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2019 DIGILAW 1004 (ALL)

Kailash Narain Dwivedi v. State Of U. P.

2019-04-19

SIDDHARTH

body2019
JUDGMENT : 1. Heard Sri Anil Kumar Bajpai, learned counsel for the applicant and learned A.G.A. on behalf of State. 2. This applicant u/s 482 Cr.P.C. has been filed praying for quashing of the charge sheet no. 6 of 1998 submitted by U.P. Vigilance Establishment, Meerut, bearing Inquiry/Investigation No. 124 of 1995, under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471 and 120-B I.P.C. and Section 13 (1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 in Case No. 30 of 1998, State vs. K.N. Dwivedi and others, pending before Special Judge, Anti Corruption, Meerut. 3. The prosecution case is that the applicant while being posted as Competent Authority, Peripheral Area of Urban Land Ceiling, Saharanpur, illegally restored an ex-parte order dated 23.11.1977 vide his order dated 05.01.1990 and on its basis Sri Ganga Ram Raj, Joint Director-cum-Competent Authority by his order dated 01.08.1991 declared the land exempted from Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 (hereinafter referred to as “Act”) which was earlier declared to be excess land belonging to the tenure holder, Alla Rakkha son of Natthu, resident of Mohalla Rayabala, District- Saharanapur. The applicant along with Sri Ganga Ram Raj committed the alleged offences under Sections- 420, 467, 468, 471 and 120-B I.P.C. and Section 13 (1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. 4. The brief of facts of the case are that the applicant jointed his duties as Competent Authority, Peripheral Area, Urban Land Ceiling, Saharanpur on 01.08.1989. On 22.09.1989 an application along with an affidavit was moved by the land holder, Alla Rakkha, through his power of attorney holder, Mohd. Ayyub, stating that he submitted his return under Section 6(1) of the Act regarding his land situated in village- Pinjaura, District - Saharanpur, being Khasra No. 63 Area 23155.96 square meters vide return no. 597/76 before the office of Competent Authority Urban Land Ceiling on 13.08.1976. On 23.11.1977 the aforesaid land of Alla Rakkha was declared surplus under Section 9 of the Act and a notice under Section 10(1) was published calling the land holder or anyone interested in the land to file his objection showing his interest therein under Section 10(2) of the Act but no objections were filed. The Competent Authority by his order dated 03.06.1985 send his recommendation under Section 10(3) of the Act for publishing in gazette the land declared surplus. The Competent Authority by his order dated 03.06.1985 send his recommendation under Section 10(3) of the Act for publishing in gazette the land declared surplus. He issued a notice dated 02.02.1989 under Section 10(5) of the Act to Alla Rakkha to deliver the possession of the aforesaid land within 30 days. 5. After service of aforesaid notice under Section 10(5) the land holder, Alla Rakkha, made an application before Competent Authority, the applicant, on 22.09.1989, stating that he never received any Draft Statement under Section 8(4) of the Urban Land Ceiling Act, 1976 and prayed that the order dated 23.11.1977 under Section 9 passed by the Competent Authority being ex-parte. 6. The Competent Authority, the applicant, called for a report from the reader of the office of the Competent Authority, Saharanpur and it submitted its report stating that service of the Draft Statement under Section 8(4) of the Act was not made on the land holder by registered post as per Section 8(3) of the Act and Rule 2 of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Rules, 1976 (hereinafter referred to as “Rules”). 7. The applicant, who was the Competent Authority at that time, by his order dated 05.01.1990 recalled the order dated 23.11.1977 of his predecessor and fixed the case for further hearing on 12.01.1990. 8. The allegation against the applicant is that he had no right or authority to recall the order dated 23.11.1977 of his predecessor and he illegally passed the order dated 05.01.1990 on the basis of which the land, which had vested in State, got recalled and thereafter Sri Ganga Ram Raj, Joint Director-cum-Competent Authority released the same in favour of the land holder which resulted into loss of Rs. 6,28,801.30/- to the Government. Hence the applicant has been implicated under the aforesaid Sections of I.P.C. and Prevention of Corruption Act. 9. The counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the applicant passed the order dated 05.01.1990 as per the provision of Section 8(3) of the Act and Rule 5(2) of the Rules. No appeal or revision was filed against the order dated 05.01.1990 of the applicant and it was endorsed by Director Urban Land Ceiling by his order dated 11.07.1991. 10. The counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the applicant passed the order dated 05.01.1990 as per the provision of Section 8(3) of the Act and Rule 5(2) of the Rules. No appeal or revision was filed against the order dated 05.01.1990 of the applicant and it was endorsed by Director Urban Land Ceiling by his order dated 11.07.1991. 10. It has further been submitted that as per notification dated 02.02.1996 issued by the Governor of the State under Section 2 of the U.P. Vigilance Establishment Act, 1965 in case of cognizable offence, first information report of the offence shall be lodged first at the concerned police station before proceeding with the investigation against the accused person. The aforesaid notification has been brought on record as Annexure 13 to the affidavit in support of the aforesaid application. 11. As per Vigilance Manual, Chapter 2 read with Section 351-A of the Civil Service Regulations, no judicial proceedings can be initiated against the retired person in respect of an incident which took place four or more than four years before without the permission of the Governor. In the present case the petitioner retired from service on 31.01.1998 and charge-sheet has been submitted against him on 22.12.1998. The incident in dispute took place on 05.01.1990 and cognizance of the offence has been taken in the year 1998 which is barred by civil service regulation aforesaid. 12. Learned Standing Counsel has filed counter affidavit on behalf of the opposite parties stating that sanction of prosecution of the applicant was accorded on 22.07.1998 and he should have filed objection to the charge sheet before the court concerned instead of filing the above noted application u/s 482 Cr.P.C. He has been rightly been charge-sheeted for the alleged offences since he was not empowered to restore the order dated 23.11.1977 by his order dated 05.01.1990. Had the applicant not passed the order dated 05.01.1990 Sri Ganga Ram Raj, co-accused, would not have passed the subsequent orders. The applicant was not competent to recall the order dated 23.11.1977 on the application and affidavit of the land holder. Remedy of appeal under Section 33 of the Act was available to the land holder and therefore the applicant wrongly exercised his discretion in recalling the order dated 23.11.1977 by his order dated 05.01.1990 after lapse of 12-13 years. The applicant was not competent to recall the order dated 23.11.1977 on the application and affidavit of the land holder. Remedy of appeal under Section 33 of the Act was available to the land holder and therefore the applicant wrongly exercised his discretion in recalling the order dated 23.11.1977 by his order dated 05.01.1990 after lapse of 12-13 years. It has further been submitted that as per Government Order dated 02.02.1996 there is provision of lodging FIR prior to investigation of cognizable offence but in the present case the investigation was proceeding since 1995 since the investigation number of this case was 124/95 therefore the Government order dated 02.02.1996 is not relevant for deciding this case. The applicant earlier approached the Lucknow Bench of this court against the prosecution sanction dated 22.05.1998 where he has raised of these points and therefore the challenge to the charge-sheet before this court on the same ground is not warranted. The charge-sheet has rightly been submitted against the applicant and one Kishan Lal, Moharrir. It has been submitted that the writ petition is devoid of merits and deserves to be dismissed. 13. A rejoinder affidavit has been filed by the petitioner wherein it has been stated that the land holder had remedy of filing application for recalling of the order dated 23.11.1977 and also the remedy of filing appeal under the Act. He opted for the remedy of recall of the order which was not barred and when the applicant found that the order dated 23.11.1977 was passed against the land holder without service of Draft Statement by the registered post he recalled the order exercising his inherent power as Competent Authority in accordance with law. The applicant has brought on record, the order dated 04.09.1995 passed by the State Government directing vigilance inquiry into the allegations against the applicant and other co-accuseds and submitted report before the government but, it has been submitted, that the charge-sheet was submitted by the investigation officer before the criminal court illegally. 14. After hearing the rival contentions, this court finds that the dispute between the parties lies in a very narrow compass. The applicant while working as Competent Authority under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 recalled order dated 23.11.1977 passed by the earlier Competent Authority by his order dated 05.01.1990. 14. After hearing the rival contentions, this court finds that the dispute between the parties lies in a very narrow compass. The applicant while working as Competent Authority under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 recalled order dated 23.11.1977 passed by the earlier Competent Authority by his order dated 05.01.1990. The ground for recall was that the notice was not served on the land holder as per Section 8(3) of the Act and Rule 5(2) of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Rules, 1976. The land holder was aggrieved on account of non-service of Draft Statement on him and therefore he had filed the recall application which was allowed by the applicant on the above ground. For appreciating the controversy it would be better to have a look at the relevant provisions. Section 8 of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Rules, 1976 is as follows:- “8. Preparation of draft statement as regards vacant land held in excess of ceiling limit: (1) On the basis of the statement filed under section 6 and after such inquiry as the competent authority may deem fit to make the competent authority shall prepare a draft statement in respect of the person who has filed the statement under section 6. (2) Every statement prepared under sub-section (I) shall contain the following particulars, namely:-- (i) the name and address of the person; (ii) the particulars of all vacant lands and of any other land on which there is a building, whether or not with a dwelling unit therein, held by such person; (iii) the particulars of the vacant lands which such person desires to retain within the ceiling limit; (iv) the particulars of the right, title or interest of the person in the vacant lands; and (v) such other particulars as may be prescribed. (3) The draft statement shall be served in such manner as may be prescribed on the person concerned together with a notice stating that any objection to the draft statement shall be preferred within thirty days of the service thereof. (3) The draft statement shall be served in such manner as may be prescribed on the person concerned together with a notice stating that any objection to the draft statement shall be preferred within thirty days of the service thereof. (4) The competent authority shall duly consider any objection received, within the period specified in the notice referred to in sub-section (3) or within such further period as may be specified by the competent authority for any good and sufficient reason, from the person on whom a copy of the draft statement has been served under that sub-section and the competent authority shall, after giving the objector a reasonable opportunity of being heard, pass such orders as it deems fit. Further Rule 5 provides, Rule 5: Particulars to be contained in Draft Statement as regards vacant lands and manner of service of the same. (1) Every draft statement prepared under sub-section (1) of section 8-shall contain the particulars specified in Form III. (2) (a) The draft statement shall be served together with the notice referred to in sub- section (3) of section 8-on- (i) the holder of the vacant lands, and (ii) all other persons, so far as may be known, who have, or are likely to have, any claim to, or interest in the ownership, or possession, or both, of the vacant lands, by sending the same by registered post addressed to the person concerned: (i) in the case of the holder of the vacant lands, to his address as given in the statement filed in pursuance of sub-section (1) of section 6-, and (ii) in the case of other persons at their last known addresses. (b) Where the draft statement and the notice are returned as refused by the addressee, the same shall be deemed to have been duly served on such person. (b) Where the draft statement and the notice are returned as refused by the addressee, the same shall be deemed to have been duly served on such person. (c) Where the efforts to serve the draft statement and the notice, on the holder of the vacant lands or, as the case may be, any other person referred to in clause (a), in the manner specified in that clause is not successful for reasons other than the reason referred to in clause (b), the draft statement and notice shall be served by affixing copies of the same in a conspicuous place in the office of the competent authority and also upon some conspicuous part of the house (if any) in which the holder of the vacant lands or, as the case may be, the other person is known to have last resided or carried on business or personally worked for gain. 15. In the present case it has no where been alleged by the opposite parties that notices were served on the land holder as contemplated under Section 8(3) and Rule 5(2) aforesaid. The land holder alleged that no notice were served on him by registered post as per the law and therefore the order dated 23.11.1977 of the Competent Authority may be recalled. The applicant, Competent Authority, called for an office report. In the office report it was clearly mentioned that no notice was sent to the land holder by registered post as contemplated under the aforesaid Section 8(3) and Rule 5(2). On the basis of the aforesaid report the petitioner recalled the aforesaid order by his order dated 05.01.1990 on the finding that notice was not served on the land holder as per the requirement of law and the order was passed without the opportunity of hearing. 16. This court in the case of Mohd. Islam and another vs. State of U.P, through the District Magistrate Allahabad and others, 1986 AWC 222, this court held that; “The procedure under Section 10(1) of the Act is of the stage when the vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit has been acquired and the same is published with a view that the said vacant land would be acquired by the concerned State Government and this notification is made in the official gazette. But after the Draft Statement, statement is prepared and served on the holder of the land and he files objection within 30 days or may be thereafter by explaining the delay and after considering the same, the surplus land is declared by making alteration in the Draft Statement in view of Section 9, and hence all that was subsequent to the service of notice on the petitioners. But as no notice was served on the petitioners and even the respondents did not deny the relevant statement contained in the writ petition, I am accordingly of the view that no notice was served on the petitioners. Hence, all the subsequent proceedings for determination of surplus land and publication of the same was without jurisdiction.” 17. This court in a case of Lallan vs. State of U.P. and others, 1988 AWC 1166 held that resort to the proceedings under Rule 5(c), which requires affixation of the copies of draft statement on a conspicuous place in the office of the Competent Authority and also upon some conspicuous part of the house of the land holder of the vacant land or on the place where he last resided or carried business or personally worked for gain, without compliance of Rule 5(2)(a)(ii) which requires service of notice by registered post the proceedings u/s 5(c) were illegal. Therefore, service of notice of the draft statement by registered post was found to be a mandatory provisions. 18. In view of the above consideration, it is clear that the applicant passed the order dated 05.01.1990 recalling the ex-parte order dated 23.11.1977 of his predecessor. Competent Authority as it was illegal and violative of Section 8(3) and Rule 5(2). The aforesaid exercise was conducted after verification of the office record and calling for a report from the office. It is settled law that where the order has been passed in violation of law and by mistake on the part of the court/authority, it can always be recalled by the same court/authority and such inherent powers is vested in all courts and authority in accordance with Article 14 of the constitution of India. 19. Therefore, the allegation against the applicant that he was found to be involved in offences under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471 and 120-B I.P.C. and Section 13(1)(d)read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 by the Investigating Officer merits consideration. 20. 19. Therefore, the allegation against the applicant that he was found to be involved in offences under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471 and 120-B I.P.C. and Section 13(1)(d)read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 by the Investigating Officer merits consideration. 20. Section 420 provides for cheating and dishonestly inducing delivery of property. “Cheating” has been defined under Section 415 I.P.C. as follows: 415. Cheating.--Whoever, by deceiving any person, fraudulently or dishonestly induces the person so deceived to deliver any property to any person, or to consent that any person shall retain any property, or intentionally induces the person so deceived to do or omit to do anything which he would not do or omit if he were not so deceived, and which act or omission causes or is likely to cause damage or harm to that person in body, mind, reputation or property, is said to “cheat”. 21. In the present case from the material on record there is no material that the applicant got delivered any property to the land holder by deceiving the State or anyone. 22. Section 467 I.P.C. provides for punishment for forging of valuable security, will, etc. and Section 468 I.P.C. provides for punishment for purpose of cheating and Section 471 I.P.C. provides for punishment for using as genuine a forged document fraudulently or dishonestly. 23. From the material on record no act of forgery of any document or order has been attributed to the applicant. The order passed by him has been found in the above consideration to be in accordance with law and therefore the charge-sheeting of the applicant for offences under Sections 420, 467, 468 and 471 I.P.C. is unwarranted. 24. The implication of the applicant under Section 120-B I.P.C. requires consideration. 25. Section 120A of I.P.C. defines `criminal conspiracy.' According to this Section when two or more persons agree to do, or cause to be done (i) an illegal act, or (ii) an act which is not illegal by illegal means, such an agreement is designed a criminal conspiracy. In Major EG Barsay v. State of Bombay, AIR (1961) SC 1762, Subba Rao J., speaking for the Court has said: “The gist of the offence is an agreement to break the law. The parties to such an agreement will be guilty of criminal conspiracy, though the illegal act agreed to be done has not been done. In Major EG Barsay v. State of Bombay, AIR (1961) SC 1762, Subba Rao J., speaking for the Court has said: “The gist of the offence is an agreement to break the law. The parties to such an agreement will be guilty of criminal conspiracy, though the illegal act agreed to be done has not been done. So too, it is not an ingredient of the offence that all the parties should agree to do a single illegal act. It may comprise the commission of a number of acts.” 26. In State through Superintendent of Police, CBI/SIT v. Nalini and Ors., JT (1999) 4 SC 106 it is observed by SSM Quadri J. at paragraph 677: “In reaching the stage of meeting of minds, two or more persons share information about doing an illegal act or a legal act by illegal means. This is the first stage where each is said to have knowledge of a plan for committing an illegal act or a legal act by illegal means. Among those sharing the information some or all may form an intention to do an illegal act or a legal act by illegal means. Those who do form the requisite intention would be parties to the agreement and would be conspirators but those who drop out cannot be roped in as collaborators on the basis of mere knowledge unless they commit acts or omissions from which a guilty common intention can be inferred. It is not necessary that all the conspirators should participate from the inception to the end of the conspiracy; some may join the conspiracy after the time when such intention was first entertained by any one of them and some others may quit from the conspiracy. All of them cannot but be treated as conspirators. Where in pursuance of the agreement the conspirators commit offences individually or adopt illegal means to do a legal act which has a nexus to the object of conspiracy, all of them will be liable for such offences even if some of them have not actively participated in the commission of those offences.” 27. To constitute a conspiracy, meeting of mind of two or more persons for doing an illegal act or an act by illegal means is the first and primary condition and it is not necessary that all the conspirators must know each and every detail of conspiracy. To constitute a conspiracy, meeting of mind of two or more persons for doing an illegal act or an act by illegal means is the first and primary condition and it is not necessary that all the conspirators must know each and every detail of conspiracy. Neither it is necessary that every one of the conspirators takes active part in the commission of each and every conspiratorial acts. The agreement amongst the conspirators can be inferred by necessary implications. In most of the cases, the conspiracies are proved by the circumstantial evidence, as the conspiracy is seldom an open affair. The existence of conspiracy and its objects are usually deducted from the circumstances of the case and the conduct of the accused involved in the conspiracy. While appreciating the evidence of the conspiracy, it is incumbent on the Court to keep in mind the well-known rule governing circumstantial evidence viz., each and every incriminating circumstance must be clearly established by reliable evidence and the circumstances proved must form a chain of events from which the only irresistible conclusion about the guilt of the accused can be safely drawn, and no other hypothesis against the guilt is possible. The criminal conspiracy is an independent offence in Indian Penal Code. The unlawful agreement is sine quo non for constituting offence under Indian Penal Code and not an accomplishment. Conspiracy consists of the scheme or adjustment between two or more persons which may be express or implied or partly express and partly implied. Mere knowledge, even discussion, of the Plan would not per se constitute conspiracy. The offence of conspiracy shall continue till the termination of agreement. 28. The suspicion can not take the place of a legal proof and prosecution would be required to prove each and every circumstance in the chain of circumstances so as to complete the chain. It is true that in most of the cases, it is not possible to prove the agreement between the conspirators by direct evidence but the same can be inferred from the circumstances giving rise to conclusive or irresistible inference of an agreement between two or more persons to commit an offence. It is held in Noor Mohd. v. State of Maharashtra, AIR (1971) SC 885, that: “In most cases proof of conspiracy is largely inferential though the inference must be founded on solid facts. It is held in Noor Mohd. v. State of Maharashtra, AIR (1971) SC 885, that: “In most cases proof of conspiracy is largely inferential though the inference must be founded on solid facts. Surrounding circumstances and antecedent and subsequent conduct, among other factors constitute relevant material.” 29. It is cumulative effect of the proved circumstances which should be taken into account in determining the guilt of the accused. Of-course, each one of the circumstance should be proved beyond reasonable doubt. The acts or conduct of the parties must be conscious and clear enough to infer their concurrence as to the common design and its execution. While speaking for the Bench it is held by P. Venkaratama Reddy J. in State (NCT of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu (a) Afsan Guru, JT (2005) 7 SC 1, (P. 63) as follows: “We do not think that the theory of agency can be extended thus far, that is to say, to find all the conspirators guilty of the actual offences committed in execution of the common design even if such offences were ultimately committed by some of them, without the participation of others. We are of the view that those who committed the offences pursuant to the conspiracy by indulging in various overt acts will be individually liable for those offences in addition to being liable for criminal conspiracy; but, the non-participant conspirator cannot be found guilty of the offence or offences committed by the other conspirators. There is hardly any scope for the application of the principle of agency in order to find the conspirators guilty of a substantive offence not committed by them. Criminal offences and punishments therefore are governed by statute. The offencer will be liable only if he comes within the plain terms of the penal statute. Criminal liability for an offence cannot be fastened by way of analogy or by extension of a common law principle.” 30. Considering the present case in the light of the above enunciations of the Apex Court, there is no allegation against the applicant that he entered into any conspiracy with the co-accuseds for the purpose of passing the order dated 05.01.1990. There was no meeting of minds before passing of the order aforesaid by the applicant. Considering the present case in the light of the above enunciations of the Apex Court, there is no allegation against the applicant that he entered into any conspiracy with the co-accuseds for the purpose of passing the order dated 05.01.1990. There was no meeting of minds before passing of the order aforesaid by the applicant. From the charge-sheet it is clear that after the passing of the order dated 05.01.1990 by the applicant in the subsequent proceedings the land declared surplus, prior to the passing of the order dated 05.01.1990 of the applicant recalling the order dated 23.11.1977 passed by his predecessor, was released in favour of the land holder by the co-accused on objection of land holder that in the year 1974 the land in dispute was agreed to be sold to the third parties. The applicant never released the land in dispute in favour of land holder nor there is any evidence or allegation that he conspired with the co-accuseds for the purpose of benefiting the land holder by releasing the land in his favour. Therefore, the offence under Section 120-B I.P.C. is not made out against the applicant. 31. The applicant has also been implicated under Sections 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. 32. To attract the provisions of Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, public servant should obtain for himself or for any other person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage by corrupt or illegal means or by abusing his position as a public servant. Therefore, for convicting a person under the provisions of Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1988, there must be evidence on record that the accused has obtained for himself or for any other person, any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage by corrupt or illegal means or by abusing his position as a public servant obtained for himself, or for any person, or obtain for any person, any valuable thing, or pecuniary advantage without any public interest. What this court finds in the present case is that there is no evidence on record to prove the fact that the accused-applicant had obtained for himself or for any other person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage. What this court finds in the present case is that there is no evidence on record to prove the fact that the accused-applicant had obtained for himself or for any other person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage. It is clarified that the charge of conspiracy not being proved under Section 120B I.P.C., the accused applicant could not be held responsible for the act done by co-accuseds. The Investigating Officer has failed to find evidence that the applicant has obtained for himself or for any other person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage. In view of the above implication of the applicant under Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act is also not made out. 33. The Apex Court in the case of State of Haryana vs Bhajan Lal, 1992 SCC (Cri.) 426 has elaborately dealt with the power of High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to quash the proceedings in paragraph 102:- “102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge. 34. The Apex Court in the case of Asit Kumar Kar vs. State of West-Bengal and others, 2009 LawSuit (SC) 99 held in paragraph 5 that it is basic principle of justice that no adverse orders should be passed against the party without hearing him. This is fundamental principle of natural justice and it is a basic canon of jurisprudence. The Apex Court in the Seven Judge Constitution Bench judgment of A.R. Antuley vs. R.S. Nayak and another (1984) 2 SCR 495 has observed in paragraph 55 that violation of principles of natural justice renders the act a nullity. This is fundamental principle of natural justice and it is a basic canon of jurisprudence. The Apex Court in the Seven Judge Constitution Bench judgment of A.R. Antuley vs. R.S. Nayak and another (1984) 2 SCR 495 has observed in paragraph 55 that violation of principles of natural justice renders the act a nullity. Therefore it is crystal clear that the order dated 23.11.1977 was passed by the Competent Authority under the Urban Land Ceiling Act without service of notice on the land holder as per the law and therefore it was rightly recalled by the applicant in accordance with the principles of natural justice. In case the opposite parties were aggrieved by the order of the applicant could have resorted to the remedy of appeal and revision provided under Sections 33 and 34 of the Act. Nothing was done by the opposite parties in the Urban Ceiling case and only after the suplus land was released by the subsequent Competent Authority under the Act, alleging loss of land of certain valuation, the applicant was implicated. The applicant acted in accordance with law and passed the order dated 05.01.1990. Therefore, the present case is covered by sub-paragraphs 1, 3 and 6 of paragraph 102 of the case of State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal (Supra). 35. Hence the impugned charge sheet no. 6 of 1998 submitted by U.P. Vigilance Establishment, Meerut, bearing Inquiry/Investigation No. 124 of 1995, under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471 and 120-B I.P.C. and Section 13 (1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 in Case No. 30 of 1998, State vs. K.N. Dwivedi and others, pending before Special Judge, Anti Corruption, Meerut is hereby quashed. 36. This application is allowed.