ORDER : The present petition has been filed by the Petitioners herein aggrieved by the order dated 10.10.2018, passed by the Court of the Ld. First Additional Sessions Judge, Pipariya, District Hoshangabad, in Sessions Trial No.9/2017 (State of M.P. Vs. Laxminarayan and another). By the said order, an application moved by the Petitioners under section 311 Cr.P.C, for recalling prosecution witnesses Neeraj Kumar, Sita Agrawal, Gulab Chand, Chhote Veer, Lavkush Sharma and Jamna Prasad Malviya was rejected. 2. The Petitioners are the accused persons before the Trial Court. The incident for which the Petitioners are being prosecuted is stated to had taken place on 13/09/16 between 10.00 p.m. and 11.30 p.m. The facts briefly are as follows. 3. Sita Agrawal (P.W.2) is the wife of the deceased. On 13/09/16, she returns home at night of to find her husband lying on the bed in a pool of blood, dead. She immediately calls up her son Neeraj Kumar (P.W.1) who is staying separately and informs him that his father has been murdered and the house has been ransacked. P.W.1 informs the police and reaches the scene of crime. The first information report is registered against unknown persons. Subsequently, during the course of investigation, the Petitioners are arrested and the articles alleged to have been stolen from the scene of crime, along with blood-stained clothes and a knife, are allegedly recovered from the Petitioners. The Petitioners are put to trial and the prosecution examines fifteen witnesses and closes its evidence on 12/09/17. Thereafter the statement of the Petitioners are recorded under section 313 Cr.P.C and the case was listed for final arguments. 4. At this stage, an application under section 311 Cr.P.C. is filed by the Petitioners for the recall of P.W.1 Neeraj Kumar, the son of the deceased, who was examined between 20-21/7/2017 and cross-examined on the same day. P.W.2 Sita Agrawal, the wife of the deceased, who was examined between 9-10/7/2018 and cross-examined, P.W. 3 Gulab Chand Agrawal, who is a relation of P.W.1 and P.W.2 and a witness to the seizure memo, who is examined on 10/07/18 and cross-examined, P.W. 4 Chhote Veer, a witness to the memorandum of arrest, is examined and cross-examined on 11/07/18, P.W. 15 Luvkush Sharma, the Investigating Officer of this case was examined and cross-examined on 12/09/18 and finally P.W. 12 Jamna Prasad Malviya, ASI was examined and cross-examined on 10.9.2018. 5. 5. The application filed by the Petitioners is Annexure-2 on page 17 of the petition. It is in two pages and is perfunctory. In paragraph 9, the applicants/accused give the reasons for the necessity to recall the witnesses for further cross-examination in the following words:- ^^;g fd bu lHkh fcUnqvksa ij Qj;knh uhjt dqekj] ek¡ lhrk vxzoky] lk{kh xqykc pan] NksVs ohj vuqla/kkudRrkZ] mifujh{kd yodq'k 'kekZ ,oa lgk;d mifujh{kd teuk Álkn ekyoh; ds Áfrijh{k.k iqu% djk;k tkuk U;k;fgr esa vko';d gSA** 6. The grounds on which the application was based are perfunctory and only relate to what each of the witnesses was supposed to testify and prove on behalf of the prosecution. No reason is given in the application as to why it is essential to recall these witnesses for further cross-examination, the prejudice that would visit the defence if the said witnesses are not called for further cross-examination and how injustice would be perpetrated if the said witnesses are not recalled. The impugned order dated 10/10/18 reflects that in the course of arguments on the said application also, nothing beyond that, what has been stated in the application under section 311 Cr.P.C, has been stated before the Ld. Trial Court. In short, the application itself has been parroted during arguments. The Ld. Trial Court has dismissed the said application and has observed that the reason for filing the said application was to cause delay in the trial. Thereafter the Ld. Trial Court has observed that the accused persons do not intend to lead any defence evidence and the case was fixed for final arguments on 22/10/18. 7. Ld. Senior Counsel for the Petitioners has drawn the attention of this court to section 311 Cr.P.C. He has argued that the finding of the Ld. trial court that the said application was moved at a belated stage with an intention of delaying the trial is incorrect as section 311 Cr.P.C permits that the court at any stage of the enquiry or trial to summon any person as a witness or examine any person in attendance, though not summoned as a witness, or recall and re-examine any person already examined. Therefore, Ld. Therefore, Ld. Senior Counsel appearing for the Petitioners has submitted that there is nothing like a belated stage at which the application under section 311 Cr.P.C. cannot be filed, as the same can be filed at any stage before passing of the judgment. 8. Ld. Senior Counsel for the Petitioners has thereafter drawn the attention of this court to the statements of three witnesses, viz. Neeraj Agrawal (P.W.1), Sita Agrawal (P.W.2) and Gulab Chand Agrawal (P.W.3). With regard to the statement of Neeraj Agrawal (P.W.1), the son of the deceased, the Ld. counsel for the Petitioners draws the attention of this Court to paragraph no.2 of the statement-in-chief of the witness wherein, the witness states that on 13/09/16 he had gone to the residence of his father in village Sandia at 9:00 a.m for the sale and purchase of wheat. At 9:00 p.m., he says he returned to Pipariya. At 11:45 p.m., he says that his mother Sita Agrawal (P.W.2) called him on the mobile and informed him in tears that someone has stabbed his father and that he must return to Sanadia as soon as possible. She also informed him that gold and silver articles and rupees four lacs in cash have been looted by unknown persons. He further states that upon receiving this information, he immediately informed Police Station Pipariya and went straight to his home at village Sandia. In paragraph no.3, he states that when he entered his house, his father was lying on the bed soaked in blood and knife inflicted injuries were seen on his chest, neck and cheek. He further states that he along with his friends Ashish, Kailash and Akhilesh took his father for treatment to the Community Health Centre at Pipariya where he was informed by the Government doctor that his father is no more. In paragraph no.4, this witness states that at the time of reporting the incident to the police, who were recording the Dehati Nalishi, he told them that he would give them the list of articles looted after asking his mother. 9. Thereafter, the Ld. Senior Counsel for the Petitioners has taken this court through the statement of Sita Agrawal. She has been examined as P.W.2 10/07/18. Ld. 9. Thereafter, the Ld. Senior Counsel for the Petitioners has taken this court through the statement of Sita Agrawal. She has been examined as P.W.2 10/07/18. Ld. Senior Counsel for the Petitioners has read out from paragraph no.3 of this witness’s deposition, who in her court-statement gives a description of the gold and silver ornaments/articles that were lying strewn at the scene of crime. Thereafter, he has drawn the attention of this court to Ex.P/5, which is an intimation given by P.W.1 to the police on 15/09/16, in which he has given a list of articles in seriatim from 1 to 17. The Petitioners have been arrested on 19/09/16. 10. Thereafter, Ld. Senior Counsel for the Petitioners has drawn the attention of this court to the statement of Gulab Chand Agrawal, who has been examined before the Ld. trial court on behalf of the prosecution as P.W.3. This witness states in paragraph no.4 that when he had gone along with the police to the house of the accused Yashwant and that gold and cash was recovered from Yashwant. He has also given a description of the various ornaments that were recovered from there and also the recovery of a spring-action knife and a jeans and a shirt on which there were blood-stains. 11. In support of the present petition, Ld. Senior Counsel for the Petitioners has argued that Neeraj Agrawal (P.W.1) in his court statement dated 20/07/17 and 21/07/17 does not state, that when he arrived, there were any gold and silver articles strewn at the scene of crime. Thereafter, Ld. Senior Counsel for the Petitioners submits that the statement of Sita Agrawal (P.W.2) has been recorded before the Ld. trial court after a passage of more than a year after the statement of P.W. 1 was recorded, in which she states in paragraph 3 that she had seen gold and silver articles strewn at the scene of crime and also specifically names and describes the said articles. 12. It is further submitted on behalf of the Petitioners that a substantial part of the ornaments described by Sita Agrawal (P.W.2) is what has been seized from the Petitioners. 12. It is further submitted on behalf of the Petitioners that a substantial part of the ornaments described by Sita Agrawal (P.W.2) is what has been seized from the Petitioners. Under the circumstances, as the statement of Sita Agrawal (P.W.2) succeeds that of Neeraj Agrawal (P.W.1) and where there is a difference with regard to the description of the scene of crime with reference to the gold and silver articles, it was essential to cross-examine Neeraj Agrawal (P.W.1) and Sita Agrawal (P.W.2) confronting one with the court-statement of the other. 13. Ld. Senior Counsel for the Petitioners has placed before this court a judgment of the Division Bench passed in Khoob Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh whereby two questions were placed in reference before the Division Bench for its opinion. The first question was “whether calling of witness for re8 examination or calling of a witness for further examination can be permitted under section 311 Cr.P.C after the arguments are over but before the pronouncement of judgment? The second question was “whether the view expressed in the case of Imrat Singh and others v. State of Madhya Pradesh - (2015) Cri.L.J 3473 is in accordance with the provisions of section 311 Cr.P.C.” The said questions were raised in a case pertaining to the trial of offences punishable under sections 363, 366-A, 376- A and 302 of the Indian Penal Code and section 4 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012. The trial court in that case had passed an order permitting the reexamination of three witnesses and also ordered for the examination of 12 other witnesses. Challenge was given to the said order passed in that case relying upon the judgment of this court passed in Imrat Singh and others v. State of Madhya Pradesh (supra) wherein inter-alia, it was contended that after the case is fixed for arguments, the application for recall of witnesses is not maintainable. The Ld. Division Bench of this court by an elaborate order, after examining a catena of cases of various High Courts and the Supreme Court, set aside the judgment of the Ld. Single Bench of this court passed in Imrat Singh’s case supra and held that the powers under section 311 Cr.P.C can be exercised at any stage before passing the judgment. 14. The second judgment that has been referred to by the Ld. Single Bench of this court passed in Imrat Singh’s case supra and held that the powers under section 311 Cr.P.C can be exercised at any stage before passing the judgment. 14. The second judgment that has been referred to by the Ld. Senior Counsel for the Petitioners is P. Sanjeeva Rao v. State of Andhra Pradesh - (2012) 7 SCC 56 . The Ld. Senior Counsel for the petitioner has specifically drawn the attention of this court to paragraph no.18 of the said judgment in which it has been held that denial of an opportunity to recall the witness for cross-examination would amount to condemning the appellant without giving him the opportunity to challenge the correctness of the version and credibility of the witness. It further said that denial of opportunity to do so will result in a serious miscarriage of justice. 15. The next case to be referred to by the Ld. Senior Counsel for the Petitioners is Natasha Singh v. Central Bureau of Investigation - (2013) 5 SCC 741 wherein, he has drawn the attention of this court to paragraph no.8 of the said judgment in which the Supreme Court has held that section 311 Cr.P.C empowers the court to summon a material witness or to examine a person present at any stage of an enquiry or trial or any other proceedings under the Cr.P.C if his evidence appears to it to be essential to arrive at a just decision in a case. It is relevant to mention here that the Supreme Court in the same paragraph has also observed that undoubtedly, the powers conferred are very wide and discretionary and the same was required to be exercised judiciously and not arbitrarily. Thereafter, attention was also drawn to paragraph no.16 of the that judgment where the court held “fair trial is the main object of criminal procedure and it is the duty of the court to ensure that such fairness is not hampered or threatened in any manner. Fair trial entails the interest of the accused, the victim and of the society, and, therefore, fair trial includes the grant of a fair and proper opportunities to the person concerned, and the same must be ensured as this is a constitutional as well as a human right. Thus, under no circumstances can a person’s right to a fair trial be jeopardized. Thus, under no circumstances can a person’s right to a fair trial be jeopardized. Adducing evidence in support of the defence is a valuable right. Denial of such right would amount to denial of a fair trial. Thus, it is essential that the rules or procedure that have been designed to ensure justice are scrupulously followed and the court must be zealous in ensuring that there is no breach of the same….........” 16. Lastly, the Ld. Senior Counsel for the Petitioners has referred to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Rajendra Prasad v. Narcotic Cell through its Officer-in-Charge - AIR 1999 SC 2292 . This judgment has been referred and relied upon by the counsel for the Petitioners in order to explain the meaning of the term “lacuna” as examined by the Supreme Court. In paragraph no.7 of the said judgment, the Supreme Court has held that lacuna in the prosecution must be understood as the inherent weakness or a latent wedge in the matrix of the prosecution’s case. The advantage of it should normally go to the accused in the trial of the case, but an over sight in the management of the prosecution cannot be treated as an irreparable lacuna. It further held that no party in a trial can be foreclosed from correcting errors and thereafter, the Supreme Court observed that if proper evidence was not adduced or a relevant material was not brought on record due to any inadvertence, the court should be magnanimous in permitting such mistakes to be rectified as the function of the criminal court is administration of criminal justice and not to count errors committed by the parties or to find out and declare who among the parties performed better. 17. Ld. Counsel for the State, on the other hand, has vehemently opposed this petition from being allowed. He has submitted that the application under section 311 Cr.P.C is perfunctory giving no reasons whatsoever with regard to the necessity for recalling these witnesses. He has further stated that the said application does not disclose as to how there would be a miscarriage of justice and irreparable prejudice caused to the case of the defence if the said witnesses were not further cross examined by the defence. 18. Ld. He has further stated that the said application does not disclose as to how there would be a miscarriage of justice and irreparable prejudice caused to the case of the defence if the said witnesses were not further cross examined by the defence. 18. Ld. counsel for the State has further submitted that in the impugned order also, the trial court has recorded the oral submissions made by the Ld. Senior Counsel for the Petitioners in support of the application under section 311 Cr.P.C., which is nothing more than a reiteration of the said application itself. No argument has been forwarded by the Ld. counsel for the Petitioners before the Ld. trial court as to why it was essential and how the Petitioners would be prejudiced by the witnesses not being further cross-examined by the defence. 19. Ld. counsel for the State has also submitted that the submissions put forth on behalf of the defence that these witnesses shall be produced at the cost of the Petitioners does not satisfy the requirement of law and that this court would have to see whether the said application could stand the test of law laid down by this court and the Supreme Court in a catena of cases wherein it has clearly been elucidated that the authority/power under section 311 Cr.P.C cannot be exercised in favour of either the prosecution or the defence, where such recall/re-examination of the witnesses would result in the filling up of the lacuna left behind by the parties. 20. Heard the Ld. counsel for the parties, perused the record of the case and the judgments cited by the Ld. Senior Counsel for the Petitioners. 21. The submission put forth by the Ld. Senior Counsel for the Petitioners is that it would be necessary to confront Neeraj Agrawal (P.W.1) with the court statement given by Sita Agrawal (P.W.2), almost a year after Neeraj Agrawal (P.W.1) had given his evidence before the Ld. trial court, would be essential as Neeraj Agrawal (P.W.1) in his court-statement does not say that gold and silver articles were strewn all over the scene of crime when he reached there. The recall has become essential on account of the statement of Sita Agrawal (P.W.2) in paragraph no.3 of her examination-in-chief wherein, she has given an elaborate description of the articles, gold and silver, which were lying scattered at the scene of crime. The recall has become essential on account of the statement of Sita Agrawal (P.W.2) in paragraph no.3 of her examination-in-chief wherein, she has given an elaborate description of the articles, gold and silver, which were lying scattered at the scene of crime. He says that under the circumstances, it would be necessary to confront Neeraj Agrawal (P.W.1) in further cross-examination by placing before him the statement of Sita Agrawal (P.W.2) given before the Ld. trial court. 22. The said contention put forth by the Ld. Senior Counsel for the Petitioners, though forceful, I am afraid, must be rejected. The law of evidence does not provide for any procedure whereby the court-statement of one witness can be put forth to another, either to seek a corroboration or a contradiction. Upon being questioned by this court, whether Neeraj Agrawal (P.W.1) in his statement under section 161 Cr.P.C to the police had ever stated that when he entered the scene of crime, gold and silver articles were lying scattered at the scene of crime, Ld. Senior Counsel for the Petitioners fairly admits that Neeraj Agrawal (P.W.1) has not stated so in his statement under section 161 Cr.P.C. 23. Section 145 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 provides for the confrontation of a witness with a previous statement made by him in writing with which he could be confronted in the course of cross-examination. Section 145 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 reads as under: Cross-examination as to previous statements in writing. – A witness may be cross-examined as to previous statements made by him in writing or reduced into writing, and relevant to matters in question, without such writing being shown to him, or being proved; but, if it is intended to contradict him by the writing, his attention must, before the writing can be proved, be called to those parts of it which are to be used for the purpose of contradicting him. From a plain reading of the said section, it is clear that if a previous statement of a witness which has been reduced to writing, is intended to be used to contradict the witness, attention of such witness must be drawn to those parts of the previous statement which are to be used for the purpose of contradicting his statement in court. Thus, when Neeraj Agrawal (P.W.1) has not stated in his statement under section 161 Cr.P.C that he had witnessed the gold and silver articles scattered around at the scene of crime when he entered the room, the question of cross-examining him on this issue does not arise merely because Sita Agrawal (P.W.2) has stated so in her examination-in-chief. The reference to letter marked as Ex.P/5 does not support the case of the Petitioners. The said letter was given by P.W.1 to the police, giving the list of articles after consulting his mother Sita Agarwal, as has been has stated in paragraph no.4 of his examination-in-chief which only goes to show that Neeraj Agrawal (P.W.1) does not have personal knowledge with regard to the articles that were looted. 24. Coming back to the judgments cited by the Ld. Senior Counsel for the Petitioners, the judgment of the Ld. Division Bench of this court passed in Khoob Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh, only lays down the law with regard to section 311 Cr.P.C specifically on the point that the said power can be exercised by the Ld. trial court at any stage before it passes the judgment. The said position is clear from section 311 Cr.P.C. itself, which reads as hereunder: 311. Power to summon material witness, or examine person present.- Any Court may, at any stage of any inquiry, trial or other proceeding under this Code, summon any person as a witness, or examine any person in attendance, though not summoned as a witness, or recall and re- examine any person already examined; and the Court shall summon and examine or recall and re- examine any such person if his evidence appears to it to be essential to the just decision of the case. A plain reading of the section itself discloses three facets of section 311 Cr.P.C. (1) that it can be exercised by the Ld. trial court at any stage of any inquiry, trial or other proceedings. A plain reading of the section itself discloses three facets of section 311 Cr.P.C. (1) that it can be exercised by the Ld. trial court at any stage of any inquiry, trial or other proceedings. The phrase “at any stage of any inquiry or trial” clearly indicates that the power can be exercised at any point of time of the inquiry or trial itself, the words used do not limit the exercise of jurisdiction of the Trial Court to any particular stage and can obviously be exercised by the Trial Court till it signs the judgement after which, the Trial Court becomes functus officio and cannot revisit its judgment for any purpose other than correcting a clerical or mathematical error as provided u/s. 362 Cr.P.C. (2) The trial court may summon any person as a witness or examine any person in attendance, though not summoned as witness, or recall and re-examine any person already examined. This facet of section 311 Cr.P.C reveals the persons who may be called as witnesses by the Ld. trial court. Firstly, it can be any person, including such person who may not have been forwarded by the prosecution as a witness in support of its case and it may be a witness whom the court suo-motu feels is essential to call as a witness. Secondly, the Trial Court is also empowered to examine any person who is merely present before it though not summoned as a witness. Here the court can exercise its powers where it feels that such person present before it, though never summoned by it as a witness, may have information with regard to the case which may be essential for a just decision and thirdly, the court is empowered to recall and re-examine any witness who has already been examined by it. It is under the third category that the Petitioners have moved their application and prayed for an appropriate order, as unquestionably and without dispute, all the witnesses who are sought to be cross-examined once again by the defence are witnesses who have already been examined by the prosecution and cross-examined by the defence, and (3) it is mandated in this section that the court shall summon and examine or recall and re-examine any such person if his evidence appears to be essential to the just decision of the case. This part of section 311 Cr.P.C. makes it incumbent upon the trial court to summon and examine such witnesses or recall and re-examine any person once it arrives at the opinion that doing so is essential to the just decision of the case. Section 311 Cr.P.C., thus, clearly discloses that where categories (1) and (2) are discretionary, category (3) is mandatory. 25. As regards the judgment of the Supreme Court in Natasha Singh v. Central Bureau of Investigation (supra), a brief reference to the facts would be essential to distinguish and render the same inapplicable in the present case. In Natasha Singh’s case, the prosecution had closed its evidence. The statement of the accused was recorded under section 311 Cr.P.C. There were two Petitioners before the Supreme Court, Mrs. Natasha Singh and Mrs. Rita Singh. Mrs. Natasha Singh wanted to examine three witnesses in defence and so moved an application before the Trial Court under section 311 Cr.P.C. The said application was dismissed by the Trial Court against which a Miscellaneous Petition was filed before the Delhi High Court, which was also dismissed. The facts in that case go to show that the three witnesses who were not even examined by the defence and whom the defence wanted to examine, the permission was declined by the Trial Court only on the ground that the accused Natasha Singh had already examined her witnesses and closed her evidence and thereafter wanted to examine three additional witnesses. In the present case, firstly, it is not a case where the defence witnesses are to be examined and the said right was declined. In the instant case, the application was for further cross-examination of witnesses who have already been cross-examined by the defence. The records of the present case go to show that the cross-examination by the defence was elaborate and that they were given an adequate opportunity to cross-examine. 26. The judgment of the Supreme Court in P. Sanjeeva Rao v. State of Andhra Pradesh (supra) also stands factually on similar grounds on account of which the same becomes inapplicable in the case of the Petitioners herein. In that case, the appellant before the Supreme Court had moved an application before the trial court for keeping the cross-examination of two witnesses in abeyance till the examination and cross-examination of the officer who laid the trap was complete. In that case, the appellant before the Supreme Court had moved an application before the trial court for keeping the cross-examination of two witnesses in abeyance till the examination and cross-examination of the officer who laid the trap was complete. In that case, the factual matrix suggests that there was no cross-examination at all of the prosecution witnesses whose cross-examination was sought to be kept in abeyance. Therefore, the Supreme Court interceded in that case and permitted the accused to cross-examine the said witnesses. In this case, at the risk of repetition, the Petitioners had elaborately cross-examined the witnesses who are sought to be recalled for further cross-examination. 27. The judgments of the Supreme Court in Rajendra Prasad v. Narcotic Cell through its Officer-in-Charge (supra) in which the Supreme Court in paragraph no.7 has explained what a lacuna means. However, whether the further cross-examination of a witness would result in the filling up of the lacuna left behind by the defence is a situation for which there can be no rule of thumb and the same must be assessed on the facts and circumstances of each case. 28. In the present case, it appears from the statement of Sita Agrawal (P.W.2) in her examination-in-chief that the elaborate description that she has given of the gold and silver articles lying scattered at the scene of crime with a great degree of accuracy describing each and every article and where a substantial part of these articles have been seized from the accused and where the seizure witness have supported the case of the prosecution, the cross-examination of that witness left a serious lacuna. Even though the cross-examination is elaborate, what the defence overlooked was that in her statement under section 161 Cr.P.C., this witness has never stated or given any description with regard to the gold and silver articles that were lying scattered at the scene of crime. She only states that when she entered her house, she saw her husband lying in an injured condition, she called her son who arrived there and that her son along with his friends took the deceased to the hospital. She has not stated one word with regard to the presence of the gold and silver articles lying scattered at the scene of crime which she has mentioned with great detail in paragraph no.3 of her examination-in-chief. She has not stated one word with regard to the presence of the gold and silver articles lying scattered at the scene of crime which she has mentioned with great detail in paragraph no.3 of her examination-in-chief. The defence in cross-examination of this witness, has not confronted her with her statement under section 161 Cr.P.C that what she had stated in paragraph 3 of her Court statement was omitted in her statement u/s. 161 Cr.P.C. Such confrontation of this witness with the relevant portion of her statement u/s. 161 Cr.P.C was essential u/s. 145 of the Evidence Act, in order to discredit her statement in Court on this aspect. Therefore, the statement given in her examination-in-chief in paragraph no.3 remains unchallenged and that goes to corroborate the recovery of the same articles from the accused persons, who are the Petitioners before this court. Thus, it is clear that a lacuna was left behind by the Petitioners in the course of cross examination of this witness and that the said application u/s. 311 was filed before the Trial Court, not to examine all the other witnesses but specifically to confront Sita Agrawal (P.W.2) with that part of her 161 statement where this description has been omitted. Ld. Senior Counsel for the Petitioners, in the course of his arguments has not vociferously pressed or given any reasons why the other witnesses should be recalled and cross-examined who have been mentioned in the application under section 311 Cr.P.C. Thus, it is clear that the witness who was sought to be targeted specifically and to be cross-examined is Sita Agrawal (P.W.2) and the inclusion of the others only appear to be a red herring. 29. Under the circumstances, in view of what has been argued and observed by this court herein above the law on the above subject, this court is of the firm opinion that the power under section 311 Cr.P.C. cannot be used for the purpose of filling up the lacuna left behind by the defence in this case. 30. Under the circumstances, this petition is dismissed. However, the Ld. trial court is requested not to be influenced by the observations made in this order with regard to the merits of the case as the same have only been observed prima facie by this court for the purpose of deciding this petition under section 482 Cr.P.C and for no other purpose. However, the Ld. trial court is requested not to be influenced by the observations made in this order with regard to the merits of the case as the same have only been observed prima facie by this court for the purpose of deciding this petition under section 482 Cr.P.C and for no other purpose. It shall proceed with the trial and consider the evidence independently, without any bias and completely uninfluenced by the observations made by this court.