JUDGMENT : 1. This application under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. has been moved by the applicants seeking quashing of the charge sheet dated 02.6.2002 and all subsequent proceedings initiated against them in S.S.T. No. 14 of 2003, State of U.P. vs. Tej Singh and others, under Section 3(1) U.P. Gangsters and Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 1986. 2. Heard learned counsel for the applicants. 3. Submission of learned counsel for the applicants is that an F.I.R. was lodged against the applicants as Case Crime No. 220 of 2001 under Sections 147,148, 149, 324, 323, 307, 302 I.P.C. P.S.-Mandawar, Distict-Bijnor. This F.I.R. is annexure no. 1 to the present application. Further submission is that it is this solitary case which was made the basis to impose Gangsters Act and such a course is bad in the eyes of law. The perusal of the same would show that the same was lodged against about 20 persons who were alleged to have made assault and resorted to firing also that eventually resulted in the death of two persons. There is also a cross case registered against the other side as Case Crime No. 220A of 2001, under Sections 147, 323, 324 I.P.C., in the police station Mandawar, District-Bijnor. Submission is that perusal of the F.I.R. would show that though it was a grave crime but it was nonetheless a regular kind of crime that unfortunately keeps taking place between the parties. The motive of personal hostility, feud, village factionalism, local disputes are most of the times in the background of commission of such offence. According to the counsel it is certainly not a crime which may be said to have been committed either to make undue economic gain or to perpetrate some terror or to continue any such criminal activities which is, by and large, detrimental to the safety and security of the society. Counsel has gone to the extent of arguing that Gangsters Act in the present case has been imposed only on the basis of a single aforesaid case that has been registered against the applicants which is an illegal misuse of the Act and can not survive the scrutiny of law. Submission of learned counsel for the applicants is that actually it is a case of such nature during the trial of which the plea of self defense has to be necessarily decided by the Court. Submission of learned counsel for the applicants is that actually it is a case of such nature during the trial of which the plea of self defense has to be necessarily decided by the Court. Contention is that when the trials of two cases shall be completed it is also quite probable that the court may come to the conclusion that the incident in question took place in the exercise of self defense or may be, the court would hold that the incident took place in which the accused persons simply exceeded their right of private defense and they were never rank aggressors. In that eventuality imposition of the case Gangster Act does not appear to be a justified exercise. Submission of learned counsel is that therefore in such circumstances it shall result in the abuse of court's process if the single case of aforesaid kind is made the basis to impose Gangsters Act as the ingredients of the offence shall not be born out and thus in such circumstances, the impugned proceedings deserve to be quashed. 4. Heard learned A.G.A. and perused the record. 5. This Court has the occasion to go through the F.I.R. of the murder case that was registered against the applicants and it has also gone through the cross version that was registered against the other side. This Court does not find itself in agreement with the submissions made by learned counsel that a single case cannot constitute a legitimate basis to impose the Gangsters Act. But it is of the considered view that it is not the number of cases registered against a particular accused which is so relevant as the nature of allegations made in the F.I.R. of the criminal case or cases registered against the accused on which shall depend whether the offence under the Gangsters Act is made out or not. A man may be involved in more than one cases but all those cases may be of such nature which may arise out of some trivial personal dispute over some drainage problem or over some connected boundary wall dispute or over some rival competing civil claim on some piece of land and the relationship of the two parties may deteriorate to the extent that they may get involved in some squabble, quarrels or sometimes even in making criminal assaults upon each other. Such kind of crimes are somewhat of a regular kind and nature. They do not make a good ground to impose Gangsters Act. The definition as has been provided in the Act and the ingredients which are required to be fulfilled before imposition of Gangster Act are on a different footing as is clear from the perusal of the definition of Gangster Act itself. "2. They do not make a good ground to impose Gangsters Act. The definition as has been provided in the Act and the ingredients which are required to be fulfilled before imposition of Gangster Act are on a different footing as is clear from the perusal of the definition of Gangster Act itself. "2. Definitions.-In this Act,-- (a) "Code" means the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Act No. 2 of 1974); (b) "Gang" means a group of persons, who acting either singly or collectively, by violence, or threat or show of violence, or intimidation, or coercion, or otherwise with the object of disturbing public order or of gaining any undue temporal, pecuniary, material or other advantage for himself or any other person, indulge in antisocial activities, namely: (i) offences punishable under Chapter XVI, or Chapter XVII, or Chapter XXII of the Indian Penal Code (Act No. 45 of 1860), or (ii) distilling or manufacturing or storing or transporting or importing or exporting or selling or distributing any liquor, or intoxicating or dangerous drugs, or other intoxicants or narcotics or cultivating any plant, in contravention of any of the provisions of the U. P. Excise Act, 1910 (U. P. Act No. 4 of 1910), or the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (Act No. 61 of 1985), or any other law for the time being in force, or (iii) occupying or taking possession of immovable property otherwise than in accordance with law, or setting-up false claims for title or possession of immovable property whether in himself or any other person, or (iv) preventing or attempting to prevent any public servant or any witness from discharging his lawful duties, or (v) offences punishable under the Suppression of Immoral Traffic in Women and Girls Act, 1956 (Act No. 104 of 1956), or (vi) offences punishable under Section 3 of the Public Gambling Act, 1867 (Act No. 3 of 1867), or (vii) preventing any person from offering bids in auction lawfully conducted, or tender, lawfully invited, by or on behalf of any Government department, local body or public or private undertaking, for any lease or rights or supply of goods or work to be done, or (viii) preventing or disturbing the smooth running by any person of his lawful business, profession, trade or employment or any other lawful activity connected therewith, or (ix) offences punishable under Section 171-E of the Indian Penal Code (Act No. 45 of 1860), or in preventing or obstructing any public election being lawfully held, by physically preventing the voter from exercising his electoral rights, or (x) inciting others to resort to violence to disturb communal harmony, or (xi) creating panic, alarm or terror in public, or (xii) terrorising or assaulting employees or owners or occupiers of public or private undertakings or factories and causing mischief in respect of their properties, or (xiii) inducing or attempting to induce any person to go to foreign countries on false representation that any employment, trade or profession shall be provided to him in such foreign country, or (xiv) kidnapping or abducting any person with intent to extort ransom, or (xv) diverting or otherwise preventing any aircraft or public transport vehicle from following its scheduled course ; (c) "gangster" means a member or leader or organiser of a gang and includes any person who abets or assists in the activities of a gang enumerated in clause (b), whether before or after the commission of such activities or harbours any person who has indulged in such activities ; (d) "public servant" means a public servant as defined in Section 21 of the Indian Penal Code (Act No. 45 of 1860), or any other law for the time being in force, and includes any person who lawfully assist the police or other authorities of the State, in investigation or prosecution or punishment of an offence punishable under this Act, whether by giving information or evidence relating to such offence or offender or in any other manner; (e) "member of the family of a public servant" means his parents or spouse and brother, sister, son, daughter, grandson, grand-daughter or the spouses of any of them, and includes a person dependent on or residing with the public servant and a person in whose welfare the public servant is interested ; (f) words and phrases used but not defined in this Act and defined in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, or the Indian Penal Code shall have the meanings respectively assigned to them in such Codes." 6. A careful perusal of the definition of "Gangster" and "Gang" would not fail to indicate that if an offence punishable under Chapter XVI, Chapter XVII and Chapter XXII of Indian Penal Code is committed with the object of disturbing public order or with the object of gaining any undue temporal, pecuniary or material advantage, such activity on the part of accused can make him liable to face the imposition of Gangsters Act in question. He may commit such kind of act just once and may face a single F.I.R. or he may commit such kind of offences many times and may face more than one F.I.Rs. in that connection. It is not the number of F.I.Rs. which is relevant as it is significant to assess whether the crime committed by the accused was inspired and prompted with the motive of gaining any undue temporal, pecuniary or material advantage or not. It is the object of the offence or the motive behind it which is of crucial significance in order to adjudge whether the provisions of Gangsters Act in question can be brought into application in a given case or not. 7. After having perused the record, this Court finds itself in agreement with the submissions made by the learned counsel for the applicants that though the accused are facing the allegations of having committed murder but they cannot be said to have committed the crime because they were gangsters. There was no motive of making any wrongful economic gains. This Court also does not see any material on the basis of which it may be held that the prime object behind committing the crime in question was so as to disturb the public order. Whenever some grave crime is committed it always leads to a consequential result of some kind of disturbance in society. Such normal disturbance in society and disturbing the public order or creating panic or terror are different species. Ordinary law and order problems can not be clubbed with phenomenon of break of public order. The crime in question does not appear to have been committed with the object of gaining any undue temporal, pecuniary, material or other similar kind of advantage for itself or for any other person indulged in anti-social activities. 8. Ordinary law and order problems can not be clubbed with phenomenon of break of public order. The crime in question does not appear to have been committed with the object of gaining any undue temporal, pecuniary, material or other similar kind of advantage for itself or for any other person indulged in anti-social activities. 8. Here in this context it may also be seen that in the definition of 'gang' as provided under Section -2(b) of the U.P. Gangsters and Anti Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 1986 (hereinafter referred to as Act) reference to the words 'gaining any undue temporal, pecuniary, material or other advantage' for himself or any other person has been given. One might argue that the words 'other advantage' is an all inclusive term and all kinds and categories of advantages will come under its title, and therefore, there is hardly any need to see the facts of the case with a fine class in order to find whether the object of the gang is or was of gaining undue temporal, pecuniary and material advantage or not. If the violence or offence committed was inspired to get any kind of advantage for himself or for any other person, the letter of definition as provided by the Act shall stand satisfied. But in the considered opinion of this Court such kind of approach will lead to complete misinterpretation of the Statute. If the Legislature in its wisdom has used a number of qualifying words with regard to Anti Social Activity as has been referred to and contemplated in the Act, then its whole purpose shall stand defeated by providing such an all sweeping meaning to the words 'other advantage' as has been used in the definition. If the term 'other advantage' was meant to include all advantages or was meant to include any kind of advantage whatsoever where was the need to use different other defining words like 'temporal, pecuniary and material' which immediately precede the words 'or other advantage' ! It is self evident that the use of the preceding words have a qualifying effect and must be seen lending its complexion to the subsequently used words 'other advantage'. The words 'other advantage' has got to be seen in the context and perspective and with reference to the preceding aforesaid words and must be understood in the same light. It is self evident that the use of the preceding words have a qualifying effect and must be seen lending its complexion to the subsequently used words 'other advantage'. The words 'other advantage' has got to be seen in the context and perspective and with reference to the preceding aforesaid words and must be understood in the same light. Just as a man is often known by the company he keeps, the import of words in Statute also are often to be seen and understood by the company of the words in which they appear. In this regard this Court deems it appropriate to keep in perspective the rule of 'Ejusdem Generis' in order to correctly appreciate the scope and the actual ambit of the general words which follow the aforesaid specific words used in the Statute. The Court is of the view that the aforesaid preceding words 'temporal, pecuniary and material' are constituting a genus and the words 'other advantage' has to be read as an species of the same. Though ordinarily the general words must be provided to bear their natural and larger meaning but they have to be confined Ejusdem generisto the class of things previously enumerated by certain specific words because it is not difficult to see clearly the intention of the Statute which it spells out by using a specific class and category of qualifying words. This Court sees reasons and therefore feels persuaded to limit the scope of the meaning of the general words 'other advantage' because if we provide to it a larger all embracing meaning it is likely to lead to absurd and unforeseen results. The general expression has to be read contemplating to imply the things of the same kind which have been referred to by the preceding specific class of things constituting a genus. The general expression has to be read contemplating to imply the things of the same kind which have been referred to by the preceding specific class of things constituting a genus. If we do not adhere to this rule and do not impute specific complexion to the general words in the light of the preceding words the blatant misuse and plain absurdity to which it shall lead is that the administrative executives and the police would feel free to impose the provisions of this Act upon anybody and everybody who is facing the charge of committing any sort of offence or any breach of law howsoever trivial it be because hardly any violence or threat or show of violence or intimidation or coercion is done without having the object of gaining some kind of advantage himself or for any other person. The word 'advantage' has an all sweeping natural meaning and may include material and psychological both kinds of advantages. In that view of the matter the use of the words 'other advantage' will bring in its mischief everything under the sun. It is therefore very expediently needed to read these words in right perspective and read them Ejusdem generis with the things or words previously enumerated by the Statute. In order to substantiate its view this Court finds strength from the pronouncement given by the Apex Court in the case of Assistant Collector of Central Excise, Guntur vs. Ramdev Tobacco Company, 1991 AIR (SC) 506. In this case the principle of Ejusdem generis was expatiated upon at some length and was also brought into application while giving interpretation to the issues involved in the case with which it was dealing. It would be profitable to extract the relevant portion of the pronouncement which reads as under : “5. But the question is whether the issuance of a show cause notice and the initiation of the consequential adjudication proceedings can be described as `other legal proceedings' within the meaning of sub-section (2) of section 40 of the Act? If the said departmental action falls within the expression `other legal proceeding' there can be no doubt that the action would be barred as the same indisputably was initiated six months after the accrual of the cause action. If the said departmental action falls within the expression `other legal proceeding' there can be no doubt that the action would be barred as the same indisputably was initiated six months after the accrual of the cause action. So the crucial question is whether the issuance of the show cause notice dated August 30, 1972 and the passing of the impugned order in adjudication proceedings emanating therefrom constitutes `other legal proceeding' within the meaning of section 40 (2) of the Act to fall within the mischief of that sub-section which bars such proceedings if commenced after a period of six months from the accrual of the cause of action. The learned Additional Solicitor General submitted that the expression `other legal proceeding' must be read ejusdem generis with the preceding expressions `suit' and `prosecution' and if so read it becomes crystal clear that the department's action cannot come within the purview of `other legal proceeding'. How valid is this contention is the question which we are called upon to answer in the present appeal. 6. The rule of ejusdem generis is generally invoked where the scope and ambit of the general words which follow certain specific words (which have some common characteristic and constitute a genus) is required to be determined. By the application of this rule the scope and ambit of the general words which follow certain specific words constituting a genus is restricted to things ejusdem generis with those preceding them, unless the context otherwise requires. General words must ordinarily bear their natural and larger meaning and need not be confined ejusdem generis to things previously enumerated unless the language of the statute spells out an intention to that effect. Courts have also limited the scope of the general words in cases where a larger meaning is likely to lead to absurd and unforeseen results. To put it differently, the general expression has to be read to comprehend things of the same kind as those referred to by the preceding specific things constituting a genus, unless of course from the language of the statute it can be inferred that the general words were not intended to be so limited and no absurdity or unintended and unforeseen complication is likely to result if they are allowed to take their natural meaning. The cardinal rule of interpretation is to allow the general words to take their natural wide meaning unless the language of the statute gives a different indication or such meaning is likely to lead to absurd results in which case their meaning can be restricted by the application of this rule and they may be required to fall in line with the specific things designated by the preceding words. But unless there is genus which can be comprehended from the preceding words, there can be no question of invoking this rule. Nor can this rule have any application where the general words precede specific words. 7. There can be little doubt that the words `other legal proceeding' are wide enough to include adjudication and penalty proceedings under the Act. Even the learned Additional Solicitor General did not contend to the contrary but what he said was that since this wide expression is preceded by particular words of a certain genus, namely, words indicating reference to proceedings taken in courts only, the wide words must be limited to things ejusdem generis and must take colour from the preceding words and should, therefore, receive a limited meaning to exclude proceedings of the type in question. There can be no doubt that `suit' or `prosecution' are those judicial or legal proceedings which are lodged in a court of law and not before any executive authority, even if a statutory one. The use of the expression `instituted' in section 40 (2) strengthens this belief. Since this sub-section has been construed by this Court in Raju's case (supra) not to be confined in its application to only Government servants but to extend to others including the assessees and since the words `for anything done or ordered to be done under this Act' are found to be comprehensive enough to include acts of non-compliance or omissions to do what the Act and the Rule enjoin, the limitation prescribed by section 40(2) would undoubtedly hit the adjudication and penalty proceedings unless the expression `other legal proceeding' is read ejusdem generis to limit its ambit to legal proceedings initiated in a court of law. 8. 8. The scope of section 40(2) as it stood before its amendment pursuant to Raju's case came up for consideration before a Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Universal Cables Ltd. v. Union of India, [1977 Tax LR 1825]: 1977 ELT (J92) wherein the question raised for determination was whether penalty proceedings taken under Rule 173Q for the infraction of Rule 173C with a view to evading payment of duty fell within the expression `other legal proceeding' used in the said subsection. The High Court conceded that the expression when read in isolation is wide enough to include any proceeding taken in accordance with law, whether so taken in a court of law or before any authority or tribunal but when read with the preceding words `suit' or `prosecution' it must be given a restricted meaning. This is how the High Court expressed itself at page J 106 (at page 1838 of Tax. L.R.): "Now the language of section 40(2) is: `no suit, prosecution or other legal proceeding shall be instituted'. `Suit' and `prosecution' which precede the expression `other legal proceeding' can be taken only in a Court of Law". After stating the expanse of the ejusdem generis rule, as explained in Amar Chandra v. Excise Collector, Tripura, AIR. 1972 SC 1863 at 1868 (Sutherland, Volume 2 pages 399-400) the High Court observed that there was no indication in the said sub-section or elsewhere in the Act that the said general words were intended to receive their wide meaning and were not to be construed in a limited sense with the aid of the ejusdem generis rule. A departmental proceeding like penalty proceedings were, therefore, placed outside the scope of the said sub-section. This view was quoted with approval by a learned Single Judge of the Bombay High Court in C.C. Industries & Others v. H.N. Ray, 1980 ELT 442 at 453. These two cases, therefore, clearly support the view canvassed before us by the learned Additional Solicitor General. 9. We have given our careful consideration to the submission made on behalf of the appellant, reinforced by the view expressed in the aforesaid two decisions. These two cases, therefore, clearly support the view canvassed before us by the learned Additional Solicitor General. 9. We have given our careful consideration to the submission made on behalf of the appellant, reinforced by the view expressed in the aforesaid two decisions. In considering the scope of the expression `other legal proceeding' we have confined ourselves to the language of sub-section (2) of section 40 of the Act before its amendment by Act 22 of 1973 and should not be understood to express any view on the amended provision. On careful consideration we are in respectful agreement with the view expressed in the aforesaid decisions that the wide expression `other legal proceeding' must be read ejusdem generis with the preceding words `suit' and `prosecution' as they constitute a genus. In this view of the matter we must uphold the contention of the learned Additional Solicitor General that the penalty and adjudication proceedings in question did not fall within the expression `other legal proceeding' employed in section 40(2) of the Act as it stood prior to its amendment by Act 22 of 1973 and therefore, the said proceedings were not subject to the limitation prescribed by the said sub-section.” 8. Illumined by the aforesaid view adopted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court this Court sees good reason to hold that the use of phrase 'other advantage' as it finds place in the Act must take its hue from the accompanying words which immediately precede the same and which have a qualifying effect. 9. The definition as has been provided in the Gangster Act is very exhaustive and has very wide contours. While dealing with the issues involved in the case of Gangster Act, the court has to be cautious and should not stretch it too much or to the extent where any kind of crime committed by anybody or all kinds of offences committed by anybody would make him a "gangster". In fact it is a question of fact and the court will have to see it as per the allegations made in each individual case whether the nature of crime committed was such on the basis of which an accused can be brought under the bracket of the definition of the gangster or not. In fact it is a question of fact and the court will have to see it as per the allegations made in each individual case whether the nature of crime committed was such on the basis of which an accused can be brought under the bracket of the definition of the gangster or not. There cannot be a over generalized formula on this point and the Court has to satisfy itself on a subjective basis as well as on the objective basis as per the allegations and the circumstances as they may appear from the nature of crime said to have been committed by a particular accused and see for itself whether he can be brought within the mischief of the Act or not. In the present case this Court is of the considered opinion that the nature of crime committed, the background in which it was committed, the motive and the object which appears to have been behind this incident were such, which fall far short of bringing the case under the category where the provisions of U.P. Gangsters and Anti Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 1986 could be successfully attributed or imposed. 10. In such view of the matter, the charge sheet under the said act and the consequent proceedings thereof stand quashed. 11. The application stands allowed. A copy of this order be certified to the lower court forthwith.