JUDGMENT : RAJ BEER SINGH, J. 1. These two appeals arise out of a common impugned judgment and order dated 30.03.1991 passed by the learned Special Judge, (E.C. Act), Jhansi in Special Case No. 4 of 1988, under Section 3/7 of Essential Commodities Act, P.S. Sipri Bazar, District Jhansi whereby the accused-respondent, namely, Satish Chandra has been acquitted of the charge under Section 3/4 of E.C. Act while accused appellant, namely, Munshi Ram has been convicted under Section 3/4 of E.C. Act read with Clause 3 of U.P. Pulses (Licensing and Storage Control) order, 1979 and has been sentenced to six month rigorous imprisonment along with fine of Rs. 5000/-and in default of payment of fine, he has to undergo to two months simple imprisonment. In government appeal No. 1593 of 1991, State of U.P. has challenged the acquittal of Satish Chandra, while criminal appeal no. 738 of 1991, has been preferred by Munshi Ram against his conviction and sentence. 2. During the pendency of the appeal, accused-appellant Munshi Ram has expired and, thus, Criminal Appeal No. 738 of 1991 stands abated and the present matter is confined only in respect of accused-appellant Satish Chandra. 3. It is alleged that on 25.09.1987 PW-1 Deep Chandra, Marketing Inspector along with other Marketing Officials inspected the two shops of accused-appellant Munshi Ram and found that 157 quintals, 29 kgs. 500 grams Masoor and Masoor Dal was illegally stored for black-marketing. The recovery memo Ex. Ka-1 was prepared and thereafter on the basis of the written tehrir submitted by PW-1, an FIR was registered on 25.09.19887 at 21:10 hours, under Section 3/7 of E.C. Act. 4. PW-2 S.I. Aidal Singh conducted investigation of the case and filed a chargesheet against both the accused persons under Section 3/7 of E.C. Act read with under Clause 3 of U.P. Pulses (Licensing and Storage Control) order, 1979. 5. Learned trial court framed charge under Sections 3/7 of E.C. Act read with under Clause 3 of U.P. Pulses (Licensing and Storage Control) order, 1979 against both the accused persons. The accused persons pleaded not guilty and claimed trial. 6. So as to hold the accused persons guilty, the prosecution has examined two witnesses. After prosecution evidence, statements of accused persons were also recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C, wherein they have denied the evidence and claimed false implication. The accused persons pleaded not guilty and claimed trial. 6. So as to hold the accused persons guilty, the prosecution has examined two witnesses. After prosecution evidence, statements of accused persons were also recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C, wherein they have denied the evidence and claimed false implication. In defence, accused persons have examined DW-1 Haripat, DW-2 Narayan Das and DW-3 Kali Charan. 7. After hearing and analysing the evidence on record, accused-respondent Satish Chandra was acquitted while accused-appellant Munshi Ram was found guilty for the offence under Clause 3 of U.P. Pulses (Licensing and Storage Control) order, 1979 vide impugned judgment and order dated 30.03.1991 and was sentenced as mentioned in paragraph no. 1 of this judgment. 8. Being aggrieved by the impugned judgment and order of the trial court, whereby accused-respondent Satish Chandra has been acquitted of the charge, the State of U.P. has preferred the Government Appeal no. 1593 of 1991. 9. I have heard Sri Bhaiya Ghanshyam Singh, learned A.G.A. for the State, Sri Vivek Sandilya, learned counsel for accused-respondent and perused the record. 10. Learned A.G.A. for the State appellant has submitted that the accused-respondent was present at the shop and the shop was inspected in his presence. There is clear and categorical evidence against the accused-respondent but the same was not appreciated by learned trial court in its correct perspective. It was submitted that the prosecution has successfully proved the charge under Section 3/7 E.C. Act read with Clause 3 of U.P. Pulses (Licensing and Storage Control) order, 1979. 11. On the other hand, learned counsel for the accused-respondent has submitted that the version of PW-1 Deep Chandra has not been corroborated by any witness. Further, no statement of the accused-respondent was recorded and there is no evidence to connect the accused-respondent with the alleged shop. It was argued that learned trial court has considered the entire evidence on record and found that no case is made out against the accused-respondent. There is no error or perversity in the conclusion reached by the trial court and the present appeal is lacking any substance. 12. I have considered the rival contentions of learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 13. It is an appeal against the order of acquittal. There is no error or perversity in the conclusion reached by the trial court and the present appeal is lacking any substance. 12. I have considered the rival contentions of learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 13. It is an appeal against the order of acquittal. It is well settled that while exercising the powers in appeal against the order of acquittal the Court of appeal would not ordinarily interfere with the order of acquittal unless the approach of the lower Court is vitiated by some manifest illegality and the conclusion arrived at would not be arrived at by any reasonable person and, therefore, the decision is to be characterized as perverse. Merely because two views are possible, the Court of appeal would not take the view which would upset the judgment delivered by the Court below. However, the appellate Court has a power to review the evidence if it is of the view that the conclusion arrived at by the Court below is perverse and the Court has committed a manifest error of law and ignored the material evidence on record. A duty is cast upon the appellate Court, in such circumstances, to reappreciate the evidence to arrive to a just decision on the basis of material placed on record to find out whether any of the accused is connected with the commission of the crime he is charged with. 14. The principles which would govern and regulate the hearing of appeal by this Court, against an order of acquittal passed by the trial Court, have been very succinctly explained by the Apex Court in a catena of decisions. In the case of M.S. Narayana Menon @ Mani Vs. State of Kerala & Anr, reported in (2006) 6 SCC 39 , the Apex Court has narrated about the powers of the High Court in appeal against the order of acquittal. In para 54 of the decision, the Apex Court has observed as under: "In any event the High Court entertained an appeal treating to be an appeal against acquittal, it was in fact exercising the revisional jurisdiction. Even while exercising an appellate power against a judgment of acquittal, the High Court should have borne in mind the well settled principles of law that where two view are possible, the appellate Court should not interfere with the finding of acquittal recorded by the Court below." 15. Even while exercising an appellate power against a judgment of acquittal, the High Court should have borne in mind the well settled principles of law that where two view are possible, the appellate Court should not interfere with the finding of acquittal recorded by the Court below." 15. In the case of Chandrappa Vs. State of Karnataka reported in (2007) 4 SCC 415 , the Apex Court laid down the following principles; "42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding powers of the appellate Court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge: (1) An appellate Court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. (2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate Court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law. (3) Various expressions, such as, "substantial and compelling reasons", "good and sufficient grounds", "very strong circumstances", "distorted conclusions", "glaring mistakes", etc. are not intended to curtain extensive powers of an appellate Court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of "flourishes of language" to emphasis the reluctance of an appellate Court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the Court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate Court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent Court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial Court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate Court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial Court." 16. In the case of Luna Ram Vs. Bhupat Singh and Ors, reported in (2009) SCC 749, the Apex Court in para 10 and 11 has held as under: "10. The High Court has noted that the prosecution version was not clearly believable. In the case of Luna Ram Vs. Bhupat Singh and Ors, reported in (2009) SCC 749, the Apex Court in para 10 and 11 has held as under: "10. The High Court has noted that the prosecution version was not clearly believable. Some of the so called eye witnesses stated that the deceased died because his anke was twisted by an accused. Others said that he was strangulated. It was the case of the prosecution that the injured witnesses were thrown out of the bus. The doctor who conducted the postmortem and examined the witnesses had categorically stated that it was not possible that somebody would throw a person out of the bus when it was in running condition." 17. In case of Mookkiah and Anr. Vs. State, rep. by the Inspector of Police, Tamil Nadu, reported in AIR 2013 SC 321 , the Apex Court in para 4 has held as under: "4. It is not in dispute that the trial Court, on appreciation of oral and documentary evidence led in by the prosecution and defence, acquitted the accused in respect of the charges leveled against them. On appeal by the State, the High Court, by impugned order, reversed the said decision and convicted the accused under Section 302 read with Section 34 of IPC and awarded RI for life. Since counsel for the appellants very much emphasized that the High Court has exceeded its jurisdiction in upsetting the order of acquittal into conviction, let us analyze the scope and power of the High Court in an appeal filed against the order of acquittal. This Court in a series of decisions has repeatedly laid down that as the first appellate court the High Court, even while dealing with an appeal against acquittal, was also entitled, and obliged as well, to scan through and if need be re-appreciate the entire evidence, though while choosing to interfere only the court should find an absolute assurance of the guilt on the basis of the evidence on record and not merely because the High Court could take one more possible or a different view only. Except the above, where the matter of the extent and depth of consideration of the appeal is concerned, no distinctions or differences in approach are envisaged in dealing with an appeal as such merely because one was against conviction or the other against an acquittal. Except the above, where the matter of the extent and depth of consideration of the appeal is concerned, no distinctions or differences in approach are envisaged in dealing with an appeal as such merely because one was against conviction or the other against an acquittal. [Vide State of Rajasthan vs. Sohan Lal and Others, (2004) 5 SCC 573 ]" 18. It is also a settled legal position that in acquittal appeal, the appellate Court is not required to rewrite the judgment or to give fresh reasonings, when the reasons assigned by the Court below are found to be just and proper. Such principle is laid down by the Apex Court in the case of State of Karnataka Vs. Hemareddy, reported in AIR 1981 SC 1417 , wherein it is held as under: "... This Court has observed in Girija Nandini Devi V. Bigendra Nandini Choudhary (1967) 1 SCR 93 :( AIR 1967 SC 1124 ) that it is not the duty of the Appellate Court on the evidence to repeat the narration of the evidence or to reiterate the reasons given by the trial Court expression of general agreement with the reasons given by the Court the decision of which is under appeal, will ordinarily suffice." 19. Thus, it is a settled principle that while exercising appellate power, even if two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate Court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial Court. Similar principle has been laid down by the Apex Court in the cases of State of Uttar Pradesh Vs. Ram Veer Singh & Ors reported in 2007 AIR SCW 5553 and in Girja Prasad (Dead) by LRs Vs. State of MP reported in 2007 AIR SCW 5589. Thus, the powers, which this Court may exercise against an order of acquittal, are well settled. In case the Appellate Court agrees with the reasons and the opinion given by the lower Court, then the discussion of evidence is not necessary. In this regard the decision of Apex Court in Vinod Kumar Vs. State of Haryana, AIR 2015 SC 1032 and Gulbar Husain Vs. State of Assam, 2015 (11) SCC 242 may be referred. 20. In case the Appellate Court agrees with the reasons and the opinion given by the lower Court, then the discussion of evidence is not necessary. In this regard the decision of Apex Court in Vinod Kumar Vs. State of Haryana, AIR 2015 SC 1032 and Gulbar Husain Vs. State of Assam, 2015 (11) SCC 242 may be referred. 20. In the present case, PW-1 Deep Chandra has deposed that on 25.09.1987 on the basis of the secret information, he along with other officials of Marketing Department and police reached at the shop of Munshi Ram. There both the accused persons were found present and they have opened the locks of the two shops. They could not offer any satisfactory explanation regarding the storage of lentils and pulses (daal and dalahan) nor they produced any licence for selling and purchasing of the same. As per PW-1, 95 quintals, 38 kgs, 500 grams of lentils (masur daal) were found stored, which was seized and recovery memo was prepared. 21. PW-2 S.I. Aidal Singh has investigated the case. 22. DW-1 Haripat, inter alia, has stated that he has more than 18 acres land in which he is farming lentils (masur daal) and wheat since the year 1987. He has taken his lentils (masur daal) for selling but the same could not be sold and thus, he has put the same at the warehouse of the accused persons. Similarly, DW-2 Narayan Das has also made similar statement and has stated that he has put his lentils (masur daal) outside the warehouse at the instance of the watch-man. Similar is the statement of DW-3 Kali Charan. 23. It is clear from the evidence on record that the version of PW-1 Deep Chandra has not been corroborated by any other witness of Marketing Department, who were present in the inspecting team. In his cross-examination, PW-1 has stated that a number of public persons assembled there but no public witness has been examined. One important aspect of the matter is that no documentary evidence has been collected to connect the accused-respondent with the shops in question. PW-1 has stated in his cross-examination that co-accused Munshi Ram told that the recovered pulses belongs to him as well as accused Satish Chandra but except that no evidence was collected to show that the recovered pulses belongs to the accused-respondent Satish Chandra. 24. PW-1 has stated in his cross-examination that co-accused Munshi Ram told that the recovered pulses belongs to him as well as accused Satish Chandra but except that no evidence was collected to show that the recovered pulses belongs to the accused-respondent Satish Chandra. 24. After analysing the evidence, learned trial court has noted that PW-1 has not recorded the statement of Satish Chandra which is quite unnatural. No memo was prepared regarding opening of the locks. Learned trial court has doubted the contents of the recovery memo. The statement of co-accused Munshi Ram cannot be a material evidence against the accused-respondent. Learned trial court noted that presumption under Section 10-C of Essential Commodities Act is not attracted in this case because the recovery is not proved from the shop of the accused-respondent. 25. After going through the entire record, learned trial court did not found the accused-respondent to be guilty. In view of the aforesaid, the view taken by the learned trial court cannot be said perverse or against the provisions of law. Most important aspect of the matter is that testimony of PW-1 Deep Chandra has not been corroborated by any witness and there is no documentary evidence to connect the accused-respondent with the alleged shop and that neither any statement of the accused-respondent was recorded nor any memo regarding opening of the locks was prepared. Thus in view of aforesaid consistent legal position as elaborated above and also in view of the fact that learned A.G.A. has failed to point out any illegality or perversity in the findings so recorded in the impugned order, no case for interference has been made out. 26. It is an established position of law that if the court below has taken a view which is a possible view in a reasonable manner, then the same shall not be interfered with and that too in view of the fact that more than 28 years have already elapsed after the alleged incident. 27. Thus, on a bare perusal of the judgment and order dated 30.03.1991, it cannot be said that the view taken by the trial court is not a possible view or a feasible view that could be taken on the facts of the case. Moreover no illegality or perversity has been pointed out in the impugned judgment. 28. 27. Thus, on a bare perusal of the judgment and order dated 30.03.1991, it cannot be said that the view taken by the trial court is not a possible view or a feasible view that could be taken on the facts of the case. Moreover no illegality or perversity has been pointed out in the impugned judgment. 28. Another aspect which has to be appreciated is that a period of almost 28 years has already elapsed as the alleged incident is of the year 1987. 29. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstance of the case, the government appeal is dismissed.