ORDER : V.M. Pancholi, J. 1. By way of this petition which is filed under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioners have prayed for the following relief/s: "(A) Admit this petition; (B) Allow this petition by issuing an appropriate writ, order or direction quashing and setting aside an order dated 22.08.2016 passed by the Special Secretary (Appeals), Revenue Department, Gujarat State in revision application no. MVV/HKP/MSN/16/2016 and thereby, be pleased to confirm the order dated 01.03.2016 passed by the Collector, Mehsana in Revision Application No. 43/2014 and the order dated 23.01.2014 passed by the Prant Officer, Mehsana in RTS Case No. 374/2012; (C) Pending, Admission and till final disposal of the present petition, be pleased to stay the execution, operation and implementation of the order dated 22.08.2016 passed by the Special Secretary (Appeals), Revenue Department, Gujarat State in revision application no. MVV/HKP/MSN/16/2016; (D) Pending, Admission and till final disposal of the present petition, be pleased to direct the respondents to maintain status quo in respect of the lands in question; (E) Grant such other and further relief(s) as deemed fit in the interest of justice." 2. Heard learned Senior Counsel Mr. Shalin Mehta assisted by learned advocate Mr. Dipak Patel for the petitioners, learned Assistant Government Pleader Mr. K.M. Antani for the respondent State and learned Senior Counsel Mr. D.C. Dave assisted by learned advocate Mr. Viral Dave for respondent Nos. 5 to 5.5 and 6. 3. The facts of the present case in nutshell are as under: 3.1. It is the case of the petitioners that petitioners and private respondents are real brothers. They were jointly holding various parcels of land bearing Survey Nos. 213 Paiki, 214/1, 214/2, 215/1, 215/2, 534 and 216 Paiki 2 situated at Unjha, District Mahesana as ancestral properties. It is stated that on 29.03.1982, as per mutual understanding among all the brothers, writing came to be executed by them to hold the lands in question only for administration purpose to get water for the agricultural activities and for other purposes. It is submitted that the private respondents misused the said writing and thereby submitted an application for entering their names in the revenue record by showing the said document as partition deed between the brothers. It is submitted that the private respondents misused the said writing and thereby submitted an application for entering their names in the revenue record by showing the said document as partition deed between the brothers. Accordingly, revenue entry No. 7482 came to be mutated in the record of rights on 27.09.1982 which came to be certified subsequently by Deputy Mamlatdar on 30.10.1982. 3.2. It is also alleged that the concerned revenue officer did not issue notice under Section 135D of the Gujarat Land Revenue Code (hereinafter referred to as 'the Code' for short) and therefore petitioners were not aware about mutation of the disputed entry. When the petitioners came to know about the said entry, they filed RTS Appeal No. 374 of 2012 before the Prant Officer, Mahesana. The said appeal came to be allowed by the Prant Officer vide order dated 23.01.2014. The private respondents, therefore, filed Revision Application No. 43 of 2014 before the Collector. The Collector rejected the said revision application vide order dated 01.03.2016. The private respondents, therefore, filed Revision Application before the Special Secretary, Revenue Department (Appeals). The SSRD, by impugned order dated 22.08.2016 allowed the said revision application and therefore petitioners have filed present petition. 4. Learned Senior Counsel Mr. Shalin Mehta appearing for the petitioners would contend that the document which was produced before the revenue authority by the private respondents is not a partition deed and the same is also not registered document and therefore in absence of registration under the provisions of the Registration Act, the revenue authority could not have mutated the entry in question. It is, therefore, urged that the impugned order passed by the SSRD is required to be quashed and set aside. In support of his submission, learned counsel has placed reliance upon the decision rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Roshan Singh and others v. Zile Singh and others, reported in AIR 1988 SC 881 . He has also placed reliance upon the decision rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Suraj Lamp and Industries Private Ltd. v. State of Haryana & Anr., reported in (2012) 1 SCC 656 . Learned counsel would further submit that no limitation period is prescribed for filing appeal before the Deputy Collector and therefore within reasonable time appeal can be filed before the Deputy Collector challenging the entry mutated in the revenue record. Learned counsel would further submit that no limitation period is prescribed for filing appeal before the Deputy Collector and therefore within reasonable time appeal can be filed before the Deputy Collector challenging the entry mutated in the revenue record. It is submitted that in the present case, when the private respondents produced the copy of the aforesaid writing before the revenue authority for mutation of the entry, notice was not issued to the petitioners and therefore they were not aware about entry made in the revenue record and therefore as and when petitioners came to know about the disputed entry, appeal was preferred and the Deputy Collector as well as Collector have considered the case of the petitioners on merits. Therefore, it was not proper on the part of respondent - SSRD to consider the aspect of delay in filing the appeal by way of impugned order passed in the revision application filed by the private respondents. 5. At this stage, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners has placed reliance upon the provisions contained in Section 135-D(8) of the Code and after referring to the same, it is submitted that when the certifying officer has a reason to believe that such mutation entry violates or contravenes any of the provisions of the Act or any other Act, he shall not certify such entry and shall intimate the same with reasons in writing to the person concerned. 6. Lastly, it is submitted that during the pendency of the civil suit pending before the concerned Civil Court names of the petitioners as well as private respondents be shown in the revenue record. It is therefore urged that the impugned order be set aside. 7. On the other hand, learned Senior Counsel Mr. D.C. Dave appearing for the private respondents has submitted that it is not in dispute that the petitioners have signed the mutual understanding executed on 29.03.1982. Learned counsel has referred the averments made in para 3.2 of the petition. It is therefore urged that the impugned order be set aside. 7. On the other hand, learned Senior Counsel Mr. D.C. Dave appearing for the private respondents has submitted that it is not in dispute that the petitioners have signed the mutual understanding executed on 29.03.1982. Learned counsel has referred the averments made in para 3.2 of the petition. Thereafter, it is contended that after a period of 30 years from the date of mutation of the disputed entry, petitioners filed an appeal before the Deputy Collector and petitioners have failed to give reasonable explanation for not filing the appeal within reasonable time and therefore the respondent SSRD has rightly considered the aspect of gross delay and therefore it cannot be said that SSRD has committed any error while allowing the revision application filed by the private respondents. 8. It is further submitted by learned counsel for the private respondents that the civil suit is filed by the petitioners in the year 2017 wherein no relief is granted by the concerned Civil Court in favour of the petitioners till today and therefore also this Court may not interfere with the impugned order passed by the SSRD. Learned counsel lastly contended that the revenue entries are only for fiscal purpose and right of the parties cannot be determined by the revenue authorities and whether partition deed is genuine or not or whether the said mutual understanding was executed for limited purpose or not can be examined by the concerned Civil Court and therefore this Court may not interfere with the impugned order. 9. In support of his submission, learned counsel appearing for the private respondents has placed reliance upon the decision rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Suraj Bhan & Ors. v. Financial Commissioner & Ors., reported in (2007) 6 SCC 186 and in the case of Rajinder Singh v. State of Jammu & Kashmir, reported in (2008) 9 SCC 368 . 10. Learned Assistant Government Pleader Mr. Antani has also opposed this petition and submitted that as per the provisions contained in Section 135C of the Code, when any person acquiring the right on any land by succession, survivorship, partition, etc., any right as holder, occupant, owner, etc., he shall make a report of such acquisition of such right to the designated officer within stipulated time from the date of such acquisition. It is further submitted that if any person acquiring right by virtue of a registered document, such person is exempted from the obligation to report to the designated officer. It is, therefore, contended that it is not necessary for the person acquiring right by way of a registered document to inform to the concerned revenue authority about acquisition of his right. Further, if the document is unregistered, he has to inform to the concerned revenue authority within stipulated time. Learned Assistant Government Pleader, therefore, submitted that the submission canvassed by learned counsel appearing for the petitioners about the aspect of registration of the document in question cannot be examined by the revenue authority and revenue authority is not empowered to decide the validity of the transaction. 11. Learned AGP further submits that under Rule 108(5) of the Bombay Land Revenue Rules, limitation period of 60 days is provided for filing an appeal before the Deputy Collector and therefore it is not correct on the part of the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners to contend that no limitation period is prescribed. It is, therefore, urged that this petition be dismissed. 12. This Court has considered the submissions canvassed by learned counsel appearing for the parties. This Court has also examined the material placed on record. It transpires from the record that document was executed on 29.03.1982 by way of mutual agreement of all the brothers i.e. petitioners as well as private respondents. Execution of the said document is not in dispute in view of averments made in para 3.2 of the petition. However, the contention raised by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners is that the said document was executed for a limited purpose and it cannot be said to be a partition deed. However, the said aspect cannot be decided by the revenue authorities in the RTS proceedings. It is further revealed that the petitioners have already filed a civil suit before the competent civil Court in the year 2017 and in the said suit, till today, no relief is granted by the concerned civil Court in favour of the petitioners. The rights of the parties can be determined by the civil Court and the mutation entries are only for the fiscal purpose. 13. At this stage, the decision rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Suraj Bhan & Ors. The rights of the parties can be determined by the civil Court and the mutation entries are only for the fiscal purpose. 13. At this stage, the decision rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Suraj Bhan & Ors. (supra) is required to be kept in view. In the said case, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed in para 8 and 9 as under: "8. So far as mutation is concerned, it clear that entry has been made and mutation has been effected in Revenue Records by Tehsildar on the basis of an application made by respondent No. 5 herein and his name has been entered in Record of Rights on the basis of the Will said to have been executed by Ratni Devi. In our opinion, therefore, it cannot be said that by entering the name of respondent No. 5 in Revenue Records, any illegality had been committed by Tehsildar. It is true that no notice was issued to the appellants but the Tehsildar had taken the action on the basis of Will said to have been executed by deceased Ratni Devi in favour of respondent No. 5. The said order has been confirmed by the Collector as also by Financial Commissioner. When the grievance was made against the said action by filing a Writ Petition, the High Court also confirmed all the orders passed by Revenue Authorities under the Act. We see no infirmity so far as that part of the order is concerned. 9. There is an additional reason as to why we need not interfere with that order under Article 136 of the Constitution. It is well settled that an entry in Revenue Records does not confer title on a person whose name appears in Record of Rights. It is settled law that entries in the Revenue Records or Jamabandi have only 'fiscal purpose' i.e. payment of land-revenue, and no ownership is conferred on the basis of such entries. So far as title to the property is concerned, it can only be decided by a competent Civil Court (vide Jattu Ram v. Hakam Singh and Ors., AIR 1994 SC 1653 ). As already noted earlier, Civil Proceedings in regard to genuineness of Will are pending with High Court of Delhi. In the circumstances, we see no reason to interfere with the order passed by the High Court in the writ petition." 13.1. As already noted earlier, Civil Proceedings in regard to genuineness of Will are pending with High Court of Delhi. In the circumstances, we see no reason to interfere with the order passed by the High Court in the writ petition." 13.1. In the case of Rajinder Singh (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed in para 17 to 19 as under: "17. It is well settled that Revenue Records confer no title on the party. It has been recently held by this Court in Suraj Bhan & Ors. v. Financial Commissioner & Ors., (2007) 6 SCC 186 , that such entries are relevant only for "fiscal purpose" and substantive rights of title and of ownership of contesting claimants can be decided only by a competent civil Court in appropriate proceedings. 18. It is clear from the record that grievance of respondent No. 2 daughter related to Mutation entry. If the Authorities under the Tenancy Act felt that the action was in consonance with law, it could have retained the entry. The inquiry, however, was limited to the entry in Revenue Records and nothing more. It had no bearing whatsoever as to right of ownership, inheritance or title to the property. In our opinion, therefore, neither the Authorities under the Tenancy Act nor the High Court could have entered into question of ownership, title or inheritance in the present proceedings and they ought to have decided the controversy limited to mutation entry in the Revenue Records. 19. The present appeal, therefore, deserves to be disposed of by leaving all the parties to take appropriate proceedings in accordance with law in a competent civil Court so far as substantive rights of ownership, title or inheritance are concerned. In view of the fact, however, that certain observations have been made and questions have been considered with regard to rights of sons and daughters in the property of father under the Hindu Succession Act as also under the Jammu and Kashmir Hindu Succession Act, we clarify that all those observations which were not relevant in view of the limited question before the Revenue Authorities, would have no effect in the proceedings before the Civil Court if such proceedings have been initiated in a competent Court." 13.2. At this stage, decisions upon which the reliance is placed by learned counsel appearing for the petitioners are also required to be kept in view. At this stage, decisions upon which the reliance is placed by learned counsel appearing for the petitioners are also required to be kept in view. In the case of Roshan Singh & Ors. (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed in para 9 and 16 as under: "9. It is well-settled that while an instrument of partition which operates or is intended to operate as a declared volition constituting or severing ownership and causes a change of legal relation to the property divided amongst the parties to it, requires registration under s. 17(1)(b) of the Act, a writing which merely recites that there has in time past been a partition, is not a declaration of will, but a mere statement of fact, and it does not require registration. The essence of the matter is whether the deed is a part of the partition transaction or contains merely an incidental recital of a previously completed transaction. The use of the past tense does not necessarily indicate that it is merely a recital of a past transaction. It is equally well-settled that a mere list of properties allotted at a partition is not an instrument of partition and does not require registration. Sec. 17(1)(b) lays down that a document for which registration is compulsory should, by its own force, operate or purport to operate to create or declare some 1114 right in immovable property. Therefore, a mere recital of what has already taken place cannot be held to declare any right and there would be no necessity of registering such a document. Two propositions must therefore flow: (1) A partition may be effected orally; but if it is subsequently reduced into a form of a document and that document purports by itself to effect a division and embodies all the terms of bargain, it will be necessary to register it. If it be not registered, s. 49 of the Act will prevent its being admitted in evidence. Secondary evidence of the factum of partition will not be admissible by reason of s. 91 of the Evidence Act, 1872. (2) Partition lists which are mere records of a previously completed partition between the parties, will be admitted in evidence even though they are unregistered, to prove the fact of partition: See Mulla's Registration Act, 8th edn., pp. 54-57. 16. (2) Partition lists which are mere records of a previously completed partition between the parties, will be admitted in evidence even though they are unregistered, to prove the fact of partition: See Mulla's Registration Act, 8th edn., pp. 54-57. 16. In the present case, admittedly there was a partition by metes and bounds of the agricultural lands effected in the year 1955 and the shares allotted to the two branches were separately mutated in the revenue records. There was thus a disruption of joint status. All that remained was the partition of the ancestral residential house called rihaishi, the smaller house called baithak and ghers/ghetwars. The document Exh. P-12 does not effect a partition but merely records the nature of the arrangement arrived at as regards the division of the remaining property. A mere agreement to divide does not require registration. But if the writing itself effects a division, it must be registered. See: Rajangam Ayyar v. Rajangam Ayyar, LR (1923) 69 IA 123 and Nani Bai v. Gita Bai, AIR (1958) SC 706. It is well-settled that the document though unregistered can however be looked into for the limited purpose of establishing a severance in status, though that 1117 severance would ultimately affect the nature of the possession held by the members of the separated family as co-tenants. The document Exh. P-12 can be used for the limited and collateral purpose of showing that the subsequent division of the properties allotted was in pursuance of the original intention to divide. In any view, the document Exh. P-12 was a mere list of properties allotted to the shares of the parties." 13.3. In the case of Suraj Lamp and Industries Private Ltd. (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed in para 24 as under: "24. We therefore reiterate that immovable property can be legally and lawfully transferred/conveyed only by a registered deed of conveyance. Transactions of the nature of 'GPA sales' or 'SA/GPA/WILL transfers' do not convey title and do not amount to transfer, nor can they be recognized or valid mode of transfer of immovable property. The courts will not treat such transactions as completed or concluded transfers or as conveyances as they neither convey title nor create any interest in an immovable property. They cannot be recognized as deeds of title, except to the limited extent of section 53-A of the TP Act. The courts will not treat such transactions as completed or concluded transfers or as conveyances as they neither convey title nor create any interest in an immovable property. They cannot be recognized as deeds of title, except to the limited extent of section 53-A of the TP Act. Such transactions cannot be relied upon or made the basis for mutations in Municipal or Revenue Records. What is stated above will apply not only to deeds of conveyance in regard to freehold property but also to transfer of leasehold property. A lease can be validly transferred only under a registered Assignment of Lease. It is time that an end is put to the pernicious practice of SA/GPA/WILL transactions known as GPA sales." 14. This Court cannot dispute the proposition of law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid cases. However, in the facts of the present case, the aforesaid decisions relied on by learned counsel for the petitioners would not be applicable. 15. At this stage, provisions contained in Section 135C of the Code are required to be referred to, which provide as under: "[135C. Any person acquiring the right on any land by succession, survivorship, inheritance, partition, purchase, mortgage, gift, 8 [lease or Certificate of No Dues made under sub-section (2) and (3) of section 125L and section 133(2), or otherwise] any right as holder, occupant, owner, mortgagee, assignee of the rent thereof, shall make a report of such acquisition of such right, either manually or electronically, to the designated officer within the period of three months from the date of such acquisition, and the said designated officer shall at once, give a written acknowledgment of the receipt of such report to the person making it: Provided that where the person acquiring the right is a minor, or otherwise disqualified, his guardian or other person, having charge of his property, shall make the report to the designated officer: Provided further that any person acquiring a right by virtue of a registered document shall be exempted from the obligation to report to the designated officer: Explanation I.--The rights mentioned above include a mortgage without possession, but do not include an easement or a charge not amounting to a mortgage of the kind specified in section 100 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. Explanation II.-A person in whose favour a mortgage is discharged or extinguished, or lease determines, acquires a right within the meaning of this section." 16. From the aforesaid provisions, it can be said that if a person acquires the right on any land by succession, partition, purchase, etc., as holder, occupant, owner, etc., he shall make a report of acquisition of such right to the designated officer within stipulated period. It is not stated in the aforesaid provision that if the person has acquired the right only by way of a registered document then he has to inform to the concerned revenue authority. Further, proviso of the aforesaid Section provides for exemption given to a person acquiring any such right by virtue of a registered document, from the obligation to report to the designated officer. Thus, if the right is acquired by virtue of a registered document, it is not necessary for the person acquiring such right to report to the designated officer. Hence, the submission canvassed by learned counsel appearing for the petitioners that the revenue authority can mutate the entry in the revenue record only on the basis of the registered document, in the opinion of this Court, is misconceived. 17. Further, it is well settled that validity of the transaction entered into between the parties cannot be decided by the revenue authorities and the rights of the parties can be determined by the civil Court as held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the decisions referred to hereinabove. 18. It is pertinent to note at this stage that the petitioners filed RTS appeal after a period of 30 years from the date of mutation of the disputed entry in the revenue record. Thus, there is a gross delay of 30 years in filing an appeal by the petitioners and the petitioners have failed to give any reasonable explanation. The only contention canvassed by learned counsel appearing for the petitioners is that notice under Section 135D of the Code was not issued to the petitioners and therefore they were not aware about the said entry. However, said contention is also misconceived. It was always open for the petitioners to verify the revenue record during the period of 30 years. The only contention canvassed by learned counsel appearing for the petitioners is that notice under Section 135D of the Code was not issued to the petitioners and therefore they were not aware about the said entry. However, said contention is also misconceived. It was always open for the petitioners to verify the revenue record during the period of 30 years. Thus, in absence of any reasonable explanation given by the petitioners for not filing appeal within reasonable time, the respondent SSRD has rightly considered the said aspect of delay while passing the impugned order. Therefore, no illegality is committed by the SSRD. 19. The provisions contained in Section 135-D(8) of the Code has been inserted in the year 2010, whereas the disputed entry was mutated in the year 1982 and therefore the reliance placed by the learned counsel for the petitioners on the said provision is also misconceived. 20. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the present case, I am not inclined to interfere with the impugned order passed by the Special Secretary, Revenue Department (Appeals). Petition is, therefore, dismissed.