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2019 DIGILAW 1006 (ALL)

Abrar v. State of U. P.

2019-04-19

KARUNA NAND BAJPAYEE

body2019
JUDGMENT : Karuna Nand Bajpayee, J. 1. The prayer made in the present application is that a direction may be made to the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Court No.1, Muzaffar Nagar that the trial of applicants in Case No.54/9 of 2015 (State vs. Aqram and others) arising out of Case Crime No.394 of 2014, u/s 452, 323, 325, 506 I.P.C., P.S.-Shahpur, District-Muzaffar Nagar pending in the court below should be decided on the basis of judgment and order dated 20.11.2018 passed with regard to co-accused. 2. Heard learned counsel for the applicants and learned A.G.A. and also perused the record. 3. Submission of counsel for applicants is that as in another trial with regard to co-accused they have been acquitted and the judgment has been passed in favour of co-accused, therefore, there is no need for these applicants to be tried afresh and on the basis of the judgment of acquittal passed in favour of co-accused the applicants also should be acquitted. 4. Submission as has been made by the counsel appearing on behalf of applicants is per-se fallacious. The trials are decided on the basis of evidence produced against the accused in that particular trial and not on the basis of judgment pronounced in another trial. What kind of evidence has been adduced in another trial and what kind of evidence may be produced in the present trial are two different matters. Often it happens that the trial of some other co-accused results in acquittal because of the witnesses turning hostile. The possibility cannot be ruled out that the witnesses examined in another trial may remain intact and support the prosecution version. The only thing permissible would be to use the previous statements of the same witnesses, if they were examined in earlier trial, in order to discredit and impeach their testimony. The ultimate finding will depend upon the appreciation of evidence during trial. Even the nature of evidence, its quality, set of witnesses and set of documents that may be produced in the next trial may not necessarily be identical. If the prosecution has in its possession better evidence it cannot be estopped from producing the same just for the reason that the prosecuting agency in another case with regard to another accused had not succeeded to produce the same. If the prosecution has in its possession better evidence it cannot be estopped from producing the same just for the reason that the prosecuting agency in another case with regard to another accused had not succeeded to produce the same. Even in cases where the role played by the two accused appears similar, it is not necessary that the evidence collected against the two accused may also be of similar nature. The participation of one accused may get substantiated by sufficient evidence during the course of investigation while the evidence collected against another accused may not be on the same footing of sufficiency or adequacy. There may be even cases where the acquittal of co-accused may have followed a successful proof of their alibi which may have been found in the given case to be cast iron and trustworthy. All these aspects have been touched upon by this Court only as a matter of illustration, there cannot be any exhaustive list of differences that may appear in the nature of evidence of the two trials. We shall subject the inherent jurisdiction of this Court to an inapt use, if it is employed to enter into wild conjectures or wild anticipations. Regular trials as they are supposed to take place have been provided under the statutory scheme of Criminal Procedure Code, they cannot be pre-empted by an interested accused because he does not find it convenient to face the trial. Such inconvenience which he would face while facing the trial is because sufficient evidence has been found by the investigating agencies against him which justified the submission of charge sheet and which in the estimate of a judicial court was found sufficient to take cognizance of and also to summon the accused thereupon to face the trial. This Court in the name of exercise of inherent jurisdiction does not see it fit to have a pretrial before actual trial begins. The law on this point is trite and does not call for any great elaboration. The extent and the relevance of judgments passed in some other cases have been specifically provided under the Indian Evidence Act. It certainly does not contemplate any such result as has been sought by the applicants or their counsel. 5. Application lacks merit and therefore same stands dismissed.