JUDGMENT : K. SURENDRA MOHAN, J. 1. Both these writ petitions are filed by the same petitioners. Since common questions arise for determination, these writ petitions have been heard and are disposed of together. The common petitioner is an Association by name Kerala Private Medical College Managements Association (hereinafter referred to as the Association for short). The second petitioner is a trustee of a Trust that is conducting the KMCT Medical College, Kozhikode. The Association is a registered organization of the consortium of Kerala Self Financed Professional Medical Colleges. A list of 18 members of the Association forms part of the writ petition. 2. The members of the Association are all conducting Self Financing Medical Colleges in Kerala. They are aggrieved by the manner in which students are being allotted by the respondents to their Colleges. Earlier, the members of the Association used to enter into seat sharing agreements with the Government stipulating the conditions subject to which and the manner in which seats were to be shared. Accordingly, there used to be Government seats as well as Management seats. A few seats out of the Management quota used to be earmarked as NRI seats for being filled up by candidates who are dependents of non-resident Indians. However, the practice of executing such agreements has been held to be unsustainable by this Court. Thereafter, the practice has been discontinued. As per the orders of the Apex Court, allotment of students to all the seats in Private Self Financing Medical Colleges are being done by the Commissioner for Entrance Examinations on the basis of the inter se ranking of the candidates in the NEET rank list. The fees to be remitted by the candidates allotted to the respective Colleges are also received by the second respondent through Demand Drafts that are later on transmitted to the respective Colleges. The fees are also received by the second respondent pursuant to the direction of the Apex Court since it was noticed that some of the Colleges had been turning away the allotted candidates on some flimsy reason or the other without receiving fees from them. 3. According to the petitioners, the seat sharing agreements executed by them with the Government earlier, used to contain a provision entitling them to require the admitted students to furnish Bank Guarantees for payment of the fees for the entire course. 3. According to the petitioners, the seat sharing agreements executed by them with the Government earlier, used to contain a provision entitling them to require the admitted students to furnish Bank Guarantees for payment of the fees for the entire course. Such a condition was necessary to safeguard the interests of the Self Financing Institutions which would be the loser, if a student discontinues his studies midway through the course. The said seat would then remain vacant throughout the duration of the course. Since Private Self Financing Colleges are entirely dependent on the fees paid by the students for their sustenance, such loss of revenue would seriously hamper even their existence. It is contended that during the year 2018-2019, no provision for furnishing a Bank Guarantee is available in the Prospectus. Therefore, it is contended that, the same is necessary to be directed to be included. 4. The second contention put forward is that the clause in the Prospectus regarding nativity excludes entirely, students belonging to other States and confines the eligibility for claiming admission to Keralites alone. The said clause is stated to be unsustainable, discriminatory and violative of Articles 14 and 15 of the Constitution. A further challenge is made against the spot admissions to unfilled seats, which are to be made by the Commissioner for Entrance Examinations. It is contended that, it is necessary to permit each institution to conduct spot admissions to fill up unfilled vacancies. Another claim is for setting apart a limited number of seats in every institution, to be filled up by candidates sponsored by the employees and trustees thereof, which shall include children and relatives of such employees and trustees. In the absence of stipulations in the Prospectus on the above aspects, it is contended that the same is unsustainable and liable to be set aside. 5. According to Adv. Santhosh Krishnan who appears for the petitioners, Clause 6.1 of the KEAM Prospectus, 2018 (Ext.P12 in W.P. (C) No. 21686 of 2018) imposes 100% domicile or nativity criterion to exclude all non-Keralite students. As per the said clause, 100% seats are reserved for persons of Kerala origin or having nexus to Kerala. Even NRI students have to satisfy the said criterion. It is contended that, no provision for even the 50% All India Quota has been made. Such exclusion of outside State candidates is violative of the dictum in Dr. As per the said clause, 100% seats are reserved for persons of Kerala origin or having nexus to Kerala. Even NRI students have to satisfy the said criterion. It is contended that, no provision for even the 50% All India Quota has been made. Such exclusion of outside State candidates is violative of the dictum in Dr. Pradeep Jain vs. Union of India, (1984) 3 SCC 654 . Reliance is placed on the decision in Nikhil Himthani vs. State of Uttarakhand, (2013) 10 SCC 237 . Therefore, it is contended that, the said clause is liable to be set aside. 6. It is further contended that, the member Colleges of the Association are Self Financing Institutions dependent for all their expenses entirely on the fees collected from the students. The conduct of the College involves a lot of expenditure and the fee is determined by the Admission and Fee Regulatory Committee (AFRC for short) taking into account all the above factors and the student intake capacity of the College. Therefore, when there is a drop out, or discontinuance by a student, the revenue of the College is adversely affected. The College is not in a position to fill up the said seats nor is there any provision for compensating the College for the loss of such seats. In order to secure the interests of the College therefore, insistence on furnishing of Bank Guarantees by the students is absolutely necessary. Such a condition would also ensure that students do not casually discontinue their studies after taking admission. According to the learned counsel, a clause insisting on furnishing of such Bank Guarantee was there in the consensual agreement that used to be executed by the College with the Government. However, such a clause does not find a place in the KEAM Prospectus. The Prospectus does not even extend the benefit of liquidated damages to the Colleges. In the Prospectus, liquidated damages is restricted to Government seats, it is pointed out. Since there is no practice of entering into seat sharing agreements now, there are no Government seats in the Colleges of the petitioners. Consequently, Clause 12.2 of the Prospectus is discriminatory. It is further contended that, the provision for liquidated damages, even if held to be applicable to the members of the Association, is not as effective as a Bank Guarantee. Further, the liquidated damages is limited to Rs. Consequently, Clause 12.2 of the Prospectus is discriminatory. It is further contended that, the provision for liquidated damages, even if held to be applicable to the members of the Association, is not as effective as a Bank Guarantee. Further, the liquidated damages is limited to Rs. 7 Lakhs in the case of MBBS students and Rs. 5 Lakhs in the case of BDS students when the discontinuance is in the first year. Capping of the liquidated damages as above, according to the learned counsel, is illegal. The decision of the Apex Court in Islamic Academy of Education vs. State of Karnataka, (2003) 6 SCC 697 is relied upon to contend that, the Apex Court had recognized the rights of the Colleges to secure Bank Guarantees from the students. 7. The learned counsel attacks the provision for spot admission pointing out that, as per the decision of the Apex Court in Dar-Us-Slam Educational Trust vs. Medical Council of India, W.P. (C) No. 267 of 2017, (Ext.P8 in W.P. (C) No. 21686 of 2018), the proper procedure to be followed is to forward a list of students to the college to fill up the unfilled seats, in the ratio of 10 students for each unfilled seat. However, what is done as per Ext.P12 is to make the allotment to such unfilled seats also by the Commissioner for Entrance Examinations. 8. Apart from the above, according to the learned counsel, since admissions could be made only on the basis of the merit of each candidate, according to the NEET rank list, the colleges would be able to grant admissions only on the basis of merit. Without sacrificing the merit, it is necessary, according to the learned counsel, to set apart a small percentage of at least 5% seats for being filled up by the dependents of trustees and employees of the College. It is pointed out that, the State has recognized such quota with respect to all Colleges coming under the Kerala Self Financing Engineering College Management Association and colleges coming under the Kerala Catholic Engineering College Management Association and Colleges coming under the Architecture College Management Association. It is therefore contended that, these petitions are only to be allowed. 9. It is pointed out that, the State has recognized such quota with respect to all Colleges coming under the Kerala Self Financing Engineering College Management Association and colleges coming under the Kerala Catholic Engineering College Management Association and Colleges coming under the Architecture College Management Association. It is therefore contended that, these petitions are only to be allowed. 9. The learned Government Pleader Shri. V. Manu responds to the submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioners contending that the nativity clause in Ext.P12 does not suffer from any infirmity as pointed out by the petitioners. What the Supreme Court has held to be bad is only 100% reservation of outside State students. In the present case, there is no 100% reservation. It has been so found by a Division Bench of this Court in judgment dated 7.8.2018 in W.P. (C) No. 26683 of 2018. According to the learned Government Pleader, wholesale reservation of all seats for candidates of Kerala origin alone has been prohibited. Therefore, the contentions of the counsel for the petitioners are without any basis. With respect to the contention regarding the furnishing of Bank Guarantee, the learned Government Pleader points out that, the practice of entering into seat sharing agreement with the Government has been done away with. At present, allotment of candidates to all seats are being done by the Commissioner for Entrance Examinations. Therefore, there are no Government seats or Management seats, now. All the seats are Government seats. The same fee is charged for all the seats. Therefore, there is no discrimination in favour of Government seats, as alleged. Section 8(3) of the Kerala Medical Education (Regulation and Control of Admission to Private Medical Educational Institutions) Act, 2017 ('Act 15 of 2017' for short) prohibits collection of fee in excess of one year at a time. Collection of more than one year's fee is to be treated as collection of capitation fee, liable to be proceeded against. Since the present process of admission is only on the basis of the ranking in the NEET, it is contended that an insistence on furnishing of Bank Guarantees would prevent many a student from pursuing their education, for want of financial resources. 10. Since the present process of admission is only on the basis of the ranking in the NEET, it is contended that an insistence on furnishing of Bank Guarantees would prevent many a student from pursuing their education, for want of financial resources. 10. With respect to the objection regarding the manner in which spot admission is conducted, the learned Government Pleader submits that, spot admissions would be done only in accordance with the directions issued by the Apex Court. We are assured that the stipulation contained in Dar-Us-Slam Educational Trust vs. Medical Council of India (supra) would be scrupulously followed. On the question of granting reservation to the dependents of the trustees and employees of the Colleges, it is contended that no such reservation is contemplated by any law. Grant of such reservation would only result in facilitating the admission of students otherwise than on merit. Such permission would give a handle to the Management to pick and choose candidates. The word 'dependent' itself is a very ambiguous expression and could be interpreted to include any person to whom College wants to give admission. Therefore, it is contended that no such request could be entertained. Learned Government Pleader therefore seeks dismissal of the writ petitions. 11. Heard. With respect to the objections raised regarding the manner in which spot admissions are conducted by the second respondent, we are assured by the learned Government Pleader that the directions of the Apex Court in Dar-Us-Slam Educational Trust case (supra) would be scrupulously observed and that, spot admissions would be completed only in accordance with the said directions. As far as the present academic year is concerned, the spot admissions are already completed. No instance of violation of any of the conditions stipulated by the Apex Court has been brought to our notice. Therefore, we are not satisfied that any further directions are required to be issued on the said aspect. 12. The learned counsel for the petitioner has strenuously put forward his contentions attacking Clause 6.1 of Ext.P12 Prospectus to contend that, the said Clause effects a 100% reservation in favour of Keralites. As rightly pointed out by the learned Government Pleader, the issue has been considered by us in W.P. (C) No. 26683 of 2018, Riya R. Ebenezer vs. Union of India, AIR 2018 Kerala 168. As rightly pointed out by the learned Government Pleader, the issue has been considered by us in W.P. (C) No. 26683 of 2018, Riya R. Ebenezer vs. Union of India, AIR 2018 Kerala 168. In the said case, the validity of clause 6.1 of the very same Prospectus has been upheld after referring to the various authorities on the point. Paragraphs 5 and 6 of the said judgment which discusses the import of the clause being relevant in the context are extracted herein-below: “5. The basic question canvassed before us is with regard to the validity of Clause 6.1 in Ext.P5. Clause 6 stipulates the criteria for eligibility for admission. It is provided in Clause 6.1 that only Indian citizens, persons of Indian origin, Overseas citizens of India would be eligible for admission. The clause further goes on to categorize candidates into Non-Keralite Category I (NK-I) and Non- Keralite Category II (NK-II). A candidate of Kerala origin is categorized as a Keralite. The said category would include children of All India Service Officers (Non-Keralites) allotted to Kerala cadre who are deemed to be Keralites, but they would not be eligible for communal/Special/ Persons with Disabilities reservation or any fee concession. NK-I category includes a person who is not of Kerala origin, who has undergone qualifying course in Kerala and who is the son/daughter of Non-Keralite parents belonging to Government of India/Defence Service, posted to Kerala. It also includes a candidate who has undergone qualifying course in Kerala and who is the son/daughter of Non-Keralite parents serving or served Government of Kerala for a minimum period of two years. A candidate who has been a resident of Kerala for more than a period of five years within a period of twelve years is also included in the said category. Candidates who do not come under NK-I category fall within NK-II category. They are held not eligible for admission to Medical and Allied Courses including MBBS/BDS and for admission to Government Engineering Colleges. 6. A perusal of the above clause leaves no doubt in our minds that, the said clause does not impose a 100% prohibition on the grant of admission to persons who do not belong to the State of Kerala. What has been done is only to restrict the eligibility of persons from outside Kerala to obtain admission to the various courses in the State. What has been done is only to restrict the eligibility of persons from outside Kerala to obtain admission to the various courses in the State. We notice that, Non-Keralites are also permitted and considered to be eligible to seek admission in the State of Kerala under the NK-I category. Under the NK-II category also, the exclusion is only with respect to the eligibility for admission to MBBS/BDS and for admission to Government Engineering Colleges. It therefore follows that, there is no restriction to the extent of 100% which alone is prohibited.” In Dr. Pradeep Jain vs. Union of India, (1984) 3 SCC 654 the Apex Court has considered the validity of a similar clause and held in paragraph 6 as follows: “6. But, it is clear that so far as admissions to an educational institution such as a medical college are concerned, Article 16(2) has no application. If, therefore, there is any residence requirement for admission to a medical college in a State, it cannot be condemned as unconstitutional on ground of violation of Article 16(2). Nor can Article 15 clauses (1) and (2) be invoked for invalidating such residence requirement because these clauses prohibits discrimination on ground of place of birth and not on ground of residence and, as pointed out by this Court in D.P. Joshi vs. State of Madhya Bharat, residence and place of birth are “two distinct conceptions with different connotations both in law and in fact.” The only provision of the Constitution on the touchstone of which such residence requirement can be required to be tested is Article 14 and that is precisely the challenge which falls to be considered by us in these writ petitions.” The challenge to the said clause has been considered by the Court with reference to Article 14 of the Constitution and has been negatived in paragraph 19 of the judgment, which reads as follows: “19. It will be noticed from the above discussion that though intra-State discrimination between persons resident in different districts or regions of a State has by and large been frowned upon by the Court and struck down as invalid as in Minor P. Rajendran case and Peeria Karuppan case, the Court has in D.N. Chanchala case and other similar cases upheld institutional reservation effected through university wise distribution of seats for admission to medical colleges. The Court has also by its decisions in D.P. Joshi case and N. Vasundara case sustained the constitutional validity of reservation based on residence requirement within a State for the purpose of admission to medical colleges. These decisions which all relate to admission to MBBS course are binding upon us and it is therefore not possible for us to hold, in the face of these decisions, that residence requirement in a State for admission to MBBS course is irrational and irrelevant and cannot be introduced as a condition for admission without violating the mandate of equality of opportunity contained in Article 14. We must proceed on the basis that at least so far as admission to MBBS course is concerned, residence requirement in a State can be introduced as a condition for admission to the MBBS course.” 13. In view of the above, we do not find any substance in the challenge made against Clause 6.1 of Ext. P12. Even in the case of a minority educational institution claiming benefit under Article 30(1) of the Constitution, it has been held in T.M.A. Pai Foundation vs. State of Karnataka, (2002) 8 SCC 481 that the minority status of the community is to be determined treating each State as a unit. This is for the reason that, a community that is a minority in one State need not be a minority in another State. Therefore, even in the case of minority institutions, what has been permitted by the Apex Court in P.A. Inamdar vs. State of Maharashtra (supra) is only to have a sprinkling of outside State students. In Clause 6.1 of Ext.P12, there is no total prohibition of outside students. Since NK- I category permits students from other States who satisfy the conditions therein also to be admitted to all Colleges within the State, the criterion regarding 'sprinkling' stands satisfied. 14. The next contention put forward by the petitioners is that, the students should be compelled to furnish Bank Guarantees to the Colleges for fees payable by them in respect of the subsequent years of the course. According to the learned counsel, such a condition used to form part of the consensual agreement that the petitioners used to execute with the Government. According to the Government, at the time when the consensual agreement used to be executed, there were different categories of seats, the Government seats and Management seats. According to the learned counsel, such a condition used to form part of the consensual agreement that the petitioners used to execute with the Government. According to the Government, at the time when the consensual agreement used to be executed, there were different categories of seats, the Government seats and Management seats. The Management had the right to admit students to the Management quota at that time. However, the situation has changed. At present the allotment of students to each College is done by the second respondent through a centralized allotment process. Such centralized allotment is done entirely on the basis of the ranking of each candidate in the NEET rank list. Consequently, the sole criterion for the allotment of students to each Medical College has now become merit and merit alone. In the above circumstances, an insistence on furnishing of Bank Guarantee by all students would prevent many meritorious students from pursuing their studies for want of sufficient funds. We find merit in the contentions of the learned Government Pleader. 15. Since allotment of students to each College is done by the second respondent purely on the basis of merit, an insistence on furnishing of Bank Guarantee by students would cast an additional burden on the students as well as the parents. We bear in mind the fact that a medical seat is a very sought after one in the State and therefore, the likelihood of students dropping out after taking admission occurs only few and far between, sometimes students dropping out for reasons beyond their control also. Therefore, such instances are better tackled on a case to case basis. An insistence on furnishing of Production of Bank Guarantees by every student would place them at the mercy of the managements. Encashment of Bank Guarantees without justification by unscrupulous Managements are possibilities that cannot be ruled out. Apart from the above, it is common knowledge that Bank Guarantees could be obtained only by depositing sufficient cash with the Banks to secure their interests. An ordinary parent would not be in a position to raise sufficient funds to procure a Bank Guarantee. The learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on the decision in Islamic Academy of Education vs. State of Karnataka, (2003) 6 SCC 697 particularly paragraph 8 to contend that the Apex Court has permitted the Colleges to insist on production of Bank Guarantees by the students. The learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on the decision in Islamic Academy of Education vs. State of Karnataka, (2003) 6 SCC 697 particularly paragraph 8 to contend that the Apex Court has permitted the Colleges to insist on production of Bank Guarantees by the students. However, we do not find any merit in the said contention. What the Apex Court has held in paragraph 8 is as follows: “8. It must be mentioned that during arguments it was pointed out to us that some educational institutions are collecting, in advance, the fees for the entire course i.e. for all the years. It was submitted that this was done because the institute was not sure whether the student would leave the institute midstream. It was submitted that if the student left the course in midstream then for the remaining years the seat would lie vacant and the institute would suffer. In our view an educational institution can only charge prescribed fees for one semester/year. If an institution feels that any particular student may leave in midstream then, at the highest, it may require that student to give a bond/bank guarantee that the balance fees for the whole course would be received by the institute even if the student left in midstream.” (Emphasis supplied) It is clear from the above passage that, what the Apex Court has observed is only that if an institution feels that 'any particular student' may leave in midstream, then, 'at the highest' it may require the student to give a Bond or Bank Guarantee that the balance fee for the whole course would be received by the College, even if the student left in midstream. The said passage cannot be construed as a carte blanche to the institution to insist on the furnishing of bank guarantees by each and every student. Therefore, we are not satisfied that, the petitioners are entitled to any relief on the said ground also. 16. The last aspect canvassed by the counsel for the petitioners is that every member of the Association should be permitted to reserve 5% of their seats to be filled up by the dependents of the Trustees or employees of the College. The counsel has not been able to point out to us any law that permits such reservation. 16. The last aspect canvassed by the counsel for the petitioners is that every member of the Association should be permitted to reserve 5% of their seats to be filled up by the dependents of the Trustees or employees of the College. The counsel has not been able to point out to us any law that permits such reservation. As we have already noticed above, allotments of candidates to the respective colleges are made solely on the basis of merit. Any reservation on the lines canvassed for by the learned counsel for the petitioners would result in sacrificing merit. Just for the reason that, a College is being conducted by a Trust or Organization, no reservation of seats for its members or its dependents could be permitted. Any such reservation would only give room to the Managements to admit persons of their choice, which would only be counter productive. Therefore, we are not satisfied that the said request could be accepted. 17. For the foregoing reasons, both the writ petitions are dismissed.