JUDGMENT : 1. The prayers in the WP(C).No.36560 of 2018 are as follows. “i. To issue a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order or direction, directing the 2nd and 4th respondents to grant the benefit of enhanced compensation to the petitioners also for their 16.30 Ares of property acquired vide LAC No.12/2013 on the basis of Ext.P4 orders and as requested in Ext.P5 representation and to disburse the same accordingly in the interest of justice; ii. To issue a writ of certiorari or any other writ, order or direction quashing the applicability of Ext.P3 award in granting enhanced compensation to the petitioner at 15% excess alone as being arbitrary, illegal unjust and two meagre while considering the amount granted in Ext.P4 award and direct the respondents 2 to 4 to grant the same compensation envisaged in Ext.P4 to the petitioners also without infringement of their rights guaranteed under Article 14 of the Constitution and sought for vide Ext.P5 representation; and iii. To grant such other and further reliefs deemed fit to be granted by this Honourable Court in the facts and circumstances of the above case; and iv. To allow the costs of this proceedings. ” 2. The prayers in the WP(C).No.36569 of 2018 are as follows. “i. To issue a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order or direction, directing the 2nd and 4th respondents to grant the benefit of enhanced compensation to the petitioner also for her 8.51(5.99+2.52) Ares of property acquired vide LAC No.175 & 176/2013 on the basis of Ext.P4 orders and as requested in Ext.P5 representation and to disburse the same accordingly in the interest of justice; ii. To issue a writ of certiorari or any other writ, order or direction quashing the applicability of Ext.P3 award in granting enhanced compensation to the petitioner at 15% excess alone as being arbitrary, illegal, unjust and two meagre while considering the amount granted in Ext.P4 award and direct the respondents 2 to 4 to grant the same compensation envisaged in Ext.P4 to the petitioners also without infringement of their rights guaranteed under Article 14 of the Constitution and sought for vide Ext.P5 representation; and iii. To grant such other and further reliefs deemed fit to be granted by this Honourable Court in the facts and circumstances of the above case; and iv. To allow the costs of this proceedings. ” 3. To grant such other and further reliefs deemed fit to be granted by this Honourable Court in the facts and circumstances of the above case; and iv. To allow the costs of this proceedings. ” 3. The prayers in the WP(C).No.37563 of 2018 are as follows. “i. To issue a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order or direction, directing the 2nd and 4th respondents to grant the benefit of enhanced compensation to the petitioners also for her 2 Ares of property acquired vide LAC No.151/2013 on the basis of Ext.P4 orders and as requested in Ext.P5 representation and to disburse the same accordingly in the interest of justice; ii. To issue a writ of certiorari or any other writ, order or direction quashing the applicability of Ext.P3 award in granting enhanced compensation to the petitioner at 15% excess alone as being arbitrary, illegal unjust and two meagre while considering the amount granted in Ext.P4 award and direct the respondents 2 to 4 to grant the same compensation envisaged in Ext.P4 to the petitioners also without infringement of her rights guaranteed under Article 14 of the Constitution and sought for vide Ext.P5 representation; and iii. To grant such other and further reliefs deemed fit to be granted by this Honourable Court in the facts and circumstances of the above case; and iv. To allow the costs of this proceedings.” 4. As these cases give rise to common and interrelated issues, these matters are disposed on the basis of this common judgment. 5. The lands of these petitioners have been acquired by the respondents in accordance with the provisions contained in National Highways Act, 1956. Ext.P-2 is the copy of the respective awards passed in each of these land acquisition cases by the 2nd respondent competent authority in terms of the provisions contained in the above said Act. The petitioner's contended that the award does not reflect the correct compensation benefits payable to the petitioners more so particularly in the light of Ext.P-1 minutes of the District Level Purchase Committee wherein the 4th respondent District Collector and 3rd respondent Project Director, NHAI, certain other officials concerned and the petitioner are all signatories to the minutes of said meeting. The petitioner's contended that the award does not reflect the correct compensation benefits payable to the petitioners more so particularly in the light of Ext.P-1 minutes of the District Level Purchase Committee wherein the 4th respondent District Collector and 3rd respondent Project Director, NHAI, certain other officials concerned and the petitioner are all signatories to the minutes of said meeting. Thereupon the petitioners had challenged impugned Ext.P-2 award by setting in motion arbitral proceedings as envisaged in Sec. 3G(5) of the National Highways Act, 1956 r/w the provisions contained in the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The matter was referred to the competent Arbitrator, The 4th respondent District Collector, Thiruvananthapuram who has rendered Ext.P-3 arbitral award on 19.7.2017 in all these 3 cases. Thereafter the petitioners had not taken any steps to challenge Ext.P-3 arbitral award in terms of specific remedy conceived as per Sec.34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The petitioners would now point out, that Ext.P-4 is arbitral award passed in the case of certain other land owners from whom lands have been acquired under the very same notification by the respondents in terms of provisions contained in the National Highways Act, 1956. Further it is pointed out that in Ext.P-4 the arbitrator was a different District Collector who according to the petitioners has correctly applied the aspects bearing out of Ext.P-1 and has awarded higher compensation than the one awarded to the petitioners as per Ext.P-3. On this basis the petitioners would solemnly urge that as both Exts.P-3 & P-4 arbitral awards are passed by the arbitrator who is none other than the District Collector concerned, non extension of the benefits to the petitioners as the one rendered in Ext.P-4 would amount to imposing hostile discrimination on the petitioners and which is admonished and forbidden in terms of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. On this basis, the petitioners would contend that the petitioners are entitled to challenge the legality and correctness of Ext.P-3 award atleast on the limited ground of hostile discrimination by invoking the public law remedy of judicial review as envisaged in Articles 226 of the Constitution of India. The petitioners have submitted Ext.P-5 representation before the 4th respondent District Collector to extent to them the same benefits as has been given to similarly situated land owners as per Ext.P-4 award. The petitioners have submitted Ext.P-5 representation before the 4th respondent District Collector to extent to them the same benefits as has been given to similarly situated land owners as per Ext.P-4 award. It is in these basis that the petitioners have filed the instant writ petitions with the aforementioned prayers. 6. Heard Sri. M.A. Zohra, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners, Sri. Thomas Antony, learned Standing Counsel for NHAI appearing for R-3 in WP(C).Nos.36560 & 36569 of 2018 and, Smt. I. Sheela Devi, learned Standing Counsel for NHAI appearing for R-3 in WP(C).No.37563 of 2018 and Sri. Saigi Jacob Palatty, learned Senior Government Pleader appearing for the respondent State Authorities in these 3 cases. 7. The learned Standing Counsel appearing for the respondent NHAI and the learned Senior Government Pleader appearing for the respondent State Authorities would strongly object to the very maintainability of this petition and would contend that in view of the specific provisions contained in Sec. 3G (5) of the NH Act, 1956, the remedy of the aggrieved party is to approach the arbitrator appointed by the Central Government as envisaged in that section and further that it is mandated by sub section 6 of Sec. 3G that subject to the provisions of the NH Act, 1956, the provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 shall apply to any arbitration under the NH Act, 1956. Hence it is pointed out that by virtue of the mandate of Sec.3G(6) of the NH Act, 1956, the remedy of a person like the petitioner who is aggrieved by the arbitral award rendered by the arbitrator appointed by the Central Government in terms of Sec.3G(5) is to file an application before the District Court under Sec.34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 praying to set aside the said arbitral award as per the grounds enumerated in that section. Further that the period of limitation for filing an application under Sec.34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 before the District Court is prescribed in Sec. 34(3), whereby such application for setting aside the arbitral award cannot be made after 3 months have elapsed on which the date from the party makes an application had received the arbitral award etc, subject to the proviso that if the Court is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause for making the application within a period of 3 months, it may entertain the application within a further period of 30 days and not thereafter. Hence it is pointed out that since the petitioners had never filed such an application under Sec.34 before the District Court to challenge impugned Ext.P-3 award, the period of limitation for so doing, is already over and that since the petitioners have been given a statutory remedy and if they have not invoked it, it is not right and proper for this Court to exercise extra ordinary Constitutional discretion conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Hence it is urged by the learned Advocates appearing for the respondent NHAI as well as by the learned Senior Government Pleader appearing for the respondent State Authorities that, by virtue of well known canons of judicial self-restraint, this Court may not exercise extra ordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution in a case like this where the petitioners have not availed the specific statutory remedy conferred on them in terms of Sec.34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. 8. Per contra Sri. M.A. Zohra, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners has raised 3 contentions. The first contention is that in view of the Sec.11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act will not apply to the arbitration proceedings in terms of Sec.3G(5) of the NH Act, 1956 and that therefore going by the dictum laid down by this Court in the judgment in Rajamma v. Project Director, NHAI & others [ 2017 (5) KHC 464 = 2017 (4) KLT 1047 ] that the petitioner cannot be faulted for not having availed the remedy under Sec.34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. And that hence the petitioners cannot be denied the discretionary relief under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, more so when the petitioners have made out a strong case of hostile discrimination. 9. And that hence the petitioners cannot be denied the discretionary relief under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, more so when the petitioners have made out a strong case of hostile discrimination. 9. The second contention is that going by the dictum laid down by the Division Bench of this Court in Leela K. v. District Collector & Artbitrator, Thrissur and another [ 2015 (2) KHC 813 DB], the period of limitation in relation to arbitral proceedings under the NH Act, is 3 years. Further the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners would contend that the contention of the petitioners based on hostile discrimination with reference to the two awards as per Exts.P-3 & P-4, cannot be a ground which can be legally advanced before the District Court in terms of Sec.34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and that since the petitioners are not legally permitted to raise such contentions, they cannot be faulted for not having invoked the remedy under Sec.34 and that hence the remedy under Article 226 would certainly lie. 10. As regards the first contention, this Court has no hesitation to hold , after hearing both sides that the decision rendered by this Court in Rajamma v. Project Director, NHAI & others [ 2017 (5) KHC 464 ] = 2017 (4) KLT 1047 ], is no authority for the proposition that remedy under Sec.34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 is not available to a person who is aggrieved by the award rendered in terms of the provisions contained in Sec.3G(5) of the National Highways Act, 1956. A reading of the above said judgment in Rajamma's case supra, would indicate that in the said case after the award was passed by the competent authority in the land acqusiiton case, the aggrieved land owner had specifically challenged the said award of the competent authority by setting in motion arbitral proceedings under Sec.3G(5). Thereafter the said arbitral award under Sec. 3G(5) was also challenged by the said land owner by invoking the remedy under Sec.34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 by filing application to set aside the arbitral award before the District Court concerned. Thereafter the District Court found that the award suffers from serious legal infirmities and had set aside the award. Thereafter the District Court found that the award suffers from serious legal infirmities and had set aside the award. The question that arose before this Court in Rajamma's case supra, was as to whether in such a case where the District Court sets aside the arbitral award, whether the matter could be remitted to the arbitrator to proceed further or whether the arbitral proceedings should be recommenced afresh. Relying on the decisions of the Apex Court in Mc Dermott International Inc. v. Burn Standard Co. Ltd. [ (2006) 11 SCC 181 ], as well as judgment of the Bombay High Court in Associated Constructions v. Mormugoa Port Trust [2010 (5) BOM. CR 100] this Court held that in a case where the District Court sets aside arbitral award under Sec.34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 due to the legal infirmities then there is no question of remitting the matter to the arbitrator concerned and that in such cases the arbitral proceedings will have to commence afresh if so desired by any of the parties. Further it was held that where the statutory arbitrator on a request of the party concerned does not recommence the arbitral proceedings afresh in such cases, then the party concerned cannot be left without any remedy and in such appropriate cases, the party concerned can approach this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and that in appropriate cases this Court can direct the statutory Arbitrator to recommence the arbitral proceedings. This was the proposition of law laid down by this Court in Rajamma's case supra. This Court has not laid down in Rajamma's case supra, that where the party concerned who is aggrieved by the arbitral award need not challenge it under Sec.34 before the District Court and that the challenge could be straight away made in Article 226 proceedings. On the other hand it can be seen from the above said judgment of the Rajamma's case supra, that the party concerned on being aggrieved by the award of the competent authority had approached the arbitrator and on further being aggrieved by the arbitral award had successfully challenged the same before the District Court under Sec.34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and the limited issued posed before for by this Court was on the above said aspects. Hence the above said contention raised by the petitioners is no avail. Hence the above said contention raised by the petitioners is no avail. 11. The 2nd contention of the petitioners is that an argument like the one in the instant case based on hostile discrimination based on awards as per Exts.P-3 & P-4 etc cannot be legally maintained in Sec.34 proceedings before the District Court. If the aggrieved party like the petitioners have specific case that the award passed by another arbitrator in respect of lands covered by the very same notification grants substantially higher compensation than the one given to the party concerned, then certainly such a party can certainly raise the contention of hostile discrimination, as the arbitrator is the one who is appointed by the Central Government and therefore if the party can successfully point that there is a case of hostile discrimination, such an impugned award would then be one which is opposed to public policy of India as envisaged in Sec. 34(2)(b)(ii) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. It can now also be seen from the perusal of the judgment of this Court in Rajamma's case supra, that a similar argument of hostile discrimination was successfully established before the District Court under Sec.34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and the District Court had set aside the arbitral award which led to the other disputes in the matter of Rajamma's case supra. In a case like this, it is for the aggrieved party like the petitioner to have challenged the award before the District Court under Sec.34 within the period of limitation or within the maximum extent of period of limitation as envisaged in the proviso to Sec.34(3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. If a party like the petitioner does not challenge the award under Sec.34 of the Act within the extent of period of limitation, then such persons cannot be permitted to advance those contentions by approaching this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 12. Lastly a faint argument is made by the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners that the period of limitation in arbitral proceedings is 3 years in view of the decision rendered by the Division Bench of this Court in Leela K. v. District Collector & Artbitrator, Thrissur and another [ 2015 (2) KHC 813 DB]. 12. Lastly a faint argument is made by the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners that the period of limitation in arbitral proceedings is 3 years in view of the decision rendered by the Division Bench of this Court in Leela K. v. District Collector & Artbitrator, Thrissur and another [ 2015 (2) KHC 813 DB]. A reading of the said judgment would disclose that the issue before the Division Bench was as to the period of limitation applicable for initiating proceedings under Sec.3G(1) for approaching the arbitrator, as no specific period of limitation in that regard has been stipulated either in Sec.3G or in any other provisions of the National Highways Act, 1956. Therefore this Court held that in such a case since no period of limitation prescribed in the special law relating to the National Highway Acquisition, then the period of limitation should be 3 years as envisaged in Article 136 of the Limitation Act, 1963. Therefore the period of limitation of 3 years is only for approaching the arbitrator under Sec.3G(1) and it cannot be one for setting aside the arbitral award under Sec.34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 for which a specific period of limitation and a maximum extendable period thereof has been prescribed in Sec.34(3) and its proviso. Sec.34(3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 reads as follows. “An application for setting aside may not be made after three months have elapsed from the date on which the party making that application had received that arbitral award or, if a request had been made under Section 33, from the date on which that request had been disposed of by the arbitral Tribunal: PROVIDED that if the Court is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application within the said period of three months it may entertain the application within a further period of thirty days, but not thereafter.” 13. It is prescribed that application for setting aside the arbitral award may not be made after 3 months have elapsed from the date on which the party making an application had received arbitral award. The second limb of Sec.34 (3) regarding request under Sec.33 does not apply in the instant case. It is prescribed that application for setting aside the arbitral award may not be made after 3 months have elapsed from the date on which the party making an application had received arbitral award. The second limb of Sec.34 (3) regarding request under Sec.33 does not apply in the instant case. Proviso to Sec.34(3) stipulates that if the Court is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application within the period of 3 months, then it may entertain the application within a further period of 30 days, but not thereafter. Therefore the Parliament has made a special provision as per Sec.34(3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 that even though the period of limitation is 3 months as per the first limb of Sec.34(3) the same could be extended in deserving cases, but only upto a further period of 30 days and but not thereafter. The said provision contained in Sec.34(3) and its proviso is a special law regulating limitation in the context of challenge as against arbitral award under Sec.34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. Therefore the general provision for condonation of delay envisaged in the Limitation Act, 1963 as per Sec.5 thereof in the matter of appeals and application wherein there is no upper cap for period of condonation of delay in deserving cases cannot be pressed into service. Then, for the simple reason that the special law contained in Sec.34(3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 would prevail over the general law of limitation. Hence if the party is not in a position to file the application under Sec.34 either within the period of limitation or within the maximum extendable of period of limitation as envisaged in the proviso to Sec.34(3), then the application in that regard is time barred. In such a case, where the aggrieved party does not invoke the remedy under Sec.34, he cannot be permitted to approach this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India on the plea of hostile discrimination, which plea could have been validly pressed into service by him under Sec.34 proceedings before the District Court. In the light of these aspects this Court is constrained to hold that it will not be right and proper to exercise the extra ordinary constitutional discretion conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in the present cases. In the light of these aspects this Court is constrained to hold that it will not be right and proper to exercise the extra ordinary constitutional discretion conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in the present cases. Hence the above Writ Petition (Civil) will stand dismissed.