JUDGMENT : Sanjay Kumar Dwivedi, J. 1. Heard the learned counsel for the appellants and, learned counsel for respondents. 2. The present appeal is directed against the order dated 30.05.2017 passed in Title (P) No. 107/2014 by the learned Court of Civil Judge Sr. Division I, Jamshedpur whereby the learned court has been pleased to reject the petition dated 11.09.2014 filed by the plaintiffs under order 39 Rule1 and 2 r/w section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter referred as ‘the Code’). 3. The appellants herein are the plaintiffs who have filed the suit before the court below for declaration of title and partition by of metes and bounds and permanent injunction with respect to the suit property mentioned in the scheduled “B” of the plaint. 4. The facts of this case are that the common ancestor of Sk. Abdul Ghani (since deceased) are the parties in this suit and he was the absolute owner in possession of the schedule “B” suit property, which was purchased by him during his life time along with Md. Ekram Ahmad, Manisurul Haque and Sk. Abdul Bari vide Sale Deed No. 3877 dated 04.11.1952 on a valuable consideration from its lawful owner and thereafter they partitioned the land by means of deed of partition dated 05.01.1953 and suit property came in exclusive share of Sk. Abdul Ghani who during his life time constructed pucca house structures over the eastern portion of the suit property and was in peaceful possession over the same and had been enjoying its all acts of ownership over the said suit property with his all legal rights, titles, interests and possessions over the same without any let or hindrance from any corner. After the death of the Sk. Abdul Ghani, the suit property devolved upon their four sons and four daughters excluding one daughter Safia Khatoon, who pre-deceased to her father Sk. Abdul Ghani and excluded and abolished from her right of inheritance as per Muslim Law and Shariyat and all the parties of this suit have jointly inherited, acquired and possessed the schedule “B” suit property and have been in joint peaceful possession over the same and there are unity of possession over the same which has not been partitioned by them till date by metes and bounds. Further submitted that, after the death of Sk. Abdul Ghani, the principal defendant no. Further submitted that, after the death of Sk. Abdul Ghani, the principal defendant no. 1 was allowed by plaintiffs and other defendants to reside and occupy suit property and look after it and when the plaintiff found inconvenient to keep suit property in joint when they approached and requested to the principal defendant no. 1 in the month of May 2014 to partition the schedule “B” suit property and to demarcate the share and portion of the plaintiffs over suit property, but the principal defendant no. 1 took time on some or other pretext. Further submitted that, plaintiff learnt that, principal defendant no. 1 has entered into a development Agreement with a Promoter and Developer M/s Aditya Developer Sakchi, Jamshedpur, for construction of a multi-storied building and complex over the entire schedule “B” suit property and the plaintiffs enquired into the matter and became surprised to learn that, the principal defendant no. 1 on the basis of some forged, false and manufactured documents have become success to get it recorded in his name in the rights of record of the Government of Jharkhand and became also success to get mutated in his name. On the above pleadings the suit was filed for declaration of title partition of metes and bounds and permanent injunction. 5. The plaintiffs asserted before the court below that they are having a good and strong prima-facie case as the suit property are the joint property of the parties and the balance of convenience also lies in favour of the plaintiffs and if the principal defendant no. 1 or his any other persons or parties shall not be restrained in getting developed the entire suit property through their above developer and promoter, the plaintiffs will suffer from irreparable losses, which cannot be compensated in terms of money and therefore, it is further prayed that, the defendant no. 1 or his any persons or parties may be restrained by an order of interim or temporary injunction not to allow any construction work by demolishing the existing structures standing over the schedule “B” suit property of the plaint through their any developer or promoter on the basis of illegal, forged and manufactured documents and/or change the nature and character of the schedule “B” suit property of the plaint during the pendency of this suit. 6. The defendant no. 6. The defendant no. 1 has opposed the injunction petition in the court below by filing show cause and submitted that land recorded under C.S. Khata No. 4, C.S. Plot No. 5, area measuring 6 bigha, were jointly purchased by Sayed Md. Ekram Ahmad, Manazurul Haque, Sheikh Abdul Bari and Sk. Abdul Ghani, by means of a registered sale deed bearing Sale Deed No. 3877 dated 04.11.1952 from one Naru Ho and came in peaceful possession of the same and thereafter they partitioned the said land in the year 1953 amongst themselves equally and accordingly Sk. Abdul Ghani the father of the answering defendant got 1 1/2 bigha of land in his share in the said partition and he became the owner of the said 1 1/2 bigha of land mentioned in schedule “B” of the plaint and in the survey operation finally published in 1964, the aforesaid land which was in possession of Sk. Abdul Ghani, came to be recorded in plot nos. 810, 811, 817 and 818 in the name of Sk. Abdul Ghani. It is further submitted that, the said Sk. Abdul Ghani, the father of the answering defendant orally gifted the aforesaid land in the year 1967 in favour of principal defendant in presence of the witnesses. The declaration and acceptance of gift was accompanied by delivery of possession of the property by the ‘donor’ to the ‘donee’. The gift became complete in compliance of aforesaid requirement of gift and after that the answering defendant no. 1 came in peaceful possession of the aforesaid plots as absolute owner thereof and also constructed house in a portion of the aforesaid land. Further submitted that the answering defendant while in possession of the aforesaid land, the present survey settlement operation commenced in or about the year 1971 and in the present survey operation the aforesaid land recorded under khata no. 763, plot no. 2913 ,a, b, c, d, and ward no. 9, Mango Notified Area Committee (hereinafter referred as MNAC) and the structures standing thereon recorded in the name of answering defendant no. 1, finally published in the record of rights of the year 1979 and thereafter answering defendant also got his name mutated in the office of Superior landlord vide mutation case no. 118/XV/MNAC/87-88 with respect to the suit land and is paying rent, charges and other charges in his name to the concerned authorities. 1, finally published in the record of rights of the year 1979 and thereafter answering defendant also got his name mutated in the office of Superior landlord vide mutation case no. 118/XV/MNAC/87-88 with respect to the suit land and is paying rent, charges and other charges in his name to the concerned authorities. The same is also registered in the office of MNAC, Mango as Holding No. 26 in the name of defendant no. 1 who has been paying tax regularly to MNAC. In this way, it is crystal clear that defendant no. 1 is the absolute owner of the suit property and in possession of the same. Hence, the plaintiffs or other legal heirs and successors of Sk. Abdul Ghani had or have no manner of right, title, interest or possession over the suit property or any portion thereof at any point of time. It is further stated that after death of Sk. Abdul Ghani, the suit property devolved upon their four sons and four daughters in excluding one daughter Safia Khatoon, who pre-deceased of her father Sk. Abdul Ghani excluded and abolished from her right of inheritance as per Muslim law and Shariyat because Sk. Abdul Ghani at the time of his death himself did not have any right title or interest over the suit property as such the claim of the plaintiffs regarding inheritance is absolutely wrong regarding suit property. 7. Mr. D.K. Prasad, learned counsel appearing for the appellants submitted that plaintiffs are having good and strong prima-facie case as the suit property are the joint property of the parties and the balance of convenience also lies in favour of the plaintiffs and if the principal defendant no. 1 or his any other person or parties shall not be restrained in getting develop the entire suit property through their above developer and promoter, the plaintiffs will suffer from irreparable losses, which cannot be compensated in terms of money and therefore, it is further prayed that, the defendant no. 1 or his any other person or parties shall not be restrained in getting develop the entire suit property through their above developer and promoter, the plaintiffs will suffer from irreparable losses, which cannot be compensated in terms of money and therefore, it is further prayed that, the defendant no. 1 or his any persons or parties may be restrained by an order of interim or temporary injunction not to allow any construction work by demolishing the existing structures standing over the schedule “B” suit property of the plaintiffs through their any developer or promoter on the basis of illegal, forged and manufactured documents and/or change the nature and character of the schedule “B” suit property of the plaint during the pendency of this suit. Mr. Prasad relied upon the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Daya Singh and Another versus Gurdev Singh (Dead) reported in (2010) 2 SCC 194 particularly on the paragraph nos. 15 to 19 of the said judgment which reads as under: 15. A similar view was reiterated in the case of C.Mohammad Yunus vs. Syed Unnissa and others in which this Court observed : "7….The period of 6 years prescribed by Article 120 has to be computed from the date when the right to sue accrues and there could be no right to sue until there is an accrual of the right asserted in the suit and its infringement or at least a clear and unequivocal threat to infringe that right." In the case of C.Mohammad Yunus, this Court held that the cause of action for the purposes of Article 58 of the Act accrues only when the right asserted in the suit is infringed or there is at least a clear and unequivocal threat to infringe that right. Therefore, the mere existence of an adverse entry into the revenue record cannot give rise to cause of action. 16. Keeping these principles in mind, let us consider the admitted facts of the case. In Para 16 of the plaint, it has been clearly averred that the right to sue accrued when such right was infringed by the defendants about a week back when the plaintiffs had for the first time come to know about the wrong entries in the record-of-rights and when the defendants had refused to admit the claim of the plaintiffs. Admittedly, the suit was filed on 21-8-1990. Admittedly, the suit was filed on 21-8-1990. According to the averments made by the plaintiffs in their plaint, as noted hereinabove, if this statement is accepted, the question of holding that the suit was barred by limitation could not arise at all. Accordingly, we are of the view that the right to sue accrues when a clear and unequivocal threat to infringe that right by the defendants when they refused to admit the claim of the appellants, i.e. only seven days before filing of the suit. Therefore, we are of the view that within three years from the date of infringement as noted in Para 16 of the plaint, the suit was filed. Therefore, the suit which was filed for declaration on 21-8-1990, in our view, cannot be held to be barred by limitation. 17. Therefore, the courts below including the High Court had proceeded entirely on a wrong footing that the cause of action arose on the date of entering into the compromise and, therefore, the suit was barred by limitation, whether or not the compromise decree was acted upon and whether delivery of possession had taken place has to be decided by the trial court before it could come to a proper conclusion that the suit was barred by limitation. 18. In this view of the matter, we do not find any ground to agree with the findings of the High Court that the suit was barred by time because of its filing after 18 years of entering into the compromise. The question of filing the suit before the right accrued to them by compromise could not arise until and unless infringement of that right was noticed by one of the parties. The High Court in the impugned judgment, in our view, had fallen in grave error in holding that the suit was barred by time and had ignored to appreciate that the rights of the appellants to have the revenue record accrued first arose in 1990 when the appellants came to know about the wrong entry and the respondents failed to join the appellants in getting it corrected. In our view, the High Court was not justified in holding that mere existence of a wrong entry in the revenue records does not, in law, give rise to a cause of action within the meaning of Article 58 of the Act. In our view, the High Court was not justified in holding that mere existence of a wrong entry in the revenue records does not, in law, give rise to a cause of action within the meaning of Article 58 of the Act. No other point was urged before us by the learned counsel for the parties. 19. In view of our discussions made hereinabove, the impugned judgment of the High Court on the question that the suit was barred by limitation cannot be sustained. Therefore, the judgment of the High Court is set aside and the matter may be remitted back to the High Court for decision on merits. The High Court is requested to dispose of the second appeal at an early date preferably within six months from the date of supply of a copy of this order to it. This case was dismissed by the High Court on the ground that the suit was barred by the limitation since the suit filed after 18 years of entering into the compromise. The Hon’ble Supreme Court came to the conclusion that the suit was barred by limitation cannot be sustained and considering this aspect Hon’ble the Apex Court remitted back the matter to the High Court for decision on merits. This judgment was referred by Mr. Prasad got no relevance in the facts and circumstances of the present case. He further relied upon the judgment passed by the Apex Court in the Case of Baleshwar Tewari (Dead) by LRs. And others V. Sheo Jatan Tiwary and Others reported in AIR 1997 SC 2089 in that case the question arises is : whether it will be a "khas possession" and the respondents are entitled to declaration that the intermediary remained in possession as khas possession. In view of the law laid down by this Court, as extracted earlier, and the factual position, the conclusion would be that the tenant remained in possession in his own right as a raiyat though he was paying rent to the intermediary prior to the abolition. His possession is only of a raiyat possession. It is the duty of the respondents to establish by unequivocal evidence that the intermediary retained their intermediary rights in the land and that proof has not been established by adducing any evidence. Thus, the facts of this case is different from the present case. This case does not help the appellants. His possession is only of a raiyat possession. It is the duty of the respondents to establish by unequivocal evidence that the intermediary retained their intermediary rights in the land and that proof has not been established by adducing any evidence. Thus, the facts of this case is different from the present case. This case does not help the appellants. 8. Mr. Rahul Gupta, appearing for the defendant submitted that the defendant is in possession over the suit land and further submitted that, the said Sk. Abdul Ghani, the father of the answering defendant orally gifted the aforesaid land in the year 1967 in favour of principal defendant in presence of the witnesses. The declaration and acceptance of gift was accompanied by delivery of possession of the property by the ‘donor’ to the ‘donee’. The gift became complete in compliance of aforesaid requirement of gift and after that the answering defendant no. 1 came in peaceful possession of the aforesaid plots as absolute owner thereof and also constructed house in a portion of the aforesaid land. He further submitted that the person, who had kept quiet for a long time and allowed another to deal with the properties exclusively, ordinarily would not be entitled to an order of injunction. The name of principal defendant Md. Wali Alam son of Sk. Abdul Ghani was reflected in the record of rights which was finally published in the year 1979 and thereafter his name was mutated in the revenue records in the year 1987-88. Since, then the original defendant was continuously paying rent. The plaintiffs/appellants kept quite since 1979 itself and they for the first time started claiming only when the defendants/respondents entered into a development agreement with the developer. He further submitted that the defendant is in possession over the suit property so balance of convenience is also goes against the plaintiffs/appellants. He further submitted that the suit property at present appears to be recorded in the name of principal defendant Md. Wali Alam S/o Abdul Ghani in the record of rights at this stage it appears that prima facie case is not established in favour of plaintiffs. The question of irreparable loss does not arise to the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs will not suffer from the irreparable injury, which cannot be compensated by money after the suit is decreed in favour of plaintiffs. Mr. The question of irreparable loss does not arise to the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs will not suffer from the irreparable injury, which cannot be compensated by money after the suit is decreed in favour of plaintiffs. Mr. Gupta submitted that there is no illegality in the order passed by the learned court below and the appeal is fit to be dismissed. Mr. Gupta relied upon the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of ECE Industries Limited Versus S.P.Real Estate Developer Private Limited and Another reported in (2009) 12 SCC 776 on the paragraph nos. 26, 27, 28, 29 and 30 which reads as under: “26. It is well settled that when construction has been made on a land, which is of considerable magnitude, and when the plaintiff shall not face any substantial injury, if no order of injunction is granted because of payment/deposit of the entire amount payable by the defendant to the plaintiff under the Agreement, though belatedly, we are of the view that the Court will not, as a matter of course, pass an order of injunction against the other party restraining the other party from raising any construction on the suit property till the disposal of the suit. 27. If ultimately, the suit filed by the appellant-plaintiff is decreed, he can be compensated in damages or the respondents-defendants may be directed to pull down the construction and deliver vacant possession to the appellant-plaintiff when no equity can be claimed for such construction by the respondents-defendants. 28. on the other hand, in our view, if at this stage, an order of injunction is granted against the respondents-defendants from proceeding with further construction in the suit property, it will undoubtedly destroy the constructions already made by the respondents-defendants and the respondents-defendants will suffer irreparable loss and injury for not allowing them to make construction on the suit property. 29. That apart, in view of our discussions made hereinabove, the entire amount payable by the respondents-defendants having been paid/deposited in favour of the appellant-plaintiff, there is no reason to pass an order of injunction against the respondents-defendants when the appellant-plaintiff would not face substantial injury for permitting the respondents-defendants to proceed with the construction in the suit property. 30. 29. That apart, in view of our discussions made hereinabove, the entire amount payable by the respondents-defendants having been paid/deposited in favour of the appellant-plaintiff, there is no reason to pass an order of injunction against the respondents-defendants when the appellant-plaintiff would not face substantial injury for permitting the respondents-defendants to proceed with the construction in the suit property. 30. Accordingly, in view of our discussions made hereinabove, we are, therefore, of the view that the balance of convenience lies against granting an order of injunction, which, if granted, will substantially and irreparably injure and prejudice the respondents-defendants. For the reasons aforesaid, we are, therefore, of the view that the High Court was fully justified in affirming the order of the trial Court refusing to grant any order of injunction in favour of the appellant-plaintiff. 9. Having heard learned counsels for both the sides and after going through the entire materials on record and observations made in the impugned order it transpires that defendant no. 1 submitted the following documents in support of his contention before the court below: Xerox copy of certified copy of Khatiyan No. 763, plot no. 2913, certified copy of order in rent fixation case no. 137/88-89 dated 25.01.89 passed by LRDC, Jamshedpur, Xerox copy of rent receipt dated 16.09.94, 09.03.89 and 09.06.14, Xerox copy of judgment passed in JC/2 case no. 102/II/67 passed by Sri B.B. Tuli, 1st class Magistrate, Jamshedpur etc. 10. In view of the facts as discussed above and after considering the entire materials available on record, this Court comes to the conclusion that the plaintiffs failed to establish a prima facie case in their favour for issuance of temporary injunction. It also appears that the defendants is in possession over the suit property so balance of convenience is also goes against the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs will not suffer irreparable injury. 11. The court below has to examine the materials on records and the revenue records has been reputed or not it cannot be examined at this stage, this has to be examined in the trial as to whether the documents are consistent or not. Prima-facie the case is not established in favour of the appellants for issuance of temporary injunction, and balance of convenience is also against the plaintiffs and construction over the suit property also not cause such irreparable loss which cannot be compensated by money. 12. Prima-facie the case is not established in favour of the appellants for issuance of temporary injunction, and balance of convenience is also against the plaintiffs and construction over the suit property also not cause such irreparable loss which cannot be compensated by money. 12. Considering these aspects and relying on the case of ECE Industries Limited Versus S.P.Real Estate Developer Private Limited & Anr. (Supra) this court finds that there is no illegality in the order passed by the court below and also find no merits in this appeal. 13. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.