JUDGMENT : By impugned order dated 26th September 2018, the learned Single Judge has rejected the writ petition filed by the present appellant. Essentially, the challenge in the writ petition was to the communication refusing to grant refund to the petitioner of stamp duty paid under the Karnatak a Stamp Act, 1957 (for short ‘the said Act of 1957’). 2. A Lease Deed dated 24th September 2008 was executed by one A. Krishnappa as lessor in favour of the petitioner and the same was registered on the very same day in the office of the Sub-Registrar. On 26th September 2009, a Deed of Surrender was executed between the parties to the said Lease Deed and was registered on the same day. On 29th September 2009, the lessor under the Lease Deed dated 24th September 2008, along with his two sons, executed a fresh Deed of Lease in respect of the same property in favour of the petitioner which was duly registered. The petitioner claimed refund of the stamp duty paid on the Lease Deed dated 24th September 2008. Admittedly, the petitioner applied for refund of stamp duty by invoking sub-clause (6) of Clause (c) of Section 47 of the said Act of 1957. The refund was denied to the petitioner and therefore, a writ petition was filed before the learned Single Judge. 3. By the impugned order, the learned Single Judge has held that sub-clause (6) of Clause (c) of Section 47 of the said Act of 1957 is not applicable to the facts of the case and hence, the appellant is not entitled to refund. 4. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant submits that the stamp used for the Lease Deed dated 24th September 2008 became useless in view of the Deed of Surrender executed between the parties as well as a fresh Deed of Lease executed on 29th September 2009, in respect of the same property. Secondly, he submitted that the first Lease Deed dated 24th September 2008 was not acted upon. He would, therefore, submit that refund ought to have been granted to the petitioner. 5. We have considered the submissions. Section 47 of the said Act of 1957 reads thus: “47. Secondly, he submitted that the first Lease Deed dated 24th September 2008 was not acted upon. He would, therefore, submit that refund ought to have been granted to the petitioner. 5. We have considered the submissions. Section 47 of the said Act of 1957 reads thus: “47. Allowances for spoiled stamps:- Subject to such rules as may be made by the State Government as to evidence to be required, or the enquiry to be made, the [Deputy Commissioner] may, on application made within the period prescribed in Section 48, and if he is satisfied as to the facts, make allowance for impressed stamps spoiled in the cases hereinafter mentioned, namely,- (a) the stamps on any paper inadvertently and undesignedly spoiled, obliterated or by error in writing or any other means rendered unfit for the purpose intended before any instrument written thereon is executed by any person; (b) the stamp on any document which is written out wholly or in part, but which is not signed or executed by any party thereto; (c) the stamp used for an instrument executed by any party thereto which,- (1) has been afterwards found to be absolutely void in law from the beginning; (2) has been afterwards found unfit, by reason of any error or mistake therein, for the purpose originally intended; (3) by reason of the death of any person by whom it is necessary that it should be executed, without having executed the same, or of the refusal of any such person to execute the same, cannot be completed so as to effect the intended transaction in the form proposed; (4) for want of the execution thereof by some material party, and his inability or refusal to sign the same, is in fact incomplete and insufficient for the purpose for which it was intended; (5) by reason of the refusal of any person to act under the same, or to advance any money intended to be thereby secured, or by the refusal or non-acceptance of any office thereby grunted, totally fails the intended purpose; (6) becomes useless in consequence of the transaction intended to be thereby effected, being effected by some other instrument between the same parties and bearing a stamp of not less value; (7) is deficient in value and the transaction intended to be thereby effected has been effected by some other instrument between the same parties and bearing a stamp of not less value; (8) is inadvertently and undesignedly spoiled, and in lieu whereof another instrument made between the same parties and for the same purpose is executed and duly stamped:” (emphasis added) 6. On plain reading of Section 47, it is apparent that sub-clause (6) of Clause (c) is applicable when stamp duty paid on an instrument or stamp affixed thereon becomes useless in consequence of the transaction intended to be thereby effected, being effected by some other instrument between the same parties and bearing a stamp of not less value. 7. The word ‘intended’ used in sub-clause (6) of Clause (c) of Section 47 of the said Act of 1957 shows that refund can be sought under Clause (c) of stamp paid on an instrument which is not executed. Moreover, the second condition for the applicability of sub-clause (6) of Clause (c) is that the transaction intended to be effected by the instrument must be effected by some other instrument between the parties on which a stamp of not less value is paid. It follows that the word “parties” will have to be interpreted as the parties to the first instrument in respect of which refund is claimed. 8. Perusal of the Deed of Surrender dated 26th September 2009 shows that there is no recital therein that the Lease Deed dated 24th September 2008 was either not acted upon or was not agreed to be acted upon. The only reason stated therein for surrender is that the lessor under the Lease Deed dated 24th September 2008 has agreed to execute a lease along with his sons for ninety years and therefore, the petitioner has agreed to surrender the Lease. The Lease dated 24th September 2008 was for twenty years. Thus, the Deed of Surrender itself confirms the fact that a lease was granted under the Lease Deed dated 24th September 2008 and the parties to the said lease, on their own volition, agreed to surrender for the purpose of executing another lease by the lessor along with two others. Two other persons who have executed the subsequent lease are not the lessors under the Lease Deed dated 24th September 2008. The subsequent lease is for ninety years. Therefore, by no stretch of imagination, it can be said that the stamp used for the registered Lease Deed dated 24th September 2008 became useless. Two other persons who have executed the subsequent lease are not the lessors under the Lease Deed dated 24th September 2008. The subsequent lease is for ninety years. Therefore, by no stretch of imagination, it can be said that the stamp used for the registered Lease Deed dated 24th September 2008 became useless. It is very apparent from the recitals of the Deed of Surrender and the subsequent Lease Deed that what was executed in the form of subsequent Lease Deed was not the transaction intended to be executed by the Lease Deed dated 24th September 2008 and it was an independent transaction. Therefore, we find no error in the view taken by the learned Single Judge that the sub-clause (6) of Clause (c) of Section 47 was not applicable and the appeal is accordingly dismissed.