ORDER : Siddhartha Varma, J. 1. The respondent no. 3 in the instant writ petition raised an industrial dispute against the petitioners claiming that he was employed as peon by the petitioners on 22.2.1993 and that his services were illegally terminated on 7.10.1998. He raised an industrial dispute wherein he prayed for reinstatement with all back wages and continuity of service. The claim of the respondent no. 3 was contested by the petitioners and thereafter an award, which is under challenged in this writ petition, dated 22.1.2010 was passed. The petitioners have challenged the instant award on the very same grounds on which they had opposed the claim of the respondent no. 3 before the Labour Tribunal. The petitioners assailed the award essentially on three grounds: I. The petitioners were not an industry. II. There existed no relationship of an employee and an employer between the respondent no. 3 and the petitioners. III. The State Government was not the competent authority to refer the matter to the Industrial Tribunal when the petitioners were a body which found their existence on account of a central enactment of the Parliament. 2. Learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that at the first instance, before it was seen as to whether the petitioners were an industry or whether there existed a relationship of an employer and an employee between the petitioners and the respondent no. 3, the question as to whether the State Government was authorized to refer the matter to the Labour Tribunal or whether it was the Central Government which ought to have made the reference had to be seen. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioners stated that the petitioners were an autonomous body which came into existence on account of the Act No. 38 of 1949 enacted by the Parliament of India, and, therefore, the appropriate Government as per sub section 2 (a) (i) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, would be the Central Government. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioners further submitted that not only the petitioners came into existence because of the Act No. 38 of 1949 but all its activities were controlled by the Central Government. The Act came into existence on account of it's notification in the Official Gazette of the Central Government. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioners further submitted that not only the petitioners came into existence because of the Act No. 38 of 1949 but all its activities were controlled by the Central Government. The Act came into existence on account of it's notification in the Official Gazette of the Central Government. Learned counsel for the petitioners read out the Sections 1 and 2 of the Chartered Accountants Act, 1949, as also the preamble and, therefore, the same are being reproduced here as under:- 1. Short title, extent and commencement. – (1) This Act may be called the Chartered Accountants Act, 1949. (2) It extends to the whole of India. (3) It shall come into force on such date as the Central Government may by notification in the Official Gazette, appoint in this behalf. 2. Interpretation. – (1) In this Act, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context, – (a) “associate” means an associate member of the Institute; [(aa) “Authority” means the Appellate Authority constituted under Section 22A;] [(aaa) “Board” means that Quality Review Board constituted under Section 28A;] (b) “chartered accountant” means a person who is a member of the Institute. Interpretation. – (1) In this Act, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context, – (a) “associate” means an associate member of the Institute; [(aa) “Authority” means the Appellate Authority constituted under Section 22A;] [(aaa) “Board” means that Quality Review Board constituted under Section 28A;] (b) “chartered accountant” means a person who is a member of the Institute. (c) “Council” means the Council of the Institute; [(ca) “firm” shall have the meaning assigned to it in section 4 of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932, (9 of 1932), and includes, – (i) the limited liability partnership as defined in clause (n) of sub section (1) of section 2 of the Limited Liability Partnership Act, 2008 (6 of 2009); or (ii) the sole proprietorship, registered with the Institute;] (d) “holder of a restricted certificate” means a person holding a permanent or temporary restricted certificate granted by a [State] Government under the Restricted Certificate Rules, 1932; (e) “Institute” means the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India constituted under this Act; [(ea) “notification” means a notification published in the Official Gazette;] [(eb) “partner” shall have the meaning assigned to it in section 4 of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932 (9 of 1932) or in clause (q) of sub section (1) of section 2 of the Limited Liability Partnership Act, 2008 (6 of 2009), as the case may be;] [(ec) “partnership” means – (A) a partnership as defined in section 4 of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932 (9 of 1932); or (B) a limited liability partnership which has no company as its partner;] (f) “prescribed” means prescribed by regulations made under this Act; (g) “Register” means the Register of members maintained under this Act; (h) “Registered accountant” means any person who has been enrolled on the Register of Accountants maintained by the Central Government under the Auditor's Certificates Rules, 1932; [(ha) “specified” means specified by rules made by the Central Government under this Act;] [(haa) ''sole proprietorship” means an individual who engages himself in the practice of accountancy or offers to perform services referred to in clauses (ii) to (iv) of sub-section (2);] [(hb) “Tribunal” means a Tribunal established under sub-section (1) of Section 10B;] (i) “year” means the period commencing on the 1st day of April of any year and ending on the 31st day of March of the succeeding year. 5. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioners thereafter referred to Section 2(a) (i) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and, therefore, the same is being reproduced here as under:- 2. Definitions. – In this Act, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or contest, – (a). 5. Learned counsel for the petitioners thereafter referred to Section 2(a) (i) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and, therefore, the same is being reproduced here as under:- 2. Definitions. – In this Act, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or contest, – (a). “appropriate Government” means- (i) in relation to any industrial dispute concerning any industry carried on by or under the authority of the Central Government, or by a railway company or concerning any such controlled industry as may be specified in this behalf by the Central Government or in relation to an industrial dispute concerning a Dock Labour Board established under Section 5A of the Dock Workers (Regulation of Employment) Act, 1948 (9 of 1948), or the Industrial Finance Corporation of India Limited formed and registered under the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956) or the Employees' State Insurance Corporation established under section 3 of the Employees State Insurance Act, 1948 (34 of 1948), or the Board of Trustees constituted under section 3A of the Coal Mines Provident Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1948 (46 of 1948), or the Central Board of Trustees and the State Boards of Trustees constituted under section 5A and section 5B, respectively, of the Employees' Provident Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 (19 of 1952), or the Life Insurance Corporation of India established under section 3 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956 (31 of 1956), or the Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Limited registered under the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956) or the Deposit Insurance and Credit Guarantee Corporation established under section 3 of the Deposit Insurance and Credit Guarantee Corporation Act, 1961 (47 of 1961), or the Central Warehousing Corporation established under section 3 of the Warehousing Corporations Act, 1962 (58 of 1962), or the Unit Trust of India established under section 3 of the Unit Trust of India Act, 1963 (52 of 1963), or the Food Corporation of India established under section 3, or a Board of Management established for two or more contiguous States under section 16, of the Food Corporations Act, 1964 (37 of 1964), or the Airports Authority of India constituted under Section 3 of the Airports Authority of India Act, 1994 (55 of 1994), or a Regional Rural Bank established under section 3 of the Regional Rural Banks Act, 1976 (21 of 1976), or the Export Credit and Guarantee Corporation Limited or the Industrial Reconstruction Bank of India Limited, the National Housing Bank established under section 3 of the National Housing Bank Act, 1987 (53 of 1987), or an air transport service, or a banking or an insurance company, a mine, an oil field, a Cantonment Board, or a major port, any company in which not less than 50-1 per cent. of the paid – up share capital is held by the Central Government, or any corporation, not being a corporation referred to in this clause, establish by under any law made by Parliament, or the Central public sector undertaking, subsidiary companies set up by the principle undertaking and autonomous bodies owned or controlled by the Central Government, the Central Government, and; 6. Therefore referring to the Act No. 38 of 1949 and the Section 2(a) (i) of the Industrial Disputes Act, learned counsel submitted that the petitioners were an autonomous body controlled by the Central Government and, therefore, the Central Government alone was the proper authority which could have referred the matter to the Tribunal for an adjudication. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner also relied upon a judgment reported in 2013 (2) UPLBEC 1136 (M/s Muir Mills vs. The Presiding Officer, Labour Court, (I), U.P. Kanpur & Ors.) and submitted that therein also upon finding that the reference made by the State Government was fallacious, the writ petition was allowed and the award was quashed. 8. Learned counsel specifically relied upon 2001 (7) SCC 1 (Steel Authority of India Ltd. And others vs. National Union Waterfront Workers and others) and submitted that whether an employer had been specifically named in Section 2 (a) (I) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, or the employer was involved in an activity which was carried on by or under the Authority of the Central Government had to be seen. 9. Learned counsel for the petitioners further relied upon a judgment dated 4.7.2013 passed by the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi in W.P. (C) No. 3147 of 2012 (The Institute of Chartered Accountants of India and another vs. The Director General of Income Tax (Exemptions), Delhi and Ors.). It was held that petitioner therein i.e. Institute of Chartered Accountants of India was not an industry at all. 10. Still further learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the records revealed that the respondents were not employed by the petitioners but were employed by an employment agency namely Ms. Star Security Agency. Therefore the respondent was not even an employee of the petitioners. 11. In reply learned counsel for the respondent no. 10. Still further learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the records revealed that the respondents were not employed by the petitioners but were employed by an employment agency namely Ms. Star Security Agency. Therefore the respondent was not even an employee of the petitioners. 11. In reply learned counsel for the respondent no. 3 Sri Aadarsh Kumar vehemently argued that the Institute of Charted Accountants of India was an employer which was an Industry and also any dispute regarding it had to be referred under Section 4K of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, as it was essentially run by the State Government. In this regard, the counsel for the respondent no. 3 relied upon paragraph no. 20 of the award which had relied upon a letter of the additional Labour Commissioner (Central) Kanpur which was dated 30.1.2002. Further learned counsel relied upon paragraph 20 itself and submitted that since no proof of the fact had been placed before the Tribunal that the petitioners were an autonomous body working under the control of the Central Government it had rightly been held by the Tribunal that the proper government was the state government which could refer the matter to the Labour Tribunal. 12. Learned counsel for the respondents further submitted that labour laws were beneficial legislations and once when an award was passed this Court should not interfere with it. 13. Learned counsel for the respondent no. 3 relied upon 2015 (4) SCC 270 (Pepsico India Holding Private Limited vs. Krishna Kant Pandey) and further submitted that findings of fact should not be interfered with and the writ petition should be dismissed. 14. Learned counsel for the respondent no. 3 also submitted that the Labour Tribunal was functioning under a referral jurisdiction. It had not to decide as to whether the reference was good or bad. It had no other option but to decide the reference and, therefore no fault could be found with the award. Learned counsel for the respondents still further submitted that if the petitioners were aggrieved by the reference then they should have challenged the reference at the very initial stage by filing a writ petition. This having not been done they cannot now turn around and say that the reference was bad. Learned counsel for the respondents still further submitted that if the petitioners were aggrieved by the reference then they should have challenged the reference at the very initial stage by filing a writ petition. This having not been done they cannot now turn around and say that the reference was bad. Learned counsel for the respondents further submitted that definitely the petitioners were an Industry and they were carrying such activities which could be scrutinized by an Industrial Tribunal. 15. Further, learned counsel for the respondents submitted that, if the petitioners wanted to establish that they were not the employers of the respondent no. 3 then they should have brought before the Tribunal such attendance registers which they must have definitely maintained. 16. Having heard the learned counsel for the petitioners and the respondent no. 3, I am of the view that the reference as was made by the State Government was essentially erroneous. Since I have found that the reference itself was bad, no finding is required to be given on the issues as to whether the petitioners were an industry and as to whether there was a relationship of an employee and employer existing between the parties. The petitioners were a body which got its existence because of a central enactment being Act No. 38 of 1949. If one goes by Section 2(a)(ii) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, it becomes clear that even an autonomous body which was doing industrial work and was governed by the Central Government then the appropriate Government for making the reference of the dispute was the Central Government. In this regard since the Act No. 38 of 1949 definitely shows that the petitioners were a body which was a result of a Central enactment because of which the petitioners found their identity, any dispute which arose vis-a-vis the parties had to be, therefore, necessarily referred by the appropriate government i.e. the Central Government. This having not been done, I find that the reference was bad and, therefore, the subsequent award also becomes bad in law. 17. Under such circumstances, the award dated 22.1.2010 passed by the respondent no. 2 is set aside and the writ petition is allowed. 18. However, the respondent no. 3 can raise an industrial dispute by getting a reference made by the proper “appropriate government” within a period of two months. 17. Under such circumstances, the award dated 22.1.2010 passed by the respondent no. 2 is set aside and the writ petition is allowed. 18. However, the respondent no. 3 can raise an industrial dispute by getting a reference made by the proper “appropriate government” within a period of two months. If the reference is made thereafter then the dispute shall be settled thereafter within the next six months.