JUDGMENT : Hemant Kumar Srivastava, J. Heard learned counsel appearing for appellant as well as learned Additional Public Prosecutor for State on I.A. No. 2531 of 2018 as well as on the point of admission. 2. I.A. No.2531 of 2018 has been filed under Section 5 of Limitation Act for condonation of delay of thirty five days in filing this criminal appeal. 3. The appellant claims in her abovestated I.A. No. 2531 of 2018 that due to poverty she could not file the appeal in time. Moreover, the delay in filing this criminal appeal is condoned and, accordingly, I.A. No. 2531 of 2018 stands disposed of. 4. The appellant has challenged the impugned judgment of acquittal dated 10.01.2018 passed by Presiding Officer, Fast Track Court No. I, Madhepura in Sessions Trial No. 201 of 2010 by which and whereunder he acquitted the respondent no. 2 from the charge framed against him for the offences punishable under Sections 302/120B of the Indian Penal Code and section 27 of the Arms Act. 5. Learned counsel appearing for appellant submits that the appellant being an illiterate lady gave her thumb impression on her fard-e-beyan and as a matter of fact the concerned police officer did not explain the contents of fard-e-beyan to her and subsequently in course of trial she came to know that the concerned police officer did not mention the name of respondent no. 2 in her fard-e-beyan. 6. He further submitted that in course of trial not only appellant, but her daughter also very clearly stated that it was respondent no. 2 who shot fire on the deceased. 7. He submitted that the learned trial court did not take note of the aforesaid fact and passed the judgment of acquittal which cannot be sustained in the eye of law. 8. On the other hand, learned Additional Public Prosecutor supported the impugned judgment of acquittal submitting that admittedly the fard-e-beyan was lodged against unknown person and at the time of giving fard-e-beyan the appellant did not disclose the name of assailant. 9. He further submitted that the Investigating Officer gave his examination-in-chief, but he did not turn up for cross-examination and therefore, his statement became redundant. 10. He further submitted that the learned trial court noted that there was no eye-witness nor there was any circumstantial evidence to prove the guilt of respondent no. 2. 11. 9. He further submitted that the Investigating Officer gave his examination-in-chief, but he did not turn up for cross-examination and therefore, his statement became redundant. 10. He further submitted that the learned trial court noted that there was no eye-witness nor there was any circumstantial evidence to prove the guilt of respondent no. 2. 11. Having heard the contentions of the parties, we went through the impugned judgment and in our view this criminal appeal can be disposed of at admission stage itself. 12. The perusal of impugned judgment goes to show that initially case was registered against unknown, but in course of trial, appellant as well as her daughter claimed that it was respondent no. 2 who shot fire on the deceased. However, the learned trial court doubted the abovestated claim of appellant as well as her daughter on various grounds. We do not find any perversity in the grounds taken by the learned trial court. We further find that the learned trial court has passed a well thought and well discussed judgment. Therefore, there is no need to interfere into the impugned judgment of acquittal. 13. Accordingly, this criminal appeal stands dismissed at admission stage itself.