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2019 DIGILAW 1014 (HP)

Neem Chand v. Sarvinder Kumar

2019-07-24

TARLOK SINGH CHAUHAN

body2019
JUDGMENT Tarlok Singh Chauhan, J. - CMP No. 11744 of 2018 By medium of this application the applicants-tenants have sought permission to amend their reply filed to the eviction petition. A perusal of the application would show that entirely a different case is proposed to be set up in the reply by adding following sub para to existing para-13 of the reply:- "The petitioner has not given complete details of the owners of the building in question. Building in question is situated upon area of Khasra Nos. 75, 76, 77 and 78. Owners of the building are Tilak Raj, Kalso Devi, Bhag Devi, Hans Raj, Sarvinder Kumar, Smt. Harpati, Smt. Santosh Kumari, Smt. Darshna Kumari, Smt. Suraksha Kumari, Smt. Sujata Kumar and Smt. Himpati. In the building in question in the basement, there are three rooms. Two rooms are in possession of Sh. Tilak Raj, one room and another room is in possession ofShri Moti Ram. Third room in the basement is under the tenancy of Sh. Rajesh Kumar, son of late Sh. Joundu Ram on monthly rent of Rs.200/- which was earlier Rs.100. However, Shri Moti Ram who is one of the owner of the building has not applied for grant of sanction of map of new construction. Similarly, eviction petition has not been filed against Shri Rajesh Kumar son of late Shri Joundu Ram who is a tenant in the basement in respect of one room accommodation. Similarly, above the basement, the respondents/applicants are tenants and in the same storey, there is one tenant Sh. Sarwan Kumar who is doing business of sale of vegetables but against him also no eviction petition has been filed. Earlier rent used to be collected from late Shri Puran Chand father of the petitioners by Sh. Moti Ram and similarly, he used to collect rent from Sh. Joundu Ram father of Sh. Rajesh and Sarwan Kumar, vegetable seller. Since the entire body of owners of the building have not joined in filing eviction petition nor they have given any written consent, therefore, the eviction petition as filed is not maintainable. They are not interested to vacate the accommodation nor want rebuilding of this building." 2. The eviction proceedings were initiated in the year 2011 and there is no reason forthcoming as to why the aforesaid defence was not taken either before the Rent Controller or before the first Appellate Court. They are not interested to vacate the accommodation nor want rebuilding of this building." 2. The eviction proceedings were initiated in the year 2011 and there is no reason forthcoming as to why the aforesaid defence was not taken either before the Rent Controller or before the first Appellate Court. It was not even pleaded that in spite of due diligence, the tenant could not have raised the matter for which the amendment is sought at this stage. 3. It is more than settled that leave to amend may be refused if it introduces a totally different, new and inconsistent case or changes the fundamental character of the case. Be it the plaint or the written statement, the proviso to Order 7 Rule 17 of the CPC virtually prevents an application for amendment of pleadings from being allowed after trial has commenced unless the Court comes to the conclusion that in spite of due diligence the party could not have raised the matter before the commencement of trial. The proviso to an extent curtails the absolute discretion of the Court to allow the amendment at any stage, therefore, the burden is on the person who seeks an amendment after commencement of the trial to show that in spite of due diligence such amendment could not have been sought earlier. 4. There cannot be any dispute that an amendment cannot be claimed as a matter of right and under all circumstances, the proposed amendment is clearly malafide and cannot, therefore, be allowed. Application stands disposed of. CR No. 170 of 2017 5. The tenants are the petitioners, who aggrieved by the order of eviction passed by the learned Rent Controller and as affirmed by the learned first Appellate Court with the right ofre-induction in the demised premises in terms of the provisions contained in proviso under Section 14 (3) (c) of the H. P. Urban Rent Control Act (for short the ''Act''), has filed the instant petition. The parties shall be hereinafter referred to as the ''landlord'' and ''tenants''. 6. The parties shall be hereinafter referred to as the ''landlord'' and ''tenants''. 6. The landlord filed an eviction petition before the learned Rent Controller against the tenants for eviction from the premises known as ground floor, old Post Office Building, Chhotta Shimla (hereinafter called as ''demised premises'') on the ground that tenant No. 1 is running a dhaba in the demised premises whereas tenants No. 2 and 3 were carrying out their separate business in Darlaghat, Tehsil Arki, District Solan. It was pleaded that the demised premises was rented out to the father of the tenants late Shri Puran Chand and after his death, it devolved upon the tenants and, in fact, it was only tenant No. 1, who is in actual possession of the demised premises. The demised premises were let out on a rental of Rs.1700/- per month inclusive of M. C. Taxes. As per the landlord, the demised premises was more than 80-85 years old and sought eviction of the tenants on the ground of bonafide requirement for carrying out re-building and reconstruction. 7. The tenants contested the petition by filing reply wherein raised the preliminary objections with regard to maintainability estoppel, non-joinder of necessary parties, petition lacks complete material and better particulars and there is no description of the property having been set out properly. It is further claimed that this was for the first time that the petitioner-landlord has set up a claim of being the landlord. On merits, it was pleaded that the petitioner-landlord had not disclosed as to how he was setting up the claim of being the landlord and was required to disclose in what manner he became owner of the demised premises. It is pleaded that the demised premises were being used by all the respondents-tenants after the death of their father late Puran Chand. Initially, the demised premises were rented out at Rs.70/- per month and the rate of rent was regularly increased and at present rent was Rs. 1700/-per month. It was further averred that the respondents-tenants alongwith three sisters have inherited the estate of late Puran Chand, but the sisters had not being made party in the present petition. It was denied that the demised premises were old. It was further denied that wood in the doors and wooden frames have also deteriorated and decayed. It was also denied that the premises were in a dangerous condition. It was denied that the demised premises were old. It was further denied that wood in the doors and wooden frames have also deteriorated and decayed. It was also denied that the premises were in a dangerous condition. In fact, the building in question was in good and sound condition and not required reconstruction or renovation work and the petition had been filed with the ulterior motive to simply seek eviction of the respondents-tenants. It was, therefore, prayed that the petition be dismissed. 8. Landlord filed rejoinder to the reply filed by the respondents-tenants. 9. The learned Rent Controller on 13.06.2012, framed the following issues:- 1. Whether the respondents are liable to be evicted on the ground of bonafide requirement of the rebuilding and reconstruction, as alleged? OPP 2. Whether there exists no relationship of tenant and landlord between the parties, as alleged? OPR 3. Whether the present petition is not competent or maintainable, as alleged?OPR 4. Whether the petition is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties, as alleged?OPR 5. Whether the petitioner is estopped from filing the present petition, as alleged?OPR 6. Whether the petitioner has no locus standi to file the present petition, as alleged?OPR 7. Whether the petition in question lacks complete material and better particulars, as alleged?OPR 8. Whether the petition of the petitioner is liable to be dismissed on the ground of improper identification, as alleged?OPR 10. After recording evidence and evaluating the same, the learned Rent Controller, ordered the eviction of the respondents-tenants. However, on appeal though the order of eviction was affirmed by the learned first Appellate Court, but the tenants were given the right to re-induction in the demised premises. Aggrieved by the order of eviction, the tenants have filed the instant petition. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the records of the case. 11. It is vehemently argued by Shri G. D. Verma, learned Senior Advocate duly assisted by Mr. B. C. Verma, Advocate that the findings recorded by the learned Courts below are perverse and, therefore, deserve to be set aside. Two-fold submissions have been made on behalf of the tenants. Firstly, that all the co-owners were necessary parties to the eviction petition and therefore, in their absence no order of eviction could have been passed against the tenants. B. C. Verma, Advocate that the findings recorded by the learned Courts below are perverse and, therefore, deserve to be set aside. Two-fold submissions have been made on behalf of the tenants. Firstly, that all the co-owners were necessary parties to the eviction petition and therefore, in their absence no order of eviction could have been passed against the tenants. Secondly, the other tenants of the premises were required to be arrayed as parties as in their absence the premises cannot be re-built or re-constructed. In support of such contentions, the learned counsel for the respondents-tenants has placed reliance on the following judgments:- 1. Shiv Chand vs. Manghru and others, 2007 (1) SLC 389 . 2. Prabhu Nath and another vs. Sushma, 2014 (2) SLC 1003 3. Ashok Kapoor vs. Murtu Devi, 2016 (1) SLC 207 12. On the other hand, Shri Y P. Sood, learned Advocate, would argue that since the findings recorded by the learned Courts below are based upon a correct appreciation of the pleadings and evidence on record, therefore, the same warrants no interference. Learned counsel for the landlord would further contend that since all the co-owners are consenting parties, therefore, the petition for eviction was maintainable and secondly that another tenant in the premises has already agreed to vacate the premises as per the compromise entered into between the landlord, therefore, also the eviction petition was maintainable and has placed reliance on the following judgments:- 1. Sh. Lin Kuei Tsan vs. Ashok Kumar Goel Latest HLJ 2015 (HP) 1096 . 2. Kewal Krishan Sehgal and others vs. Rajeshwar Kumar and another 2019 (1) SLC 323 , 13. In order to appreciate the controversy between the parties, it would be necessary to first deal with the case law as relied upon by the respective parties. 14. In Shiv Chand vs. Manghru, 2007 (1) SLC 389, the facts therein were that the plaintiff/appellant therein had sought permanent prohibitory injunction against respondents /defendants restraining them from raising construction over any part of the suit land. It was alleged to be in joint possession of the parties though owned by the State Government and it was in this background that the Court observed that the persons in joint possession of immovable property are supposed to respect the right of joint possession of each other in the same fashion and manner as the owners in joint possession. It was alleged to be in joint possession of the parties though owned by the State Government and it was in this background that the Court observed that the persons in joint possession of immovable property are supposed to respect the right of joint possession of each other in the same fashion and manner as the owners in joint possession. Therefore, the ratio laid down in this judgment has no applicability to the facts of the present case. 15. Likewise in Prabhu Nath and another vs. Sushma, 2014 (2) SLC 1003, this Court held that every co-owner has every right over each inch of land as possession of one co-owner is possession of all. Hence, co-sharer cannot change nature of the suit land to the detriment of every co-owner unless the land is partitioned. For the reasons stated above, this judgment as no applicability to the facts of the present case. 16. Now, adverting to the judgment Ashok Kapoor vs. Murtu Devi, 2016 (1) SLC 207, similar reiteration of law with regard to rights and duties of co-sharers have been laid down and, therefore, even this judgment has no applicability to the facts of the instant case. 17. In Sh. Lin Kuei Tsan vs. Ashok Kumar Goel Latest HLJ 2015 (HP) 1096, the fact was that the building was owned by the petitioner alongwith his wife Kamlesh, who had admittedly not been arrayed as party. One of the objections raised in the petition was non-joinder of the parties as the co-owners had not been made a party. This contention was negated by this Court by observing as under:- "19. Indisputably, the premises in question were owned by the landlord and his wife Kamiesh and this fact has in fact been mentioned in the eviction petition, though not in so many words. Even otherwise, it is more than settled that one co-owner can maintain an eviction petition. That part, no prejudice has otherwise been shown to have been caused to the tenant by not arraying the co-owner so as to make a grievance. It was not disputed before me that the co-owner Smt. Kamiesh is nor more in the land of living and, therefore, even this objection of the tenant therefore holds no water." 18. That part, no prejudice has otherwise been shown to have been caused to the tenant by not arraying the co-owner so as to make a grievance. It was not disputed before me that the co-owner Smt. Kamiesh is nor more in the land of living and, therefore, even this objection of the tenant therefore holds no water." 18. Similar issue came up before this Court in Kewal Krishan Sehgal and others vs. Rajeshwar Kumar and another 2019 (1) SLC 323, wherein a specific point for determination regarding non-joinder of necessary parties was formulated as under: - 6(iii) the eviction petition was bad for non-joinder of necessary parties as the other co-owners of the building had not been arrayed as parties to the petition; and This point was answered in the following terms:- POINT No. (iii): 17. It has way back in 1976 that a bench of three Hon''ble Judges in Sri Ram Pasricha vs. Jagannath and others AIR 1976 SC 2335 held that a co-owner is as much an owner of the entire property as sole owner of the property is, therefore, can maintain an eviction petition. The aforesaid judgment was thereafter followed by a bench of three Hon''ble Judges in Kanta Goel vs. B.P. Pathak and others (1977) 2 SCC 814 . Similar reiteration of law can be found in Pal Singh vs. Sunder Singh (dead) by LRs andothers (1989) 1 SCC 444 , Dhannalal vs. Kalawatibai and others (2002) 6 SCC 16 and India Umbrella Manufacturing Co. and others vs. Bhagabandei Agarwalla (dead) by LRs Savitri Agarwalla (Smt.) and others (2004) 3 SCC 178 . 18. In view of the law propounded in all the aforesaid judgments, it can be taken to be well settled that one of the co-owners can file a suit for eviction of a tenant in the property generally owned by the co-owners. This principle is based on the doctrine of agency. One co-owner filing a suit for eviction against the tenant does so on his own behalf in his own right and as an agent of the other co-owners. The consent of other co-owners is assumed as taken unless it is shown that the other co-owners were not agreeable to eject the tenant and the suit was filed in spite of their disagreement. 19. The consent of other co-owners is assumed as taken unless it is shown that the other co-owners were not agreeable to eject the tenant and the suit was filed in spite of their disagreement. 19. Adverting to the facts of the case, it would be noticed that there is nothing on record to even remotely indicate that other co- owners were not agreeable to eject the tenants and yet the eviction petition had been filed despite such disagreement. 19. Adverting to the second contention of the petitioner regarding non-joinder of the tenants, it has already come on record that the other tenant in the premises, namely, Rajesh Kumar had entered into a compromise with the landlord, as would be evident from the order passed on 06.10.2017 in Civil Revision No. 53 of 2017, titled Rajesh Kumar vs. Sarvinder Kumar, which reads as under:- "It is heartening to note that with the intervention of Mr. Satyen Vaidya, learned Mediator, parties have amicably resolved their dispute. Efforts put in by learned Mediator are highly appreciable. Report of the learned Mediator is taken on record. 2. Terms of settlement stand recorded by the learned Mediator in the proceedings which the parties reiterate before this Court. They undertake to abide by the same. They have been made aware of the consequences of breach thereof, including initiation of proceedings of contempt. 3. Accordingly, the present petition is disposed of clarifying that the order dated 3 rd March, 2016, passed by the Rent Controller, Shimla in Case No.107-2of 2015/11, titled as Sarvinder Kumar vs. Rajesh Kumar, as affirmed by Appellate Authority-(IV), Shimla, H.P., vide order dated 29 th December, 2016, passed in Rent Appeal NO.12-S/14 of 2016, titled as Rajesh Kumar vs. Sarvinder Kumar is modified in terms of settlement, which shall form part of the order. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of." 20. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of." 20. This Court while exercising its revisional jurisdiction has to bear in mind the scope of such jurisdiction as have been laid down by the Hon''ble Constitution Bench of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. vs. Dilbahar Singh (2014) 9 SCC 78 , the broad principles so laid down can be summarised as under: - (i) The term ''propriety'' would imply something which is legal and proper, (ii) The power of the High Court even though wider than the one provided under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure is not wide enough to that of the appellate Authority. (iii) Such power cannot be exercised as the cloak of an appeal in disguise. (iv) Issues raised in the original proceedings cannot be permitted to be reheard as a appellate Authority. (v) The expression "revision" is meant to convey the idea of much narrower expression than the one expressed by the expression "appeal". The revisional power under the Rent Control Act may not be as narrow as the revisional power under Section 115 of the CPC but certainly it is not wide enough to make the High Court a second court of first appeal. While holding so the Court reiterated the view taken in Dattonpant Gopalvarao Devakate vs. Vithalrao Maruthirao Janagawal, (1975) 2 SCC 246 . (vi). The meaning of the expression "legality and propriety" so explained in Ram Dass vs. Ishwar Chander, (1988) 3 SCC 131 was only to the extent that exercise of the power is not confined to jurisdictional error alone and has to be "according to law". (vii) Whether or not the finding of fact is according to law or not is required to be seen on the touch stone, as to whether such finding of fact is based on some legal evidence or it suffers from any illegality like misreading of the evidence; overlooking; ignoring the material evidence all together; suffers from perversity; illegality; or such finding has resulted into gross miscarriage of justice. Court clarified that the ratio of Ram Dass (supra) does not exposit that the revisional power conferred upon the High Court is as wide as an appellate power to reappraise or reassess the evidence for coming to a finding contrary to the findings returned by the authority below. Court clarified that the ratio of Ram Dass (supra) does not exposit that the revisional power conferred upon the High Court is as wide as an appellate power to reappraise or reassess the evidence for coming to a finding contrary to the findings returned by the authority below. (viii) In exercise of its revisional jurisdiction High Court shall not reverse findings of fact merely because on reappreciation of the evidence it may have a different view thereupon, (ix) The exercise of such power to examine record and facts must be understood in the context of the purpose that such findings are based on firm legal basis and not on a wrong premise of law. (x) Pure findings of fact are not to be interfered with. Reconsideration of all questions of fact is impermissible as Court cannot function as a Court of appeal, (xi) Even while considering the propriety and legality, high Court cannot reappreciate the evidence only for the purposes of arriving at a different conclusion. Consideration of the evidence is confined only to adjudge the legality, regularity and propriety of the order, (xii) Incorrect finding of fact must be understood in the context of such findings being perverse, based on no evidence; and misreading of evidence." 21. In the aforesaid decision, the Hon''ble Supreme Court was dealing with the provisions of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965, T. N. Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 and Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1973. The incongruity in the decisions rendered by the Hon''ble Supreme Court in Rukmini Amma Saradamma vs. Kallyani Sulochana, (1993) 1 SCC 499 and Ram Dass (supra) was the backdrop in which the Constitution Bench was called upon to decide the scope of the revisional jurisdiction and the expression "legality and propriety" provided in the relevant statues. The essential question being as to whether in exercise of such powers, the revisional authority could re-appreciate the evidence or not. Finally the Hon''ble Supreme Court answered the reference by making the following observations:- "43. We hold, as we must, that none of the above Rent Control Acts entitles the High Court to interfere with the findings of fact recorded by the first appellate court/first appellate authority because on reappreciation of the evidence, its view is different from the court/authority below. Finally the Hon''ble Supreme Court answered the reference by making the following observations:- "43. We hold, as we must, that none of the above Rent Control Acts entitles the High Court to interfere with the findings of fact recorded by the first appellate court/first appellate authority because on reappreciation of the evidence, its view is different from the court/authority below. The consideration or examination of the evidence by the High Court in revisional jurisdiction under these Acts is confined to find out that finding of facts recorded by the court/authority below is according to law and does not suffer from any error of law. A finding of fact recorded by court/authority below, if perverse or has been arrived at without consideration of the material evidence or such finding is based on no evidence or misreading of the evidence or is grossly erroneous that, if allowed to stand, it would result in gross miscarriage of justice, is open to correction because it is not treated as a finding according to law. In that event, the High Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction under the above Rent Control Acts shall be entitled to set aside the impugned order as being not legal or proper. The High Court is entitled to satisfy itself as to the correctness or legality or propriety of any decision or order impugned before it as indicated above. However, to satisfy itself to the regularity, correctness, legality or propriety of the impugned decision or the order, the High Court shall not exercise its power as an appellate power to reappreciate or reassess the evidence for coming to a different finding on facts. Revisional power is not and cannot be eguated with the power of reconsideration of all guestions of fact as a court of first appeal. Where the High Court is reguired to be satisfied that the decision is according to law, it may examine whether the order impugned before it suffers." 22. Bearing in mind the aforesaid exposition of law and the scope of revisional jurisdiction of this Court, it would be noticed that not only the learned Rent Controller but learned first Appellate Court had also threadbare discussed the pleadings and the evidence led by the parties and only thereafter ordered the eviction of the tenants. It would be noticed that the landlord examined as many as three witnesses to prove his case. 23. It would be noticed that the landlord examined as many as three witnesses to prove his case. 23. At first, official witness Yashwant Singh from M. C, Shimla, appeared as PW-1 and proved the notice Ext. PW-l/A that had been issued by the Municipal Corporation, Shimla declaring the building in question to be dangerous. He has also proved on record the sanctioning of the map vide order Ext.PW-1/whereby the plan had been sanctioned as Ext.PWl/C. 24. Petitioner-landlord while appearing as PW-2 proved on record the notice Ext.PW-l/A that had been received by him from M. C. Shimla declaring the building to be in a dangerous condition and on receipt of the notice he had asked the tenants to vacate the premises but they refused to do so. Thereafter, he requested engineer Shri B. C. Sharma to prepare spot report, who after visiting the spot prepared site plan, which was then submitted to the M. C. Shimla for approval and the same had been approved and sanctioned vide letter Ext.PW-1/C. In cross-examination, he admitted that earlier his brother Moti Ram was residing in Shimla and now he was residing in his parental village. He admitted that Puran Chand was inducted as tenant in the year 1971-72 and he used to pay rent to his brother Moti Ram. He admitted that his brother Moti Ram was residing separately but voluntarily stated that the property was still joint. He denied the suggestion that his brother was still taking rent from the tenants and volunteered to state that after 1992 he was collecting rent from the tenants. He also denied the suggestion that three daughters of late Puran Chand were also residing in demised premises during his life time. He admitted that he had moved an application to the M. C. Shimla to declare the demised premises unsafe, however, he denied that the demised premises were in good condition and did not require re-building or reconstruction. 25. PW-3 Shri B. C. Sharma, who was Civil Engineer by profession had visited the demised premises on 16.10.2011 on the request of the petitioner-landlord. He proved on record spot report Ext.PW-3/A, tendered copy of jamabandi Ext.PW-3/B, sketch plan Ext.PW-3/C-l to Ext.PW-3/C-3 and photographs Ext.PW-3/D-l to Ext.PW-3/D-10 of the demised premises. 25. PW-3 Shri B. C. Sharma, who was Civil Engineer by profession had visited the demised premises on 16.10.2011 on the request of the petitioner-landlord. He proved on record spot report Ext.PW-3/A, tendered copy of jamabandi Ext.PW-3/B, sketch plan Ext.PW-3/C-l to Ext.PW-3/C-3 and photographs Ext.PW-3/D-l to Ext.PW-3/D-10 of the demised premises. According to him, the demised premises were in a dangerous condition and were required to be re-constructed, which could not be done without the tenants vacating the same. He denied the suggestion that he had prepared a false report at the instance of the landlord. 26. In order to rebut the evidence led by the landlord the tenants have examined tenant No. 1 Shri Neem Chand as RW-1, who deposed that the eviction petition had been filed simply to harass them. He further stated that the demised premises were rented to his later father Puran Chand, however, after his death tenancy rights were succeeded by him alongwith his brother and sisters. In cross-examination, he admitted that there was a Gurudwa adjoining the demised premises and the same had recently been re-constructed. He also admitted that in Ext.PW-3/D-5 and Ext. PW-3/D-6, the back portion of the demised premises was visible. He admitted that respondent No. 3 was having a shop on the name and style of Jai Mata Naina Devi at Darlaghat. He admitted the demised premises was having commercial value. He denied that he is deposing falsely. 27. The tenants also examined RW-2 V. S. Panwar, retired Assistant Engineer and was working as a consultant. As per this witness he had visited the demised premises and prepared report Ext. RW-2/A. According to him, the demised premises were in good condition and did not require rebuilding or reconstruction. In cross-examination, he admitted that he had not given any notice to the landlord at the time of inspection. He also admitted that the demised premises were in the shape of Dhabaand had been adjoining to a Gurudwara. He admitted that photographs Ext. PW-3/D-1 and Ext.PW-3/D-2 were of the demised premises. He denied that he had prepared a false report at the instance of the tenants. 28. This is in entirety the evidence led by the parties, which clearly establishes that the landlord is the recorded owner of the property alongwith his brother. 29. He admitted that photographs Ext. PW-3/D-1 and Ext.PW-3/D-2 were of the demised premises. He denied that he had prepared a false report at the instance of the tenants. 28. This is in entirety the evidence led by the parties, which clearly establishes that the landlord is the recorded owner of the property alongwith his brother. 29. As regards the objections of the respondents with regard to the non-joinder of necessary parties, it has been held by the learned Courts below that the tenants had led no cogent or reliable evidence to prove that the sisters of the tenants were also residing with them. 30. As regards the bona fide plea of the landlord, he had discharged the onus by proving that the building requires reconstruction. Even if the building was not dangerous the landlord would be entitled to seek eviction in light of the judgment of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in Prem Chand alias Prem Nath vs. Shanta Prabhakar 1998 (1) SCC 274 , wherein it was held that even if the building was not unsafe or unfit for human habitation, the landlord requires it for rebuilding or making any substantial additions or alterations, he was entitled to the order of eviction as is evident from the following observations as contained in paras 8 and 9 which reads thus:- 8. A careful reading of the above Section will show that the Section contemplates different independent situations/circumstances enabling the landlord to apply for eviction of a tenant. Those different and independent situations/circumstances can be set out as follows :- "(i) When the tenanted premises are required by the landlord to carry out any building work at the instance of the Government or local authority or any Improvement Trust under some improvement or development scheme; or (ii) When the tenanted premises have become unsafe or unfit for human habitation; or (iii) When the tenanted premises are required bona fide by the landlord for carrying out repairs which cannot be carried out without such tenanted premises being vacated; or (iv) When the tenanted premises are required bona fide by the landlord for purposes of building or rebuilding or making thereto any substantial additions or alterations and that such building or re-building or addition or alteration cannot be carried out without the building or rented land being vacated." 9. From the above analysis, it will be seen that the condition of the building is required to be considered when the application falls under the abovementioned Category (ii). Admittedly, the application for eviction in the present case falls under Category (iv) and there is no requirement in such cases to go into the condition of the building. It is true that this Court has held that the requirement of the condition of the building is a vital factor whether such requirement is specifically stated in the Section or not. It must be remembered that the decision of this Court was rendered while interpreting Section 14(1)(b) of the Tamil Nadu Act which is not in pah materia with the Himachal Pradesh Act. In other words, there are no different categories as set out above in the Tamil Nadu Act as in Himachal Pradesh Act. 31. In Jagat Pal Dhawan vs. Kahan Singh (Dead) By Lrs. And others (2003) 1 SCC 191 , the Hon''ble Supreme Court while deciding eviction petition on the ground of demolition and reconstruction, observed as under:- "6. Section 14(3)(c) provides inter alia that a landlord may apply to the Controller for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of tenancy premises in case of any building or rented land being required bona fide by him for the purpose of building or rebuilding which cannot be carried out without the building or rented land being vacated. The provision does not have as an essential ingredient thereof and is a relevant factor the age and condition of the building. The provision also does not lay down that the availability of requisite funds and availability of building plans duly sanctioned by the local authority must be proved by the landlord as an ingredient of the provision or as a condition precedent to his entitlement to eviction of the tenant. However still, suffice it to observe, depending on the facts and circumstances of a given case, the court may look into such facts as relevant, though not specifically mentioned as ingredient of the ground for eviction, for the purpose of determining the bona fides of the landlord. If a building, as proposed, cannot be constructed or if the landlord does not have means for carrying out the construction or reconstruction obviously his requirement would remain a mere wish and would not be bona fide. 7. If a building, as proposed, cannot be constructed or if the landlord does not have means for carrying out the construction or reconstruction obviously his requirement would remain a mere wish and would not be bona fide. 7. Metal ware & Co. ''s case deals with Section 14 of Tamil Nadu Building (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 where recovery of possession by landlord from the tenant is contemplated if the building is bona fide required for the immediate purpose of demolishing it.(emphasis supplied). This Court held in Metalware & Co. ''s case that a building which, looking at its age and nature of construction, was not required to be demolished then the necessary ingredient of the provision was not satisfied. Metalware & Co''s case is a two-Judge Bench decision which was considered by a three-Judges Bench in P. Orr & Sons (P.) Ltd. vs. Associated Publishers (Madras) Ltd., (1991) 1 SCC 301 wherein this Court clarified that condition of the building cannot alone be the determining factor of bona fides of the landlord though it may be taken into consideration as one of the various circumstances such as the capacity of the landlord, the size of the existing building, the demand for additional space, the condition of the place, the economic advantage and other factors justifying investment of capital on reconstruction. 8. The Constitution Bench in Vijay Singh and Ors. vs. Vijayalaksmi Animal, (1996) 6 SCC 475 , authoritatively pronounced that for granting permission under Section 14(1)(b) of Tamil Nadu Act the relevant factors are (i) bona fide intention of the landlord far from the sole object only to get rid of the tenants; (ii) the age and condition of the building; and (iii) financial position of the landlord to demolish and erect a new building. However the Constitution Bench cautioned that these are only some of the illustrative factors to be taken into consideration alongwith other factors and no Court can fix any limit in respect of the age and condition of the building. 9. So is the view taken in R.V.E. Venkatachala Gounder vs. Venkatesha Gupta (2002) 4 SCC 437 and in Harrington House School vs. S.M. Ispahani (2002) 5 SCC 229 . 9. So is the view taken in R.V.E. Venkatachala Gounder vs. Venkatesha Gupta (2002) 4 SCC 437 and in Harrington House School vs. S.M. Ispahani (2002) 5 SCC 229 . The fact that demolition and reconstruction would result in modernization, making additional space available and/or would augment the earning of the landlord are relevant factors for determining the bona fides of the requirement for demolition and reconstruction." 10. The locality where the premises are situated has, with the lapse of time, become a busy commercial locality. The structure of the building is more than 100 years old. It is in mud mortar and with slates'' roofing-Instead of outdated two floor space, the landlord proposes to construct a modern three-storey ed building which would obviously provide additional space and much better return to the landlord. The landlord has stated that he had no other residential house of his own available with him and having reconstructed the building he would like to shift his residence too in his own newly constructed house. The bona fides of such a requirement could not have been doubted solely on the ground that the structure of the building, though old and outdated, had not gone so weak as was needed to be demolished immediately. 11. So far as the neighbours are concerned, none has objected to the proposed reconstruction. In any case that is a matter to be settled by the landlord with his neighbours. The learned counsel for the appellant submitted during the course of hearing, and rightly in our opinion, that even if the neighbours were not agreeable to have the common wall demolished and replaced by a new wall the appellant was prepared to raise additional walls of his own next to the common walls, if any, and rest his entire structure on such walls. This obviates the need of proving consent of the adjoining building owners for the proposed reconstruction. 12. So far as the building plans are concerned, it is not the case of the tenant-respondent that the building, as proposed, cannot under the local law be permitted to be built. This obviates the need of proving consent of the adjoining building owners for the proposed reconstruction. 12. So far as the building plans are concerned, it is not the case of the tenant-respondent that the building, as proposed, cannot under the local law be permitted to be built. However, this aspect loses all its significance inasmuch as on behalf of the appellant permission No. NPAP/Mandi/97/1389 dated 30.6.1998 issued by Municipal Council, Mandi, H.P. has been brought to the notice of this Court showing that the building plans proposed by the appellant have been sanctioned under Section 203 of the H.P. Municipal Council Adhiniyam, 1994 during the pendency of these proceedings. 32. The learned Rent Controller as also the learned first Appellate Court while upholding the bonafide requirement of the landlord have held the landlord to have duly proved on record his sanction plan from the M. C. Shimla and there is no dispute that the landlord has necessary means for carrying out the construction of the new building. As rightly observed by the learned first Appellate Court, in the present era of liberalised economy, it is not very difficult to arrange financial assistance from various banks and other financial institutions for raising construction of a building especially for commercial purposes. 33. Lastly, it would be noticed that the landlord has placed on record photographs Ext. PW-3/D1 to D10, which clearly evince that the premises in question are in a highly dilapidated condition and require rebuilding and reconstruction. That apart the premises have otherwise been declared to be dangerous, therefore, it would be neither safe nor prudent to still permit the tenants to reside in the same. 34. In view of the aforesaid discussion, there is no merit in this petition and the same is accordingly dismissed, so also the pending application(s), if any.