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2019 DIGILAW 1058 (BOM)

Siddheshwar v. State of Maharashtra, Through Its Secretary, Urban Development Department, Mantralaya, Mumbai

2019-04-16

A.S.CHANDURKAR

body2019
JUDGMENT : A.S. Chandurkar, J. The challenge raised in this writ petition filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is to the order dated 02/06/2017 passed by the respondent no.1 thereby refusing to entertain the appeal filed by the petitioner herein under Section 47 of the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966 (for short, the said Act) thus also refusing to consider the prayer for grant of stay in that appeal. 2. The facts in brief are that it is the case of the petitioner that he is the owner and occupier of an apartment that has been constructed by the respondent Nos.6 on the plot of land owned by the respondent No. 7 herein. It is the grievance of the petitioner that the common areas that are meant for use of all flat owners has been utilized by the said respondents contrary to the sanctioned plan and in a manner contrary to the provisions of the Apartment Ownership Act, 1970. In view thereof the petitioner has filed R.C.S. No.517/2011 before the civil Court seeking relief in that regard which suit is pending. During pendency of that suit on 27/06/2014 the Planning Authority passed an order approving certain changes in the sanctioned plan. The petitioner being aggrieved by that action sought to challenge the same by filing an appeal under Section 47 of the said Act. As there was delay in filing the said appeal an application for condonation of delay was also filed along with the said appeal. The Appellate Authority by the impugned order has held that the petitioner had no locus to challenge the building permission as granted to a third party and further there was also no provision to grant any stay to the said building permission as prayed for by the petitioner. Being aggrieved the petitioner has challenged the said order in the present writ petition. 3. Shri S. S. Dhengale, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that since the petitioner was a flat owner in the building erected by the respondent No.6 and since the said plan was modified thereby affecting the common areas to which all the flat owners were entitled, the petitioner had challenged that action by filing an appeal under Section 47 of the said Act. The petitioner had sufficient locus to maintain the said appeal in view of the fact that on account of the revised sanctioned plan, his rights as regards the common areas had been affected. Referring to the provisions of Section 47 of the said Act it was submitted that "any applicant" aggrieved by an order granting permission can prefer an appeal within a period of forty days before the Appellate Authority. Since the petitioner was aggrieved by the modified sanction order dated 27/06/2014, he had preferred the said appeal. The respondent No.1 ought to have entertained the same and it ought to have proceeded to adjudicate the appeal in accordance with law. Failure to do so had resulted in failure to exercise jurisdiction by the respondent No.1 and hence the impugned order was liable to be set aside. 4. Ms K. Deshpande, learned Assistant Government Pleader for respondent Nos.1, 2 and 5 and Shri J. B. Kasat, learned counsel for respondent No.3 supported the impugned order. Reference was made to the provisions of Sections 44, 45 and 47 of the said Act to urge that the right to file an appeal was given only to an aggrieved applicant and not to any other person like the petitioner. Since a limited right of appeal had been granted to an aggrieved applicant and as the petitioner did not answer that requirement, it was rightly held that the appeal at the behest of the petitioner was not maintainable. Moreover, the petitioner having filed a civil suit it was open for the petitioner to agitate his grievances therein. It was thus submitted that the impugned order was legally correct and there was no reason to interfere with the same. 5. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties and after giving due consideration to their respective submissions, in my view the impugned order does not call for any interference. Under provisions of Section 44 of the said Act any person intending to carry out any development on any land has to make an application in writing to the Planning Authority for grant of permission in the prescribed manner. Under provisions of Section 44 of the said Act any person intending to carry out any development on any land has to make an application in writing to the Planning Authority for grant of permission in the prescribed manner. Under Section 45 of the said Act after receiving such application as contemplated by Section 44 of the said Act, the Planning Authority can either grant permission unconditionally or it can grant permission subject to conditions that could be imposed with the previous approval of the State Government or it can refuse the permission. Under Section 47 of the said Act the right to file an appeal is granted to any applicant who is aggrieved by an order granting permission on conditions or refusing permission under Section 45 of the said Act. From the aforesaid provisions it becomes clear that Section 44 of the said Act contemplates an application being made in writing to the Competent Authority for grant of permission. The Planning Authority has been granted power either to grant or refuse permission subject to the provisions of the said Act. The words "any applicant aggrieved by an order granting permission on conditions or refusing permission under Section 45 may.." appearing in Section 47 (1) of the said Act clearly indicate that the right to file an appeal has been conferred only on an applicant who is aggrieved either by an order granting permission on conditions or when permission as sought is refused. No appeal has been provided against an order granting unconditional permission. In other words, the right to file an appeal has been given only to an applicant when he is aggrieved by grant of conditional permission or refusal of permission. A person other than the applicant who is aggrieved by the grant of permission has not been granted the right to file an appeal. 6. In the present case the petitioner is not the applicant but he is aggrieved by the grant of permission to the respondent No.6. The Appellate Authority was therefore legally correct in observing that the petitioner being a third person and there being no right of appeal conferred on such third person by Section 47 of the said Act, the appeal as filed by the petitioner was not maintainable. Consequently the application for condonation of delay was also not liable to be entertained. 7. The Appellate Authority was therefore legally correct in observing that the petitioner being a third person and there being no right of appeal conferred on such third person by Section 47 of the said Act, the appeal as filed by the petitioner was not maintainable. Consequently the application for condonation of delay was also not liable to be entertained. 7. In that view of the matter no fault can be found with the impugned order refusing to entertain the appeal filed by the petitioner who was not an "applicant" under Section 44 of the said Act. By clarifying that it would be open for the petitioner to avail such remedies as are permissible in law and by keeping the points raised in the writ petition in that regard open, the writ petition stands dismissed with no order as to costs.