JUDGMENT : 1. The prayer in the present petition is to order the sentence imposed in the judgment dated 24.07.2014 made in STC.Nos.25 and 26 of 2013 to run concurrently with the sentence imposed in the judgment dated 24.07.2014 made in STC.No.528 of 2012 on the file of the learned Judicial Magistrate, Fast Track Court No.1, Erode. 2. The case of the respondent herein, before the Trial Court was that, he had lent money for business requirements to the petitioner herein on three occasions within a span of one year, for which, the impugned cheques came to be issued. In connection with the dishonour of three cheques, three complaints came to be filed by the respondent herein in STC.No.528 of 2012, STC.Nos.25 and 26 of 2013 before the learned Judicial Magistrate, Fast Track Court No.1, Erode. On 24.07.2014, all the three complaints came to be disposed of and the petitioner herein was convicted for an offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (hereinafter referred to as The N.I.Act) and the petitioner was sentenced to undergo six months imprisonment in each of the three cases. As against the sentences, three appeals came to be filed in C.A.Nos.69, 70 and 71 of 2014 before the First Additional District and Sessions Court, Erode, which also came to be dismissed on 27.09.2016, confirming the order of the trial Court, by three separate judgments. 3. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that, before the first Appellate Court, the learned counsel who appeared for the petitioner had failed to make a request for having the sentences run concurrently and in view of such failure , the petitioner herein is undergoing sentences separately. It is in this backdrop, the present Crl.O.P.No.14044 of 2017 has been filed. 4. The cumulative of several sentences is envisaged under Section 427 of Cr.P.C. The said Section 427 of the Criminal Procedure Code which reads as follows:- 427. It is in this backdrop, the present Crl.O.P.No.14044 of 2017 has been filed. 4. The cumulative of several sentences is envisaged under Section 427 of Cr.P.C. The said Section 427 of the Criminal Procedure Code which reads as follows:- 427. Sentence on offender already sentenced for another offence.(1) When a person already undergoing a sentence of imprisonment is sentenced on a subsequent conviction to imprisonment or imprisonment for life, such imprisonment or imprisonment for life shall commence at the expiration of the imprisonment to which he has been previously sentenced, unless the Court directs that the subsequent sentence shall run concurrently with such previous sentence: Provided that where a person who has been sentenced to imprisonment by an order under section 122 in default of furnishing security is, whilst undergoing such sentence, sentenced to imprisonment for an offence committed prior to the making of suchorder, the latter sentence shall commence immediately. (2) When a person already undergoing a sentence of imprisonment for life is sentenced on a subsequent conviction to imprisonment for a term or imprisonment for life, the subsequent sentence shall run concurrently with such previous sentence. 5. On a bare out look at the wordings under Section 427 Cr.P.C., it can be said that the power vested with the Court to order for several sentences to run concurrently is a discretionary power. What is to be considered while exercising such a discretion are that the transactions, for which the sentences have been imposed should not be distinctly different and separate from each other. In other words, the transaction and the cause of action for which the sentences are imposed should have some connection to each other, in order to enable the Court to exercise the discretionary power and order for the sentences to run concurrently. 6. In the instant case, the proceedings are private complaints under Section 138 of the N.I.Act. The complainant and the accused in all the three complaints are one and the same. The pre-existing liability alleged in all the three complaints are loans taken by the petitioner herein for his business purpose. The proceedings were before the same Trial Court and all the three proceedings as well as the appeals came to be passed on the same date. This position has come up for scrutiny before various High Court as well as the Hon'ble Apex Court and concurrent views have been taken therein. The proceedings were before the same Trial Court and all the three proceedings as well as the appeals came to be passed on the same date. This position has come up for scrutiny before various High Court as well as the Hon'ble Apex Court and concurrent views have been taken therein. It has been broadly held therein that it is the discretion of the Trial Court to order for running of the sentence concurrently based on single transaction wherein, several complaints have been defined. Some of the observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the judgment reported in (2016) 10 SCC 761 (Syam Pal Vs. Dayawati Besoya) reads as follows: (12) The law on the orientation of two sentences awarded to an offender following his conviction successively, to define the cumulative duration thereof is envisaged in Section 427 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short Code) in following terms: 427. Sentence on offender already sentenced for another offence. - (1) When a person already undergoing a sentence of imprisonment is sentenced on a subsequent conviction to imprisonment or imprisonment for life, such imprisonment or imprisonment for life shall commence at the expiration of the imprisonment to which he has been previously sentenced, unless the Court directs that the subsequent sentence shall run concurrently with such previous sentence: Provided that where a person who has been sentenced to imprisonment by an order under section 122 in default of furnishing security is, whilst undergoing such sentence, sentenced to imprisonment for an offence committed prior to the making of such order, the latter sentence shall commence immediately. (2) When a person already undergoing a sentence of imprisonment for life is sentenced on a subsequent conviction to imprisonment for a term or imprisonment for life, the subsequent sentence shall run concurrently with such previous sentence. (2) When a person already undergoing a sentence of imprisonment for life is sentenced on a subsequent conviction to imprisonment for a term or imprisonment for life, the subsequent sentence shall run concurrently with such previous sentence. (13) Though this provision has fallen for scrutiny of this Court umpteen times, we can profitably refer to one of the recent pronouncements in V.K. Bansal vs. State of Haryana and Another (2013) 7 SCC 211 where it was held that though it is manifest from Section 427(1), that the Court has the power and discretion to issue a direction that a subsequent sentence shall run concurrently with the previous sentences, the very nature of the power so conferred, predicates that the discretion, would have to be exercised along judicial lines or not in a mechanical or pedantic manner. It was underlined that there is no cut and dried formula for the Court to follow, in the exercise of such power and that the justifiability or otherwise of the same, would depend on the nature of the offence or offences committed and the attendant facts and circumstances. It was however postulated, that the legal position favours the exercise of the discretion to the benefit of the prisoners in cases where the prosecution is based on a single transaction, no matter even if different complaints in relation thereto might have been filed. The caveat as well was that such a concession cannot be extended to transactions which are distinctly different, separate and independent of each other and amongst others where the parties are not the same. (14) The imperative essentiality of a single transaction as the decisive factor to enable the Court to direct the subsequent sentence to run concurrently with the previous one was thus underscored. It was expounded as well that the direction for concurrent running of sentence would be limited to the substantive sentence alone. (15) In a more recent decision of this Court in Benson vs. State of Kerala Criminal Appeal No.958 of 2016 (since disposed of on 03.10.2016) and the accompanying appeals, arising from the conviction of the appellant from his prosecution on the offences proved, this Court in the singular facts as involved and having regard to the duration of his incarceration and the remission earned by him, extended the benefit of such discretion and directed that the sentences awarded to him in those cases would run concurrently. It was noticeably recorded that the offences in the cases under scrutiny had been committed on the same day. The benefit of the discretion was accorded to the appellant therein referring as well to the observation in V.K. Bansal (supra) that it is difficult to lay down any straight jacket approach in the matter and that a direction that the subsequent sentence would run concurrently or not, would essentially depend on the nature of the offence or offences and the overall fact situation. Understandably, the appellant was required to serve the default sentence as awarded with the direction that if the fine imposed had not been deposited, the default sentence or sentences would run consecutively. 7. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the judgment reported in (2013) 7 SCC 211 (V.K.Bansal Vs. State of Haryana) reads as follows:- 10. We are in the case at hand concerned more with the nature of power available to the Court under Section 427(1) of the Code, which in our opinion stipulates a general rule to be followed except in three situations, one falling under the proviso to sub-section (1) to Section 427, the second falling under sub-section (2) thereof and the third where the Court directs that the sentences shall run concurrently. It is manifest from Section 427(1) that the Court has the power and the discretion to issue a direction but in the very nature of the power so conferred upon the Court the discretionary power shall have to be exercised along judicial lines and not in a mechanical, wooden or pedantic manner. It is difficult to lay down any strait jacket approach in the matter of exercise of such discretion by the Courts. There is no cut and dried formula for the Court to follow in the matter of issue or refusal of a direction within the contemplation of Section 427(1). Whether or not a direction ought to be issued in a given case would depend upon the nature of the offence or offences committed, and the fact situation in which the question of concurrent running of the sentences arises. 18. Applying the principle of single transaction referred to above to the above fact situations we are of the view that each one of the loan transactions/financial arrangements was a separate and distinct transaction between the complainant on the one hand and the borrowing company/appellant on the other. 18. Applying the principle of single transaction referred to above to the above fact situations we are of the view that each one of the loan transactions/financial arrangements was a separate and distinct transaction between the complainant on the one hand and the borrowing company/appellant on the other. If different cheques which are subsequently dishonoured on presentation, are issued by the borrowing company acting through the appellant, the same could be said to be arising out of a single loan transaction so as to justify a direction for concurrent running of the sentences awarded in relation to dishonour of cheques relevant to each such transaction. That being so, the substantive sentence awarded to the appellant in each case relevant to the transactions with each company referred to above ought to run concurrently. We, however, see no reason to extend that concession to transactions in which the borrowing company is different no matter the appellant before us is the promoter/Director of the said other companies also. Similarly we see no reason to direct running of the sentence concurrently in the case filed by the State Bank of Patiala against M/s Sabhyata Plastics and M/s Rahul Plastics which transaction is also independent of any loan or financial assistance between the State Financial Corporation and the borrowing companies. We make it clear that the direction regarding concurrent running of sentence shall be limited to the substantive sentence only. The sentence which the appellant has been directed to undergo in default of payment of fine/compensation shall not be affected by this direction. We do so because the provisions of Section 427 of the Cr.P.C. do not, in our opinion, permit a direction for the concurrent running of the substantive sentences with sentences awarded in default of payment of fine/compensation. 8. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in the judgment reported in (2009) 5 SCC 238 (State of Punjab Vs. Madan Lal), by relying upon paragraph Nos.17 and 18 of the judgment reported in (2001) 6 SCC 311 (State of Maharashtra Vs. Najakat), observed as follows:- 17. In the above context, it is apposite to point out that very often it happens, when an accused is convicted in one case under different counts of offences and sentenced to different terms of imprisonment under each such count, all such sentences are directed to run concurrently. Najakat), observed as follows:- 17. In the above context, it is apposite to point out that very often it happens, when an accused is convicted in one case under different counts of offences and sentenced to different terms of imprisonment under each such count, all such sentences are directed to run concurrently. The idea behind it is that the imprisonment to be suffered by him for one count of offence will, in fact and in effect be imprisonment for other counts as well. 18. Reading Section 428 of the Code in the above perspective, the words 'of the same case' are not to be understood as suggesting that the set-off is allowable only if the earlier jail life was undergone by him exclusively for the case in which the sentence is imposed. The period during which the accused was in prison subsequent to the inception of a particular case, should be credited towards the period of imprisonment awarded as sentence in that particular case. It is immaterial that the prisoner was undergoing sentence of imprisonment in another case also during the said period. The words 'of the same case' were used to refer to the pre-sentenced period of detention undergone by him. Nothing more can be made out of the collocation of those words. 9. In the light of the observation of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the judgments cited supra and taking note of the fact that the parties before Trial Court, were locked at a liability in respect of the same transactions namely, loan for business transaction and also taking into account that all the three transactions took place within a span of one year and came to be dealt with finally by the Trial Court as well as the Apex Court on a single date, the benefit of Section 427 of Cr.P.C. can be extended to the petitioner herein. 10. In the result, there shall be an order to the effect that the sentences imposed against the petitioner herein, in judgment STC.No.528 of 2012, STC.Nos.25 and 26 of 2013 dated 24.07.2014 shall run concurrently. 11. Accordingly, this Criminal Original Petition stands allowed.