JUDGMENT : Suneet Kumar, J. 1. Heard learned counsel for the parties. 2. The writ petition is being decided, on consent, without calling for counter-affidavit. 3. Petitioner claims to have been appointed Bandi Rakshak in January 1980 at District Jail, Deoria. It is contended that he continued until November 1985, thereafter, on oral information to the Authorities that his mother is ill, he proceeded on leave and thereafter never returned on duty. It appears, thereafter, he filed an application under the Right to Information Act, 2005 (R.T.I. Act), seeking information regarding his services rendered with the respondent-Jail Authorities. In the information furnished by the Appellate Authority under the R.T.I. Act, it is noted that service record of the applicant is not available as the matter has been raised after 33 years, the attendance register from October 1980 to February 1981 is the only record available. 4. In the backdrop of the information received under the R. T.I. Act, petitioner seeks following relief: "to issue a writ order or direction in the nature of mandamus directing to the respondent authority to consider the claim of the petitioner and grant with all consequential benefit of the service period which was done by the petitioner." 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that it Was incumbent upon the respondent authorities to have terminated the services of the petitioner after adopting due process of law. Since, the services of the petitioner was not terminated following the service rules petitioner is entitled to arrears of salary and retiral dues. 6. The argument, though attractive on face value lacks merit. As per the case of the petitioner, he abandoned the service in 1985 and never returned thereafter; petitioner is presently aged about 63 years as is being informed by the learned counsel for the petitioner; no service record of the petitioner is available, except the attendance register of five months, therefore, it cannot be said, in the absence of record, that petitioner was duly appointed or continued in service after 1985. 7. Petitioner has specifically pleaded in paragraph No. 4 of the writ petition that he left the service in 1985 on oral information to the authorities, and thereafter, never returned to work, meaning thereby petitioner abandoned the service in 1985 on his own. 7. Petitioner has specifically pleaded in paragraph No. 4 of the writ petition that he left the service in 1985 on oral information to the authorities, and thereafter, never returned to work, meaning thereby petitioner abandoned the service in 1985 on his own. He is not entitled to any consequential benefit for the reason that the competent authority had not taken any action terminating the services of the petitioner upon abandonment. 8. It is settled law that a Government servant cannot be termed as a slave, he has a right to abandon the service any time voluntarily by submitting his resignation and alternatively, not joining the duty and remaining absent for long. Absence from duty in the beginning may be misconduct but when absence is for a very long period, it may amount to voluntarily abandonment of service and in that eventuality, the bonds of service come to an end automatically without requiring any order to be passed by the employer. 9. In Jeewanlal (1929) Ltd., Calcutta v. Its Workmen, AIR 1961 SC 1567 , the Apex Court held: "........if an employee continues to be absent from duty without obtaining leave and in an unauthorised manner for such a long period of time that an inference may reasonably be drawn from such absence that by his absence he has abandoned service, then such long unauthorised absence may legitimately be held to cast a break in continuity of service.....We would like to make it clear that.....there would be class of cases where long unauthorised absence may reasonably give rise to an inference that such service is intended to be abandoned by the employee." Similarly, in Shahoodul Haque v. Registrar, Co-Operative Societies, Bihar, AIR 1974 SC 1896 , the Apex Court observed as under: "The undenied and undeniable fact that the appellant had actually abandoned his post or duty for an exceedingly long period, without sufficient grounds for his absence, is so glaring that giving him further opportunity to disprove what he practically admits, could serve no useful purpose. It could not benefit him or make any difference to the order which could be and has been passed against him. It would prolong his agony. It could not benefit him or make any difference to the order which could be and has been passed against him. It would prolong his agony. On the view we have adopted on the facts of this case, it is not necessary to consider the further question whether any notice for termination of services was necessary or duly given on the assumption that he was not punished. We do not think that there is any question involved in this case which could justify an interference by us......" 10. For the purpose of termination, there has to be positive action on the part of the employer while abandonment of service is a consequence of unilateral action of the employee and the employer has no role in it. 11. In State of Haryana v. Om Parkash Bhasin, AIR 1998 SC 2898 , the Apex Court explained the distinction between 'retrenchment' and 'abandonment' from service, observing as under: "Retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) means termination by the employer of the service of the workman for any reason whatsoever. Therefore, it contemplates an act on the part of the employer which puts an end to service to fall within the definition of the expression "retrenchment" in Section 2(oo) of the Act. There was nothing of the sort in the instant case. It was the workman who ceased to report for duty.........therefore, this is a case in which the employer has done nothing whatsoever to put an end to his employment and hence, the case does not fall within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Act. Therefore, the case does not attract Section 2(oo), nor does it satisfy the requirements of Section 25-F." In Buckingham and Carnatic Co. Ltd. v. Venkatiah, (1964) 4 SCR 265 , while dealing with a similar case, the Supreme Court observed: "It is true that under common law an inference that an employee has abandoned or relinquished service is not easily drawn unless from the length of absence and from other surrounding circumstances an inference to that effect can be legitimately drawn and it can be assumed that the employee intended to abandon service. Abandonment or relinquishment of service is always a question of intention, and normally, such an intention cannot be attributed to an employee without adequate evidence in that behalf." Similar view was reiterated in G.T. Lad v. Chemicals & Fibres India Ltd., AIR 1979 SC 582 . In Syndicate Bank v. General Secretary, Syndicate Bank Staff Association, 2000 (3) SCR 285 , Aligarh Muslim University v. Mansoor Ali Khan, AIR 2000 SC 2783 , the Supreme Court ruled that if a person is absent beyond the prescribed period for which leave of any kind can be granted, he should be treated to have resigned and ceased to be in service. In such a case, there is no need to hold an enquiry or to give any notice as it would amount to useless formalities. Similar view has been reiterated in V.C. Banaras Hindu University v. Shrikant, AIR 2006 SC 2304 , Chief Engineer (Construction) v. Keshava Rao, (2005) 11 SCC 229 and Regional Manager, Bank of Baroda v. Anita Nandrajog, (2009) 9 SCC 462 . (See also: Vijay S. Sathaye v. Indian Airlines Ltd., (2013) 10 SCC 253 ) 12. Reliance has been placed on Fundamental Rule 18 to contend that the services of the petitioner ought to have been terminated in case the absence without leave exceeded five years. Rule 18 reads thus: "Rule 18. Unless the Government, in view of the special circumstances of the case, shall otherwise determine, after five years' continuous absence from duty elsewhere than on foreign service in India, whether with or without leave, Government servant ceases to be in Government employee." 13. In support of his submission learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on Jai Shankar v. State of Rajasthan, AIR SC 492, Deokinandan Prasad v. State of Bihar, AIR. 1971 SC 1409 and B.N. Tripathi v. State of U.P., AIR 1971 All 346 , to urge that removal of the Government servant for overstayed of leave is illegal. The discharge from service of an individual by way of punishment amounts to removal from service and the constitutional protection cannot be taken away in any manner without affording opportunity and show-cause to the incumbent. Even if it is a question of automatic termination of service for being continuously absent over a period of five years, Article 311 applies to such cases. 14. Even if it is a question of automatic termination of service for being continuously absent over a period of five years, Article 311 applies to such cases. 14. The submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner lacks merit, Fundamental Rule 18 is applicable in the facts of the instant case. It is not the case of the petitioner that petitioner came to be removed from service for overstayal of leave until his retirement on attaining the age of superannuation. No order was passed by the respondent under Fundamental Rule 18 dispensing with the services of the petitioner. In the instant case, petitioner abandoned his service on his own in 1985 and thereafter, never returned or approached the authorities to resume duty. 15. The act of abandonment of service was voluntary on the part of the petitioner. The respondents had not terminated the service of the petitioner under the Rules, for his prolonged absence, rather, the petitioner ceased to be in service on his own choice in terms of Fundamental Rule 18 and not due to any punitive action by the employer. The employer cannot compel the Government servant to perform the duty. The writ petition being devoid of merit is, accordingly, dismissed. No cost.