JUDGMENT Dinesh Mehta, J. -It is rather unusual and disturbing that the Court is required to deal with and dilate upon an application, seeking recusal of the Presiding Judge(s) of the Court from hearing the matter. 2. No sooner, had Ms. Prem Lata Parihar (applicant/respondent - present-in-person) began her submissions on the application eliciting exception by the Court concerned (Dinesh Mehta, J.) than, I posed a few questions to ascertain the possibility of conflict or bias at my end while hearing the matter, viz: Is she personally known to me? Or had she ever engaged me, as her counsel? Or had I ever remained opposite counsel in any of her litigation? Or is there any conflict of interest otherwise? Her answer was anobvious and emphatic 'No'. 3. With the given background, I set out to deal with the contentions raised by the applicant. However before doing so, it would be appropriate to reproduce the application filed by her, in extenso for better grasp of her purported grievance:- "Application for exception of the judges who has practiced in Rajasthan High Court at Jodhpur before becoming a judge at the same High Court and for honbe justice dinesh Mehta, R.C. jahala and for call file D.B SAW 261/9 And cmb 68/16 and cmb 215/12. 1. This civil misc appeal involves fraud committed by the respondents since 1997 and their advocate Mr. J. Gehlot and Justice Dinesh Mehta has practiced in the Rajasthan High Court at Jodhpur since 1992-93 around. 2. Mr. Jitendra Gehlot has also been practicing since 92 and advocate of the respondent who signed on consent order dated 15.05.1998. 3. The manner on dated 18.01.18 the stay granted to the Appellant by floating the mandatory statutory provisions under order 39 rule 3 CPC with out issuing Notice, giving me an opportunity to be heard, is violation of natural law and also on dated 15.02.18, the notice not served till today 10-4-18 the date but justice R.C. Jhala extended the stay without ordering under order 39 rule 3 under section 27, under order 5 rule 9, 9 (a), 12, 19(a), 20(a). They also violated D.B. order of Supreme Court dated 11.09.2000 in Zenith Metaplast P. Ltd. versus State of Maharashtra and others, AIR 200 SC 2114, AIR 2007 14, SCC 721 and Central Electricity Regulatory Commission V/s , National Hydro Electric Power Corporation Ltd. and others. 4. Prayer. They also violated D.B. order of Supreme Court dated 11.09.2000 in Zenith Metaplast P. Ltd. versus State of Maharashtra and others, AIR 200 SC 2114, AIR 2007 14, SCC 721 and Central Electricity Regulatory Commission V/s , National Hydro Electric Power Corporation Ltd. and others. 4. Prayer. So in the interest of justice , it is requested that the judges who has practiced at Jodhpur in Rajasthan High Court before becoming judge should not hear my case i. e. this appeal no. 183/18. 5. AIR 1996 SC 513 DB order Litigant having reasonable basis to expect that practitioner judge should not hear his matter. The judge should rescue himself from ensuring credibility and impartially of judiciary. 6. So please provide me suitable bench and call the SAW 261/09 and CMB 68/16 215/12 from ADJ no.3, Jodhpur." # The application has been reproduced as it was; leaving the grammatical & other errors, as they were. 4. The applicant, arguing her application submitted that I should abstain from hearing this case, as the counsel for the appellants Mr. J. Gehlot has been practicing in this Court, just as I was practicing, until my elevation as a Judge of this Court. She submitted that having practiced in the same Court, there was likelihood of me being biased in his favour. Such being the contention, she expressed her apprehension that all Hon'ble Judges, including me, who have been elevated from the Bar to the Bench practiced in this Court were prone to be influenced by the very presence of Mr. J. Gehlot, who happens to be personally involved in the dispute at hand, for which he has been arrayed as a party in another case, emanating from the dispute in question. 5. Apart from this, she contended that the interim order dated 18.01.2018 passed by this Court, without even issuing a notice to the respondent, shows that the Court had exercised its powers of granting stay, without properly understanding and going through the provisions of law. In this regard, she drew my attention towards the provisions contained in Order XXXIX Rule 1 & 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure and argued that it was incumbent upon the Court to have issued a notice to the respondent, before granting an interim order and to have recorded reasons while granting ex-parte injunction. 6. In this regard, she drew my attention towards the provisions contained in Order XXXIX Rule 1 & 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure and argued that it was incumbent upon the Court to have issued a notice to the respondent, before granting an interim order and to have recorded reasons while granting ex-parte injunction. 6. The applicant has referred to and relied upon a judgment of Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the case of P.K. Ghosh, I.A.S. & Anr. Vs. J.G. Rajput, reported in AIR 1996 SC 513 . While reading para-9 of the said judgment, she submitted that 'justice should not only be done but it must also seem to have been done', and that if a litigant has a reasonable apprehension of injustice, it is required of the Court concerned to recuse from the hearing. 7. Having gone through the application at hand and given fullest audience to the applicant, this Court is of the firm view that instant application deserves to be rejected, for its spuriousness alone, let apart the fact that it is devoid of any grounds. As the ensuing reasoning would further go on to show that it suffers from frivolousness and vexatiousness and hence, it amounts to nothing short of abuse of process of law. 8. At this juncture, I deem it to be my duty to make a disclosure that I have never had any occasion to come across or interact with the applicant, who is present in the Court. The applicant herself has candidly admitted that she has neither engaged me as a lawyer, during my practice days at the bar, nor have I ever opposed the applicant in any of her litigations. 9. The applicant's contention that Mr. J. Gehlot, Advocate, for the respondent who also happens to be a party in some connected case (not in the case at hand), having practiced in this premise has developed a natural proximity giving rise to bias, is not only absolutely unfounded, but also presumptuous. Going by the contents of her application and the arguments advanced, no Judge of the Principal Seat of this High Court, who has been elevated from the Bar should hear her case. 10. Going by the contents of her application and the arguments advanced, no Judge of the Principal Seat of this High Court, who has been elevated from the Bar should hear her case. 10. Needless to mention that I have no personal desire to hear this case, much less personal interest, but I think, acceding to such request of recusal would tentamount to validating and legitimizing the allegations and permitting the abuse of process, attempted to by the applicant. Yielding to such attempt would disseminate wrong message to the litigants that mere allegation of bias could compel the judge to withdraw from discharging his duties of imparting justice. 11. The decision of abstinence is to be taken by the Judge concerned, on the basis of personal/private interest in the subject matter of the lis before him; his proximity with the party/parties to the lis; his perception about conflict of interest in taking up the matter; and above all "his own conscience". The discretion to recuse or not to recuse is essentially an inner impulsion or inner voice of the Presiding Officer and the same cannot be thrusted upon or even elicited by anyone; may it be a litigant or a lawyer. 12. The duty of a litigant and/or lawyer is only to bring to the notice of the Court, the relevant and requisite fact(s), which may have a bearing on such discretion or decision of the Judge. 13. An application or even suggestion /request to abstain from hearing is not expected from a litigant/lawyer, in this Institution having high tradition and highest repute. 14. The applicant has cited the judgment of Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the case of P.K. Ghosh (supra) to actuate rather instigate the Court for marking an exception to this case. 15. I have carefully gone through the judgment aforesaid cited by the applicant and considered the facts involved in the said case. For capturing the factual niceties, it will not be out of place to reproduce para-5 of the said judgment, which runs as under:- "5. 15. I have carefully gone through the judgment aforesaid cited by the applicant and considered the facts involved in the said case. For capturing the factual niceties, it will not be out of place to reproduce para-5 of the said judgment, which runs as under:- "5. The above facts and the specific case of the respondent in the contempt petition leave no doubt that the appropriate course for B. J. Shethna, J. in these circumstances was to rescuse himself from hearing this contempt matter on account of the stand taken by the respondent for whom he had appeared as counsel in Special Civil Application No.1497 of 1988. It appears that the constitution of the Division Bench had undergone a change in the meantime and the regular Division bench comprised of R.A. Mehta and M.S. parikh, JJ. but the matter was treated as part-heard by the earlier Division Bench of R.A. Mehta and B.J. Shethna, JJ. in spite of the objection taken on behalf f the Municipal Corporation to the hearing of the contempt petition by B.J. Shethna, J., as earlier indicated." 16. A bare reading of para-5 quoted hereinabove reveals that the fact, for which, Hon'ble the Supreme Court has observed that the Judge ought to have recused himself from hearing the contempt petition, was that the Judge concerned had appeared as a counsel on behalf of the appellants involved therein. 17. The judgment cited by the applicant is, therefore, clearly distinguishable. There is neither any practice nor any precedent that as and when an application for recusal from hearing the matter is moved, the Court should desist from hearing the matter. 18. In the series of Judgments dealing with the aspect of recusal, the Courts more often than not have been referring to the observation made by Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the case of R.K. Anand Vs. Registrar, Delhi High Court reported in (2009) 8 SCC 106 . The relevant part whereof is being reproduced here infra for ready reference:- "The path of recusal is very often a convenient and a soft option. This is especially so since a Judge really has no vested interest in doing a particular matter. Registrar, Delhi High Court reported in (2009) 8 SCC 106 . The relevant part whereof is being reproduced here infra for ready reference:- "The path of recusal is very often a convenient and a soft option. This is especially so since a Judge really has no vested interest in doing a particular matter. However, the oath of office taken under Article 219 of the Constitution of India enjoins the Judge to duly and faithfully and to the best of his knowledge and judgment, perform the duties of office without fear or favour, affection or ill will while upholding the constitution and the laws. In a case, where unfounded and motivated allegations of bias are sought to be made with a view of forum hunting/Bench preference or brow-beating the Court, then, succumbing to such a pressure would tantamount to not fulfilling the oath of office. The above passage, in our view, correctly sums up what should be the Court's response in the face of a request for recusal made with the intent to intimidate the court or to get better of an inconvenient' judge or to obfuscate the issues or to cause obstruction and delay the proceedings or in any other way frustrate or obstruct the course of justice." 19. As far as, recording of reasons, while granting interim order is concerned, suffice it to observe that the stay application filed by the appellants along with their appeal is under Order 41 Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure (wrongly mentioned as Order 43 Rule 5 CPC), which neither requires issuance of notice to the opposite party, nor does it require recording of reasons. 20. There is a significant difference between the provisions contained in Order XXXIX Rule 1 & 2 of the Code, if juxtaposed with the provisions of Order XLI Rule 5 of the Code. Order XXXIX Rule 1 & 2 of the Code speaks of grant of injunction, whereas, Order XLI Rule 5 of the Code are meant for granting stay over execution or operation of the decree or judgment under challenge. 21. Be that as it may, even if, the applicant feels that the Court ought to have afforded opportunity of hearing to her, before or while granting stay on 18.01.2018, the same cannot be a reason requiring the Court to recuse itself from hearing a case. 22. 21. Be that as it may, even if, the applicant feels that the Court ought to have afforded opportunity of hearing to her, before or while granting stay on 18.01.2018, the same cannot be a reason requiring the Court to recuse itself from hearing a case. 22. In this regard, observations made by a Division Bench of Bombay High Court in the case of Ganesh Ramkisan Bairagi Vs. Parwatabai Tukaram Appa Landge & Ors., reported in 2016 (4) ABR 669 (Bombay HC) can also be gainfully quoted:- "19. To prevent a Judge or the Judges from performing his or their duties in this fashion causes distraction of attention in the judicial proceedings, which amounts to interference in the course of justice. Merely because a lawyer, litigant or public at large feels that the approach adopted or a decision is wrong, the authority or the force of the decision does not get eroded. A wrong decision in the matter is equally enforceable like a correct decision. If the Constitution and the laws provide a remedy to get such decision corrected in a higher forum , such a remedy can be avoided. Even a wrong decision becomes final, binding and enforceable like a correct decision , if there is no remedy available. The lawyers , litigants or public at large cannot run away from such decision and they have to be cautioned about the authority of the Courts." 23. Taking an impermeable and emphatic stance, is the need of the hour. The expression of Hon'ble J.S. Khehar, J. (as he then was) so lucidly and concisely composed, while dealing with the issue of recusal, in NJAC case, [ (2016) 5 SCC 808 ], reverberates in my mind, which I am impelled to quote:- "56. Despite the factual position noticed above, I wish to record that it is not their persuasion or exhortation, which made me take a final call on the matter. The decision that I made, was not of the heart, but that of the head. The choice was made by posing two questions to myself. Firstly, whether a Judge hearing a matter should recuse, even though the prayer for recusal is found to be unjustified and unwarranted? Secondly, whether I would stand true to the oath of my office, if I recused from hearing the matters? 57............... The choice was made by posing two questions to myself. Firstly, whether a Judge hearing a matter should recuse, even though the prayer for recusal is found to be unjustified and unwarranted? Secondly, whether I would stand true to the oath of my office, if I recused from hearing the matters? 57............... If I were to accede to the prayer for my recusal, I would be initiating a wrong practice, and laying down a wrong precedent. A Judge may recuse at his own, from a case entrusted to him by the Chief Justice. That would be matter of his own choosing. But recusal at the asking of a litigating party, unless justified, must never to be acceded to. For that would give the impression, of the Judge had been scared out of the case, just by the force of the objection. A Judge before he assumes his office, takes an oath to discharge his duties without fear or favour. He would breach his oath of office, if he accepts a prayer for recusal, unless justified. It is my duty to discharge my responsibility with absolute earnestness and sincerity. It is my duty to abide by my oath of office to uphold the Constitution and the laws. My decision to continue to be a part of the Bench, flows from the oath which I took, at the time of my elevation to this Court." 24. Taking guidance from the aforesaid extract, I feel bound by the oath of Office I took, not to abandon the case at the instance or insistence of the applicant; and to go ahead with the hearing of the case. 25. Having examined from each possible angle, I have no hesitation in holding that the application filed by the applicant is frivolous, vexatious and is an attempt to stifle the justice delivery system as well as synergy of the legal fraternity. 26. The application is thus rejected, with a cost of 7 days' adjournment; with a hope and belief that in the period interregnum, the applicant would realize the value of precious public time, which could have been utilized for some better cause. List the matter on 18.04.2018. 27. Mr. J. Gehlot, learned counsel for the appellants, sought extension of the stay, till the matter comes up for consideration on 18.04.2018. 28. At this juncture, Ms. List the matter on 18.04.2018. 27. Mr. J. Gehlot, learned counsel for the appellants, sought extension of the stay, till the matter comes up for consideration on 18.04.2018. 28. At this juncture, Ms. Prem Lata Parihar, applicant interjected and cited a photocopy of an order, claiming it to be an order of High Court and contended that the stay order cannot be extended. 29. A bare look thereat reveals that it is simply a letter written by the Registrar General of this Court to the Trial Court. The same cannot be said to be an order of High Court by any stretch of imagination. Request for not extending the interim order is, thus, declined. 30. The interim order passed by this Court on 18.01.2018 is extended till the next date of hearing. 31. Record of Civil Misc. Case No. 68/2016 "Prem Lata Vs. Ratanlal" so also of Civil Original Suit No. 45-A/1997 be summoned from the Trial Court, as prayed by the Respondent. 32. Precept for record be given 'Dasti' to Ms. Prem Lata Parihar, for ensuring expeditious summoning of the record.