Research › Search › Judgment

Meghalaya High Court · body

2019 DIGILAW 106 (MEG)

Maiantis Mawlot v. State of Meghalaya

2019-04-05

H.S.THANGKHIEW

body2019
JUDGMENT : 1. The brief facts of the case is that the writ petitioner was settled with the lease for collection of parking fees for the period w.e.f. 6th December, 2016 to 5th December, 2018 by the respondent No. 2 in respect of parking lot known as Khlieh Iewduh Parking Lot. The writ petitioner on being allotted the same, started operation as the authorized collector and also executed an agreement dated 2nd November, 2016 with the respondent No. 2. 2. Thereafter, the respondent No. 2 took a decision to renew/extend the agreement with the petitioner in respect of the same parking lot for collection of parking fees and toilets fees, and an agreement to this effect was executed on 12th March, 2018 for a period of 1(one) year w.e.f. 6th December, 2018 to 5th December, 2019. 3. However, without issuance any notice or any reason being assigned thereto, the respondent No. 2 issued letter No. MUDA/TECH/48/Pt-1/07-08/123, dated 27th April, 2018 communicating that the extension period from 6th December, 2018 to 5th December, 2019 stood cancelled. The impugned letter is reproduced herein below:- "MEGHALAYA URBAN DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY SHILLONG No. MUDA/TECH/48/Pt-1/07-08/123 Dated Shillong the 27th April 2018 To, Shri Maiantis Mawlot Lessee of the Khlieh Iewduh Parking Lot Shillong. Subject: MATTER RELATING TO COLLECTION OF PARKING FEES & MANAGEMENT OF TOILETS AT KHLIEH IEWDUH PARKING LOT, SHILLONG With reference to the subject cited above, I am directed to inform you that the Extension period of one year w.e.f. 6th December 2018 to 5th December 2019 vide our office letter No. MUDA/TECH/48/Pt-1/07-08/121, dated 29.11.2017 is hereby cancelled, and the Security Deposit for the same will returned to you accordingly. Yours faithfully, Sd/- Secretary Meghalaya Urban Development Authority, Shillong Memo. No. MUDA/TECH/48/Pt-1/07-08/123-A,Dated Shillong the 27th April 2018 Copy to: 1. The P.A. to the Chairman, Meghalaya Urban Development Authority, Shillong for kind information of the Chairman. 2. The Chief Finance & Accounts Officer, Meghalaya Urban Development Authority, Shillong for information. 3. The Engineer in-Chief, Meghalaya Urban Development Authority, Shillong for information. 4. The Project Director, Meghalaya Urban Development Authority, Shillong for information. 5. The Executive Engineer, Meghalaya Urban Development Authority, Shillong for information. 6. The Asstt. Engineer, Meghalaya Urban Development Authority, Shillong for information. 7. The Divisional Accountant (Accounts Branch) Meghalaya Urban Development Authority, Shillong for information. Sd/- Secretary Meghalaya Urban Development Authority, Shillong" 4. 4. The Project Director, Meghalaya Urban Development Authority, Shillong for information. 5. The Executive Engineer, Meghalaya Urban Development Authority, Shillong for information. 6. The Asstt. Engineer, Meghalaya Urban Development Authority, Shillong for information. 7. The Divisional Accountant (Accounts Branch) Meghalaya Urban Development Authority, Shillong for information. Sd/- Secretary Meghalaya Urban Development Authority, Shillong" 4. Being aggrieved the petitioner has filed the instant writ application. 5. Heard Mr. L. Lyngdoh, learned counsel for the petitioner who submits that the impugned order is bad in law and highly arbitrary inasmuch as, the petitioner was not given any show cause nor any hearing afforded to him before the drastic action was taken. He further submits that the respondent No. 2 in Para 9 of the affidavit-in-opposition, has stated that the earlier extension had been given on the basis of the good performance of the lessee through the lease period namely; payment of fees, maintenance etc. He further prays that though the agreement is in the realm of a contractual dispute, the manner in which the impugned order was issued is in violation of the principles of natural justice; as such, the writ petition is maintainable before this Court calling for interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 6. Also heard Mr. P.N. Nongbri, learned counsel for the respondent No. 2 who submits that the cancellation was done in view of the fact that there was a review and it was seen that the extension order was highly unusual, inasmuch as, the same was done during subsistence of the earlier lease period. He further submits that the respondent No. 2 authority in view of this discrepancy had decided to cancel the lease of the petitioner and to re- tender the same. 7. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and after hearing their submissions and going through the materials on record, the fact that the cancellation was issued without due process or without any show cause is not in dispute nor refuted by the Respondent No.2. 8. This dispute which has arisen out of a contractual agreement normally would not be entertained or interfered with by a writ Court in exercise of powers under Article No. 226 of the Constitution of India. 8. This dispute which has arisen out of a contractual agreement normally would not be entertained or interfered with by a writ Court in exercise of powers under Article No. 226 of the Constitution of India. However, in the stated circumstances in the present case, as the impugned order was passed without affording any opportunity to the writ petitioner to present his case nor any show cause issued, the cancellation by the respondent No. 2 of the agreement is nothing but an arbitrary exercise of power in total violation of the Principles of Natural Justice. 9 The maintainability of an application under Article 226, even when there is alternative remedy has been elaborately answered by the Honble Apex Court in Harbanslal Sahnia v. Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd., (2003) 2 SCC 107 . The relevant paragraph is quoted herein below: "7. So far as the view taken by the High Court that the remedy by way of recourse to arbitration clause was available to the appellants and therefore the writ petition filed by the appellants was liable to be dismissed is concerned, suffice it to observe that the rule of exclusion of writ jurisdiction by availability of an alternative remedy is a rule of discretion and not one of compulsion. In an appropriate case, in spite of availability of the alternative remedy, the High Court may still exercise its writ jurisdiction in at least three contingencies: (i) where the writ petition seeks enforcement of any of the fundamental rights; (ii) where there is failure of principles of natural justice; or (iii) where the orders or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or the vires of an Act is challenged. (See Whirlpool Corpn. v. Registrar of Trade Marks [ (1998) 8 SCC 1 ].) The present case attracts applicability of the first two contingencies. Moreover, as noted, the petitioners' dealership, which is their bread and butter, came to be terminated for an irrelevant and non-existent cause. In such circumstances, we feel that the appellants should have been allowed relief by the High Court itself instead of driving them to the need of initiating arbitration proceedings." 10. In the instant case there has been a clear failure in adhering to the principles of natural justice which is one of the contingencies as illustrated by this judgment, as such limited interference is called for. 11. In the instant case there has been a clear failure in adhering to the principles of natural justice which is one of the contingencies as illustrated by this judgment, as such limited interference is called for. 11. The impugned order being arbitrary, and in violation of the principles of natural justice is hereby quashed and set aside. 12. If any process of cancellation etc. is initiated hereafter, the respondent No. 2, is directed to afford opportunity of hearing to the petitioner and to pass a reasoned order thereon. 13. With the above mentioned directions, the instant writ petition is allowed to the extent indicated and disposed of.