JUDGMENT : This writ petition is filed by the petitioner seeking the following reliefs: “(i) Declare that the search and seizure of the drugs detailed in the Table inserted in paragraph 4 of the writ petition, manufactured for sale under Ext.P1 licence, is ultra vires Section 8 of the Drugs and Magical Remedies (Objectionable Advertisements) Act, 1954 read with Rule 3 of the Drugs and Magical Remedies (Objectionable Advertisements)Rules, 1955; (ii) Issue a writ in the nature of certiorari or such other writ order or direction calling for the records leading to Exhibits P2 to P5 'mahassers' and eight like other 'mahassers' prepared consequent to the search and seizure detailed in the Table inserted in paragraph 4 of the writ petition; and (iii) Issue a writ in the nature of mandamus or such other writ order or direction commanding the 2nd respondent to issue appropriate directions to the officers under him to forthwith return to the petitioner the entire stock of drugs seized from the several distributors detailed in the Table inserted in paragraph 4 of the writ petition.” 2. Brief material facts for the disposal of the writ petition are as follows: 3. Petitioner is the proprietrix of a unit engaged in the manufacture of Ayurvedic patent and proprietary medicines on the strength of Ext.P1 licence issued under the provisions of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940. While continuing with the business, on 10.05.2012 and 11.05.2012, simultaneous search and seizure operations were carried out at the premises of several wholesale distributors spread across the length and breadth of the State, and the entire stock of the petitioner's drugs licensed under Ext.P1 were seized and removed by inspectors acting under orders from the 2nd respondent. The search and seizure have been conducted in exercise of the powers conferred under the provisions of the Drugs and Magical Remedies (Objectionable Advertisements) Act, 1954, on the allegation that the boxes enclosing the bottle containing the oil, the labels affixed to such bottles and enclosed literature accompanying the boxes constitute 'misleading advertisements' relating to the drug, which is an offence under Sec.4 of the Act and punishable under Sec.7 thereof. 4. According to the petitioner, the entire exercise leading to and culminating the seizure of the entire stock of the drugs has been done in contravention of every mandatory provision of the Act and the Rules framed thereunder. 4. According to the petitioner, the entire exercise leading to and culminating the seizure of the entire stock of the drugs has been done in contravention of every mandatory provision of the Act and the Rules framed thereunder. It is also the case of the petitioner that, there is no allegation that the petitioner has contravened any of the provisions of the Drugs Act, requiring invocation of the proceedings for suspension or cancellation of the licence issued to her. Further, it is contended, the licence has not been suspended or cancelled, and therefore, any threat or intimidation of the distributors or stockists of the petitioner's drugs and any interference in their right to stock and sell the drugs would be an indirect assault on the right of the petitioner's right to manufacture for sale the drugs enumerated in Ext.P1 licence. 5. That apart, it is contended that, the entire exercise leading to the search, seizure and removal of the drugs under the impugned mahazars has been done in violation of the mandatory provisions contained in Sec.8 of the Act, read with Rule 3 of the Drugs and Magical Remedies (Objectionable Advertisements)Rules, 1955 (for short, 'the Rules, 1955'). To put it short, the contention advanced by the petitioner is that, contrary to the mandate of Rule 3, the search and seizure was made and in the absence of a 'scrutiny' of the drug conducted under Rule 3, the entry, search and seizure under Sec.8 of the Act has been vitiated, and the respondents are duty bound to return the seized articles as expeditiously as possible. 6. Respondents 1 and 2 have filed a very detailed counter affidavit, refuting the allegations and claims and demands raised by the petitioner. Among other contentions, it is stated that, the relevant provisions in respect of the issue involved in this case are based on Sec.2(a) of Act, 1954, wherein, 'advertisement' is defined as 'any notice, circular, label, wrapper, or other document and any announcements made orally or by means of producing or transmitting light, sound or smoke'. Among other contentions, it is stated that, the relevant provisions in respect of the issue involved in this case are based on Sec.2(a) of Act, 1954, wherein, 'advertisement' is defined as 'any notice, circular, label, wrapper, or other document and any announcements made orally or by means of producing or transmitting light, sound or smoke'. Section 4 of the said Act provides for 'Prohibition of misleading Advertisements Relating to Drugs' and no person shall take any part in the publication of any advertisement relating to a drug if the advertisement contains any matter, which is directly or indirectly giving false information regarding the true character of the drug; or makes a false claim for the drug; or is otherwise false or misleading in any material particular, and the violation of the said provisions are punishable under Sec.7. 7. Therefore, according to the respondents, the contention put forth by the petitioner with respect to the misleading advertisements pointed out against the petitioner cannot be sustained under law. That apart, it is pointed out that, before initiating any action, there is no need to furnish any information regarding the composition of the drug or the ingredients thereof or any other information in regard to that drug as it is specifically mentioned in the approved formulae issued by the Department. Therefore, the seizure of the drugs by the officers of the Department is not an illegal act or any abuse of power. That apart, it is submitted, the entire actions were initiated in accordance with the procedure prescribed under Sec.8 of the Act and Rule 3 of the Rules. Therefore, petitioner is not entitled to secure any relief’s as is sought for in the writ petition. 8. I have heard Sri. P.Deepak, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri. M.R.Sabu, learned Senior Government Pleader appearing for the respondents and perused the pleadings and the documents on record. 9. The thrust of the contention advanced by learned counsel for the petitioner is based on Sec.8 of Act, 1954, which read thus: “8. 8. I have heard Sri. P.Deepak, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri. M.R.Sabu, learned Senior Government Pleader appearing for the respondents and perused the pleadings and the documents on record. 9. The thrust of the contention advanced by learned counsel for the petitioner is based on Sec.8 of Act, 1954, which read thus: “8. Powers of entry, search, etc.--(1) Subject to the provisions of any rules made in this behalf, any Gazetted Officer authorised by the State Government may, within the local limits of the area for which he is so authorised,- (a) enter and search at all reasonable times, with such assistants, if any, as he considers necessary, any place in which he has reason to believe that an offence under this Act has been or is being committed; (b) seize any advertisement which he has reason to believe contravenes any of the provisions of this Act: Provided that the power of seizure under this clause may be exercised in respect of any document, article or thing which contains any such advertisement, including the contents, if any, of such document, article or thing, if the advertisement cannot be separated by reason of its being embossed or otherwise, from such document, article or thing without affecting the integrity, utility or saleable value thereof; (c) examine any record, register, document or any other material object found in any place mentioned in clause (a) and seize the same if he has reason to believe that it may furnish evidence of the commission of an offence punishable under this Act. (2) The provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (5 of 1898) shall, so far as may be, apply to any search or seizure under this Act as they apply to any search or seizure made under the authority of a warrant issued under Section 98 of the said Code. (3) Where any persons seizes anything under clause (b) or (c) of sub-section (1), he shall, as soon as may be, inform a Magistrate and take his orders as to the custody thereof.” 10. The contention put forth by the learned counsel is that, since the stipulations contained under Sec.8 are dependent upon any Rules framed on behalf of Sec.8, unless and until the procedures stipulated under the Rules are followed, search and seizure cannot be made. Rule 3 of Rules, 1955, read thus: “3. The contention put forth by the learned counsel is that, since the stipulations contained under Sec.8 are dependent upon any Rules framed on behalf of Sec.8, unless and until the procedures stipulated under the Rules are followed, search and seizure cannot be made. Rule 3 of Rules, 1955, read thus: “3. Scrutiny of misleading advertisements relating to drugs.--Any person authorised by the State Government in this behalf may, if satisfied, that an advertisement relating to a drug contravenes the provisions of Section 4, by order, require the manufacturer, packer, distributor or seller of the drug to furnish, within such time as may be specified in the order or such further time as may be allowed in this behalf by the person so authorised information regarding the composition of the drug or the ingredients thereof or any other information in regard to that drug as he deems necessary for holding the scrutiny of the advertisement, and where any such order is made, it shall be the duty of the manufacture, packer, distributor or seller of the drug to which the advertisement relates to comply with the order. Any failure to comply with such order shall, for the purposes of Section 7, be deemed to be a contravention of the provisions of Section 4: Provided that no publisher or advertising agency of any medium for the dissemination of an advertisement relating to a drug shall be deemed to have made any such contravention merely by reason of the dissemination by him or it of any such advertisement, unless such publisher or advertising agency has failed to comply with any direction made by the authorised person in this behalf calling upon him or it to furnish the name and address of the manufacturer, packer, distributor, seller or advertising agency, as the case may be, who or which caused such advertisement to be disseminated.” 11. Therefore, according to the learned counsel, going by the provisions of the Rules, any person authorised by the State Government is satisfied that an advertisement relating to a drug contravenes the provisions of Sec.4, by order, require the manufacturer, packer, distributor or seller of the drug to furnish within such time, as may be specified in the order, or such further time as may be allowed in this behalf by the person so authorised, information regarding the composition of the drug or the ingredients thereat or any other information in regard to that drug as he deems necessary for holding the scrutiny of the advertisement, and where any such order is made, it shall be the duty of the manufacturer, trader, etc. etc. to comply with the order, and any failure to comply with such order for the purpose of Sec.7 be deemed to be a contravention of the provisions of Sec.4. 12. Learned counsel for the petitioner has invited my attention to the judgment of the apex court in 'Punjab Sikh Regular Motor Service, Moudhapara, Raipur v. Regional Transport Authority, Raipur and Another' [ AIR 1966 SC 1318 ], to canvass the proposition that when there is a clear prescription made under a law, the same is to be scrupulously followed by the authority conferred with the power, and has invited my attention to paragraph 5 of the judgment, which read thus: “5. We do not think it is necessary to express any opinion on the contentions advanced by the parties on this aspect of the case, for we are of the view that on a proper construction of the rules made by the State Government in regard to the grant of permits and Counter-signatures of inter-regional permits the Regional Transport Authority, Raipur was not competent to renew the countersignature on the permit for the interregional route granted by the Regional Transport Authority, Bilaspur in the present case. Under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 the Central Provinces and Berar Motor Vehicles Rules, 1940 were made by the appropriate authority and it is the admitted position that these rules were at the material time in operation in the two regions - Bilaspur and Raipur in the State of Madhya Pradesh with which we are concerned. Under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 the Central Provinces and Berar Motor Vehicles Rules, 1940 were made by the appropriate authority and it is the admitted position that these rules were at the material time in operation in the two regions - Bilaspur and Raipur in the State of Madhya Pradesh with which we are concerned. By R. 61 it is provided: "(a) Application for the renewal of a permit shall be made, in writing to the Regional Transport Authority by which the permit was issued not less than two months, in the case of a stage carriage permit or a public carrier's permit, and not less than one month in other cases, before the expiry of the permit, and shall be accompanied by Part A of the permit. The application shall state the period for which the renewal is desired and shall be accompanied by the fee prescribed in rule 55. (b) The Regional Transport Authority renewing a permit shall call upon the holder to produce Part B or Parts A, B thereof, as the case may be, and shall endorse Parts A and B accordingly and shall return them to the holder." By Rule 62 clause (a) it is provided: "Subject to the provisions of R. 63, application for the renewal of a countersignature on a permit shall be made to the Regional Transport Authority concerned and within the appropriate periods prescribed by Rule 61 and shall, subject to the provisions of sub-rule (b), be accompanied by Part A of the permit. The application shall set forth the period for which the renewal of the countersignature is required." By Rule 63 clause (a) it is provided: "The authority by which a permit is renewed may, unless any authority by which the permit has been countersigned (with effect not terminating before the date of expiry of the permit) has by general or special order otherwise directed, likewise renew any countersignature of the permit (by endorsement of the permit in the manner set forth in the appropriate form) and shall, in such case, intimate the renewal to such authority." Rule 61 substantially incorporates the provisions of sub-section (2) of S. 58 of the Motor Vehicles Act and the proviso thereto, and makes certain incidental provisions. Clause (a) of R. 62 provides that the application for renewal of counter signature of a permit shall be made to the Regional Transport Authority concerned and within the appropriate period prescribed by R. 61 but the provisions of R. 62(a) are subject to the provisions of R. 63(a) which confers power upon the Authority which grants renewal of interregional permit under the first proviso to S. 45 to countersign the permit so as to make it valid for the other region covered by the route. Therefore, even though by S. 63 the power to countersign the permit is entrusted to the Regional Transport Authority of the region in which the remaining part of the route is situate, the effect of R. 63 is that the power to countersign the permit is vested in the Authority which grants the renewal of the permit. The Legislature has by providing in the opening part of sub-section (1) of S. 63 "except as may be otherwise prescribed" made the provision subject to the rules framed by the State Government under S. 68 of the Motor Vehicles Act. The provisions of R. 63, therefore, must supersede the direction contained in S. 63(1) of the statute and the Regional Transport Authority, Bilaspur was competent in the present case to grant countersignature of the permit even in so far as it related to the Raipur region. On behalf of the appellant attention was drawn to the expression "may" in R. 63. But in the context and the language of the rule the word "may" though permissive in form must be held to be obligatory. Under R.63 the power to grant renewal of the countersignature on the permits in the present case is conferred on the Regional Transport Authority, Bilaspur. The exercise of such power of renewal depends not upon the direction of the authority but upon the proof of the particular case out of which such power arises. "Enabling words are construed as compulsory whenever the object of the power is to effectuate a legal right".(See Julius v. Bishop of Oxford, (1880) 5 AC 214 at p. 244). The exercise of such power of renewal depends not upon the direction of the authority but upon the proof of the particular case out of which such power arises. "Enabling words are construed as compulsory whenever the object of the power is to effectuate a legal right".(See Julius v. Bishop of Oxford, (1880) 5 AC 214 at p. 244). If the Regional Transport Authority, Bilaspur had power to renew the countersignature on the permit under R. 63, it must be held that the Regional Transport Authority, Raipur had no such power under Rule 62 because the latter rule is expressly made subject to the provisions of R. 63, and the power granted to the Regional Transport Authority under R. 62 is taken away by the provisions of R. 63. It follows, therefore, that the Regional Transport Authority, Raipur was not competent to renew the countersignature on the permit in the present case and the Regional Transport Authority, Bilaspur was alone competent to renew the countersignature of the permit. We accordingly hold that the order of the Regional Transport Authority, Raipur dated February 24, 1964 granting countersignature of the permit was illegal and ultra vires and was rightly quashed by the High Court by its order dated November 13, 1964.” 13. So also, the judgment of the apex court in 'Hamdard Dawakhana (Wakf) Lal Kuan, Delhi and Another v. Union of India and Others' [ AIR 1960 SC 554 ] is pressed into service to support the submission that, the issue in question cannot be treated as an advertisement, and has invited my attention to paragraphs 14 and 15 of the said judgment, which read thus: “14. As already stated when an enactment is impugned on the ground that it is ultra vires and unconstitutional, what has to be ascertained is the true character of the legislation and for that purpose regard must be had to the enactment as a whole, to its objects, purpose and true intention and to the scope and effect of its provisions or what they are directed against and what they aim at. 1957 SCR 399 : (A.S. Krishna v. State of Madras AIR 1957 SC 297 ). 1957 SCR 399 : (A.S. Krishna v. State of Madras AIR 1957 SC 297 ). Thus examined it cannot be said that the object of the Act was merely to put a curb on advertisements which offend against decency or morality but the object truly and properly understood is to prevent self-medication or treatment by prohibiting instruments which may be used to advocate the same or which tend to spread the evil. No doubt in S. 3 diseases are expressly mentioned which have relation to sex and disorders peculiar to women but taken as a whole it cannot be said that the object of the Act, was to deal only with matters which relate to indecency or immorality. The name and the preamble are indicative of the purpose being the control of all advertisements relating to drugs and the use of the word animals in cl. (b) of the definition section negatives the object being merely to curb emphasis on sex and indecency. Section 4 further suggests that the legislature was trying to stop misleading advertisements relating to drugs. Section 5 also tends to support the object being prohibition of advertisements suggesting remedies for all kinds of diseases. Section 6 also points in the same direction i.e., to stop advertisements as to drugs. Sections 14 and 15 are a clearer indication that there should be no advertisements for drugs for certain diseases in order that the general public may not be misled into using them for ailments which they may imagine they are suffering from and which they might believe to be curable thereby. That this is so is shown by the fact that such advertisements can be sent to medical practitioners, hospitals and laboratories. The exclusion of Government advertisements and the power to give exemption all point to the objective being the stopping of advertisements of drugs for the object above mentioned and not merely to stop advertisements offending against morality and decency. 15. Mr. Munshi's argument was that S. 3 was the key to the Act and that the object and direct effect of the Act was to stop advertisements and thereby impair the right of free speech by directly putting a prohibition on advertisement. If the contention of Mr. Munshi were accepted then the restriction to be valid must fall within cl (2) of Art. 19 of the Constitution. If the contention of Mr. Munshi were accepted then the restriction to be valid must fall within cl (2) of Art. 19 of the Constitution. In other words it must have relationship with decency or morality because the other restrictions of that clause have no application. If on the other hand the submission of the learned Solicitor-General is accepted then the matter would fall under subcls. (f) and (g) and the restriction under Art. 19(6). The object of the Act as shown by the scheme of the Act and as stated in the affidavit of Mr. Merchant is the prevention of selfmedication and self-treatment and a curb on such advertisements is a means to achieve that end. Objection was taken that the preamble in the Act does not indicate the object to be the prevention of treatment of diseases otherwise than by qualified medical practitioners as the English Venereal Diseases Act, 1917 does. In this Court in many cases affidavits were allowed to be given to show the reasons for the enactment of a law, the circumstances in which it was conceived and the evils it was to cure. This was done in the case of Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Shri Justice S.R. Tendolkar. Similarly, in Kathi Raning v. State of Saurashtra and in Kavalappara Kottarathil Kochunni v. State of Madras affidavits were allowed to be filed setting out in detail the circumstances which led to the passing of the respective enactments.” 14. Learned counsel has also brought to my notice the judgment of the apex court in 'State of Uttar Pradesh v. Hari Ram' [ (2013) 4 SCC 280 ], disposed of along with other writ petitions, to canvass the proposition that when notice is contemplated under law, the same is to be treated as a mandatory one, if it is having any adverse consequences. Paragraph 37 of the said judgment is relevant to the context, which read thus: “37. The requirement of giving notice under sub-sections (5) and (6) of Section 10 is mandatory. Though the word “may” has been used therein, the word “may” in both the sub-sections has to be understood as “shall” because a court charged with the task of enforcing the statute needs to decide the consequences that the legislature intended to follow from failure to implement the requirement. Though the word “may” has been used therein, the word “may” in both the sub-sections has to be understood as “shall” because a court charged with the task of enforcing the statute needs to decide the consequences that the legislature intended to follow from failure to implement the requirement. Effect of non-issue of notice under sub-section (5) or sub-section (6) of Section 11 is that it might result in the landholder being dispossessed without notice, therefore, the word “may” has to be read as “shall”.” Therefore, the sum and substance of the contention put forth by learned counsel for the petitioner is that, the search and seizure and the launching of the prosecution proceedings based on the search and seizure cannot be sustained under law. 15. On the other hand, learned Senior Government Pleader has invited my attention to Sections 3 and 4 of Act, 1954, which read thus: “3. Prohibition of advertisement of certain drugs for treatment of certain diseases and disorders.--Subject to the provisions of this Act, no person shall take any part in the publication of any advertisement referring to any drug in terms which suggest or are calculated to lead to the use of that drug for,-- (a) the procurement of miscarriage in women or prevention of conception in women; or (b) the maintenance or improvement of the capacity of human beings for sexual pleasure; or (c) the correction of menstrual disorder in women; or (d) the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment or prevention of any disease, disorder or condition specified in the Schedule, or any other disease, disorder or condition (by whatsoever name called) which may be specified in the rules made under this Act: Provided that no such rule shall be made except-- (i) in respect of any disease, disorder or condition which requires timely treatment in consultation with a registered medical practitioner or for which there are normally no accepted remedies, and (ii) after consultation with the Drugs Technical Advisory Board constituted under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 (23 of 1940) and, if the Central Government considers necessary, with such other persons having special knowledge or practical experience in respect of Ayurvedic or Unani systems of medicines as that Government deems fit. 4. 4. Prohibition of misleading advertisements relating to drugs.--Subject to the provisions of this Act, no person shall take any part in the publication of any advertisement relating to a drug if the advertisement contains any matter which,-- (a) directly or directly gives a false impression regarding the true character of the drug; or (b) makes a false claim for the drug; or (c) is otherwise false or misleading in any material particular.” 16. Therefore, according to the learned Government Pleader, once it is found that the advertisement is misleading in accordance with the terms of the aforesaid provisions, the authorised officer is vested with ample powers for the search and seizure, and no manner of scrutiny is required as is provided under Rule 3. It is also submitted that, the provisions of the Rules cannot have any overriding effect on the provisions of the Act. 17. I have evaluated the rival submissions made across the Bar. On an appreciation of Sec.8 of Act, 1954, I am of the considered opinion that, the powers of entry and search provided to any authorised officer of the State Government is largely dependent upon the provisions of any Rules made in this behalf, especially due to the employment of “Subject to” provided there under. In sum and substance, as and when the rules are framed, the provisions of Sec.8 will have to be subservient to the Rules made. This is quite clear from the peremptory stipulation contained under Sec.8 of Act, 1954, 'subject to', which thus means, the action under the said provision is predominantly guided by any procedure contemplated under the Rules made. If the Parliament did not intend the procedure under the Rules to be mandatory, the qualifying phraseology 'subject to' need not have been employed in Section 8. It is an admitted fact that, none of the procedures contemplated under Rule 3 were followed by the authorised officer. 18. True, under the first limb of Rule 3, the word used is 'may', but it is only in respect to the satisfaction to be secured by the authorised person with regard to the advertisement in contravention of law. To put it otherwise, employment of the word 'may' in that context exemplifies that, there need not be any absolute satisfaction required at that stage to proceed with the procedure contemplated under the Rule. To put it otherwise, employment of the word 'may' in that context exemplifies that, there need not be any absolute satisfaction required at that stage to proceed with the procedure contemplated under the Rule. Which thus also means, a prima facie satisfaction alone is necessitated under law to conduct the scrutiny provided under Rule 3 of the Rules, 1955. This is more clear from the employment of the word 'shall' under the second limb of Rule 3, essentially to mean that, once prima facie satisfaction is arrived at by the authorised person, he shall follow the requirements of Rule 3, before a search and seizure is conducted under Section 8 of Act, 1954. 19. Moreover, the action prescribed under Sec.8 has got severe consequences and ramifications, including penal consequences affecting the rights and liberties, and life of the manufacturer, seller, trader etc. etc., and therefore, whenever there is a procedure prescribed, under law, it is to be scrupulously followed, before taking the drastic steps of search and seizure, failing which, the action will become arbitrary and illegal, interfering with the fundamental rights guaranteed under Part-III of the Constitution of India. The case put forth by the respondents is that, there is no requirement for following the procedure contemplated under the Rules, since the action was under Sec.3 of the Act. But, Section 3 deals with prohibition of advertisements in respect of the aspects dealt with there under, i.e., certain diseases and disorders. But, going through Exts.P2 to P5 mahazars, it is clear, there is no case for the authorised person that any such eventuality is involved in the case on hand. So also, no allegations are made in Exts.P2 to P5 mahazars that advertisements are made to cure any diseases and disorders specified in Sec.3 of the Act and its schedule, and the schedule of the Rules. Moreover, in Exts.P4 and P5, it is clearly stated that the products are seized for violation of Sec.4 of the Act. It is the case put forth in the counter affidavit also. Therefore, the contentions advanced relying upon Sec.3 of the Act cannot be sustained under law. 20. In that context, the judgment pointed out by the petitioner in 'Hamdard Dawakhana (Wakf) Lal Kuan, Delhi and Another' (supra) is relevant, and I find force in the contention advanced by learned counsel for the petitioner, based on the proposition so laid down. Therefore, the contentions advanced relying upon Sec.3 of the Act cannot be sustained under law. 20. In that context, the judgment pointed out by the petitioner in 'Hamdard Dawakhana (Wakf) Lal Kuan, Delhi and Another' (supra) is relevant, and I find force in the contention advanced by learned counsel for the petitioner, based on the proposition so laid down. So much so, since the statutory provision was made dependent upon the Rules, no doubt, it was mandatory on the part of the authorised officer to follow the procedure contemplated under Rule 3 of Rules, 1955, before making any search and seizure under the provisions of Act, 1954. 21. However, the contention advanced by the petitioner with respect to the legality or otherwise of the advertisement of the product, and its consequences is a subject matter of adjudication by a competent court taking into account the relevant aspects, and therefore, this court is not expected to delve deep into the said issue and identify whether the advertisement was in accordance with the provisions of the Act and the Rules or in violation of the same. But, I am of the considered opinion that, if and when the search and seizure is found to be bad, illegal and arbitrary, then the other issues consequential to the same, cannot have any implication, being the products and components of a structural flaw. 22. Having assimilated the entire situations, taking into account the provisions of the Act and the Rules discussed above, and the judgments rendered by the apex court in the afore-quoted cases, I am of the definite opinion that, the search and seizure made by the respondents are not in accordance with the provisions of Rule 3 of the Rules, 1955, which, according to me, is a mandatory requirement under law, to sustain a violation under Sec.4 of the Act, and therefore, the entire consequential action based on the search and seizure, also cannot be sustained under law. Therefore, the writ petition is allowed partly and all actions based on the search and seizure relating to Exts.P2 to P5 mahazars are quashed. Needless to say, necessary consequential action in accordance with law shall be taken by the respondents, if anything remains to be done.