JUDGMENT : YOGENDRA KUMAR SRIVASTAVA, J. 1. Heard Sri Mithilesh Kumar Tiwari, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri Birendra Kumar Srivastava, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Sri Dhiraj Srivastava, learned counsel appearing for the respondent. 2. The present petition seeks to challenge the order dated 24.09.2012 passed by the 1st Additional Small Causes Court/Prescribed Authority, Kanpur Nagar in Rent Case No.22 of 2011 (Arvind Mishra Vs. Prem Narayan Shukla @ Raja Shukla) and also the order dated 09.10.2013 passed by the Additional District Judge, Court No.5, Kanpur Nagar in Rent Appeal No.85 of 2012 (Prem Narayan Shukla @ Raja Shukla Vs. Arvind Mishra). 3. Briefly stated the facts of the case are that a release application dated 12.10.2011 was filed by the respondent-landlord under Section 21(1)(a) of the UP Act No.13 of 1972 for release of his shop situate on ground floor of House No.124/B/152, Govind Nagar, Kanpur Nagar. The release application was registered as Rent Case No.22 of 2011 and upon considering the facts of the case and pleadings of the parties as well as the evidence on record, the Prescribed Authority allowed the release application vide order dated 24.09.2012 and directed the petitioner-tenant to vacate the shop in dispute within a period of one month. 4. Aggrieved by the aforesaid order, Rent Appeal No.85 of 2012 was filed before the Additional District Judge, Court No.5, Kanpur Nagar under Section 22 of the UP Act No.13 of 1972 which was also dismissed vide order dated 09.10.2013. 5. The courts below have recorded concurrent findings of fact with regard to the relationship of the landlord and tenant having been established. 6. As regards the issue pertaining to the bona fide need there is a detailed discussion in the order passed by the Prescribed Authority wherein adverting to the guidelines contained under Rule 16 of the UP Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Rules, 1972 (The Rules, 1972) notice has been taken of the fact that the defendant-tenant had his own house situate in Kidwai Nagar, District Kanpur Nagar itself where eight shops had been constructed. The applicant-landlord was suffering from a disability and his son who was possessing a technical qualification i.e. diploma in animation, was unemployed, and wanted to set up his independent business. The applicant-landlord was suffering from a disability and his son who was possessing a technical qualification i.e. diploma in animation, was unemployed, and wanted to set up his independent business. In respect of the contention raised with regard to the landlord having an alternative accommodation at House No.124/B/152 the court below on the basis of the evidence on record has returned a finding that the said house belonged to the brother of the applicant-landlord. Based on the aforesaid the need set up by the landlord was held to be bona fide. 7. The Prescribed Authority as also the Appellate Authority have taken notice of the fact that the applicant-landlord in his affidavit filed as evidence, had asserted that the tenant had constructed an independent house of his own House No.124/18, Y-Block in Kidwai Nagar, Kanpur Nagar, where there were eight shops, and in one of the shops the tenant was having a business in the name of "M/s Luxmi Grihasthi Bhandar", and that the tenant could easily shift his business to any of his shops at Kidwai Nagar. The aforementioned fact was not controverted by the tenant in his affidavit filed as evidence. Accordingly, inference was drawn that the tenant had an alternative accommodation available to him where he could shift his shop. This together with the fact that despite pendency of the release proceedings the tenant did not make any effort to search for an alternative accommodation the issue with regard to comparative hardship was decided in favour of the landlord. 8. The only ground which has been pressed by the counsel for the petitioner-tenant before this Court is that the Prescribed Authority has not taken into consideration the factors enumerated under Rule 16(2) of the Rules, 1972 while considering the application for release under Section 21(1)(a) in respect of a building which had been let out to him for doing business. 9. In this regard it may be noted that the Prescribed Authority has not only adverted to the provisions contained under Rule 16(2), but has also discussed the legal position with regard to the same. The Prescribed Authority has referred to clause (b) of Rule 16(2) to record a finding that the tenant having available with him suitable accommodation to which he could shift his business without substantial loss there was a greater justification for allowing the release application. The Prescribed Authority has referred to clause (b) of Rule 16(2) to record a finding that the tenant having available with him suitable accommodation to which he could shift his business without substantial loss there was a greater justification for allowing the release application. Referring to clause (d), a finding has been returned that the son of the landlord had completed his technical education and obtained a diploma in animation, and being unemployed, wanted to set up his independent business, and accordingly the same was required to be given due consideration. While recording the finding in respect of comparative hardship in favour of the petitioner-landlord the Prescribed Authority has again adverted to the factors enumerated under clause (b) and clause (d) of Rule 16(2). 10. In this context the Prescribed Authority has referred to the judgment in the case of Rishi Kumar Govil Vs. Maqsoodan, 2007 4 SCC 645 for the proposition that where the tenant has available with him suitable accommodation to which he could shift his business there was a justification for allowing the release application. The Appellate Authority has also reiterated the findings recorded by the trial court with regard to bona fide need and comparative hardship on the basis of the evidence on record. 11. In view of the aforesaid, the contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the factors enumerated under Rule 16(2) of the Rules, 1972 have not been considered by the Prescribed Authority while recording the finding in respect of bona fide need and comparative hardship, cannot be accepted. 12. The learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance upon the judgment of this Court in Ashok Kumar Vs. VII-Additional District Judge, Muzaffar Nagar, (1998) 2 ARC 430 to support his argument based on Rule 16(2)(b) of the Rules, 1972. Paragraph 14 of the aforementioned judgment which has been referred to is being extracted below:- "14. Learned counsel for the contesting respondent Shri S.S. Tyagi vehemently argued that since tenant-petitioner has available with him alternative accommodation, he had no right to raise objection against the release application. It is well settled law that even where the tenant may be having another alternative accommodation, the landlord is not relieved of the burden of proving that the need set up by him is genuine and bona fide. It is well settled law that even where the tenant may be having another alternative accommodation, the landlord is not relieved of the burden of proving that the need set up by him is genuine and bona fide. The attention of the court was also invited to Rule 16(2)(b) which says that where the tenant has available with him suitable accommodation to which he can shift his business without substantial loss, there shall be greater justification for allowing the application. On the basis of this sub-rule, it was argued by the learned counsel for the respondents that since the petitioner-tenant has available with him suitable accommodation for shifting his business, the release application has rightly been allowed and, therefore, this court should not make interference in the order of the Appellate Authority. It may be relevant to mention here that Rule 16 provides guidelines which are to be considered by the concerned authorities while making comparison of hardship of the parties. The landlord is first to prove and establish his bona fide need for the disputed accommodation. In any view of the matter merely on the ground that some other accommodation is available to the tenant, Rule 16(2)(b) cannot be attracted. For attracting Rule 16(2)(b) the following conditions are essential; (a) that another accommodation is available to the tenant for shifting his business; (b) that such an accommodation is suitable for his business; and (c) that the shifting of business in that accommodation will be without any substantial to his business." 13. The aforementioned judgment can only be relied for the proposition that even in a case where the tenant is having another alternative accommodation the landlord would not be relieved of the burden of proving that the need set up by him was genuine and bona fide. In the facts of the present case, the plaintiff-landlord having duly established his need to be bona fide and findings having been returned by the authorities below in favour of the landlord on the question of comparative hardship, the petitioner-tenant cannot claim any benefit of the law laid down in the aforementioned judgment. 14. The learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondents places reliance upon a judgment in the case of Sushila Vs. 14. The learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondents places reliance upon a judgment in the case of Sushila Vs. II- Additional District Judge, Banda & Ors., (2003) 2 SCC 28 wherein referring to Rule 16(2) of the Rules, 1972 it was held that the factum of length of tenancy would be neutralized if the tenant had available to him another accommodation to which he could shift, moreso where the landlord admittedly had an unemployed son who needs to be established an independent business. The observations made in the aforementioned judgment in this regard are as follows:- "10. A bare perusal of Rule 16 of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Rules, 1972, makes it clear that the Rule only prescribes certain factors which have also to be taken into account while considering the application for eviction of a tenant on the ground of bona fide need. Sub-rule (2) of Rule 16 quoted earlier relates to the cases of eviction from an accommodation for business use. Clause (a) of sub-rule (2) provides, greater the period of tenancy less the justification for allowing the application; whereas according to clause (b) in case the tenant has a suitable accommodation available to him to shift his business, greater the justification to allow the application. Availability of another suitable accommodation to the tenant, waters down the weight attached to the longer period of tenancy as a factor to be considered as provided under clause (a) of sub-rule (2) of Rule 16. Yet another factor which may in some cases be relevant under clause (c) is where the existing business of the landlord is quite huge and extensive leaving aside the proposed business to be set up, there would be lesser justification to allow the application. The idea behind clause (c) is apparent i.e. where the landlord runs a huge business eviction may not be resorted to for expansion or diversification of the business by uprooting a tenant having a small business for a very long period of time. In such a situation if eviction is ordered it is definitely bound to cause greater hardship to the tenant. 11. In such a situation if eviction is ordered it is definitely bound to cause greater hardship to the tenant. 11. In the case in hand we find that even though the period of tenancy of the respondent is no doubt long but availability of another shop to him where he can very well shift his business as found by the prescribed authority, neutralises the factor of length of tenancy in the accommodation in dispute. We further find that the landlady has no other shop where she can establish her son who is married and unemployed. There is nothing on the record to indicate that the business of the father of Prem Prakash is so huge or that it is a very flourishing business so as to attract application of clause (c) of Rule 16(2). As observed earlier it is clear that the length of the period of tenancy as provided under clause (a) of sub-rule (2) of Rule 16 of the Rules, 1972 is only one of the factors to be taken into account in context with other facts and circumstances of the case. It cannot be a sole criterion or deciding factor to order or not the eviction of the tenant. Considering the facts in the light of Rule 16 pressed into service on behalf of the respondent, we find that according to the guidelines provided therein balance tilts in favour of the unemployed son of the landlady whose need is certainly bona fide and has also been so accepted by the respondent before us. 12. It may be mentioned that we are not taking into account clause (d) of sub-rule (2) Rule 16 of the Rules; where yet another factor is to be borne in mind, in favour of releasing the shop, if the person has some technical education to his credit but is not employed in any government service and wants to engage in self-employment. The petitioner had shown that her son Prem Prakash had undergone a training course in household electrical wiring and had obtained a certificate from Industrial Training Institute, Banda. He did not get any government job and wanted to be self-employed by starting a shop of electrical goods and utensils..." 15. In order to appreciate the rival contentions, Rule 16 of the Rules, 1972 upon which reliance has been placed by both the parties, is being reproduced below:- "16. He did not get any government job and wanted to be self-employed by starting a shop of electrical goods and utensils..." 15. In order to appreciate the rival contentions, Rule 16 of the Rules, 1972 upon which reliance has been placed by both the parties, is being reproduced below:- "16. Application for release on the ground of personal requirement.--(1) In considering the requirements of personal occupation for purposes of residence by the landlord or any member of his family, the prescribed authority shall, also have regard to such factors as the following-- (a) where the landlord already has adequate and reasonably suitable accommodation having regard to the number of members of his family and their respective ages and his means and social status, his claim for additional requirements shall be construed strictly; (b) where a residential building was let out at a time when the sons of the landlord were minors and subsequently one or more of them has married, the additional requirement of accommodation for the landlord's sons shall be given due consideration; (c) where the tenant has, apart from the building under tenancy other adequate accommodation, whether owned by him or held as tenant of any public premises, having regard to the number of members of his family and their respective ages and his social status, the landlord's claim for additional requirements shall be construed liberally; (d) where the tenant's needs would be adequately met by leaving with him a part of the building under tenancy and the landlord's needs would be served by releasing the other part, the prescribed authority shall release only the latter part of the building; (e) where there are a number of tenants separately occupying a block of tenements and the landlord desires their eviction on ground of his personal need the prescribed authority shall, consider whether suitable alternative accommodation is likely to be available to such tenants; (f) where the landlord offers to the tenant alternative accommodation reasonably suitable to the needs of the tenant and his family the landlord's claim for release of the building under tenancy shall be construed liberally; (g) where the landlord was engaged in any employment in the same city, municipality, notified area or town area in which the building is situate and was in occupation of other accommodation by reason of such employment or where the landlord is the wife or minor son or unmarried daughter of a person who was engaged in any profession, trade, calling or employment away from the city, municipality, notified area or town area within which the building is situate and was living with such person, and by reason of the cessation of such engagement, the landlord needs the building for occupation by himself for residential purposes, such need shall ordinarily be deemed sufficient. (2) While considering an application for release under clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 21 in respect of a building let out for purposes of any business, the prescribed authority shall also have regard to such facts as the following-- (a) the greater the period since when the tenant opposite party, or the original tenant whose heir the opposite party is, has been carrying on his business in that building, the less the justification for allowing the application; (b) where the tenant has available with him suitable accommodation to which he can shift his business without substantial loss there shall be greater justification for allowing the application; (c) the greater the existing business of the landlords own, apart from the business proposed to be set up in the leased premises, the less the justification for allowing the application, and even if an application is allowed in such a case, the prescribed authority may on the application of the tenant impose the condition where the landlord has available with him other accommodation (whether subject to the Act or not) which is not suitable for his own proposed business but may serve the purpose of the tenant, that the landlord shall let out that accommodation to the tenant on a fair rent to be fixed by the prescribed authority; (d) where a son or unmarried or widowed or divorced or judicially separated daughter or daughter of a male lineal descendant of the landlord has, after the building was originally let out, completed his or her technical education and is not employed in government service, and wants to engage in self-employment, his or her need shall be given due consideration. (3) Where the tenant being servant of Government or of any local authority or any public sector corporation does not contest the application, then a reasonable opportunity of being heard shall be given to the District Magistrate, who shall have the right to oppose the application." 16. In the case of Ragavendra Kumar Vs. Firm Prem Machinery & Co., (2000) 1 SCC 679 it was reiterated that the landlord is the best judge of his requirement for residential or business purposes and has complete freedom in the matter. The observations made in the judgment are as follows:- "10. In the case of Ragavendra Kumar Vs. Firm Prem Machinery & Co., (2000) 1 SCC 679 it was reiterated that the landlord is the best judge of his requirement for residential or business purposes and has complete freedom in the matter. The observations made in the judgment are as follows:- "10. ...It is true that the plaintiff landlord in his evidence stated that there were a number of other shops and houses belonging to him but he made a categorical statement that his said houses and shops were not vacant and that the suit premises is suitable for his business purpose. It is a settled position of law that the landlord is the best judge of his requirement for residential or business purpose and he has got complete freedom in the matter. See Prativa Devi v. T.V. Krishnan, (1996) 5 SCC 353 In the case in hand the plaintiff landlord wanted eviction of the tenant from the suit premises for starting his business as it was suitable and it cannot be faulted." 17. The factors enumerated under Rule 16(2) which are to be taken note of while considering an application for release under Section 21(1)(a), in respect of a building let out for the purposes of any business, fell for consideration in the case of Sushila Vs. II-Additional District Judge, Banda (supra) and it was held that the factor of length of tenancy would be neutralized if the tenant had available to him another accommodation to which he could shift; moreso where the landlord had an unemployed son who needs to be established in an independent business, and his own business is not so huge so as to tilt the balance in favour of the tenant. 18. In the case of Prativa Devi (Smt.) Vs. T.V. Krishnan, (1996) 5 SCC 353 while considering the issue of bona fide need, it was held that the landlord is the best judge of his residential requirement and that he had complete freedom in that matter and it was no concern of the courts to dictate to the landlord as to how and in what manner he should live or to prescribe for him a residential standard. The observations made in the aforementioned judgment are as follows:- "2. The observations made in the aforementioned judgment are as follows:- "2. The proven facts are that the appellant who is a widow, since the demise of her husband late Shiv Nath Mukherjee, has been staying as a guest with Shri N.C. Chatterjee who was a family friend of her late husband, at B-4/20, Safdarjang Enclave, New Delhi. There is nothing to show that she has any kind of right whatever to stay in the house of Shri Chatterjee. On the other hand, she is there merely by sufferance. The reason given by the High Court that the appellant is an old lady aged about 70 years and has no one to look after her and therefore she should continue to live with Shri Chatterjee, was hardly a ground sufficient for interference. The landlord is the best judge of his residential requirement. He has a complete freedom in the matter. It is no concern of the courts to dictate to the landlord how, and in what manner, he should live or to prescribe for him a residential standard of their own. The High Court is rather solicitous about the age of the appellant and thinks that because of her age she needs to be looked after. Now, that is a lookout of the appellant and not of the High Court. We fail to appreciate the High Court giving such a gratuitous advice which was uncalled for. There is no law which deprives the landlord of the beneficial enjoyment of his property. We accordingly reverse the finding reached by the High Court and restore that of the Rent Controller that the appellant had established her bona fide requirement of the demised premises for her personal use and occupation, which finding was based on a proper appreciation of the evidence in the light of the surrounding circumstances. 3. The learned counsel for the appellant however relies on the following observations made by a learned Single Judge (T.P.S. Chawla, J.) supposed to be based on the decision of this Court in Phiroze Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant N. Patel, (1974) 1 SCC 661 : (1974) 3 SCR 267 ] to the effect: "I think, the true test is whether, on an overall and reasonable view, it can be said that the landlord has suitable accommodation ''available for his use'. In deciding this question one should certainly have regard to the fact that the landlord has no legal right to the other accommodation, but that is only a factor and not the end of the matter." These observations proceed on a misunderstanding of the ratio of the decision of this Court in Phiroze Bamanji Desai case, (1974) 1 SCC 661 : (1974) 3 SCR 267 ] . The High Court was in error in laying down that the test is availability of alternative accommodation and not the legal right to such occupation in adjudging the bona fides of the claim of the landlord under Section 14(1)(e) of the Act. The decision of this Court in Phiroze Bamanji Desai case, (1974) 1 SCC 661 : (1974) 3 SCR 267 ] does not lay down any such proposition. On the contrary, this Court reversed the judgment of the Bombay High Court which proceeded upon that basis. In that case, the first floor was in occupation of the mother of the appellant as a tenant and the question was as to the availability of the Truth Bungalow which was given on leave and licence to one Dr Bharucha. The High Court came to the conclusion that the requirement of the appellant for the ground floor of the demised premises was not reasonable and bona fide since the appellant was in juridical possession of the Truth Bungalow. This Court in allowing the appeal observed: (SCC p. 668, para 8) "Now, it is true that when premises are given on leave and licence, the licensor continues, from a juridical point of view, to be in possession of the premises and the licensee is merely given occupation and therefore, strictly speaking the High Court was right in observing that the Truth Bungalow, which was given on leave and licence to Dr Bharucha, was in the possession of the appellant." The Court then pointed out: (SCC p. 668, para 8) "But for the purpose of determining whether the requirement of the appellant for the ground floor premises was reasonable and bona fide, what is necessary to be considered is not whether the appellant was juridically in possession of the Truth Bungalow, but whether the Truth Bungalow was available to the appellant for occupation so that he could not be said to need the ground floor premises. If the Truth Bungalow was in occupation of Dr Bharucha on leave and licence, it was obviously not available to the appellant for occupation and it could not be taken into account for negativing the need of the appellant for the ground floor premises." We accordingly overrule the decision of the Delhi High Court in Sat Pal v. Nand Kishore, 1983 ILR(Del) 73 as not laying down good law. 4. In the premises, the judgment of the High Court disallowing the appellant's claim cannot be supported. In considering the availability of alternative accommodation, the Court has to consider not merely whether such accommodation is available but also whether the landlord has a legal right to such accommodation. The appellant had established her bona fide personal requirement of the demised premises under Section 14(1)(e) of the Act and her claim could not be disallowed merely on the ground that she was staying as a guest with a family friend by force of circumstances." 19. In the case of Sait Nagjee Purushottam & Co. Ltd. Vs. Vimalabai Prabhulal & Ors., (2005) 8 SCC 252 it was held that in a case of an eviction suit filed on the basis of bona fide requirement of the landlord it is always the prerogative of the landlord to decide for what purpose he requires the premises in question and that it cannot be a ground to say that the landlord is already having his business at another place, therefore, such need is not a genuine need. It was also held that it is not the tenant who can dictate terms to the landlord and advise what he should do and what he should not, and then it is always the privilege of the landlord to choose the nature and place of his business. The observations made therein are as follows:- "4. First of all we shall take up the question of bona fide need of the landlords. So far as the partition of the property and the present premises coming to the share of the landlords are concerned, there is no dispute that the portion of the building has come to the share of the landlords and they are the owners as a result of the partition of the family properties. So far as the partition of the property and the present premises coming to the share of the landlords are concerned, there is no dispute that the portion of the building has come to the share of the landlords and they are the owners as a result of the partition of the family properties. But the question is whether the landlords who are the owners of the portion of the building have substantiated the allegation with regard to the bona fide need or not. We have gone through the findings of the trial court as well as that of the Appellate Authority and the High Court and after closely scrutinising the same, we do not think that the finding recorded by the appellate court and the High Court can be interfered with by this Court on the ground of being perverse or without any basis. The landlords have led evidence to show that one of their sons who had requisite qualification for starting a computer institute wants to establish the same at Calicut and others for extension of their business. The trial court as well as the first appellate court and the High Court examined the statements of PWs 2 and 3 and after considering their evidence, the appellate court reversed the finding of the trial court and held that the need of the respondent landlords to start a business at Calicut, is bona fide and genuine. It was held that it cannot be said that a person who is already having a business at one place cannot expand his business at any other place in the country. It is true that the landlords have their business spreading over Chennai and Hyderabad and if they wanted to expand their business at Calicut it cannot be said to be unnatural thereby denying the eviction of the tenant from the premises in question. It is always the prerogative of the landlord that if he requires the premises in question for his bona fide use for expansion of business this is no ground to say that the landlords are already having their business at Chennai and Hyderabad therefore, it is not genuine need. It is not the tenant who can dictate the terms to the landlord and advise him what he should do and what he should not. It is not the tenant who can dictate the terms to the landlord and advise him what he should do and what he should not. It is always the privilege of the landlord to choose the nature of the business and the place of business. However, the trial court held in favour of the appellant tenant. But the appellate court as well as the High Court after scrutinising the evidence on record, reversed the finding of the trial court and held that the need of establishing the business at Calicut by the landlords cannot be said to be lacking in bona fides." 20. The authorities below have also taken note of the fact that despite the pendency of the release proceedings the tenant did not make any effort to search for an alternative accommodation. In this regard reference may be had to the judgment in the case of Badrinarayan Chunilal Bhutada Vs. Govindram Ramgopal Mundada, (2003) AIR SC 2713 wherein it was held that in a case where the tenant did not make any effort to search for an alternative accommodation, the question of comparative hardship was to be decided against the tenant. 21. No other point was argued by the learned counsel for the petitioner. 22. There is no patent error in the findings recorded by the courts below in the orders impugned which are based upon due consideration of the facts of the case and an appreciation of the evidence led by the parties. 23. Counsel for the petitioner has not been able to point out any material error or illegality in the orders passed by the courts below. 24. The Prescribed Authority and the Appellate Authority having recorded concurrent findings of facts based upon appreciation of evidence, the scope of judicial review in exercise of writ jurisdiction under Article 226 in such a matter is extremely limited and such findings of fact recorded by statutory authorities unless they are demonstrated to be vitiated by manifest error of law or are shown to be patently perverse, are not to be interfered with. 25. In this regard reference may be had to the judgment in the case of Ashok Kumar & Ors. Vs. 25. In this regard reference may be had to the judgment in the case of Ashok Kumar & Ors. Vs. Sita Ram, (2001) 4 SCC 478 wherein in proceedings arising out of Section 21(1)(a) of the U.P. Act No.13 of 1972, the following observations were made with regard to the exercise of powers in writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. "17. The question that remains to be considered is whether the High Court in exercise of writ jurisdiction was justified in setting aside the order of the Appellate Authority. The order passed by the Appellate Authority did not suffer from any serious illegality, nor can it be said to have taken a view of the matter which no reasonable person was likely to take. In that view of the matter there was no justification for the High Court to interfere with the order in exercise of its writ jurisdiction. In a matter like the present case where orders passed by the Statutory Authority vested with power to act quasi-judicially is challenged before the High Court, the role of the Court is supervisory and corrective. In exercise of such jurisdiction the High Court is not expected to interfere with the final order passed by the Statutory Authority unless the order suffers from manifest error and if it is allowed to stand it would amount to perpetuation of grave injustice. The Court should bear in mind that it is not acting as yet another Appellate Court in the matter. We are constrained to observe that in the present case the High Court has failed to keep the salutary principles in mind while deciding the case." 26. Having regard to the facts of the case and the proposition of law as discussed above, there is no ground which may warrant interference with the orders which have been impugned in the present writ petition. 27. The petition is devoid of merits and is accordingly dismissed.