JUDGMENT : Suman Shyam, J. Heard Mr. P.J. Saikia, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner in both the writ petitions. I have also heard Mr. G.N. Sahewalla, learned senior counsel assisted by Mr. N. Anix Singh, learned counsel representing the respondents. 2. Both the writ petitions are founded on identical facts raising a common question of law and therefore, are being disposed of by this common order. 3. The writ petitioners had submitted their respective bids in response to the e-tender notice issued by the respondents for hiring 392 numbers of light vehicles. Upon opening of the bids, it transpired that the rate quoted by a number of bidders including the writ petitioners herein was the same. That being the position, the authorities resorted to ranking of the bidders as per the provision of Clause B.12.3 of the Tender Document by taking note of the operational experience of the bidders. It would be pertinent to mention herein that in terms of rates quoted, the writ petitioner in WP(C) No.493/2019 was L1 bidder whereas the writ petitioner in WP(C) No.494/2019 was L2 bidder and both of them come under the Micro Small Enterprise (MES) category of bidders. According to the writ petitioners, the respondents had evaluated the bids by taking recourse to Clause B.12.3 on the premise that there was a tie amongst the bidders on rates but the same was not the correct procedure for evaluation of bids under the Tender Document. 4. Mr. Saikia submits that Clause B.12.3 would come into play only when there is a tie amongst the bidders both on account of rate as well as the ownership experience covered under Clause A.4.1 of the bid document. It is the submission of learned counsel for the writ petitioners that owner s experience which falls under the ambit of Clause A.4.1 is distinct and different from the operational experience of the vehicle owners as defined in Clause B.12.3 and therefore, unless the bids were found to be equal both on account of the rates quoted by the bidders as well as owners experience, there was no scope for the respondents to hold that there was a tie. Therefore, submits Mr. Saikia, the decision to apply Clause B.12.3 in this case was wholly arbitrary. 5. With a view to expose the arbitrariness in the decision making process, Mr. Therefore, submits Mr. Saikia, the decision to apply Clause B.12.3 in this case was wholly arbitrary. 5. With a view to expose the arbitrariness in the decision making process, Mr. Saikia further submits that the writ petitioner in WP(C) No.493/2019 is the L-1 bidder but he has been allotted only two vehicles but the writ petitioner in WP(C) No.494/2019 despite having emerged as L-2 bidder, had been awarded three vehicles due to the faulty process in bid evaluation and ranking adopted by the respondents. Mr. Saikia has further argued that when the clauses in the tender document did not mention that a tie would only relate to equality of rate, there is no scope for this Court to supply words and expressions to the tender clauses which are unambiguous in nature. In support of his aforementioned argument, Mr. Saikia has relied upon and referred to the following decisions of the Supreme Court of India :- (1) Union of India vs. Deoki Nandan Aggarwal, (1992) Supp1 SCC 323. (2) Nasiruddin and others vs. Sita Ram Agarwal, (2003) 2 SCC 577 . 6. Refuting the contentions advanced on behalf of the writ petitioner, Mr. G. N. Sahewalla, learned senior counsel appearing for the respondents has argued that the tender document itself makes it clear that the ownership experience would come into play in case there is a tie amongst the L1 bidders. The learned senior counsel submits that there is nothing in the tender document which support the contention of the writ petitioner s counsel that the expression tie would include parity not only in rates but also on account of owners experience. Contending that the scope of interference in a tender process by the writ court would remain confined only to examining the decision making process and not the merit of the decision, Mr. Sahewalla submits that the respondents have followed a fair and transparent process while evaluating the bids by adhering to the conditions provided by the clauses contained in the Tender Document and hence, there is no scope for this Court to interfere with the evaluation process on the grounds urged by the writ petitioners. In support of his aforesaid argument, Mr. Sahewalla has relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court rendered in the case of Michigan Rubber (India) Limited vs. State of Karnataka and others, (2012) 8 SCC 216 . 7. In support of his aforesaid argument, Mr. Sahewalla has relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court rendered in the case of Michigan Rubber (India) Limited vs. State of Karnataka and others, (2012) 8 SCC 216 . 7. I have considered the submissions advanced by learned counsel for both the parties and have also perused the records produced by Mr. Sahewalla. After hearing the arguments of both the parties, this Court is of the opinion that the core issue that arises for decision in these writ petitions is pertaining to the question as to whether, the expression tie would apply only to the rates quoted by more than one L1 bidder or L2 bidder, as the case may be, or it would include the rate quoted by the bidders as well as the owners experience within the meaning of Clause A.4.1. 8. It would be pertinent to mention herein that Clause A.3.0 of the Tender Document provides the experience criteria according to which, the bidders must fulfil the experience criteria at Clauses A.4.1 or A.4.2 failing which, the bid shall be rejected. Clause A.3.0 is quoted herein below for ready reference :- A.3.0 Experience Criteria : The bidder must fulfil the experience criteria mentioned at A.4.1 or A.4.2 failing which the bid will be rejected. 9. Clause A.4.2 relates to drivers licence of light motor vehicle (LMV) and therefore, is not relevant for the purpose of this case. The contentious issue arising in these writ petitions would fall within the ambit of Clause A.4.1 and therefore, the said clause is extracted herein below for ready reference:- A.4.1 The bidder should be owner of minimum of 1 no. of Light Commercial Vehicle with four wheels not more than seven years old as on Techno-commercial bid opening date. The bidder shall furnish a list of light commercial vehicles with four wheels (not more than seven years old as on Techno-commercial bid opening date) owned by them giving particulars regarding registration No., Month and Year of manufacture, model and transfer of ownership, supported by copies of valid R.C. book, fitness certificate and documents duly attested by Notary and a certificate showing ownership issued by the concerned RTO. This ownership certificate to be issued by the concerned RTO should be issued between start date of selling of tender and last date of submission of tender failing which the offer shall be rejected straightway. Sl. This ownership certificate to be issued by the concerned RTO should be issued between start date of selling of tender and last date of submission of tender failing which the offer shall be rejected straightway. Sl. No. Light Commercial Vehicle (four wheel) Make & model Registration authority of vehicle Date from when the light commercial vehicles (having four wheels) is owned No. of days of ownership of Light commercial vehicle (having four wheels) upto TBO date. Total experience in days = total ownership days of all light commercial vehicles (having four wheels) which are owned by bidder. Note : (1) Light Commercial Vehicle should be registered in the name of the bidder. (2) The Light Commercial vehicle should be registered in the name of proprietorship firm or proprietor, if the bidder is a proprietorship firm. (3) The Light Commercial vehicle should be registered in the name of partnership firm or in the name of partner if the bidder is a partnership firm. (4) The Light Commercial vehicle should be registered in the Private Limited Company if the bidder is a Private Limited Company. (5) The Light Commercial vehicle should be registered in the Public Limited Company if the bidder is a Public Limited Company. 10. From a plain reading of Clause A.3.0 it would be clear that bidders who fail to qualify under Clause A.4.1 or A.4.2, as the case may be, their bids would be liable to be rejected. In other words, Clause A.4.1 or A.4.2 are the eligibility conditions, failure to comply with said conditions, would render the bidder ineligible to participate in the tender process. In other words, both these clauses lay down only the eligibility conditions of the bidders. 11. Clause B.12, on the other hand, deals with ranking and allotment of vehicles and as per Clause B.12.a, the bidders having operational experience in providing light commercial vehicles to various organisations mentioned therein were required to submit documentary evidence. Clause B.12.b lays down the procedure to be followed in case of a tie. For the sake of ready reference, Clause B.12.b is extracted herein below :- B.12.b In case of tie, the following allotment process shall be followed for each category of vehicle separately : (i) Bidder having operational experience as stipulated in B.12.a will be ranked higher than the bidder having experience as stipulated in A.4.1 or A.4.2 only. For the sake of ready reference, Clause B.12.b is extracted herein below :- B.12.b In case of tie, the following allotment process shall be followed for each category of vehicle separately : (i) Bidder having operational experience as stipulated in B.12.a will be ranked higher than the bidder having experience as stipulated in A.4.1 or A.4.2 only. (ii) Among bidders having operational experience, Bidder having more operational experience will be ranked higher than the bidder having less operational experience. (iii) Among bidders having experience as stipulated in A.4.1 or A.4.2 only, Bidder having more experience as per clause A.4.1 or A.4.2 will be ranked higher than the bidder having less experience as per clause A.4.1 or A.4.2. 12. From a plain reading of Clause B.12.b it is clear that in case of a tie the documentary evidences showing the operational experience of the bidders will be taken into account. The said exercise is to be carried out under Clause B.12 which deals with ranking and allotment of vehicles. 13. Clause B.12.3 deals with the procedure to be followed in case there are more than one bidder having L1 rank. Clause B.12.3 is reproduced herein below for ready reference :- B.12.3 (a) In case L-1 price is from a MSE bidder, L-1 MSE shall be awarded contract for their offered quantity limited to quantity as mentioned in Column 6 of the table above. In case, there are more than bidder having L-1 rank, then the L-1 bidder having maximum experience shall be awarded contract for their offered quantity limited to quantity as mentioned in Column 6 of the table above. In case quantity as mentioned in Column 6 of the table above is not fully allocated, then L-1 bidder with next maximum experience shall be awarded contract for one vehicle and this process shall be repeated till quantity as mentioned in Column 6 of the table above is fully allocated. During the above process, in case more than one L-1 bidder is having same experience, then a lottery shall be drawn among such L-1 bidders having tie to decide the allotment among such L-1 bidders having same rank & same experience. The L-1 bidders who is selected in the lottery would be awarded contract for one vehicle. Drawl of lottery will be continued till the quantity as mentioned in Column 6 of the table above is fully allocated. 14. The L-1 bidders who is selected in the lottery would be awarded contract for one vehicle. Drawl of lottery will be continued till the quantity as mentioned in Column 6 of the table above is fully allocated. 14. A conjoint reading of Clauses B.12.b and B.12.3 leaves no room for doubt that the ranking and allotment of vehicles under Clause B.12 is to be carried out by resorting to Clause B.12.b by taking note of owners experience and in case more than L1 bidder is having the same experience then the allotment is to be decided by draw of lottery as per the procedure prescribed in Clause B.12.3. The aforementioned clauses in the tender document make it amply clear that the criteria mentioned under Clause A.4.1 relates to eligibility condition of the bidder whereas those coming under Clause B.12 and the other sub-clauses thereunder would be applicable for assessing the operational experience of the bidders for the purpose of ranking and allotment of the vehicles. If that be so, the argument advanced by Mr. Saikia that the experience of the bidders under Clause A.4.1 would have to be clubbed with the rate quoted by each bidder for assessing whether or not there is a tie amongst the L-1 bidders appears to be superfluous argument and therefore, does not commend acceptance by this Court. 15. Law is well settled that Court cannot interfere with freedom of contract enjoyed by the State or its instrumentalities and it is only the decision making process that would be open to scrutiny of the Court in exercise of power of judicial review. In the case of Michigan Rubber (India) Limited (supra) the Hon'ble Supreme Court has categorically held that in matters of Government contract, the basic requirement of Article 14 is fairness in action by the State and non-arbitrariness in essence and substance is the heartbeat of fair play. Actions of the State or its instrumentality are amenable to the judicial review only to the extent that the State must act validly for a discernible reason and not whimsically for any ulterior purpose. In the case of Central Coalfields Limited and another vs. SLLSML (Joint Venture Consortium) and others, (2016) 8 SCC 622 the Supreme Court has observed that the terms of the NIT cannot be ignored as being redundant or superfluous and they must be given a meaning and the necessary significance. 16. In the case of Central Coalfields Limited and another vs. SLLSML (Joint Venture Consortium) and others, (2016) 8 SCC 622 the Supreme Court has observed that the terms of the NIT cannot be ignored as being redundant or superfluous and they must be given a meaning and the necessary significance. 16. In the present case, I find that the conditions laid down under Clause B.12 have a reasonable nexus with the purpose that is sought to be achieved and the criteria mentioned therein provides a fair and transparent basis for ranking of bidders when the price quoted by the same category of bidders turn out to be equal. The aforementioned clause in the tender document is not under challenge. It is also not in dispute that the ranking of bidders has been done by following Clause B.12 and the sub-clauses thereunder. Such being the position, I do not find any justifiable ground to interfere with the impugned decision of the respondent authorities. 17. For the reasons stated herein above, these writ petitions are held to be devoid of any merit and accordingly dismissed.