JUDGMENT : PRITINKER DIWAKER, J. 1. This appeal arises out of impugned judgment and order dated 08.10.2009 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court No.1, Fatehpur in Sessions Trial No.458 of 2006 (State v. Safdar), convicting the appellant under Sections 304-B, 498-A of IPC and under Section 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act and sentencing him to undergo imprisonment for life; to undergo three years Rigorous Imprisonment, with a fine of Rs.1000/-, in default thereof, six months imprisonment and to undergo one year simple imprisonment with a fine of Rs.1000/-, in default thereof, one month imprisonment, with a direction that all sentences shall run concurrently. 2. In the present case, name of deceased is Noor Jahan @ Kallo, wife of the accused-appellant Safdar. Their marriage was solemnized on 21.04.2006 and she died homicidal death in her matrimonial house in the night intervening 12/13.06.2006. Immediately after receiving the information about the occurrence, Chand Babu (PW-1), father of the deceased, rushed to the village of appellant and found the dead body of the deceased. Based on his written report, Ex.Ka.1 dated 15.06.2006, FIR, Ex.Ka.9, was registered on 15.06.2006 against the appellant under Sections 304B, 498-A of IPC and 3/4 of Dowry Prohibition Act. 3. Inquest on the dead body of deceased was conducted on 13.06.2009, vide Ex.Ka.3 and the body was sent for postmortem, which was conducted on 14.06.2009, vide Ex.Ka.8 by (PW-6) Dr. B.N. Srivastava. 4. Autopsy Surgeon has noticed the following injuries on the body of the deceased:- 1. Contused swelling of left temporal and occipital prominence, underlying bone fractured. 2. Contusion 60 cm x 10 cm area one left upper and fore arm. 3. Contusion left side of face 11 cm x 9 cm. 4. Abraded contusion 15 cm x 10 cm Rt. scapula (back). 5. Abraded contusion 13 cm x 9 cm Lt. scapula 6. Contusion 10 cm x 9 cm Rt. knee. 7. Contusion 40 cm x 10 cm Rt. upper arm and fore arm 8. Abrasion 30 cm x 10 cm Rt. ankle and foot. 9. Abraded contusion 60 cm x 20 cm left thigh, hip and knee. The cause of death of the deceased was 'due to coma as a result of head injury'. 5. While framing charge, the trial Judge has framed charge against the accused appellant under Sections 498-A, 304-B of IPC and 3/4 of Dowry Prohibition Act. 6. ankle and foot. 9. Abraded contusion 60 cm x 20 cm left thigh, hip and knee. The cause of death of the deceased was 'due to coma as a result of head injury'. 5. While framing charge, the trial Judge has framed charge against the accused appellant under Sections 498-A, 304-B of IPC and 3/4 of Dowry Prohibition Act. 6. So as to hold accused person guilty, prosecution has examined eight witnesses, whereas three court witnesses have also been examined. Statement of accused appellant was also recorded under Section 313 of Cr PC in which, he pleaded his innocence and false implication. 7. By the impugned judgment, the trial Judge has convicted the accused-appellant under Sections 304-B, 498-A of IPC and 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act and sentenced him, as mentioned in para 1 of this judgment. 8. Learned counsel for the appellant submits:- (i) that important witness of the prosecution (PW-1) Chand Babu, father of the deceased, though has not been declared hostile, but has not supported the prosecution case in its entirety. (ii) that there is no evidence of demand of dowry soon before the death of deceased, therefore, question of conviction of the appellant under Section 304-B of IPC does not at all arise. He placed reliance on the judgements of the Supreme Court in Kailash Vs. State of U.P. (2006) 12 SCC 667 ; Sheila Sebastian Vs. R. Jawaharaj and another (2018) 7 SCC 581 and Devinder @ Kala Ram & others Vs. State of Haryana (2012) 10 SCC 763 . (iii) that other important witnesses of the prosecution have not supported the prosecution case and have been declared hostile. (iv) that Ali Hasan (CW-1) and Mohammad (CW-2) have categorically stated that on the date of occurrence, the accused had gone to other village and stayed there in the night. (v) Lastly, it has been argued that the life sentence is not mandatory under Section 304-B of IPC. The appellant is in jail since June 2006 and, therefore, his sentence may be reduced to the period already undergone by him. He submits that the appellant is willing to compensate Chand Babu (PW-1) by paying adequate compensation under Section 357 of Cr.P.C. 9. The appellant is in jail since June 2006 and, therefore, his sentence may be reduced to the period already undergone by him. He submits that the appellant is willing to compensate Chand Babu (PW-1) by paying adequate compensation under Section 357 of Cr.P.C. 9. On the other hand, supporting the impugned judgment, it has been argued by the State counsel: (i) that conviction of the appellant is in accordance with law and there is no infirmity in the same. (ii) that examination-in-chief of Chand Babu (PW-1) began on 19.06.2007 and his cross examination was concluded on 16.07.2008. It has been argued that in his initial part of statement, Chand Babu (PW-1) has duly supported the prosecution case and it seems that on account of long interval in his cross examination, the defence could succeed to win him over. It is for the reason that it could get certain observation of (PW-1), even though not exactly supporting the prosecution case. State counsel has argued that entire statement of (PW-1) has to be read as a whole and not one sentence in isolation. Reading of his complete statement would establish that the demand of dowry is duly proved. (iii) that in respect of other witnesses, including Rayeesa Begum (PW-2), the mother of the deceased, who have not supported the prosecution case, it has been argued that having turned hostile, question of they supporting the prosecution case, does not arise. According to learned AGA, these witnesses have also been won over by the defence and that is why they have not fully supported the prosecution case. (iv) that in respect of Court witnesses, it has been argued that they were examined by the Court for different purposes and a surprise question was put to them regarding the availability of the accused in the village on the date of occurrence, perhaps, without following the same, they have stated that the accused appellant was not present in the village. Learned AGA submits that this portion of their examination is required to be ignored and at least no weightage can be given to the same. (v) that in the eventuality of reduction of sentence awarded to the appellant, Chand Babu (PW-1) (father of the victim) be adequately compensated. 10. We have heard the parties and perused the record. 11. Chand Babu (PW-1), is the father of the deceased. (v) that in the eventuality of reduction of sentence awarded to the appellant, Chand Babu (PW-1) (father of the victim) be adequately compensated. 10. We have heard the parties and perused the record. 11. Chand Babu (PW-1), is the father of the deceased. He states that the marriage of the deceased was solemnized with the appellant on 21.04.2006 and as per his capacity he had given sufficient dowry to the appellant. He submits that immediately after marriage, the appellant started harassing the deceased for fulfillment of the demand of dowry. His examination-in-chief was recorded on 19.06.2007. His cross examination began on 10.06.2008, but could not be completed on that day and further continued on 28.06.2008 and then ultimately concluded on 16.07.2008. He has duly supported the prosecution case and has categorically stated that his daughter was subjected to cruelty for demand of dowry but in the last four lines, he states that it is incorrect to say that for demand of Rs.20,000/-, accused-appellant had killed his daughter and that for not receiving the said amount, the deceased was subjected to cruelty. He further states that it is incorrect to say that his daughter was killed by the accused appellant. 12. Rayeesa Begum (PW-2), is the mother of the deceased. She has been declared hostile. Likewise Ali Haidar (PW-3), who is the uncle of the deceased, has also been declared hostile. Aajam Ali (PW-4), is maternal uncle of the deceased, but has turned hostile. 13. R.S. Dixit (PW-5), conducted inquest, whereas Dr. B.N. Srivastava (PW-6) conducted postmortem on the body of the deceased. Surprisingly, this witness states that he does not accept Jaisingh Prabhudas Modi, who is a famous author of medical jurisprudence, as an expert nor he considers any book as an authority. According to him, he is not supposed to agree with the views expressed by J.P. Modi on medical jurisprudence and while assigning reasons, he states that different authors can write different things. He further states that at the time, when the book "Medical Jurisprudence & Toxicology" was written by J.P. Modi, times have now changed. Considering the seasonal and jurisprudential change, medical jurisprudence of J.P. Modi is of no relevance. We are not passing any comment on this observation made by Autopsy Surgeon (PW-6), however, it would be for the Government to look into the matter and do the needful. 14. Insaf Ali (PW-7), registered the FIR. Considering the seasonal and jurisprudential change, medical jurisprudence of J.P. Modi is of no relevance. We are not passing any comment on this observation made by Autopsy Surgeon (PW-6), however, it would be for the Government to look into the matter and do the needful. 14. Insaf Ali (PW-7), registered the FIR. Shivaji Shukla (PW-8) is the Investigating Officer. 15. After lodging the written report, an affidavit was sworn by Chand Babu (PW-1), stating therein that after lodging the report, he was informed by Mohammad, Irshad and Ali Husain that while the appellant was beating his daughter, one Ali Ahmad and Nabi Ahmad both sons of Badruddin did not allow the deceased to escape from the clutches of the accused. After receiving this affidavit, an application was also filed by the prosecution under Section 319 Cr. P.C., which was later allowed and Ali Husain (CW-1), Mohammad (CW-2) and Irshad (CW-3)were examined by the Court. 16. Ali Husain (CW-1), in his statement has stated that on 12.6.2006, in his presence, the appellant had not caused any injury to the deceased. He further states that at the time of occurrence, the appellant was in the other village. Almost similar statement has been made by (CW-2) Mohammad. 17. Close scrutiny of the evidence makes it clear that the marriage of the deceased was solemnized on 21.4.2006 and she died homocidial death in the night intervening 12/13.6.2006 in the house of appellant. In 313 Cr. P. C. statement, the appellant has made merely a bald statement that at the time of occurrence, he was not present in his village and had gone to other village. No such witness has been examined to prove that on 12.6.2006, the appellant had gone out of his village and with whom. He has not stated, which passenger he took along with him and where he stayed in the night. In the postmortem report, the Autoposy Surgeon found number of grievous injuries on the body of the deceased including fractures. No report has been lodged by the appellant that in the night intervening 12/13.6.2006, someone else had killed the deceased. He has not stated, which passenger he took along with him and where he stayed in the night. In the postmortem report, the Autoposy Surgeon found number of grievous injuries on the body of the deceased including fractures. No report has been lodged by the appellant that in the night intervening 12/13.6.2006, someone else had killed the deceased. 18 In a case where house murder is an issue, heavy burden is on the shoulders of the accused to explain as to under what circumstances the deceased died but here no such explanation has come either in his statement recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure nor did he take any defence to this effect by adducing any evidence. While dealing with the matter involving the murder committed inside the house, it has been held by the Apex Court in the matter of Trimukh Maroti Kirkan v State of Maharashtra, (2006) 10 SCC 681 as under: "14. If an offence takes place inside the privacy of a house and in such circumstances where the assailants have all the opportunity to plan and commit the offence at the time and in circumstances of their choice, it will be extremely difficult for the prosecution to lead evidence to establish the guilt of the accused if the strict principle of circumstantial evidence, as noticed above, is insisted upon by the courts. A judge does not preside over a criminal trial merely to see that no innocent man is punished. A judge also presides to see that a guilty man does not escape. Both are public duties. (See Stirland v. Director of Public Prosecutions (1944 AC 315) -quoted with approval by Arijit Pasayat, J in State of Punjab v. Karnail Singh (2003) 11 SCC 271 ). The law does not enjoin a duty on the prosecution to lead evidence of such character which is almost impossible to be led or at any rate extremely difficult to be held. The duty on the prosecution is to lead such evidence which it is capable of leading, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case. Here it is necessary to keep in mind Section 106 of the Evidence Act which says that when any fact is especially within the knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him. Here it is necessary to keep in mind Section 106 of the Evidence Act which says that when any fact is especially within the knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him. Illustration (b) appended to this section throws some light on the content and scope of this provision and it reads: "(b) A is charged with travelling on a railway without ticket. The burden of proving that he had a ticket is on him." 15. Where an offence like murder is committed in secrecy inside a house, the initial burden to establish the case would undoubedly be upon the prosecution, but the nature and amount of evidence to be led by it to establish the charge cannot be of the same degree as is required in other cases of circumstantial evidence. The burden would be of a comparatively lighter character. In view of Section 106 of the Evidence Act there will be a corresponding burden on the inmates of the house to give a cogent explanation as to how the crime was committed. The inmates of the house cannot get away by simply keeping quiet and offering no explanation on the supposed premise that the burden to establish its case lies entirely upon the prosecution and there is no duty at all on an accused to offer any explanation." 19. Further in the matter of State of Rajasthan v Thakur Singh, (2014) 12 SCC 211 it has been held by the Apex Court as under: "17. In a specific instance in Trimukh Morati Kirkan v. State of Maharashtra (2006) 10 SCC 681 ) this Court held that when the wife is injured in the dwelling home where the husband ordinarily resides, and the husband offers no explanation for the injuries to his wife, then the circumstances would indicate that the husband is responsible for the injuries. In a specific instance in Trimukh Morati Kirkan v. State of Maharashtra (2006) 10 SCC 681 ) this Court held that when the wife is injured in the dwelling home where the husband ordinarily resides, and the husband offers no explanation for the injuries to his wife, then the circumstances would indicate that the husband is responsible for the injuries. It was said: (SCC p. 694, para 22) "22 Where an accused is alleged to have committed the murder of his wife and the prosecution succeeds in leading evidence to show that shortly before the commission of crime they were seen together or the offence takes place in the dwelling home where the husband also normally resided, it has been consistently held that if the accused does not offer any explanation how the wife received injuries or offers an explanation which is found to be false, it is a strong circumstance which indicates that he is responsible for commission of the crime." 18. Reliance was placed by this Court on Ganeshlal v. State of Maharashtra { (1992) 3 SCC 106 )} in which case the appellant was prosecuted for the murder of his wife inside his house. Since the death had occurred in his custody, it was held that the appellant was under an obligation to give an explanation for the cause of death in his statement under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. A denial of the prosecution case coupled with absence of any explanation was held to be inconsistent with the innocence of the accused, but consistent with the hypothesis that the appellant was a prime accused in the commission of murder of his wife. 19. Similarly, in Dnyaneshwar v. State of Maharashtra { (2007) 10 SCC 445 } this Court observed that since the deceased was murdered in her matrimonial home and the appellant had not set up a case that the offence was committed by somebody else or that there was a possibility of an outsider committing the offence, it was for the husband to explain the grounds for the unnatural death of his wife. 20. In Jagdish v. State of MP { (2009) 9 SCC 495 } this Court observed as follows: (SCC 503, para 22) "22... 20. In Jagdish v. State of MP { (2009) 9 SCC 495 } this Court observed as follows: (SCC 503, para 22) "22... It bears repetition that the appellant and the deceased family members were the only occupants of the room and it was therefore incumbent on the appellant to have tendered some explanation in order to avoid any suspicion as to his guilt." 20. So far as the statement of Chand Babu (PW-1) is concerned, as already stated above, his examination-in-chief concluded on 19.06.2007 and thereafter he was cross examined on 10.06.2008 i.e. one year after recording of his examination in chief. The order sheet dated 10.6.2008 even does not reflect that (PW-1) was given any opportunity to refresh his memory by perusing his previous statement. It appears that during this one year, the defence could succeed to win over (PW-1) Chand Babu and other relevant witnesses and that is why in his last four lines of the cross examination, he becomes bit shaky and has not fully supported the prosecution case. However, if the entire statement is taken into consideration, it is apparent that the accused appellant used to ill-treat the deceased for fulfilment of dowry demand and when the same was not done, she was done to death in a brutal manner by the appellant. 21. So far as the statements of Ali Husain (CW-1) and Mohammad (CW-2) are concerned, they were examined for different purposes and a surprise question was put to them regarding the presence of the appellant at the time of occurrence and they merely state that the appellant was not there in the village. Considering the entire evidence as it is, we are of the view that the prosecution has succeeded in proving their case against the appellant under Section 304-B of IPC. 22. The next question, which arises for consideration of this Court is as to what would be the appropriate sentence to be imposed upon the appellant under Section 304 B of I.P.C. 23. Section 304-B of IPC reads as under:- "304B. 22. The next question, which arises for consideration of this Court is as to what would be the appropriate sentence to be imposed upon the appellant under Section 304 B of I.P.C. 23. Section 304-B of IPC reads as under:- "304B. Dowry death.— (1) Where the death of a woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven years of her marriage and it is shown that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, such death shall be called “dowry death”, and such husband or relative shall be deemed to have caused her death. Explanation.—For the purpose of this sub-section, “dowry” shall have the same meaning as in section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (28 of 1961). (2) Whoever commits dowry death shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than seven years but which may extend to imprisonment for life." 24. A bare perusal of the above Section would reveal that imposition of life sentence is not mandatory under Section 304-B of IPC and it merely says that sentence shall not be less than seven years, but the same may extend to imprisonment for life. Applying the principles laid down by the Apex Court in various judgments, in particular in Hem Chand v. State of Haryana, (1994) 6 SCC 727 and G V Siddaramesh v. State of Karnataka, (2010) 3 SCC 152 , State of Karnataka v. M V Manjunathgawda, (2003) 2 SCC 188 , Hari Om v. State of Haryana, (2014) 10 SCC 577 and Sunil Dutt Sharma v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2014) 4 SCC 375 , sentence of life imprisonment imposed upon the appellant can be reduced to 10 years. 25. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case and the submissions as made on behalf of the appellant and further considering the fact that the appellant is in jail for the last 13 years and is willing to compensate Chand Babu (PW-1), we are of the view that ends of justice would be served if the sentence of life imprisonment imposed upon the appellant is reduced to the period already undergone by him. 26. 26. The appellant is directed to pay compensation of Rs.1,00,000/-(Rupees One Lakh) to Chand Babu (PW-1), father of the deceased, within eight months from the date of his release, in view of the provisions of Section 357 of Cr. P.C., and the judgment of the Supreme Court in Ankush Shivaji Gaikwad v State of Maharashtra, (2013) 6 SCC 770 . The amount so deposited by the appellant before the trial court shall be disbursed to Chand Babu (PW-1). If the appellant fails to deposit the said amount within stipulated period, he shall further undergo Jail sentence of three years and even after serving default sentence, amount of compensation shall be recoverable in view of the judgment of the Apex Court in Kumaran v State of Kerala & Anr., (2017) 7 SCC 471 . 27. The appellant is in Jail. He be set free forthwith to comply further direction of the Court, if not required in any other case. 28. The appeal succeeds and is partly allowed.