JUDGMENT : Pritinker Diwaker, J. This appeal arises out of impugned judgment and order dated 21/22.04.2009 passed by Additional Sessions Judge, Court Room No.5, Saharanpur in Sessions Trial Nos.554 of 2007,609 of 2007 and 610 of 2007, convicting the appellants under Sections 302/34 of IPC and sentencing them to undergo imprisonment for life, with a fine of Rs. 10,000/- each, in default thereof, one year rigorous imprisonment. However, the appellants have been acquitted of the charge under Section 25 of the Arms Act. 2. As per prosecution case, about a year prior to the date of incident, i.e. 24.5.2007, accused Bhullan abducted the daughter of Subhash (deceased), namely, Sangeeta. On the basis of a report lodged by Subhash, accused Bhullan was arrested and about a week prior to the incident, he was released on bail. Four days prior to 24.5.2007, one Naresh and Somdutt had approached Subhash, asking him to withdraw the case against accused Bhullan or to face consequences. Subhash had refused the demand of accused Bhullan and had decided not to withdraw the case against accused Bhullan. Annoyed with the decision of Subhash, on 24.5.2007 at about 6.00 pm, when Subhash was selling 'chat', accused Sushil and Bhullan reached there, carrying country made pistols with them and both of them caused firearm injuries to Subhash, resulting his instantaneous death. Incident has been witnessed by Surendra (PW-1), Raj Kumar (PW-2) and father of the deceased Mam Chandra. At 7:20 pm o 24.5.2007 itself, FIR Ex.Ka.3 was lodged by Surendra (PW-1) against the appellants, Naresh and Somdutt under Sections 302 and 120-B of IPC. Inquest on the dead body of the deceased was conducted vide Ex.Ka.20 on 24.5.2007 and the body was sent for postmortem which was conducted on 25.5.2007 vide Ex.Ka.2 by Dr. Ashok Agrawal (PW-3). 3. As per Autopsy Surgeon, following injuries were noticed on the body of the deceased: "1. Gun shot wound of entry 2 cm x 1 cm x chest cavity deep on right side front of chest 12 cm above from right nipple at 1 O'clock position 3.5 cm below sternal end of right clavicle. Margins are inverted. Colour of abrasion present. The wound is directed inwards downwards left side. 2. Gun shot wound of entry 1 cm x 1 cm x chest cavity deep on left side front of chest, 5 cm below from left nipple at 8 O'clock position. Margins are inverted. Margins are inverted. Colour of abrasion present. The wound is directed inwards downwards left side. 2. Gun shot wound of entry 1 cm x 1 cm x chest cavity deep on left side front of chest, 5 cm below from left nipple at 8 O'clock position. Margins are inverted. Colour of abrasion present. The wound is directed inwards, upwards, towards right side. 3. Gun shot wound of exit 3 cm x 1 cm x chest cavity deep on left side back of chest, 2 cm left to midline, 14 cm below of angle of left scapula. Margins are everted. On exploration-This injury is connecting/communicating to injury no.1. 4. Gun shot wound of entry 3 cm x 1.5 cm x bone deep on dorsal of right hand, just below base of right index finger. Margins are inverted. Blackening and tattooing present. Under Neath - Injury - Bones are fractured. 5. Gun shot wound of exit - 4 cm x 2 cm x bone deep on palmer aspect of right hand, just below base of right index finger. Margins are everted. On probing - This injury is communicating to injury no.4." The cause of death of the deceased was due to 'shock and haemorrhage as a result of antemortem injuries noted'. 4. Vide Ex.Ka.7 and Ex.Ka.9, country made pistols were seized from accused Bhullan and Sushil, however, there is no ballistic expert report in respect of these seized weapons. Likewise, vide Ex.Ka.19, blood stained soil was collected and was sent for FSL and as per FSL report, human blood was found in the soil. 5. Though in the FIR, Naresh and Somdutt have also been shown to be accused, but while filing the charge-sheet, prosecution has filed the same only against appellants, Sushil and Bhullan. 6. While framing charge, the trial Judge has framed charge against the appellants under Sections 302/34 of IPC and a separate charge was also framed against both the appellants under Section 25 of the Arms Act. 7. So as to hold the accused persons guilty, prosecution has examined ten witnesses, whereas two defence witnesses have also been examined. Statements of the accused persons were recorded under Section 313 of Cr PC, in which they pleaded their innocence and false implication. 8. 7. So as to hold the accused persons guilty, prosecution has examined ten witnesses, whereas two defence witnesses have also been examined. Statements of the accused persons were recorded under Section 313 of Cr PC, in which they pleaded their innocence and false implication. 8. By the impugned judgment, the trial Judge has convicted both the appellants under Sections 302/34 of IPC and sentenced them, as mentioned in para 1 of this judgment. However, they have been acquitted of the charge under Section 25 of the Arms Act. 9. Counsel for the appellants submits: (i) that the FIR appears to be ante timed. (ii) that the place of occurrence has not been proved by the prosecution. (iii that medical report of the deceased does not support the prosecution case and it appears that some third person may have killed the deceased, but taking the advantage of pendency of previous case between accused Bhullan and that of daughter of deceased Subhash, the appellants have been roped in. (iv) that in many places there is over writing in the G.D. entry. (v) that both Surendra (PW-1) and Raj Kumar (PW-2) have been examined as chance witnesses and from the evidence, it is apparent that neither they were present at the place of occurrence nor they have seen any such incident. (vi) that most important witness of the prosecution, Mam Chandra, father of Surendra (PW-1), Raj Kumar (PW-2) and the deceased has not been examined. (vii) that the investigation is faulty and there is delay in recording the diary statement of witnesses. (viii) that in the spot map, it has not been shown by the prosecution, as to where the accused persons were standing and from where they caused gun shot injuries to the deceased. Counsel for the appellants submits that nature and direction of wound sustained by the deceased makes it clear that the same has not been caused as alleged by the prosecution. (ix) that as per prosecution case, two firearm injuries have been caused by the accused persons, whereas three entry wounds reflect in the postmortem report. (x) that ballistic expert report does not support the prosecution case and that falsifies the first part of the incident, where it is alleged that the appellants have caused firearm injuries to the deceased. (ix) that as per prosecution case, two firearm injuries have been caused by the accused persons, whereas three entry wounds reflect in the postmortem report. (x) that ballistic expert report does not support the prosecution case and that falsifies the first part of the incident, where it is alleged that the appellants have caused firearm injuries to the deceased. It has been argued that the origin of the blood has not been proved by the prosecution and, therefore, seizure of blood stained soil is of no consequence. (xi) that scribe of the FIR, Vishwas (DW-1) has deposed that he prepared the written report at the dictate of the police officer. (xii) that identity of accused Sushil is doubtful because in the village, there were as many as four persons in the name of Sushil. 10. On the other hand, supporting the impugned judgment and order, it has been argued by learned counsel for the State and the complainant: (i) that Surendra (PW-1) and Raj Kumar (PW-2) appear to be natural eyewitnesses to the incident who reached their village after completing their day work. (ii) that the incident occurred just about three house away from the house of (PW-1) and (PW-2) and thus, their presence cannot be called as unnatural. (iii) that non examination of Mam Chandra, father of the deceased, (PW-1) and (PW-2) appears to be justified because he was an old man, aged more than 72 years. (iv) that there are no material contradictions in the statement of (PW-1) and (PW-2) and, therefore, defence cannot draw any advantage. (v) that a very prompt FIR has been lodged by Surendra (PW-1), eyewitness to the incident. The incident occurred at 6.00 pm, whereas FIR has been lodged at 7.20 pm, and the distance between the place of occurrence and that of police station is about 9 kms. (vii) that normally scribe of the FIR is the prosecution witness, however, as defence witness, even if he has stated that the report written by him was at the dictate of Police Officer, it will not give any benefit to the accused because ultimately lodger of the FIR (PW-1) has duly supported the prosecution case and has categorically stated it is he who lodged the FIR. (ix) that in respect of anomaly in the postmortem report of the deceased, it has been argued that only two entry wounds of gun shot injury have been found on the body of the deceased. While referring to injury no.4, it has been argued that gun shot injury first hit the finger of the deceased and thereafter had entered in his chest and, therefore, only three entry wounds have been shown and likewise, two exits wounds have been shown. (x) that defective investigation, if at all, is of no help to the accused persons in view of the trustworthy statement of Surendra (PW-1) and Raj Kumar (PW-2). Counsel for the State relied upon a judgment of the Apex Court in Hema v. State, thr. Inspector of Police, Madras, (2013) 10 SCC 192 and submitted that even if there are some defects in the investigation, the accused cannot be acquitted. 11. Surendra (PW-1) is the informant, eyewitness to the incident and a brother of the deceased. He states that he knew the accused persons present in the Court, they are friends and belong to same community. Daughter of the deceased (Subhash), namely Sangeeta was abducted about a year prior to the date of incident, i.e. 24.5.2007 and on the report of Subhash, a case was registered against accused Bhullan. About a week prior to the incident, accused Bhullan was released on bail and soon thereafter, he sent a message to Subhash through Naresh and Somdutt for withdrawal of the case and thereafter, he was threatened for dire consequences. He states that Subhash had refused to withdraw the case, as a result of which the appellants were having inimical relations with him. On 24.5.2007 at about 6.00 pm, when the deceased was selling 'chat' in the market, the appellants reached there, carrying country made pistols with them and caused firearm injuries to him, resulting his instantaneous death. He states that the incident has been witnessed by him, Raj Kumar (PW-2) and their father Mam Chandra. He further states that when an attempt was made by them to save the deceased, they were also threatened by the appellants and after committing offence, both the appellants fled away from the spot. He states that the written report was reduced by Vishwas (DW-1) and then the same was lodged in the police station. He further states that when an attempt was made by them to save the deceased, they were also threatened by the appellants and after committing offence, both the appellants fled away from the spot. He states that the written report was reduced by Vishwas (DW-1) and then the same was lodged in the police station. He further states that the report was read over to him and after understanding the same, he signed the same. In the cross examination, he states that he works as Labour and his working hours are from 8.00 am to 5.00 pm and after completing his work, he returns to his village. He states that normally he reaches to his house at about 6.00 pm. He further states that his brother Raj Kumar (PW-2) was also working as a Labour. He has stated that his father was aged about 70-75 years and an old and weak man. This witness was subjected to lengthy cross examination, but throughout he remained firm. Minor contradictions in the statement of this witness are required to be ignored as they do not go to the root of the matter and are of no help to the appellants. 12. Raj Kumar (PW-2), other eyewitness to the incident and a brother of the deceased, has also duly supported the prosecution case and has stated that in his presence and also in presence of Surendra (PW-1) and their father Mam Chandra, it is the appellants who caused firearm injuries to the deceased. In the lengthy cross examination, this witness also remained firm and nothing could be elicited from him. 13. Dr Ashok Agrawal (PW-3) has duly supported the prosecution case and has given details of injuries sustained by the deceased. 14. Vinod Singh (PW-4), registered the chik FIR; K P Sharma (PW-5), is the second Investigating Officer; Uday Raj (PW-6), is the first Investigating Officer; Sokendra Singh (PW-7), assisted during investigation; Mohd. Saleem (PW-8), is a witness to the FIR of the Arms Act; Arvind Kumar (PW-9) is the Investigating Officer of the Arms Act and Rashid Ahmad (PW-10), assisted during investigation. 15. Vishwas (DW-1) scribe of the FIR, has stated that he reduced the written report at the dictate of Station House Officer. B. Chand (DW-2) has not stated anything specific. 16. 15. Vishwas (DW-1) scribe of the FIR, has stated that he reduced the written report at the dictate of Station House Officer. B. Chand (DW-2) has not stated anything specific. 16. Close scrutiny of the evidence makes it clear that there was a previous enmity between appellant Bhullan and Subhash (deceased), as about a year prior to the date of incident, i.e. 24.5.2007, daughter of the deceased, namely, Sangeeta was abducted by accused Bhullan. After a year, appellant Bhullan was released on bail and soon thereafter, he sent a message to Subhash for withdrawal of the case and when Subhash had refused to succumb to his pressure, on 24.5.2007 at about 6.00 pm, both the appellants reached in the market and caused firearm injuries to the deceased, resulting his instantaneous death. Incident has been witnessed by Surendra (PW-1) and Raj Kumar (PW-2) and both these witnesses have duly supported the prosecution case. We have no reason to disbelieve the statement of these two eyewitnesses, who remained firm in their cross examination and have reiterated as to the manner in which, the deceased was done to death. Postmortem report of the deceased also supports the prosecution case. 17. There is no substance in the argument of the defence that the FIR is ante-dated. The incident occurred at 6.00 pm, FIR was lodged at 7.20 pm and the distance between the place of occurrence and that of police station is about 9 kms. Considering all these aspects of the matter, it can be easily said that the FIR is prompt. There is no evidence on record that within one hour and twenty minutes, lodger of the FIR concocted any false story or fabricated any evidence. There was hardly any time and chance for the prosecution to lodge an ante- timed FIR. We further find no substance in the argument of the defence that both Surendra (PW-1) and Raj Kumar (PW-2) were not present at the place of occurrence as they were in their working area. From the evidence, it is apparent that the incident occurred just about three house ahead from the house of (PW-1) and (PW-2) and as per their statements, they used to return in their village after completion of their work at around 6.00 pm. In view of the evidence available on record, both (PW-1) and (PW-2) appear to be natural eyewitnesses. From the evidence, it is apparent that the incident occurred just about three house ahead from the house of (PW-1) and (PW-2) and as per their statements, they used to return in their village after completion of their work at around 6.00 pm. In view of the evidence available on record, both (PW-1) and (PW-2) appear to be natural eyewitnesses. Non-examination of Mam Chandra, father of Surendra (PW-1), Raj Kumar (PW-2) and the deceased, does not affect the result of the trial and the prosecution was not unjustified in not producing the said witness before the Court considering the fact that he was an old and weak man, aged about 70-75 years. Moreover, when the statements of (PW-1) and (PW-2) are trustworthy, non-examination of Mam Chandra is of no advantage to the defence. We also find no substance in the argument of the defence that there are certain defects in the investigation and taking into account the said defects, the appellants are to be acquitted. Even assuming that there are some defects in the investigation, benefit thereof cannot be given to the accused. It is settled proposition of law that for certain defects in investigation, the accused cannot be acquitted. This aspect has been considered in various decisions. In C. Muniappan v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2010) 9 SCC 567 the following discussion and conclusion are relevant which are as follows:- "55. There may be highly defective investigation in a case. However, it is to be examined as to whether there is any lapse by the IO and whether due to such lapse any benefit should be given to the accused. The law on this issue is well settled that the defect in the investigation by itself cannot be a ground for acquittal. If primacy is given to such designed or negligent investigations or to the omissions or lapses by perfunctory investigation, the faith and confidence of the people in the criminal justice administration would be eroded. Where there has been negligence on the part of the investigating agency or omissions, etc. which resulted in defective investigation, there is a legal obligation on the part of the court to examine the prosecution evidence dehors such lapses, carefully, to find out whether the said evidence is reliable or not and to what extent it is reliable and as to whether such lapses affected the object of finding out the truth. which resulted in defective investigation, there is a legal obligation on the part of the court to examine the prosecution evidence dehors such lapses, carefully, to find out whether the said evidence is reliable or not and to what extent it is reliable and as to whether such lapses affected the object of finding out the truth. Therefore, the investigation is not the solitary area for judicial scrutiny in a criminal trial. The conclusion of the trial in the case cannot be allowed to depend solely on the probity of investigation. In Dayal Singh v State of Uttaranchal, (2012) 8 SCC 263 while reiterating the principles rendered in C. Muniappan (supra), the Apex Court held thus: "18. ... Merely because PW 3 and PW 6 have failed to perform their duties in accordance with the requirements of law, and there has been some defect in the investigation, it will not be to the benefit of the accused persons to the extent that they would be entitled to an order of acquittal on this ground. ..." In Gajoo v State of Uttrakhand, (2012) 9 SCC 532 while reiterating the same principle again, the Apex Court held that defective investigation, unless affects the very root of the prosecution case and is prejudicial to the accused should not be an aspect of material consideration by the Court. Since the Court has adverted to all the earlier decisions with regard to defective investigation and outcome of the same, it is useful to refer the dictum laid down in those cases: 20. In regard to defective investigation, this Court in Dayal Singh v. State of Uttranchal while dealing with the cases of omissions and commissions by the investigating officer, and duty of the court in such cases, held as under: (SCC pp. 280-83, paras 27-36) "27. Now, we may advert to the duty of the court in such cases. In Sathi Prasad v. State of U.P., this Court stated that it is well settled that if the police records become suspect and investigation perfunctory, it becomes the duty of the court to see if the evidence given in court should be relied upon and such lapses ignored. Noticing the possibility of investigation being designedly defective, this Court in Dhanaj Singh v. State of Punjab, held: (SCC p. 657, para 5) ''5. Noticing the possibility of investigation being designedly defective, this Court in Dhanaj Singh v. State of Punjab, held: (SCC p. 657, para 5) ''5. In the case of a defective investigation the court has to be circumspect in evaluating the evidence. But it would not be right in acquitting an accused person solely on account of the defect; to do so would tantamount to playing into the hands of the investigating officer if the investigation is designedly defective.' 28. Dealing with the cases of omission and commission, the Court in Paras Yadav v. State of Bihar enunciated the principle, in conformity with the previous judgments, that if the lapse or omission is committed by the investigating agency, negligently or otherwise, the prosecution evidence is required to be examined dehors such omissions to find out whether the said evidence is reliable or not. The contaminated conduct of officials should not stand in the way of evaluating the evidence by the courts, otherwise the designed mischief would be perpetuated and justice would be denied to the complainant party. 29. In Zahira Habibullah Sheikh (5) v. State of Gujarat, the Court noticed the importance of the role of witnesses in a criminal trial. The importance and primacy of the quality of trial process can be observed from the words of Bentham, who states that witnesses are the eyes and ears of justice. The court issued a caution that in such situations, there is a greater responsibility of the court on the one hand and on the other the courts must seriously deal with persons who are involved in creating designed investigation. The Court held that: (SCC p. 398, para 42) ''42. Legislative measures to emphasise prohibition against tampering with witness, victim or informant have become the imminent and inevitable need of the day. Conducts which illegitimately affect the presentation of evidence in proceedings before the courts have to be seriously and sternly dealt with. There should not be any undue anxiety to only protect the interest of the accused. That would be unfair, as noted above, to the needs of the society. On the contrary, efforts should be to ensure a fair trial where the accused and the prosecution both get a fair deal. Public interest in the proper administration of justice must be given as much importance, if not more, as the interest of the individual accused. That would be unfair, as noted above, to the needs of the society. On the contrary, efforts should be to ensure a fair trial where the accused and the prosecution both get a fair deal. Public interest in the proper administration of justice must be given as much importance, if not more, as the interest of the individual accused. In this courts have a vital role to play.' (emphasis in original) 30. With the passage of time, the law also developed and the dictum of the court emphasised that in a criminal case, the fate of proceedings cannot always be left entirely in the hands of the parties. Crime is a public wrong, in breach and violation of public rights and duties, which affects the community as a whole and is harmful to the society in general. 31. Reiterating the above principle, this Court in NHRC v. State of Gujarat held as under: (SCC pp. 777-78, para 6) ''6. ..."35. ... The concept of fair trial entails familiar triangulation of interests of the accused, the victim and the society and it is the community that acts through the State and prosecuting agencies. Interest of society is not to be treated completely with disdain and as persona non grata. The courts have always been considered to have an overriding duty to maintain public confidence in the administration of justice--often referred to as the duty to vindicate and uphold the ''majesty of the law'. Due administration of justice has always been viewed as a continuous process, not confined to determination of the particular case, protecting its ability to function as a court of law in the future as in the case before it. If a criminal court is to be an effective instrument in dispensing justice, the Presiding Judge must cease to be a spectator and a mere recording machine by becoming a participant in the trial evincing intelligence, active interest and elicit all relevant materials necessary for reaching the correct conclusion, to find out the truth, and administer justice with fairness and impartiality both to the parties and to the community it serves. The courts administering criminal justice cannot turn a blind eye to vexatious or oppressive conduct that has occurred in relation to proceedings, even if a fair trial is still possible, except at the risk of undermining the fair name and standing of the Judges as impartial and independent adjudicators." (Zahira Habibullah case, SCC p. 395, para 35)' 32. In State of Karnataka v. K. Yarappa Reddy, this Court occasioned to consider the similar question of defective investigation as to whether any manipulation in the station house diary by the investigating officer could be put against the prosecution case. This Court, in para 19, held as follows: (SCC p.720) ''19. But can the above finding (that the station house diary is not genuine) have any inevitable bearing on the other evidence in this case? If the other evidence, on scrutiny, is found credible and acceptable, should the court be influenced by the machinations demonstrated by the investigating officer in conducting investigation or in preparing the records so unscrupulously? It can be a guiding principle that as investigation is not the solitary area for judicial scrutiny in a criminal trial, the conclusion of the court in the case cannot be allowed to depend solely on the probity of investigation. It is well-nigh settled that even if the investigation is illegal or even suspicious the rest of the evidence must be scrutinised independently of the impact of it. Otherwise the criminal trial will plummet to the level of the investigating officers ruling the roost. The court must have predominance and pre-eminence in criminal trials over the action taken by the investigating officers. The criminal justice should not be made a casualty for the wrongs committed by the investigating officers in the case. In other words, if the court is convinced that the testimony of a witness to the occurrence is true the court is free to act on it albeit the investigating officer's suspicious role in the case.' 33. In Ram Bali v. State of UP, the judgment in Karnel Singh v. State of M.P. was reiterated and this Court had observed that: (Ram Bali case (SCC p. 604, para 12) ''12. ... In case of defective investigation the court has to be circumspect [while] evaluating the evidence. In Ram Bali v. State of UP, the judgment in Karnel Singh v. State of M.P. was reiterated and this Court had observed that: (Ram Bali case (SCC p. 604, para 12) ''12. ... In case of defective investigation the court has to be circumspect [while] evaluating the evidence. But it would not be right in acquitting an accused person solely on account of the defect; to do so would tantamount to playing into the hands of the investigation officer if the investigation is designedly defective.' 34. Where our criminal justice system provides safeguards of fair trial and innocent till proven guilty to an accused, there it also contemplates that a criminal trial is meant for doing justice to all, the accused, the society and a fair chance to prove to the prosecution. Then alone can law and order be maintained. The courts do not merely discharge the function to ensure that no innocent man is punished, but also that a guilty man does not escape. Both are public duties of the Judge. During the course of the trial, the learned Presiding Judge is expected to work objectively and in a correct perspective. Where the prosecution attempts to misdirect the trial on the basis of a perfunctory or designedly defective investigation, there the court is to be deeply cautious and ensure that despite such an attempt, the determinative process is not subverted. For truly attaining this object of a ''fair trial', the court should leave no stone unturned to do justice and protect the interest of the society as well. 35. This brings us to an ancillary issue as to how the court would appreciate the evidence in such cases. The possibility of some variations in the exhibits, medical and ocular evidence cannot be ruled out. But it is not that every minor variation or inconsistency would tilt the balance of justice in favour of the accused. Of course, where contradictions and variations are of a serious nature, which apparently or impliedly are destructive of the substantive case sought to be proved by the prosecution, they may provide an advantage to the accused. But it is not that every minor variation or inconsistency would tilt the balance of justice in favour of the accused. Of course, where contradictions and variations are of a serious nature, which apparently or impliedly are destructive of the substantive case sought to be proved by the prosecution, they may provide an advantage to the accused. The courts, normally, look at expert evidence with a greater sense of acceptability, but it is equally true that the courts are not absolutely guided by the report of the experts, especially if such reports are perfunctory, unsustainable and are the result of a deliberate attempt to misdirect the prosecution. In Kamaljit Singh v. State of Punjab, the Court, while dealing with discrepancies between ocular and medical evidence, held: (SCC p.159, para 8) ''8. It is trite law that minor variations between medical evidence and ocular evidence do not take away the primacy of the latter. Unless medical evidence in its term goes so far as to completely rule out all possibilities whatsoever of injuries taking place in the manner stated by the eyewitnesses, the testimony of the eyewitnesses cannot be thrown out.' 36. Where the eyewitness account is found credible and trustworthy, medical opinion pointing to alternative possibilities may not be accepted as conclusive. ''34. ... The expert witness is expected to put before the court all materials inclusive of the data which induced him to come to the conclusion and enlighten the court on the technical aspect of the case by [examining] the terms of science so that the court although, not an expert may form its own judgment on those materials after giving due regard to the expert's opinion, because once the expert's opinion is accepted, it is not the opinion of the medical officer but [that] of the court.'" Above proposition of law has been duly considered by the Apex Court in Hema (supra) and it has been further held by the Apex Court: "(13) It is clear that merely because of some defect in the investigation, lapse on the part of the I.O., it cannot be a ground for acquittal. Further, even if there had been negligence on the part of the investigating agency or omissions etc., it is the obligation on the part of the Court to scrutinize the prosecution evidence de hors such lapses to find out whether the said evidence is reliable or not and whether such lapses affect the object of finding out the truth." 18. Taking cumulative effect of the evidence and the proposition of law, this Court is of the view that the trial Judge was justified in convicting the appellants under section 302/34 of IPC. The appeal has no substance and the same is, accordingly, dismissed. As the appellants are reported to be in jail, no further order is required in their respect.