with Ankit, Raja, Manish and deceased Dashrath. At that time appellant-accused came to her house. A knife was in his hand. He started abusing in filthy language, then he inflicted injuries on the stomach of the deceased Dashrath by knife. Her husband cried and came out from his house and he fell down. Sunil (PW2) and Kundan (PW3) came on the spot and they tried to overpower the appellant accused but appellant accused inflicted injuries to Sunil and Kundan, after that appellantaccused ran away. Ankit (PW4) and Kedar also reached the spot. But appellant-accused ran away. Deceased Dashrath was admitted in Hospital but he was found to be dead. Parwati (PW1) lodged FIR Ex. P-1. 11. Sunil (PW2) and Kundan (PW3) and Ankit (PW4) corroborate the evidence of Parwati (PW1). Mukesh (PW6) also deposed in his evidence that the family members of the deceased Dashrath told him that appellant accused inflicted the injuries to the deceased Dashrath. Deceased was lying on the earth in his house and blood was oozing from his stomach. Same evidence was given by Sadashiv (PW8). In cross-examination of the witnesses there is no material contradiction and omission, so there is no ground of false implication of the appellant-accused in this serious case. So Parwati Bai (PW1), Sunil (PW2), Kundan (PW3) and Ankit (PW4) are wholly reliable witnesses. 12. Same evidence was given by Sadashiv (PW8). In cross-examination of the witnesses there is no material contradiction and omission, so there is no ground of false implication of the appellant-accused in this serious case. So Parwati Bai (PW1), Sunil (PW2), Kundan (PW3) and Ankit (PW4) are wholly reliable witnesses. 12. Learned Amicus Curiae argued before this Court that the testimony of witnesses are not reliable inasmuch as they being wife and family members of the deceased is interested witness in this Case in this regard Hon’ble apex Court in the case of State of Rajasthan v. Smt. Kalki and another ( AIR 1981 SC 1390 ) has held that “related” is not equivalent to ‘interested’. Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under : “5. As mentioned above the High Court has declined to rely on the evidence of PW1 on two grounds : (1) she was a “highly interested” witness because she “is the wife of the deceased”, and (2) there were discrepancies in her evidence. With respect, in our opinion, both the grounds are invalid. For, in the circumstances of the case, she was the only and most natural witness; she was the only person present in the hut with the deceased at the time of the occurrence, and the only person who saw the occurrence. True, it is she is the wife of the deceased; but she cannot be called an ‘interested’ witness. She is related to the deceased. ‘Related’ is not equivalent to ‘interested’. A witness may be called ‘interested’ only when he or she derives some benefit from the result of a litigation; in the decree in a civil case, or in seeing an accused person punished. A witness who is a natural one and is the only possible eye witness in the circumstances of a case cannot be said to be ‘interested’. In the instant case P.W.1 had no interest in protecting the real culprit, and falsely implicating the respondents.” 13. So, on this ground the evidence of Parvatibai (PW1) Sunil (PW2), Kundan (PW3) and Ankit (PW4) cannot be discarded. These witnesses are natural witnesses. Parvati Bai (PW1) and Ankit (PW4) were present at the time of incident, Sunil (PW2) and Kundan (PW3) are injured in the same incident, so they witnessed the incident. Sunil (PW2) and Kundan (PW3) reached on the spot to hear the cry of the deceased Dashrath. These witnesses are natural witnesses. Parvati Bai (PW1) and Ankit (PW4) were present at the time of incident, Sunil (PW2) and Kundan (PW3) are injured in the same incident, so they witnessed the incident. Sunil (PW2) and Kundan (PW3) reached on the spot to hear the cry of the deceased Dashrath. They tried to save the life of deceased Dashrath. Appellantaccused inflicted injuries to them. So these witnesses are also reliable and natural witnesses. So the evidence of these witnesses are wholly reliable. There is no material contradictions and omissions in the evidence of these witnesses. There are minor contradiction and omission that cannot be affect reliability of the witnesses. In the case of Takdir Samsuddin Sheikh v. State of Gujarat and another [(2010) 10 SCC 158], it is held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court as under : “It is settled legal proposition that while appreciating the evidence, the Court has to take into consideration whether the contradictions/omissions/improvements/embellishments etc. had been of such magnitude that they may materially affect the trial. Minor contradictions, inconsistencies, omissions or improvements on trivial matters without affecting the case of the prosecution should not be made the Court to reject the evidence in its entirety. The Court after going through the entire evidence must form an opinion about the credibility of the witnesses and the appellate Court in natural course would not be justified in reviewing the same again without justifiable reasons. (Vide: Sunil Kumar Sambhudayal Gupta (Dr.) and others v. State of Maharashtra [ (2010)13 SCC 657 ). 14. Thus, it is well established principle of law that when the substantial evidence is available on record, then seizure of weapon is not important as held by Hon’ble Supreme Court in Yogesh Singh v. Mahabeer Singh and others [ (2017)11 SCC 195 ] as under : “47. The next line of contention taken by the learned counsel for the respondents is that the recovery evidence was false and fabricated. We feel no need to address this issue since it had already been validly discarded by the Trial Court while convicting the respondents. In any case, it is an established proposition of law that mere non-recovery of weapon does not falsify the prosecution case where there is ample unimpeachable ocular evidence. We feel no need to address this issue since it had already been validly discarded by the Trial Court while convicting the respondents. In any case, it is an established proposition of law that mere non-recovery of weapon does not falsify the prosecution case where there is ample unimpeachable ocular evidence. [See Lakahan Sao v. State of Bihar and another [ (2000)9 SCC 82 ]; State of Rajasthan v. Arjun Singh and others [ (2011)9 SCC 115 ]; and Manjit Singh and another v. State of Punjab, [ (2013)12 SCC 746 ]. So from the foregoing discussion, it is proved that appellant accused caused death of the deceased Dashrath. 15. Learned Amicus Curiae for the appellant submitted that even if it is held that appellant-accused caused injury on deceased by knife and due to the said injury deceased Dashrath died then the act of appellant would not fall under section 302 IPC but it would at the most fall under section 304 (1) or 304 (2) IPC. She submitted that appellant had no intention to cause the death of deceased Dashrath and only one injury was caused to him, but it is evident that appellant abused the deceased Dashrath and inflicted one blow of knife on deceased Dashrath. Deceased Dashrath sustained one incised wound injury which was sufficient to cause the death in the ordinary course of nature. It is also evident from record that accused had entered the house of the deceased with knife on his hand. It is also proved that there was knowledge to inflict that particular bodily injury and this is not a case of sudden provocation or fight, so the act of the appellant will come within the purview of section 302 IPC. It is not a case where appellant accused deprived of power of save control by grave and sudden provocation and without premeditation in a sudden fight in the heat of passion. If accused inflicted one injury with heavy force on vital part of body then he has knowledge that injury is sufficient in the normal course to cause death. That offence will come under section 302 of IPC not section 304 Part-I or 304 Part-II. In this regard Hon’ble apex Court in the case of State of Himachal Pradesh v. Hans Raj [ AIR 2018 SC 1185 ] has held as under : “7. That offence will come under section 302 of IPC not section 304 Part-I or 304 Part-II. In this regard Hon’ble apex Court in the case of State of Himachal Pradesh v. Hans Raj [ AIR 2018 SC 1185 ] has held as under : “7. We are unable to agree with the view taken by the High Court. Injuries on the skull with a danda resulting in a fracture with brain matter oozing out of the wound has been found by PW12 in the course of the postmortem. This would show that the ingredients necessary to attract the offence under section 302, IPC are present in the instant case. A person assaulting another with a wooden danda on the head with such force that the same has resulted in a fracture enabling brain matter to come out must be understood to have knowledge, if not the intention that injuries caused by him are sufficient in the normal course to cause death. If that be so, we will have no occasion to agree with the view taken by the High Court that the offence committed is one under section 304 part II of IPC . We therefore, interfere with the order of the High Court and restore the conviction and sentence recorded by the learned trial Court. The accused respondent who is currently on bail will surrender before the learned trial Court to serve out the sentence, as awarded, forthwith, failing which he will be taken into custody.” The Hon’ble apex Court, in the case of Virsa Singh v. State of Punjab, reported in AIR 1958 SC 465 has held as under : “14. To put it shortly, the prosecution must prove the following facts before it can bring a case under section 300 “thirdly”. 15. First, it must establish, quite objectively, that a bodily injury is present. 16. Secondly, the nature of the injury must be proved; These are purely objective investigations. 17. Thirdly, it must be proved that there was an intention to inflict that particular bodily injury, that is to say, that it was not accidental or unintentional, or that some other kind of injury was intended. 18. Once these three elements are proved to be present, the enquiry proceeds further and, 19. 17. Thirdly, it must be proved that there was an intention to inflict that particular bodily injury, that is to say, that it was not accidental or unintentional, or that some other kind of injury was intended. 18. Once these three elements are proved to be present, the enquiry proceeds further and, 19. Fourthly, it must be proved that the injury of the type just described made up of the three elements set out above is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. This part of the enquiry is purely objective and inferential and has nothing to do with the intention of the offender. 20. Once these four elements are established by the prosecution (and, of course, the burden is on the prosecution throughout) the offence is murder under section 300, “thirdly”. It does not matter that there was no intention to cause death. It does not matter that there was no intention even to cause an injury of a kind that is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature (not that there is any real distinction between the two). It does not even matter that there is no knowledge that an act of that kind will be likely to cause death. Once the intention to cause the bodily injury actually found to be present is proved, the rest of the enquiry is purely objective and the only question is whether, as a matter of purely objective inference, the injury is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. No one has a licence to run around inflicting injuries that are sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature and claim that they are not guilty of murder. If they inflict injuries of that kind, they must face the consequences; and they can only escape if it can be shown, or reasonably deduced that the injury was accidental or otherwise unintentional.” In the present case, the above conditions are satisfied. There is presence of bodily injury caused with knife by appellant-accused. The injury caused is fatal in nature. The said injury has been caused with intention to cause it and the injury is sufficient to cause death. 16. So the findings of learned trial Court that appellant committed murder of deceased Dashrath is based upon proper and legal evidence. There is presence of bodily injury caused with knife by appellant-accused. The injury caused is fatal in nature. The said injury has been caused with intention to cause it and the injury is sufficient to cause death. 16. So the findings of learned trial Court that appellant committed murder of deceased Dashrath is based upon proper and legal evidence. So in this view of the matter in our opinion the learned trial Court has rightly convicted and sentenced the appellant for commission of offence. 17. Accordingly, we do not find any merit in the appeal. The same is accordingly dismissed. 18. Before parting, we must put on record our reserved appreciation for the valuable assistance rendered by the learned amicus curiae. The High Court Legal Services Authority shall remit fee of Rs. 4,000/- (Rs. Four thousand) to the amicus curiae who assisted this Court.