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Allahabad High Court · body

2019 DIGILAW 1070 (ALL)

JUGESH KUMAR v. STATE OF U. P.

2019-04-25

RAMESH SINHA

body2019
JUDGMENT : RAMESH SINHA, J. 1. Heard Sri Dileep Kumar, learned counsel for the applicant and Sri Amrit Raj Chaurasia, learned AGA for the State and perused the material brought on record. 2. The present 482 Cr.P.C. Application has been filed with the prayer to quash the charge sheet dated 18.9.2018 being charge sheet no.291 of 2018 and entire proceedings of criminal case no.160 of 2018/ State Vs. P.C. Gupta and others based on charge sheet arising out of case crime no.0421 of 2018, P.S. Kasna, district Gautam Budh Nagar, pending in the court of Special Judge, Court No.2, Anti Corruption, Meerut u/s 420, 467, 468 471, 120-B IPC and 13(1)(C), 13(1)(d) and 13(2) of Prevention of Corruption Act so far as it relates to the applicant and the order dated 20.9.2018 passed by Special Judge, Court No.2, Anti Corruption, Meerut by which learned Special Judge has taken cognizance and issued process as against the applicant. 3. The brief facts of the case are that an FIR was lodged against the applicant and twenty other co-accused persons along with other officials of Yamuna Expressway, Industrial Development Authority, Kasna, Gautam Buddha Nagar by opposite party no.2 on 3.6.2018 at Police Station Kasna, District Gautam Buddha Nagar which was registered as Case Crime No.421 of 2018, u/s 420, 467, 468, 471, 120-B IPC and 13 of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. 4. As per allegations made in the FIR, it is highlighted that the Chief Executive Officer of Yamuna Expressway and other concerned officers with a conspiracy and purchased the land in higher rate (twice to the prevailing rate) and got made the payment to their own kith and kin and close relatives and in this way, they have wrongfully gain through their relatives and caused wrongful loss to the authority. Thus they committed an offence under the Prevention of Corruption Act. It is also alleged in the FIR that after purchase of 57.1549 Hectares land, no fruitful purpose is being served and the said land is lying useless and there is no hope for its proper use in future. Thus they committed an offence under the Prevention of Corruption Act. It is also alleged in the FIR that after purchase of 57.1549 Hectares land, no fruitful purpose is being served and the said land is lying useless and there is no hope for its proper use in future. In the transaction of purchase of land for the purposes of exit-entry ramp in proportionate of 7% policy and for future development of appurtenant land number of irregularities have been highlighted in the FIR out of which the relevant highlighted irregularity is that the land was purchased in scattered area and further that the high prices have been paid in purchasing the land and further that some of the lands have been purchased without seeking approval of the Board and some of the land is not shown in concessionaire (agreement) with M/s J.P. Associates. The transparency has also not been adopted by following the Government settled norms in purchasing of the land. 5. The Investigating Officer after investigation of the case has submitted charge sheet on 18.9.2018 against accused P.C. Gupta who was the then CEO of the said authority. On 20.9.2018, the learned Special Judge (Anti-Corruption), Meerut after perusing the case diary and other relevant documents, found prima-facie a case against the accused P.C. Gupta and took cognizance of the offence and directed that the case be registered. The said order appears to have been passed on the certified copy of the charge sheet which finds place, copy of which is annexed as Annexure No.8 from page nos. 77 to 137. So far as other accused persons named in the FIR are concerned, the Investigating Officer kept the investigation pending as their arrest could not be made by him. 6. The applicant has filed the present 482 Cr.P.C. Application challenging the impugned charge sheet dated 18.9.2018 being charge sheet no.291 of 2018 and entire proceedings of criminal case no.160 of 2018/ based on charge sheet and order taking cognizance dated 20.9.2018 passed by Special Judge, Court No.2, Anti Corruption, Meerut by which it is stated that the Special Judge has taken cognizance against the applicant and issued process, hence the same be quashed against him. 7. 7. The learned AGA has raised preliminary objections regarding the maintainability of the present 482 Cr.P.C. Application filed by the applicant challenging the impugned charge sheet and the order taking cognizance as he has pointed out that the charge sheet which has been submitted against the applicant and the investigation against him is still pending and the impugned charge sheet has been filed against the main accused P.C. Gupta who is confined in jail in the present case and the court has issued process u/s 204 IPC against him only. So far as the applicant and other accused persons who are named in the FIR are concerned, the Investigating Officer has prayed for NBW issued against the applicant and other accused persons as they could not be arrested and the court below has only issued non-bailable warrant against him only. Hence this Court may dismiss the present 482 Cr.P.C. Application on behalf of the applicant on this ground alone. 8. Learned counsel for the applicant has vehemently opposed the said preliminary objections raised by learned AGA for the State and stated that it is true that the investigation against the applicant is still pending as it appears from the impugned charge sheet but the Investigating Officer had submitted charge sheet against the accused P.C. Gupta on 18.9.2018 and the learned Special Judge has taken cognizance of the case against the accused P.C. Gupta but as per the old Cr.P.C, the cognizance of an offence was taken against an accused whereas in the new Cr.P.C, the cognizance is taken of a case and not of an accused. He further argued that from the impugned charge sheet, it is evident that the Investigating Officer has not yet completed the investigation and has submitted an incomplete charge sheet in the case and the cognizance taken by the learned court is bad in the eyes of law as it cannot be treated as police report in view of Section 173 (2) Cr.P.C., hence the impugned charge sheet as well as impugned order taking cognizance is liable to be quashed by this Court on this ground alone and in support of his arguments, he has placed reliance on the judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of Bhartendu Pratap Singh Vs. State of U.P. And another, (2011) LawSuit(All) 1089 and drawn attention of the Court towards para no.5 and 22 of the said judgment which is quoted here below:- 5. The learned Senior Advocate Mr.Lalit appearing for the petitioner invited the attention of this court towards the provisions of Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and submitted that it speaks that every investigation under this Chapter shall be completed without unnecessary delay and as soon as it is completed, the officer in charge of the police station shall forward to a Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the offence on a police report. It is stated that it means that the Investigating Officer is permitted to file the charge sheet only on completion of the investigation, particularly for the facts which were within his knowledge, therefore, he was obliged to complete the proceeding for collection of evidence, which was in his knowledge and then only to file the charge sheet, whereas the Investigating Officer, as is evident from the charge sheet, though was well aware with the documentary evidence and was also making efforts to collect them, yet before collecting the said evidence, he submitted the charge sheet, which is said to be incomplete charge sheet, therefore, the learned Magistrate was not empowered to take cognizance of offence on such a police report, which is based on incomplete investigation. Thus, it is stated that the cognizance taken by the learned Magistrate on the basis of incomplete investigation is unsustainable and deserves to be quashed. 22. Indisputedly the proceeding is going on, which can, in light of the aforesaid facts, be termed as the investigation in continuation of the earlier investigation. Thus, it cannot be said to be further investigation. The preposition of law laid down by the courts, as has been discussed here-in-above, enunciates that the charge sheet was incomplete for the evidences, which were within the knowledge of the Investigating Officer, therefore, in light of the facts of the present case, I am of the view that since the charge sheet is incomplete charge sheet, it is not the stage for the learned Magistrate to take cognizance of offence on the basis of incomplete charge sheet, therefore, I hereby quash the order impugned dated 9th of November, 2010, passed in Case No.13126 of 2010, arising out of Criminal Case No.639 of 2010. However, since the investigation is still continuing on the evidences, which have been disclosed in the said incomplete charge sheet, I hereby observe that as soon as it is completed and police report is filed before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, he shall be at liberty to take cognizance of offence on the basis of police report. 9. The learned counsel for the applicant has further placed reliance on the judgment of the Madras High Court in Crl. R.C (MD) No.231 of 2013 decided on 31.3.2014 wherein the judgment passed in the case of Bhartendu Pratap Singh was also followed. 10. The learned counsel for the applicant has further placed reliance on the judgment of learned Single Judge of this court in the case of Dharmendra Tripathi Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, 1996 Laws(All) 814 and of the Apex Court passed in the case of State through CBI Vs. Dawood Ibrahim Kaskar and others, (2000) 10 SCC 438 and has drawn attention of the Court towards para no.21 and 22 of the said judgment which is quoted here below:- 21. That Section 73 confers a power upon a Magistrate to issue a warrant and that it can be exercised by him during investigation also, can be best understood with reference to Section 155 of the Code. As already noticed under this Section a police officer can investigate into a non cognizable case with the order of a Magistrate and may exercise the same powers in respect of the investigation which he may exercise in a cognizable case, except that he cannot arrest without warrant. If with the order of a Magistrate the police starts investigation into a non- cognizable and non-bailable offence, (like Sections 466 or 467 (Part I) of the Indian Penal Code) and if during investigation the Investigating Officer intends to arrest the person accused of the offence he has to seek for and obtain a warrant of arrest from the Magistrate. If the accused evade the arrest, the only course left open to the Investigating Officer to ensure his presence would be to ask the Magistrate to invoke his powers under Section 73 and thereafter those relating to proclamation and attachment. In such an eventuality, the Magistrate can legitimately exercise his power under Section 73, for the person to be apprehended is 'accused of a non-bailable offence and is evading arrest. 22. In such an eventuality, the Magistrate can legitimately exercise his power under Section 73, for the person to be apprehended is 'accused of a non-bailable offence and is evading arrest. 22. Another factor which clearly indicates that Section 73 of the Code gives a power to the Magistrate to issue warrant of arrest and that too during investigation is evident from the provisions of part 'C' of Chapter VI of the Code, which we have earlier adverted to. Needless to say the provisions of proclamation and attachment as envisaged therein is to compel the appearance of a person who is evading arrest. Now, the power of issuing a proclamation under Section 82 (quoted earlier) can be exercised by a Court only in respect of a person 'against whom a warrant has been issued by it'. In other words, unless the Court issues a warrant the provisions of Section 82, and the other Sections that follow in that part, cannot be invoked in a situation where in spite of its best effects the police cannot arrest a person under Section 41. Resultantly, if it has to take the coercive measures for the apprehension of such a person it has to approach the Court to issue warrant of arrest under Section 73; and if need be to invoke the provisions of part 'C' of Chapter VI. [Section 8 (3) in case the person is accused of an offence under TADA] 11. The learned counsel for the applicant has further placed reliance on the judgment of Apex Court passed in the case of State of Maharashtra Vs. Sharadchandra Vinayak Dongre and others, (1995) 1 SCC 42 and has drawn attention of the Court towards para no.7 and 8 of the said judgment which is quoted here below:- 7. The purpose of the submission of the police report with the details as mentioned above, is to enable the Magistrate to satisfy himself, whether on the basis of the report and the material filed along with the police report, a case for taking cognizance has been made out or not. After applying his mind to the police report and the material submitted therewith, if the Magistrate is satisfied that cognizance of the offence is required to be taken, he shall proceed further in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure. After applying his mind to the police report and the material submitted therewith, if the Magistrate is satisfied that cognizance of the offence is required to be taken, he shall proceed further in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Section 190(1)(b) CrPC provides that a Magistrate has the power to take cognizance upon a police report of such facts as are provided therein on being satisfied that the case is a fit one for taking cognizance of the offence. Therefore, if the police report and the material filed therewith is sufficient to satisfy the Magistrate that he should take cognizance, his power is not fettered by the label which the investigating agency chooses to give to the report submitted by it under Section 173(2) CrPC. Merely, because the prosecution had filed an application, after submission of the charge-sheet, seeking permission to file "supplementary charge-sheet", it could not affect the jurisdiction of the Magistrate to take cognizance, if he was otherwise satisfied from the material placed before him along with the charge-sheet that cognizance of the offence was required to be taken. It is the jurisdiction of the Magistrate and Magistrate alone to decide whether the material placed by the prosecution with the report (charge-sheet) was sufficient to take cognizance or not. The power of the Magistrate to take cognizance cannot be controlled by the investigating agency, whose duty is only to investigate and place the facts and the evidence before the Magistrate. 8. In the instant case, the Chief Judicial Magistrate was obviously satisfied with the sufficiency of the material placed by the prosecution before him with the report for taking cognizance of the offence and he therefore proceeded further after taking cognizance and directed the issuance of process against the respondents. The prayer of the investigating agency seeking permission to further investigate and submit a "supplementary charge-sheet" could not vitiate the cognizance taken by the Chief Judicial Magistrate nor denude him of his jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offence. The High Court while quashing the order dated 21-11-1986, did not record any finding to the effect that the exercise of discretion by the Magistrate in taking cognizance of the offence and issuing process was in any way improper or that the cognizance was taken on the basis of the material on which no reasonable person could have taken cognizance. The High Court while quashing the order dated 21-11-1986, did not record any finding to the effect that the exercise of discretion by the Magistrate in taking cognizance of the offence and issuing process was in any way improper or that the cognizance was taken on the basis of the material on which no reasonable person could have taken cognizance. The High Court quashed the order only because it was influenced by the application filed by the prosecution seeking permission to record additional evidence and file a "supplementary charge-sheet" and from that it inferred that the report filed by the prosecution was 'incomplete'. High Court even overlooked the fact that the application filed by the prosecution had not even been allowed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate and had been only adjourned for orders. We cannot persuade ourselves to accept the view of the High Court that if the investigating officer terms a police report as 'incomplete', it takes away the jurisdiction of the Magistrate to take cognizance of the offence, even if in the opinion of the Magistrate, the material is sufficient for him to be satisfied that it was a fit case for him to take cognizance of the offence. The Magistrate is not bound by the label given to the report or the charge-sheet by the investigating officer and it is for him to decide whether the report and the material on which it is based, is sufficient for him to take cognizance or not. It is pertinent to notice that the police report submitted before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, did not even say that it was an 'incomplete' charge-sheet or police report. The High Court was, therefore, not at all justified in opining that since the charge-sheet on the prosecution's own showing was 'incomplete', the Chief Judicial Magistrate could not have taken cognizance and quashed the order of the CJM taking cognizance of the offence. We may also record at this stage that Shri Dholakia, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant submitted before us that apart from the material already filed with the police report/charge-sheet, on the basis of which the Chief Judicial Magistrate took cognizance on 21-11-1986, the State does not intend to file any further material by way of any supplementary charge- sheet before the trial court. The statement of Shri Dholakia, adequately protects the interest of the respondents. The statement of Shri Dholakia, adequately protects the interest of the respondents. In view of the statement of Mr Dholakia, we are relieved of the necessity to deal with the effect of Section 173(8) CrPC in this case. 12. The learned counsel for the applicant has also placed reliance on the judgment of Apex Court passed in the case of M/s Swil Ltd Vs. State of Delhi and another, (2001) AIR SC 2747 and has drawn attention of the Court towards para no.6 of the said judgment which is quoted here below:- 6. In our view, from the facts stated above it is clear that at the stage of taking cognizance of the offence, provisions of Section 190 Cr.P.C. would be applicable. Section 190 inter alia provides that 'the Magistrate may take cognizance of any offence upon a police report of such facts which constitute an offence.' As per this provision, Magistrate takes cognizance of an offence and not the offender. After taking cognizance of the offence, the Magistrate under Section 204 Cr.P.C. is empowered to issue process to the accused. At the stage of issuing process, it is for the Magistrate to decide whether process should be issued against particular person/persons named in the charge sheet and also not named therein. For that purpose, he is required to consider the FIR and the statements recorded by the police officer and other documents tendered along with charge sheet. Further, upon receipt of police report under Section 173 (2) Cr.P.C., the Magistrate is entitled to take cognizance of an offence under Section 190(1)(b) even if the police report is to the effect that no case is made out against the accused by ignoring the conclusion arrived at by the investigating officer and independently applying his mind to the facts emerging from the investigation by taking into account the statement of the witnesses examined by the police. At this stage, there is no question of application of Section 319 Cr.P.C. Similar contention was negatived by this Court in Raghubans Dubey vs. State of Bihar, (1967) 2 SCR 423 by holding thus: "In our opinion, once cognizance has been taken by the Magistrate, he takes cognizance of an offence and not the offenders; once he takes cognizance of an offence it is his duty to find out who the offenders really are and once he comes to the conclusion that apart from the persons sent up by the police some other persons are involved, it is his duty to proceed against those persons. The summoning of the additional accused is part of the proceeding initiated by his taking cognizance of an offence." 13. After having considered the submissions advanced by learned counsel for the parties and perused the impugned charge sheet and order taking cognizance and other material on record. It is an admitted fact that the applicant is named in the FIR of the present case along with P.C. Gupta and other accused persons and some other officials of Yamuna Expressway. As per impugned charge sheet, it is apparent that the same has been submitted against the accused P.C. Gupta and with respect to the applicant and other accused persons named in the FIR, the investigation is stated to be pending and the Investigating Officer further observed that the arrest of the rest of the accused persons is also to be made. Hence admittedly no charge sheet has been submitted against the applicant and neither any process has been issued against him u/s 204 Cr.P.C by the Special court as the same has been issued against accused P.C. Gupta only. Thus the present 482 Cr.P.C. Application on behalf of the applicant is not at all maintainable and he has no right to challenge the impugned charge sheet as only a NBW has been issued against him by the Special Court on the prayer made by the Investigating Officer before the Court to effect the arrest of the rest of the accused persons. The contention of the learned counsel for the applicant that an incomplete charge sheet has been submitted in the present case, cannot be accepted as the Investigating Officer has concluded the investigation against the accused P.C. Gupta and so far as other accused persons are concerned, the investigation has been kept pending by the Investigating Officer who after completing the investigation is under an obligation to submit a supplementary charge-sheet against the applicant or the other co-accused persons named in the FIR or whose complicity has come into light during the investigation. The case law which has been cited by learned counsel for the applicant in the case of Bhartendu Pratap Singh (Supra) cannot be made applicable in the present case as the facts and circumstances of the said case is altogether different from the facts of the present case is distinguishable. The other case laws cited by learned counsel for the applicant of the Apex Court in the case of State through CBI Vs. Dawood Ibrahim Kaskar and others (Supra) and perusal of the same shows that it deals with the provisions of Section 167, 309 (2) and 173(8) Cr.P.C. and also the power of the Magistrate to issue warrant u/s 73 Cr.P.C., during investigation, hence the same cannot be made applicable in the present case. So far as the case of State of Maharashtra Vs. Sharadchandra Vinayan Dongre and others (Supra) are concerned, are also on a different issue which is not applicable to the instance case as it was held by the Apex Court that the power of the Magistrate to take cognizance cannot be controlled by the investigating agency whose duty is to investigate the matter and place the facts and the evidence before the Magistrate does not help the applicant and further Magistrate is not bound by the lebel given to the report or the charge-sheet by the investigating officer and it is for him to decide whether the report and the material on which it is based, is sufficient for him to take cognizance or not. So far as case M/s Swil Ltd Vs. State of Delhi (Supra) is concerned, it does not take into light the controversy of the instant case as the Apex Court held that at the stage of 190 Cr.P.C., the provisions of Section 319 Cr.P.C. cannot be invoked. So far as case M/s Swil Ltd Vs. State of Delhi (Supra) is concerned, it does not take into light the controversy of the instant case as the Apex Court held that at the stage of 190 Cr.P.C., the provisions of Section 319 Cr.P.C. cannot be invoked. It was further observed by the Apex Court that the provisions of Section 319 Cr.P.C. would come into operation in the course of any inquiry into or trial of an offence, hence the same is not applicable in the present case as it pertains to provisions of Section 167, 209 and 309 Cr.P.C with respect to remand of the accused. 14. It is noteworthy to mention here that the Apex Court in the case of West Bengal and another Vs. Mohd. Khalid and others, (1995) 1 SCC 684 has held that taking cognizance under Section 190 Cr.P.C is different from initiation of proceeding. Para no.43 of the said judgment is important to be taken note of which is quoted here below:- 43. Section 190 of the Code talks of cognizance of offences by Magistrates. This expression has not been defined in the Code. In its broad and literal sense, it means taking notice of an offence. This would include the intention of initiating judicial proceedings against the offender in respect of that offence or taking steps to see whether there is any basis for initiating judicial proceedings or for other purposes. The word 'cognizance' indicates the point when a Magistrate or a Judge first takes judicial notice of an offence. It is entirely a different thing from initiation of proceedings; rather it is the condition precedent to the initiation of proceedings by the Magistrate or the Judge. Cognizance is taken of cases and not of persons. 15. Thus from the aforesaid judgment of the Apex Court, it is apparent that taking of cognizance of cases is different from initiation of proceedings. There may be cases where the Magistrate takes cognizance of the case but may not initiate proceedings or issue process against all the accused mentioned in the police report submitted under Section 173(2) Cr.P.C. in the form of charge sheet. There may be cases where the Magistrate takes cognizance of the case but may not initiate proceedings or issue process against all the accused mentioned in the police report submitted under Section 173(2) Cr.P.C. in the form of charge sheet. Therefore, the Magistrate is not bound by the police report submitted under Section 173(2) Cr.P.C. as he may take cognizance of the offence on the basis of police report but whether proceedings have to be initiated against an accused mentioned in the charge-sheet or not has to be decided by the Magistrate after perusing the material collected during the course of investigation and thereafter if he finds a case for initiation of proceeding against an accused, then he may issue process under Section 204 Cr.P.C by summoning him to face prosecution/trial. Therefore, if a cognizance of a case is taken by the Magistrate under Section 190 Cr.P.C., it does not give right to an accused to challenge the cognizance order or the charge sheet based on the same against whom investigation is still pending or the process under Section 204 Cr.P.C has not been issued against him. In other words if a cognizance of a case is taken by the Magistrate then the accused against whom investigation is pending and not charge sheeted cannot challenge the charge sheet as the Magistrate has not yet issued process under Section 204 Cr.P.C. against him excepting where a charge sheet has been submitted against an accused as an 'absconder'. Hence in the present case, admittedly though the cognizance of the offence has been taken by the Special Judge but simply because the cognizance has been taken of the offence and has issued process under Section 204 Cr.P.C against accused P.C. Gupta as charge-sheet was submitted against him only in no manner give right to the applicant against whom, the investigation is pending and neither any proceeding has been initiated nor any process under Section 204 Cr.P.C. has been issued against him by the Special Court thus, the applicant has no locus to challenge the cognizance order. The argument of learned counsel for the applicant that non-bailable warrant which was issued against the applicant itself shows that process under Section 204 Cr.P.C. has been issued against the applicant but from the impugned order taking cognizance dated 20.9.2018, he failed to demonstrate the same and it was stated that from the questionnaire issued by the court below, dated 15.3.2019 only non-bailable warrant was issued against the applicant. Thus it is apparent from the record that no process under Section 204 Cr.P.C. has been issued against the applicant and as he could not be arrested, hence Investigating Officer in his wisdom has sought non-bailable warrant for his arrest during the course of investigation from the Special Judge, Anti-corruption. Learned counsel for the applicant further argued that the police report which has been submitted in the present case is not police report u/s 173(2) Cr.P.C as the investigation is an incomplete one and therefore, the learned counsel for the applicant could not have taken cognizance of the offence and the same is liable to be quashed by this Court. The said argument of learned counsel for the applicant is also not acceptable as it appears from the impugned charge sheet that the investigation has been completed against the accused P.C. Gupta and the police has submitted charge-sheet against him in view of Section 173(2) Cr.P.C before the Magistrate concerned who has taken cognizance of the offence and has also issued process against him u/s 204 Cr.P.C. and his bail application has also been rejected by the competent court as has been pointed out by learned AGA and so far as investigation with respect to other accused persons including the applicant is concerned, the same is stated to be pending and as the applicant is avoiding his arrest, hence NBW has been obtained by the Investigating Officer from the Special Judge, Anti-Corruption. Generally it is seen that in cases of corruption, scam, bank frauds, cyber crime etc. Generally it is seen that in cases of corruption, scam, bank frauds, cyber crime etc. the investigating agency is not able to complete the investigation with in the stipulated period of time as has been provided under the Cr.P.C. because of nature of the crime is such which requires more time to conclude investigation as stipulated in the Cr.P.C. Hence the Investigating Officer submits charge-sheet against the accused against whom it had collected evidence during the course of investigation and concludes the investigation, submits charge-sheet against him u/s 173(2) Cr.P.C and with respect to the other accused persons, the investigation is kept pending by the investigating agency and supplementary charge-sheet is submitted against the other accused persons of the cases, as the case may be. Therefore, the contention of the applicant's counsel that the investigation of the present case is incomplete, is not correct as against the main accused investigating agency found evidence collected during investigation and after concluding the investigation against him submitted police report before the competent court u/s 173(2) Cr.P.C. So far as applicant and other accused persons are concerned, the investigation has been kept pending as is evident from the impugned charge sheet submitted against accused P.C. Gupta. The present case is not a case where the investigating agency has submitted the police report in due haste so that the main accused P.C Gupta could not take benefit u/s 167(2) Cr.P.C. as his bail was already rejected by this Court and the charge-sheet submitted against him was on 18.9.2018. Therefore, the case of Bhartendu Pratap Singh (Supra) which has been relied upon by learned counsel for the applicant is distinguishable from the present case. Hence the contention of the applicant's counsel that the order taking cognizance and charge-sheet be quashed against the applicant is accordingly, rejected. 16. Learned counsel for the appellant lastly prayed that this Court may grant interim relief which has been granted to co-accused persons namely Ranbir Singh and Veer Pal Singh in Criminal Misc. 482 Cr.P.C. Application No.1895 of 2019 and 1889 of 2019 respectively on 17.1.2019. One of the order passed in 482 Cr.P.C. Application No.1895 of 2019 is quoted here below:- Heard Sri Dilip Kumar, learned counsel appearing for the applicant, assisted by Sri Rajrshi Gupta & Sri Gaurav Dhama, Advocates and Sri Patanjali Mishra, learned AGA-I appearing on behalf of opposite party nos.1 and 2. One of the order passed in 482 Cr.P.C. Application No.1895 of 2019 is quoted here below:- Heard Sri Dilip Kumar, learned counsel appearing for the applicant, assisted by Sri Rajrshi Gupta & Sri Gaurav Dhama, Advocates and Sri Patanjali Mishra, learned AGA-I appearing on behalf of opposite party nos.1 and 2. Present application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. has been filed to quash the charge-sheet dated 18.09.2018 being charge-sheet no.291 of 2018 as well as entire proceedings in Criminal Case No.160 of 2018 arising out of Case Crime No.0421 of 2018, under Sections 420 467, 468, 471, 120B and Section 13 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, Police Station Kasna, District Gautam Budh Nagar, pending the Court of Special Judge, Court no.2, Anti Corruption, Meerut. It has been submitted that charge-sheet submitted by the Investigating Officer is illegal since the applicant did not committed any illegality or any offence in discharging his due duties. The compensation for acquired land was paid by him as per the circle rate of the State Government. The investigation is still going on. In the meantime charge-sheet has been submitted in haste without awaiting for final out-come of the investigation. It has been submitted that non bailable warrant has been issued against the applicant directly in violation of law. This application is disposed of granting liberty to the applicant to move discharge application through counsel before the court below within a period of one month. The court below shall consider all the grounds raised in the discharge application and decide the same within a period of three months thereafter. Till the discharge application is decided, no coercive action shall be taken against the applicant only. 17. The court below shall consider all the grounds raised in the discharge application and decide the same within a period of three months thereafter. Till the discharge application is decided, no coercive action shall be taken against the applicant only. 17. In my opinion with due respect to the coordinate Bench of this Court which has passed the aforesaid order, the applicant is not entitled for the same as it appears from the impugned FIR as well as impugned charge-sheet that the said accused persons were not named in the FIR nor any charge sheet has been submitted against them and it appears that non bailable warrants were issued against the said accused persons as was obtained by the Investigating Officer from the Special Judge, Court no.2, Anti Corruption, Meerut when he found their involvement come into light during the course of investigation and as the said accused persons had also challenged the impugned charge sheet and the cognizance order passed by Special Judge as in the present case but against them there was no proceeding pending in the court below and the Court had passed an order for giving liberty to the said accused persons to move discharge application through counsel within one month and the court below was directed to consider all the grounds raised in the discharge application and decide the same within a period of three months thereafter and till the discharge application is decided, no coercive action shall be taken against the said accused persons. It appears from the record that no charge sheet has been filed against the said accused nor any process u/s 204 Cr.P.C has been issued against them and only investigation was pending against them and further they have not appeared before the court and the provisions of Section 207 Cr.P.C. has also not been complied with. Hence to direct the said accused persons to claim discharge appears premature as the said stage has not yet come when the investigation against them was also stated to be pending. 18. From the foregoing discussion it is crystal clear that against the applicant, the investigation is still pending. Hence to direct the said accused persons to claim discharge appears premature as the said stage has not yet come when the investigation against them was also stated to be pending. 18. From the foregoing discussion it is crystal clear that against the applicant, the investigation is still pending. Neither any charge sheet has been submitted against him nor process u/s 204 Cr.P.C. has been issued by Special Judge (Anti-Corruption), Meerut, hence applicant has no right to challenge the impugned charge sheet or the order taking cognizance and the aforesaid prayer made in the present application u/s 482 Cr.P.C by the applicant is wholly misconceived and misleading. 19. In view of the above, I do not find any ground to interfere in the matter and the present 482 Cr.P.C. Application is not at all maintainable for the aforesaid prayer made by the applicant and is, accordingly dismissed.