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2019 DIGILAW 1081 (GUJ)

Fun N. Fud v. GLK Associates

2019-11-11

J.B.PARDIWALA, VIRESHKUMAR B.MAYANI

body2019
JUDGMENT : J.B. PARDIWALA, J. 1. Rule returnable forthwith. Mr. Ruchir Patel, the learned counsel waives service of notice of rule for and on behalf of the respondents except the respondent no. 7 who is dead and gone. 2. By this application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the applicant calls in question the legality and validity of the order passed by the 2nd Additional District Judge, Dahod dated 22.10.2019 below Exh.7 in the Civil Misc. Application No. 45 of 2019, by which, the Court below declined to hear the Civil Misc. Application preferred by the applicant herein under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 [for short ‘The Act 1996’] on the ground that it had no jurisdiction to hear and entertain such application. The Court below returned the application preferred by the applicant to be presented before the Court of the Principal Senior Civil Judge, Dahod. 3. The facts giving rise to this application may be summarized as under: 3.1 The applicant herein preferred an application under Section 9 of the Act 1996 in the Court of the District Judge at Dahod, which came to be registered as the Civil Misc. Application No. 45 of 2019. In the said application preferred by the applicant herein, the applicant has prayed for the following reliefs: 22(A) That the opponents their representatives, agents, employees, assignees and every person claiming for, through and on behalf of them till the constitution of the Arbitral Tribunal may kindly be prohibited/restrained from disturbing, dispossessing or causing any disturbance/obstruction/obstacle in exclusive actual physical possession of the Possessed Leased Premises being legitimately held possessed by the applicant firm as a Lessee herein and accordingly the opponents, its agents, employees, attorneys, assignees, transferees and every person claiming for, through and on behalf of them may kindly be restrained from doing, causing or including in any acts, things or deeds amounting to disturbance, obstruction, invasion in the exclusive possession of the Possessed Leased Premises as held by the applicant firm. (B) That the opponents, their representatives, agents, employees, assignees and every person claiming for, through and on behalf of them till the constitution of the Arbitral Tribunal may kindly be prohibited/restrained from doing, carrying or indulging in any act, process or action either in or at or over the Possessed Leased Premises causing or likely to cause any obstacle, obstruction, disturbance and or dispossession of the Possession Leased Premises in any manner qua the applicant firm herein. (C) That the opponents, their representatives, agents, employees, assignees and every person claiming for, through and on behalf of them till the constitution of the Arbitral Tribunal may kindly be prohibited/restrained from doing carrying out indulging in any act, thing or process amounting to or likely to result in any disturbance, obstruction, prevention/prohibition in the ongoing business/occupation/activities/operations of the restaurant, hotel, banquet hall as run, managed and conducted by the applicant by virtue of the leasehold rights in the Possessed Leased Premises. (D) That the opponents, their representatives, agents, employees, assignees and every person claiming for, through and on behalf of them till the constitution of the Arbitral Tribunal may kindly be prohibited/restrained from doing, indulging or carrying out any act or process amounting to any change, modification and or any alteration in the Possessed Leased Premises and exclusive peaceful possession of the applicant as Lessee of the Possessed Leased Premises in any manner whatsoever. (E) That the opponents, their representatives, agents, employees, assignees and every person claiming for, through and on behalf of them till the constitution of the Arbitral Tribunal may kindly be prohibited/restrained from visiting, entering, approaching or in any way causing any process or privity in respect of the Possessed Leased Premises which is likely to cause or result in any obstruction, disturbance, obstacle against the applicant firm's lawful and exclusive possession as the Lessee of the Possessed Leased Premises and also in respect of the ongoing business being carried out from the Possessed Leased Premises. (F) That the opponents, their representatives, agents, employees, assignees and every person claiming for, through and on behalf of them till the constitution of the Arbitral Tribunal may kindly be prohibited/restrained from doing every act, thing or deed which can result or likely to result in disturbance, damage or adverse effect or likely to result in restriction, deprivation and or denial or constraint against the applicant in respect of its entire leasehold rights subsisting in the Possessed Leased Premises in any manner whatsoever. (G) That opponents and or every person claiming for and through on behalf of them may kindly be positively ordered to cease, desist and stop indulging in the prohibitory preventive actions having resulted in obstruction, disturbance, obstacle in the exclusive possession of the part of the possessed lease premises i.e. Part I as mentioned in the main petition and thereby the necessary orders and or mandatory directions may kindly be issued and passed to ensure restitution/continuation of the lawful and exclusive possession in respect of the part of the possession leased premises i.e. Part I as mentioned in the main petition. (H) Any other relief that this Honourable Court may deem fit in the larger interest of truth, legality, substantial justice and to uphold the purpose and faith in the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 against the opponents may also kindly be passed in favour of the applicant. 3.2 The 2nd Additional District Judge, Dahod on its own passed the impugned order dated 22.10.2019 holding as under: (3) Mr. Sumant has argued that according to the provision of the Arbitration Act, specifically Section 2(e) of the Act, this Court being Principal Civil Court in the District has only the jurisdiction to entertain present application and provision of Commercial Courts Act, 2015 so far as constitution of the Commercial Courts and its jurisdiction will not apply in the present case. He has further argued that because the Arbitration Act is substantial Act, provisions of Commercial Courts Act will not have any effect if the provisions are not in consonance with the provisions of the Arbitration Act. He has further argued that because the Arbitration Act is substantial Act, provisions of Commercial Courts Act will not have any effect if the provisions are not in consonance with the provisions of the Arbitration Act. (4) But this Court is of the view that the arguments are not acceptable, because if we peruse the provision of Section 21 of the Commercial Courts Act, then it is prescribed that “Save as otherwise provided, the provisions of this Act shall have effect, notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being in force or in any instrument having effect by virtue of any law for the time being in force other than this Act.” Therefore, according to this Court there is overriding Section and though the Arbitration Act is a substantial law, but the Commercial Courts Act came into force in the year 2015 i.e. after the Arbitration Act came into force. Therefore, it can be said that the Commercial Courts Act has overriding effect. Not only that but the State of Gujarat has issued Notification No. GK/09/2019/SPC/102017/GOI-44/D dated 15.04.2019 and by virtue of the said notification which has been issued by the Government of Gujarat after consultation with the Hon’ble Gujarat High Court, it is specified that all the Principal Senior Civil Judges in all district will have jurisdiction for dealing with the disputes of commercial nature which means that the Principal Senior Civil Judges are vested with the jurisdiction for the disputes of commercial nature. In the present case, there is no doubt that the dispute raised by the applicant is a commercial dispute and for that dispute in the Dahod District Principal Senior Civil Judge has been vested jurisdiction by virtue of above said notification. (5) Ld. Advocate Mr. Sumant for the applicant has argued that the notification has no effect when the Arbitration Act speaks about the definition of the Court and it is prescribed that the Court means Principal Civil Court and according to the provision of Gujarat Civil Courts Act, District Court is a Principal Civil Court. (5) Ld. Advocate Mr. Sumant for the applicant has argued that the notification has no effect when the Arbitration Act speaks about the definition of the Court and it is prescribed that the Court means Principal Civil Court and according to the provision of Gujarat Civil Courts Act, District Court is a Principal Civil Court. But this Court is of the view that the above mentioned notification of Legal Department issued in consultation with the Hon’ble Gujarat High Court is in existence and the said notification is not quashed and set aside and all the Principal Senior Civil Judges in the State of Gujarat are vested with the powers to deal with dispute in the nature of commercial disputes as a commercial Court. Therefore, the said notification has binding effect and hence following order is passed. ORDER: 1. This Civil Misc. Application is hereby returned to the applicant as this Court has no jurisdiction to deal with and applicant is directed to present this application before the Principal Senior Civil Court Dahod for hearing and disposal in accordance with the law, and this Civil Misc. Application is hereby disposed of accordingly. 3.3 Thus, the Court below took the view that the application preferred by the applicant herein under Section 9 of the Act, 1996 ought to have been filed in the Court of the Principal Senior Civil Judge, Dahod [Commercial Court] as the dispute between the parties is a commercial dispute under the provisions of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015. 4. Being dissatisfied with the impugned order passed by the Court below the applicant is here before this Court with the present application invoking the supervisory jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 5. Mr. Shalin Mehta, the learned senior counsel assisted by Mr. Aditya Pandya, the learned counsel appearing for the applicant vehemently submitted that the Court below committed a serious error in passing the impugned order. 6. Mr. Mehta would submit that the case on hand is one, in which, the Court below declined to exercise its jurisdiction though vested in law. According to Mr. Aditya Pandya, the learned counsel appearing for the applicant vehemently submitted that the Court below committed a serious error in passing the impugned order. 6. Mr. Mehta would submit that the case on hand is one, in which, the Court below declined to exercise its jurisdiction though vested in law. According to Mr. Mehta, the Court below appears to be labouring under an erroneous misconception of law that if the dispute between the parties is a commercial dispute falling within the provisions of the Act 2015, then an application under Section 9 of the Act 1996 has to be filed only before the Commercial Court and not before the District Court, which is a Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in a District. Mr. Mehta vehemently submitted that the Court below overlooked the provision of Section 11 of the Act 2015. According to Mr. Mehta, Section 11 specifies the bar of jurisdiction of the Commercial Courts and Commercial Divisions from entertaining or deciding any suit, application or proceedings relating to any commercial dispute in respect of which the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is either expressly or impliedly barred under any other law for the time being in force. In this regard Mr. Mehta invited the attention of this Court first to the definition of the term “Court” as defined under Clause (e) of Section 2 of the Act 1996. Mr. Mehta thereafter invited the attention of this Court to Section 12 of the Gujarat Civil Courts Act, 2005 which lays down that the Court of a District Judge shall be the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction within the local limits of its jurisdiction. Mr. Mehta thereafter invited the attention of this Court to Section 2(b), 3 and 10 of the Act, 2015. Mr. Mehta also invited the attention of this Court to a Notification dated 15th April, 2019 issued by the Legal Department of the Government of Gujarat specifying the Courts in the area of local limits of their jurisdiction for dealing with the disputes of Commercial nature having valuation of not less than rupees three lakh. 7. Mr. Mehta submitted that Section 2 (e)(i) of the Act 1996 expressly excludes any Civil Court of a grade inferior to such Principal Civil Court, or any Court of small Causes. According to Mr. 7. Mr. Mehta submitted that Section 2 (e)(i) of the Act 1996 expressly excludes any Civil Court of a grade inferior to such Principal Civil Court, or any Court of small Causes. According to Mr. Mehta, in view of Section 11 of the Act 2015, which bars a Commercial Court from deciding any suit, application or proceedings relating to any commercial dispute in respect of which the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is either expressly or impliedly barred under any other law for the time being in force; read with the provisions of Section 9 of the Act 1996 any Commercial Court which is a Civil Court of a grade inferior to such Principal Civil Court, or any Court of Small Causes, would be barred from exercising jurisdiction under Section 9 or any provisions of the Act 1996. 8. Mr. Mehta in support of his aforesaid submissions has placed strong reliance on a Division Bench decision of this Court in the case of Kirtikumar Futarmal Jain vs. Valencia Corporation, Special Civil Application No. 15145 of 2019, decided on 13.09.2019. Mr. Mehta submitted that Kirtikumar Jain (supra) was specifically referred to and relied upon before the Court below, but unfortunately, the Court below has not even referred to the same. In such circumstances referred to above, Mr. Mehta prays that there being merit in this application, the same be allowed and the impugned order be quashed. 9. On the other-hand, Mr. Ruchir Patel, the learned counsel appearing for the respondents very fairly submitted that the Court below committed an error in passing the impugned order. According to Mr. Patel, without there being any objection raised at the instance of his clients, the Court on its own suo-moto passed the impugned order. Even according to Mr. Patel, the issue is squarely covered by the decision of this Court rendered in the case of Kirtikumar Jain (Supra). In such circumstances, according to Mr. Patel, the impugned order may be quashed and the Court below may be directed to decide the application preferred by the applicant under Section 9 of the Act 1996 on its own merits. 10. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and having gone through the materials on record, the only question that falls for our consideration is whether the Court below committed any error in passing the impugned order. 11. 10. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and having gone through the materials on record, the only question that falls for our consideration is whether the Court below committed any error in passing the impugned order. 11. Before adverting to the submissions canvassed by Mr. Mehta, the learned senior counsel appearing for the applicant, we must look into the Notification issued by the State Government in its Legal Department, which has created lot of problems for the Courts across the State of Gujarat and also, other relevant provisions of the Act 1996 as well as the Act 2015. 12. The Notification dated 15th April 2019 reads thus: NOTIFICATION Legal Department Sachivalaya, Gandhinagar Dated the, 15th April, 2019 Commercial Courts, Act, 2015 No. GK/09/2019/SPC/102017/GOI-44/D - In exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (1) of Section 3 read with sub-section (1A) of the said Section 3 of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 (4 of 2015) and in super-session of the Government Notification, Legal Department No. GK/52/2017/GOI-44/D, dated the 16th August, 2017, the Government of Gujarat, after consultation with the High Court of Gujarat, hereby specifies the following Courts shown in Column 2 of Schedule appended here to in the area of local limits of their jurisdiction specified in column 3 of the said Schedule for dealing with disputes of Commercial nature having valuation of not less than rupees three lakhs rupees, as follows: SCHEDULE S. No. Name of the Court Areas of Jurisdiction 1 A Senior Judge of the City Civil Court Ahmedabad 2 All the Principal Senior Civil Judge All Districts 3 The Principal Senior Civil Judge and 2nd Senior Civil Judges Ahmedabad (Rural) Vadodara Rajkot Surat 4 The Chief Judge of Small Cause Court Ahmedabad 5 Senior Judge, Small Cause Court Vadodara Rajkot Surat By order and in the name of the Governor of Gujarat. [H.H. Varma] Deputy Secretary to Government. [H.H. Varma] Deputy Secretary to Government. *** *** *** *** *** NOTIFICATION Legal Department Sachivalaya, Gandhinagar Dated the, 15th April, 2019 Commercial Courts, Act, 2015 No. GK/10/2019/SPC/102017/GOI-44/D - In exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section 3A read with sub-section (1) of the Section 13 of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 (4 of 2015), the Government of Gujarat, after consultation with the High Court of Gujarat, hereby designates the following Courts as Commercial Appellate Court as shown in Column 2 of the Schedule, as follows: SCHEDULE S. No. Name of the Court 1 The Principal Judge, City Civil Court, Ahmedabad. 2 All the Principal District Judge in the State. By order and in the name of the Governor of Gujarat. [H.H. Varma] Deputy Secretary to Government. 13. Section 2(e) of the Act, 1996 defines the term “Court.” It reads thus: 2(e) “Court” means: (i) in the case of an arbitration other than international commercial arbitration, the principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in a district and includes the High Court in exercise of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction, having jurisdiction to decide the questions forming the subject-matter of the arbitration if the same had been the subject-matter of a suit, but does not include any Civil Court of a grade inferior to such principal Civil Court, or any Court of Small Causes. (ii) in the case of international commercial arbitration, the High Court in exercise of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction, having jurisdiction to decide the questions forming the subject-matter of the arbitration if the same had been the subject-matter of a suit, and in other cases, a High Court having jurisdiction to hear appeals from decrees of courts subordinate to that High Court. 14. Section 9 of the Act, 1996 reads thus: 9. Interim measures, etc. by Court - (1) A party may, before or during arbitral proceedings or at any time after the making of the arbitral award but before it is enforced in accordance with Section 36, apply to a court: (i) for the appointment of a guardian for a minor or person of unsound mind for the purposes of arbitral proceedings. (ii) for an interim measure of protection in respect of any of the following matters, namely:- (a) the preservation, interim custody or sale of any goods which are the subject-matter of the arbitration agreement. (b) securing the amount in dispute in the arbitration. (ii) for an interim measure of protection in respect of any of the following matters, namely:- (a) the preservation, interim custody or sale of any goods which are the subject-matter of the arbitration agreement. (b) securing the amount in dispute in the arbitration. (c) the detention, preservation or inspection of any property or thing which is the subject-matter of the dispute in arbitration, or as to which any question may arise therein and authorising for any of the aforesaid purposes any person to enter upon any land or building in the possession of any party, or authorising any samples to be taken or any observation to be made, or experiment to be tried, which may be necessary or expedient for the purpose of obtaining full information or evidence. (d) interim injunction or the appointment of a receiver. (e) such other interim measure of protection as may appear to the Court to be just and convenient, and the Court shall have the same power for making orders as it has for the purpose of, and in relation to, any proceedings before it. (2) Where, before the commencement of the arbitral proceedings, a Court passes an order for any interim measure of protection under sub-section (1), the arbitral proceedings shall be commenced within a period of ninety days from the date of such order or within such further time as the Court may determine. (3) Once the arbitral tribunal has been constituted, the Court shall not entertain an application under sub-section (1), unless the Court finds that circumstances exist which may not render the remedy provided under Section 17 efficacious. 15. Section 12 of the Gujarat Civil Courts Act, 2005 is with respect to the “Jurisdiction of a Court of District Judge.” The Section 12 reads thus: 12. Jurisdiction of a court of District Judge: (1) A Court of District Judge shall be the principal civil court of original jurisdiction within the local limits of its jurisdiction. (2) Subject to the provisions of the Code, the jurisdiction of a court of District Judge shall extend to all original suits and proceedings of a civil nature. (3) A Court of District Judge shall, subject to the general control of the High Court, have control over all other civil courts within the local limits of its jurisdiction. 16. (2) Subject to the provisions of the Code, the jurisdiction of a court of District Judge shall extend to all original suits and proceedings of a civil nature. (3) A Court of District Judge shall, subject to the general control of the High Court, have control over all other civil courts within the local limits of its jurisdiction. 16. Section 2(b) defines the term “Commercial Court.” The same reads thus: 2(b) “Commercial Court” means the Commercial Court constituted under sub-section (1) of Section 3. 17. Section 3 of the Act, 2015 provides that the “Constitution of the Commercial Courts.” The same reads thus: 3. Constitution of Commercial Courts - (1) The State Government, may after consultation with the concerned High Court, by notification, constitute such number of Commercial Courts at District level, as it may deem necessary for the purpose of exercising the jurisdiction and powers conferred on those Courts under this Act: Provided that with respect to the High Courts having ordinary original civil jurisdiction, the State Government may, after consultation with the concerned High Court, by notification, constitute Commercial Courts at the District Judge level: Provided further that with respect to a territory over which the High Courts have ordinary original civil jurisdiction, the State Government may, by notification, specify such pecuniary value which shall not be less than three lakh rupees and not more than the pecuniary jurisdiction exercisable by the District Courts, as it may consider necessary. (1A) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, the State Government may, after consultation with the concerned High Court, by notification, specify such pecuniary value which shall not be less than three lakh rupees or such higher value, for whole or part of the State, as it may consider necessary. (2) The State Government shall, after consultation with the concerned High Court specify, by notification, the local limits of the area to which the jurisdiction of a Commercial Court shall extend and may, from time to time, increase, reduce or alter such limits. (3) The [State Government may] with the concurrence of the Chief Justice of the High Court appoint one or more persons having experience in dealing with commercial disputes to be the Judge or Judges, of a [Commercial Court either at the level of District Judge or a court below the level of a District Judge]. (3) The [State Government may] with the concurrence of the Chief Justice of the High Court appoint one or more persons having experience in dealing with commercial disputes to be the Judge or Judges, of a [Commercial Court either at the level of District Judge or a court below the level of a District Judge]. (3A) Designation of Commercial Appellate Courts - Except the territories over which the High Courts have ordinary original civil jurisdiction, the State Government may, after consultation with the concerned High Court, by notification, designate such number of Commercial Appellate Courts at District Judge level, as it may deem necessary, for the purposes of exercising the jurisdiction and powers conferred on those Courts under this Act. 18. Section 10 of the Act 2015 is with respect to the “Jurisdiction in respect of arbitration matters.” Section 10 reads thus: 10. Jurisdiction in respect of arbitration matters - Where the subject-matter of an arbitration is a commercial dispute of a Specified Value: (1) If such arbitration is an international commercial arbitration, all applications or appeals arising out of such arbitration under the provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (26 of 1996) that have been filed in a High Court, shall be heard and disposed of by the Commercial Division where such Commercial Division has been constituted in such High Court. (2) If such arbitration is other than an international commercial arbitration, all applications or appeals arising out of such arbitration under the provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (26 of 1996) that have been filed on the original side of the High Court, shall be heard and disposed of by the Commercial Division where such Commercial Division has been constituted in such High Court. (3) If such arbitration is other than an international commercial arbitration, all applications or appeals arising out of such arbitration under the provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (26 of 1996) that would ordinarily lie before any principal civil court of original jurisdiction in a district (not being a High Court) shall be filed in, and heard and disposed of by the Commercial Court exercising territorial jurisdiction over such arbitration where such Commercial Court has been constituted. 19. 19. Section 11 of the Act 2015 specifically ‘bars the jurisdiction of Commercial Courts and Commercial Divisions’ in which the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is either expressly or impliedly barred under any other law for the time being in force. Section 11 reads thus: 11. Bar of jurisdiction of Commercial Courts and Commercial Divisions - Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, a Commercial Court or a Commercial Division shall not entertain or decide any suit, application or proceedings relating to any commercial dispute in respect of which the jurisdiction of the civil court is either expressly or impliedly barred under any other law for the time being in force. 20. Section 21 of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 reads thus: 21. Act to have overriding effect - Save as otherwise provided, the provisions of this Act shall have effect, notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being in force or in any instrument having effect by virtue of any law for the time being in force other than this Act. 21A. Power of Central Government to make rules - (1) The Central Government may, by notification, make rules for carrying out the provisions of this Act. (2) In particular and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing power, such rules may provide for or any of the following matters, namely:- (a) the manner and procedure of pre-institution mediation under sub-section (1) of Section 12A. (b) any other matter which is required to be, or may be, prescribed or in respect of which provision is to be made by rules made by the Central Government. (b) any other matter which is required to be, or may be, prescribed or in respect of which provision is to be made by rules made by the Central Government. (3) Every rule made by the Central Government under this Act shall be laid, as soon as may be after it is made, before each House of Parliament, while it is in session, for a total period of thirty days which may be comprised in one session, or in two or more successive sessions and if, before the expiry of the session immediately following the session or the successive sessions aforesaid, both Houses agree in making any modification in the rule, or both Houses agree that the rule should not be made, the rule shall thereafter have effect only in such modified form or be of no effect, as the case may be; so, however, that any such modification or annulment shall be without prejudice to the validity of anything previously done under that rule. 21. We now come to the decision of this Court in the case of Kirtikumar Jain (Supra). In the said case, the challenge was to the order passed by the Principal District Judge, Surat in the Commercial Appeal, whereby the appeal preferred by the respondents against the order passed by the Arbitral Tribunal on the application made by the applicant under Section 17 of the Act, 1996 came to be rejected and the application filed by the respondents under Section 37(2) of the Act 1996 came to be allowed. The petitioner in such circumstances approached the Commercial Court at Vadodara by way of an application under Section 9 of the Act, 1996 being a Commercial Civil Misc. Application with the prayer that the respondents be restrained from transferring or alienating the properties of the firm or creating any right in favour of the any third party. On behalf of the petitioner it was argued that the impugned order passed by the Principal District Judge was without jurisdiction inasmuch as the Principal District Judge had no power to entertain an application under Section 37 of the Act, 1996. The submissions canvassed by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner in the said case have been recorded by the Coordinate Bench of this Court in paragraph-15 of the judgment. Paragraph-15 reads thus: 15. Mr. Anshin Desai, Senior Advocate, learned counsel with Mr. The submissions canvassed by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner in the said case have been recorded by the Coordinate Bench of this Court in paragraph-15 of the judgment. Paragraph-15 reads thus: 15. Mr. Anshin Desai, Senior Advocate, learned counsel with Mr. Aditya Pandya, learned advocate for the petitioner, invited the attention of the court to the facts of the case as noted hereinabove and narrated in detail in the memorandum of petition. It was submitted that the impugned order passed by the learned Principal District Judge is without jurisdiction inasmuch as the learned Principal District Judge did not have the power to entertain such application under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act. The attention of the court was invited to the provisions of Section 37 of the Arbitration Act, to submit that an appeal lies against the orders referred to therein to the court authorised by law to hear appeals from original decrees of the court passing the order. Reference was made to the provisions of Section 10 of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 which provides the jurisdiction in respect of arbitration matters and lays down the courts which would have jurisdiction to decide applications and appeals in the matters referred to therein. Reference was made to sub-section (3) Section of 10 of the Commercial Courts Act which provides that if such arbitration is other than an international commercial arbitration, all applications or appeals arising out of such arbitration under the provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 that would ordinarily lie before any principal civil court of original jurisdiction in a district (not being a High Court) shall be filed in, and heard and disposed of by the Commercial Court exercising territorial jurisdiction over such arbitration where such Commercial Court has been constituted. The attention of the court was invited to the definition of “Commercial Court” as defined in clause (b) of Section 2 of the Commercial Courts Act which provides that “Commercial Court” means the Commercial Court constituted under sub-section (1) of Section 3 thereof. It was pointed out that sub-section (1) of Section 3 provides that the State Government, may after consultation with the concerned High Court, by notification, constitute such number of Commercial Courts at District level, as it may deem necessary for the purpose of exercising the jurisdiction and powers conferred on those Courts under the Act. It was pointed out that sub-section (1) of Section 3 provides that the State Government, may after consultation with the concerned High Court, by notification, constitute such number of Commercial Courts at District level, as it may deem necessary for the purpose of exercising the jurisdiction and powers conferred on those Courts under the Act. It was pointed out that in exercise of powers conferred by sub-section (1) of Section 3 read with sub-section (1A) of Section 3 of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, the Government of Gujarat has issued a notification after consultation with the High Court specifying the courts shown in column 2 of the Schedule appended thereto in the area of local limits of jurisdiction specified in column 3 of the said Schedule for dealing with disputes of commercial nature having valuation of not less than rupees three lakhs. It was pointed out that insofar as the District of Surat is concerned, the Principal Senior Civil Judge and Second Senior Civil Judges have been designated as Commercial Courts. It was submitted that therefore, the Principal District Judge had no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal against the order passed by the Arbitral Tribunal. 22. We also quote the Paragraphs 16.1, 16.2, 16.3, 16.4 as under: 16.1 Insofar as the jurisdiction of the learned Principal District Judge to entertain the appeal under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act is concerned, the learned counsel invited the attention of the court to sub-section (2) of Section 37 of the Arbitration Act to submit that the appeal in the present case is preferred under clause (b) of sub-section (2) of Section 37, which provides for an appeal to a court from an order of an Arbitral Tribunal granting or refusing to grant an interim measure under Section 17 of that Act. It was submitted that the expression employed in sub-section (2) of Section 37 is “court.” Reference was made to clause (e) of Section 2 of the Arbitration Act, which defines “court” to mean, in the case of an arbitration other than international commercial arbitration, the principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in a district, and includes the High Court in exercise of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction, having jurisdiction to decide the question forming the subject matter of the arbitration if the same had been the subject matter of a suit, but does not include any civil court of a grade inferior to such principal Civil Court, or any Court of Small Causes. It was submitted that therefore clause (e) of Section 2 of the Arbitration Act lays down that “court” shall mean the principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in a district, and specifically excludes any civil court of a grade inferior to such principal Civil Court or any court of Small Causes. 16.2 Reference was made to Section 12 of the Gujarat Civil Courts Act, 2005, which provides for jurisdiction of a court of District Judge and postulates that a court of District Judge shall be the principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction within the local limits of its jurisdiction. It was submitted that the word “court” used under Section 37(2)(b) of the Arbitration Act is the District Court. Moreover, Section 2(e) of the Arbitration Act, specifically excludes any court of a grade inferior to such principal Civil Court or any Court of Small Causes from the ambit of the expression “court.” It was submitted that source of appeal in this case is under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act and the right flows from Section 37. It was submitted that access to such appeal can be channelised through the concerned Section of the Commercial Courts Act, but the right to appeal does not flow from the Commercial Courts Act. 16.3 The learned counsel next drew that attention of the court to Section 10 of the Commercial Courts Act, to submit that Commercial Court contemplated under sub-section (3) of Section 10 can never be a court other than a District Court; as otherwise there would be a direct conflict between the provisions of the Arbitration Act and the provisions of the Commercial Courts Act. It was submitted that if the submission of the petitioner were to be accepted, Section 10(3) of the Commercial Courts Act would have the effect of taking away the right to appeal before the principal Civil Court, namely the District Court, under Section 37(2)(b) of the Arbitration Act which is not permissible in law. It was submitted that insofar as the notification dated 15.4.2019 issued by the State Government under Section 3((1) read with Section 3(1A) of the Commercial Courts Act is concerned, it would not have an effect of taking away the right flowing under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, inasmuch as a notification cannot take away the statutory right of appeal under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act. 16.4 Reference was also made to Section 11 of the Commercial Courts Act, which provides for bar of jurisdiction of Commercial Courts and Commercial Divisions, to submit that same provide that notwithstanding anything contained in that Act, a Commercial Court or a Commercial Division shall not entertain or decide any suit, application or proceedings relating to any commercial dispute in respect of which the jurisdiction of the civil court is either expressly or impliedly barred under any other law for the time being in force. It was pointed out that Section 2(e) of the Arbitration Act clearly excludes any civil court of a grade inferior to such principal Civil Court, or any Court of Small Causes from the meaning of the expression “court” to submit that, therefore, in view of Section 11 of the Commercial Courts Act, a Commercial Court other than the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in the district, would have no jurisdiction to decide an appeal under Section 37 of the Act. It was submitted that, therefore, the appeal was rightly transferred to the District Court which is otherwise the concerned appellate court. 23. This Court ultimately held as under: 20.1 In the present case, the appeal under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act has been preferred by the respondents before the Commercial Court at Vadodara, against an order granting interim measures under Section 17 of the Arbitration Act. Therefore, the appeal preferred by the respondents was under clause (b) of sub-section (2) of Section 37 of the Arbitration Act. Therefore, the appeal preferred by the respondents was under clause (b) of sub-section (2) of Section 37 of the Arbitration Act. In this regard it may be noted that sub-section (1) of Section 37 deals with orders passed by courts and postulates that an appeal shall lie to the court authorized by law to hear appeal from original decrees of the court passing the order; sub-section (2) which deals with orders passed by the Arbitral Tribunal provides that an appeal shall lie to a court from the order of the Arbitral Tribunal. 20.2 The expression ‘court’ has been defined under clause (e) of Section 2 of the Arbitration Act, which to the extent the same is relevant for the present purpose, reads as under: “(e) “Court” means: (i) in the case of an arbitration other than international commercial arbitration, the principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in a district, and includes the High Court in exercise of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction, having jurisdiction to decide the questions forming the subject-matter of the arbitration if the same had been the subject-matter of a suit, but does not include any Civil Court of a grade inferior to such principal Civil Court, or any Court of Small Causes.” Thus, in case of arbitration other than international commercial arbitration, the expression “court” means the principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in a district. 20.3 As to which is the principal Civil Court, has been provided under Section 12 of the Gujarat Civil Courts Act, 2005 which lays down that a court of the District Judge shall be the principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction within the local limits of its jurisdiction. Thus, prima facie, it would appear that an application under Section 37(2)(b) would lie to a court of the District Judge. However, on behalf of the petitioner, reliance has been placed upon various provisions of the Commercial Courts Act. It may, therefore, be germane to refer to the provisions of Section 2 (b), 3 and 10 of the Commercial Courts Act, which read thus: “2(b) “Commercial Court” means the Commercial Court constituted under sub-section (1) of Section 3.” “3. However, on behalf of the petitioner, reliance has been placed upon various provisions of the Commercial Courts Act. It may, therefore, be germane to refer to the provisions of Section 2 (b), 3 and 10 of the Commercial Courts Act, which read thus: “2(b) “Commercial Court” means the Commercial Court constituted under sub-section (1) of Section 3.” “3. Constitution of Commercial Courts (1) The State Government, may after consultation with the concerned High Court, by notification, constitute such number of Commercial Courts at District level, as it may deem necessary for the purpose of exercising the jurisdiction and powers conferred on those courts under this Act: Provided that no Commercial Court shall be constituted for the territory over which the High Court has ordinary original civil jurisdiction. (2) The State Government shall, after consultation with the concerned High Court specify, by notification, the local limits of the area to which the jurisdiction of a Commercial Court shall extend and may, from time to time, increase, reduce or alter such limits. (3) The State Government shall, with the concurrence of the Chief Justice of the High Court appoint one or more persons having experience in dealing with commercial disputes to be the Judge or Judges, of a Commercial Court, from amongst the cadre of Higher Judicial Service in the State.” “10. Jurisdiction in respect of arbitration matters - Where the subject-matter of an arbitration is a commercial dispute of a specified value: (1) If such arbitration is an international commercial arbitration, all applications or appeals arising out of such arbitration under the provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (26 of 1996) that have been filed in a High Court, shall be heard and disposed of by the Commercial Division where such Commercial Division has been constituted in such High Court. (2) If such arbitration is other than an international commercial arbitration, all applications or appeals arising out of such arbitration under the provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (26 of 1996) that have been filed on the original side of the High Court, shall be heard and disposed of by the Commercial Division where such Commercial Division has been constituted in such High Court. (3) If such arbitration is other than an international commercial arbitration, all applications or appeals arising out of such arbitration under the provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (26 of 1996) that would ordinarily lie before any principal civil court of original jurisdiction in a district (not being a High Court) shall be filed in, and heard and disposed of by the Commercial Court exercising territorial jurisdiction over such arbitration where such Commercial Court has been constituted.” 20.4 The learned counsel for the petitioner had also placed reliance upon a notification dated 15.4.2019 issued by the State Government in exercise of powers under sub-section (1) of Section 3 and sub-section (1A) of Section 3 of the Commercial Courts Act, whereby the courts specified therein have been notified for dealing with disputes of commercial nature having a value of not less than rupees three lakhs and the courts specified in case of Surat District are the Principal Senior Civil Judge and 2nd Senior Civil Judges. It was submitted that in view of sub-section (3) of Section 10 of the Commercial Courts Act, all applications arising under the provisions of the Arbitration Act shall be heard and disposed of by the Commercial Court exercising jurisdiction over such arbitration, which in this case would be the Principal Senior Civil Judge and 2nd Senior Civil Judges in terms of the above notification issued by the State Government. Reference is also made to Section 21 of the Commercial Courts Act to submit that the provisions of the Commercial Court Act would have an overriding effect over the provisions of the Arbitration Act and, accordingly, would override the provisions of Section 37(2)(b) of the Arbitration Act. 20.5 In this regard it may be noted that Section 11 of the Commercial Courts Act provides that a Commercial Court or a Commercial Division shall not entertain or decide any suit, application or proceedings relating to any commercial dispute in respect of which the jurisdiction of the civil court is either expressly or impliedly barred under any law for the time being in force. Clause (i) of Section 2(e) of the Arbitration Act which defines the expression ‘court’ not only vests jurisdiction in the principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in a district, including the High Court in exercise of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction, having jurisdiction to decide the questions forming the subject matter of the arbitration if the same had been the subject matter of a suit, but it expressly excludes any civil court of a grade inferior to such principal Civil Court, or any Court of Small Causes. 20.6 Thus, Section 2(e)(i) of the Arbitration Act expressly excludes any civil court of a grade inferior to such principal Civil Court, or any Court of Small Causes. Therefore, in view of Section 11 of the Commercial Courts Act, which bars a Commercial Court from deciding any suit application or proceedings relating to any commercial dispute in respect of which the jurisdiction of the civil court is either expressly or impliedly barred under any other law for the time being in force; read with the provisions of Section 37(2)(b) of the Arbitration Act, any Commercial Court which is a civil court of a grade inferior to such principal Civil Court or any Court of Small causes, would be barred from exercising jurisdiction under Section 37(2)(b) of the Act. The Supreme Court in State of West Bengal v. Associated Contractors (supra), has held that Section 2(1)(e) contains an exhaustive definition marking out only the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in a district or a High Court having original civil jurisdiction in the State, and no other court as ‘court’ for the purpose of Part 1 of the Arbitration Act, 1996. 20.7 The Madras High Court in the case of A.P. Rajappan vs. High Court of Judicature, Madras (supra), has held thus: “12. In the above context, it has to be remembered under the Arbitration Act, 1940, the expression ‘Court’ had been defined differently under the definition clause Court means a Civil Court having jurisdiction to decide the question forming the subject matter of the reference if the same had been the subject matter of a suit, but does not, except for the purpose of arbitration proceedings under Section 21 include a Small Cause Court. The definition ‘Court’ under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 indicates that the ‘Court’ means the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in a district, and includes the High Court in exercise of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction, having jurisdiction to decide the questions forming the subject matter of arbitration if the same had been the subject matter of a suit, but does not include any Civil Court of a grade inferior to such principal Civil Court, or any Court of Small Causes. A comparison of the two definitions makes it clear that in the new Act not only there is reference to “Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in a district” but also there is an exclusionary clause which excludes any civil Court of a grade inferior to such Principal Civil Court. Whatever doubt could have been there, has been dispelled by a specific clause to the effect “it does not include any Civil Court of a grade inferior to Principal Civil Court.” 20.8 The Supreme Court in Kandla Export Corporation and Another vs. OCI Corporation (supra), has held thus: “27. The matter can be looked at from a slightly different angle. Given the objects of both the statutes, it is clear that arbitration itself is meant to be a speedy resolution of disputes between parties. Equally, enforcement of foreign awards should take place as soon as possible if India is to remain as an equal partner, commercially speaking, in the international community. In point of fact, the raison d’être for the enactment of the Commercial Courts Act is that commercial disputes involving high amounts of money should be speedily decided. Given the objects of both the enactments, if we were to provide an additional appeal, when Section 50 does away with an appeal so as to speedily enforce foreign awards, we would be turning the Arbitration Act and the Commercial Courts Act on their heads. Admittedly, if the amount contained in a foreign award to be enforced in India were less than Rs. 1 crore and a Single Judge of a High Court were to enforce such award, no appeal would lie, in keeping with the object of speedy enforcement of foreign awards. However, if, in the same fact circumstance, a foreign award were to be for Rs. 1 crore and a Single Judge of a High Court were to enforce such award, no appeal would lie, in keeping with the object of speedy enforcement of foreign awards. However, if, in the same fact circumstance, a foreign award were to be for Rs. 1 crore or more, if the Appellants are correct, enforcement of such award would be further delayed by providing an appeal under Section 13(1) of the Commercial Courts Act. Any such interpretation would lead to absurdity, and would be directly contrary to the object sought to be achieved by the Commercial Courts Act, viz. speedy resolution of disputes of a commercial nature involving a sum of Rs. 1 crore and over. For this reason also, we feel that Section 13(1) of the Commercial Courts Act must be construed in accordance with the object sought to be achieved by the Act. Any construction of Section 13 of the Commercial Courts Act, which would lead to further delay, instead of an expeditious enforcement of a foreign award must, therefore, be eschewed. Even on applying the doctrine of harmonious construction of both statutes, it is clear that they are best harmonized by giving effect to the special statute i.e. the Arbitration Act, vis-a-vis the more general statute, namely the Commercial Courts Act, being left to operate in spheres other than arbitration.” Thus, the Supreme Court has held that even on applying the doctrine of harmonious construction of both statutes, it is clear that they are best harmonized by giving effect to the special statute, that is, the Arbitration Act, vis-a-vis the more general statute, namely, the Commercial Courts Act being left to operate in spheres other than arbitration. The overriding provisions of Section 21 of the Commercial Courts Act, would, therefore, not be attracted to the facts of the present case. Accordingly the notification issued by the State Government specifying the Principal Senior Civil Judge and 2nd Senior Civil Judges as Commercial Courts for Surat District for deciding disputes of commercial nature having valuation of not less than rupees three lakhs, would have no applicability to the facts of the present case as Section 2(e) of the Arbitration Act ousts their jurisdiction to decide appeals under the Arbitration Act. The first question is, therefore, required to be decided in favour of the respondents, namely that the learned Principal District Judge had the jurisdiction to decide the appeal under Section 37(2)(b) of the Arbitration Act. 24. Thus, the dictum of law as laid by this Court in paragraph 20.6 as referred to above is very clear. In view of the said dictum, the impugned order in the present case is not sustainable in law. 25. At this stage we may also refer to and rely upon a Full Bench decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of M/s. Fountain Head Developers vs. Mrs. Maria Arcangela Sequeira deceased by LRs. and Others, AIR 2007 Bombay 149, wherein, the Full Bench observed as under: 7. The definition of “Court” under Section 2(e) could be divided in the following manner: (i) The principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in a district, and includes the High Court in exercise of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction; (ii) having jurisdiction to decide the questions forming the subject-matter of the Arbitration if the same had been subject-matter of a suit and (iii) it does not include any Civil Court of a grade inferior to such principal Civil Court, or any Court of Small Causes. A careful glance at the definition of “Court” in the Act of 1996 and at the definition of “Court” occurring in the Act of 1940 would manifestly and very clearly demonstrate that in the Act of 1940 “Court” was defined to mean any Civil Court having jurisdiction to decide the questions forming the subject-matter of the reference as if the same had been the subject-matter of a suit. While under the Act of 1996, the meaning of the term “Court” was, however, narrowed down and confined to be “the principal Civil Court of the original jurisdiction in a District” and includes the High Court in exercise of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction, having jurisdiction to decide the subject matter of the arbitration if the same had been the subject matter of a suit, but does not include any civil Court of a grade inferior to such Principal Civil Court or any Small Causes Court. The term “Court” has been used in Section 9, 14 (2), 34, 36, 37, 39, 42 and 43 of part one of the Act of 1996. 8. The term “Court” has been used in Section 9, 14 (2), 34, 36, 37, 39, 42 and 43 of part one of the Act of 1996. 8. The Act of 1996 is essentially based on United Nations Commissions on International Trade Law (for short “UNCITRAL”) and various International Commercial Arbitration concepts. UNCITRAL Model Laws on International Commercial Arbitration was adopted in 1985 with a view to bring uniformity of the law of arbitral procedures and the specific needs of International Commercial Arbitration practice. The Law of Arbitration in India was earlier substantially contained in three enactments, namely, the Act of 1940, Arbitration (Protocol and Convention) Act, 1973 and the Foreign Awards (Recognition and Enforcement) Act, 1961. It was widely felt that the Act of 1940, which contains the General Law of Arbitration, has become outdated and it is against this backdrop and in view of UNCITRAL Model Laws, the Act of 1996 was introduced. This Act repeals the Act of 1940. One of the objectives of enactment of the Act of 1996 was to minimize supervisory role of the Courts in an arbitral process. This object will have to be borne in mind while interpreting the term “Court” under Section 2 (e) of the Act of 1996. A reference to the statement of objects and reasons in the process of interpretation of a Statute is held permissible by a catena of decisions of the Supreme Court. Even the preamble of a Statute is equally an important part and can be pressed into service to aid the construction thereof. 9. It is against this backdrop, we now proceed to consider the definition of “Court” in the Act of 1996. The intendment of the Parliament is clearly reflected in the language employed in defining the term “Court” under Section 2(e) of the Act of 1996. The Parliament intended to have only one Court as the forum for arbitral proceedings, that is, the “principal Court of original jurisdiction” in a district. In this group of matters we are not concerned with inclusive definition as occurring in Section 2 (e) of the Act of 1996 relating to the jurisdiction of the High Court also being the Court of ordinary original civil jurisdiction. The principal Court of original jurisdiction in a district does not include any civil Court to a grade inferior to such principal civil Court or any Court of Small Causes. The principal Court of original jurisdiction in a district does not include any civil Court to a grade inferior to such principal civil Court or any Court of Small Causes. In other words, it categorically excludes civil Courts of “a grade inferior to such principal civil Court.” The Parliament has, clearly, narrowed down the definition of the term “Court.” The only condition contemplated in the definition of “Court” is that it should have jurisdiction to decide the questions forming the subject matter of the arbitration if the same had been the subject matter of a suit. In our opinion, the definition of “Court” in the Act of 1996, does not contemplate that such Court should have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the dispute. What it means is the jurisdiction to decide “the question forming the subject matter of the arbitration” if the same had been the subject-matter of a suit. The pecuniary jurisdiction of a Court, therefore, has no significance for the purposes of the Act of 1996. The Court, however, must have a territorial jurisdiction. The expression “subject matter of the arbitration” therefore, cannot be read to mean a Court where the suit can be filed in respect of that cause of action and would, therefore, cover all the provisions from Section s 16 to 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In other words, the pecuniary jurisdiction is no longer a material for deciding the jurisdiction of a Court being the principal Court of original jurisdiction for the purpose of a petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act. 10. That takes us to consider what the expression “the principal civil Court of original jurisdiction in a district” exactly means, whether it is the Civil Judge, Senior Division or the District Court. By using the words “means” and “includes” and the expression “does not include” as occurring in the definition of “Court” it makes the intendment of the Parliament clear. By using these words the Parliament has made the meaning of the term “Court” explicitly clear. By using the words “means” and “includes” and the expression “does not include” as occurring in the definition of “Court” it makes the intendment of the Parliament clear. By using these words the Parliament has made the meaning of the term “Court” explicitly clear. The Supreme Court in (P) Kasilingam and Others vs. P.S.G. College of Technology and Others, AIR 1995 SC 1395 while dealing with the similar definition and word ‘means’ occurring therein observed that “the use of word ‘means’ indicates that definition is a hard and fast definition and no other meaning can be assigned to the expression that is put down in the definition.” Similarly the Supreme Court in Mahalaxmi Oil Mills vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1989 SC 335 , while interpreting the definition of “Tobacco” wherein all the aforesaid three words/expressions, as occurring in the definition of “Court” are there, has stated the word “means” is a term of restriction, while the word “includes” is a term of enlargement. When both these words are used together to define a thing, the intendment of the Parliament is to supply restricted meaning to the terms. The expression “does not include any civil Courts of a grade inferior to such principal civil Court or any Court of small causes” occurring in Section 2 (e), further restricts the meaning of the term “Court” defined therein. It clearly excludes the Courts inferior to the principal Court of original jurisdiction. The Allahabad High Court in M/s. I.T.I. Ltd. (supra) had an occasion to deal with very same Section and while so doing has taken a similar view. 11. We would also like to consider two more expression/words in the definition of “Court” that is, “grade inferior” and “principal.” According to Black’s Law Dictionary “inferior” means “one who, in relation to another, has less power and is below him; one who is bound to obey another.” The word “grade” used in Section 2 (e) is suggestive of status and importance and it does not refer to a class or particular class. Keeping a literal meaning of the words “inferior” and “grade” in view, if the expression “but does not include any civil Court of a grade inferior to such principal Court” is read, in our opinion, it means no Court subordinate/inferior to the principal civil Court of ordinary original civil jurisdiction in a district, would be covered within the meaning of “Court” as defined under Section 2 (e) of the Act of 1996. Similarly, insofar as the word “principal” is concerned, according to Black’s Law Dictionary, it means chief; leading; most important or considerable; primary; original, Highest in rank authority, character, importance or degree. In Law Lexicon the word “principal” is described to mean highest in rank, authority, character, importance, or degree; most considerable or important; chief; main (as) the principal officers of a Government, the principal men of a State; the principal productions of a country, principal arguments in a case. The word “principal” thus, clearly indicates only one Court being the highest in rank or chief. 12. In our opinion, a plain and literal reading of all the aforesaid words/expressions/terms employed in Section 2 (e) clearly demonstrate the exact meaning of the term “Court.” It means the district Court is the principal civil Court of original jurisdiction in a district and not a civil Court of a grade inferior to such principal civil Court. The Court of Civil Judge, Senior Division may also be a civil Court of original jurisdiction, but in any case it could not be termed as the principal civil Court of original jurisdiction in a district. 26. It appears that Section 21 of the Act 2015 has created the confusion in the mind of the Presiding Officers of the subordinate Courts. We have referred the Section 21 of the Act, 2015 in the earlier part of the judgment. We once again quote the same: 21. Act to have overriding effect - Save as otherwise provided, the provisions of this Act shall have effect, notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being in force or in any instrument having effect by virtue of any law for the time being in force other than this Act. 27. There is no doubt that Section 21 of the Act 2015 starts with a non-obstante clause. As regard the non-obstante clause, this Court deems it fit to consider few decisions. 28. 27. There is no doubt that Section 21 of the Act 2015 starts with a non-obstante clause. As regard the non-obstante clause, this Court deems it fit to consider few decisions. 28. In State of West Bengal vs. Union of India, AIR 1963 SC 1241 , it is observed as under: “The Court must ascertain the intention of the legislature by directing its attention not merely to the clauses to be construed but to the entire statute; it must compare the clause with the other parts of the law and the setting in which the clause to be interpreted occurs.” 29. In Union of India vs. Maj I.C. Lala, AIR 1973 SC 2204 , the Supreme Court held that the non-obstante clause does not mean that the whole of the said provision of law has to be made applicable or the whole of the other law has to be made inapplicable. It is the duty of the Court to avoid the conflict and construe the provisions to that they are harmonious. 30. In Union of India vs. G.M. Kokil, AIR 1984 SC 1022 , the Supreme Court, at Paragraph 10, held as follows: “It is well-known that a non-obstante clause is a legislative device which is usually employed to give overriding effect to certain provision over some contrary provision that may be found either in the same enactment or some other enactment, that is to say, to avoid the operation and effect of all contrary provisions.” 31. In Chandravarkar Sita Ratna Rao vs. Ashalata S. Guram, (1986) 4 SCC 447 , at Paragraph 67, the Supreme Court held as follows: “67. A clause beginning with the expression “notwithstanding any thing contained in this Act or in some particular provision in the Act or in some particular Act or in any law for the time being in force, or in any contract” is more often than not appended to a Section in the beginning with a view to give the enacting part of the Section in case of conflict an overriding effect over the provision of the Act or the contract mentioned in the non-obstante clause. It is equivalent to saying that in spite of the provision of the Act or any other Act mentioned in the non-obstante clause or any contract or document mentioned the enactment following it will have its full operation or that the provisions embraced in the non-obstante clause would not be an impediment for an operation of the enactment. See in this connection the observations of this Court in The South India Corporation (P) Ltd. vs. The Secretary, Board of Revenue, Trivandrum and Another, AIR 1964 SC 207 : (1964) 4 SCR 280 .” 32. In Vishin N. Kanchandani vs. Vidya Lachmandas Khanchandani, AIR 2000 SC 2747 , at Paragraph 11, the Supreme Court held that: “There is no doubt that by non-obstante clause the Legislature devices means which are usually applied to give overriding effect to certain provisions over some contrary provisions that may be found either in the same enactment or some other statute. In other words such a clause is used to avoid the operation and effect of all contrary provisions. The phrase is equivalent to showing that the Act shall be no impediment to measure intended. To attract the applicability of the phrase, the whole of the Section, the scheme of the Act and the objects and reasons for which such an enactment is made has to be kept in mind.” 33. In ICICI Bank Ltd. vs. SIDCO Leathers Ltd. (2006) 67 SCL 383 (SC), the Supreme Court, at Paragraphs 34, 36 and 37, held as follows: “34. Section 529A of the Companies Act no doubt contains a non-obstante clause but in construing the provisions thereof, it is necessary to determine the purport and object for which the same was enacted.... 36. The non-obstante nature of a provision although may be of wide amplitude, the interpretative process thereof must be kept confined to the legislative policy.... 37. A non-obstante clause must be given effect to, to the extent the Parliament intended and not beyond the same.” 34. The Supreme Court, in the case of Central Bank of India vs. State of Kerala, (2009) 4 SCC 94 , held as follows: “103. A non-obstante clause is generally incorporated in a statute to give overriding effect to a particular Section or the statute as a whole. The Supreme Court, in the case of Central Bank of India vs. State of Kerala, (2009) 4 SCC 94 , held as follows: “103. A non-obstante clause is generally incorporated in a statute to give overriding effect to a particular Section or the statute as a whole. While interpreting non-obstante clause, the Court is required to find out the extent to which the legislature intended to do so and the context in which the non obstante clause is used. This rule of interpretation has been applied in several decisions.” 35. In State Bank of West Bengal vs. Union of India, (1964) 1 SCR 371 , it was observed that: “68...the Court must ascertain the intention of the legislature by directing its attention not merely to the clauses to be construed but to the entire statute; it must compare the clause with the other parts of the law and the setting in which the clause to be interpreted occurs.” 36. In Madhav Rao Jivaji Rao Scindia vs. Union of India and Another, (1971) 1 SCC 85 , Hidayatullah, C.J. observed that: “.....the non obstante clause is no doubt a very potent clause intended to exclude every consideration arising from other provisions of the same statute or other statute but “for that reason alone we must determine the scope” of that provision strictly. When the Section containing the said clause does not refer to any particular provisions which it intends to override but refers to the provisions of the statute generally, it is not permissible to hold that it excludes the whole Act and stands all alone by itself. A search has, therefore, to be made with a view to determining which provision answers the description and which does not.” 37. In R.S. Raghunath vs. State of Karnataka and Another, (1992) 1 SCC 335 , a three-Judge Bench referred to the earlier judgments in Aswini Kumar Ghose vs. Arabinda Bose, AIR 1952 SC 369 , Dominion of India vs. Shrinbai A. Irani, AIR 1954 SC 596 , Union of India vs. G.M. Kokil, 1984 (Supp) SCC 196, Chandravarkar Sita Ratna Rao vs. Ashalata S. Guram, (1986) 4 SCC 447 and observed: “...The non-obstante clause is appended to a provision with a view to give the enacting part of the provision an overriding effect in case of a conflict. But the non-obstante clause need not necessarily and always be coextensive with the operative part so as to have the effect of cutting down the clear terms of an enactment and if the words of the enactment are clear and are capable of a clear interpretation on a plain and grammatical construction of the words the non-obstante clause cannot cut down the construction and restrict the scope of its operation. In such cases the non-obstante clause has to be read as clarifying the whole position and must be understood to have been incorporated in the enactment by the legislature by way of abundant caution and not by way of limiting the ambit and scope of the Special Rules.” 38. In A.G. Varadarajulu vs. State of Tamil Nadu, (1998) 4 SCC 231 , the Supreme Court relied on Aswini Kumar Ghose’s case. The Court while interpreting the non-obstante clause contained in Section 21A of Tamil Nadu Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling on Land) Act, 1961 held: “It is well settled that while dealing with a non-obstante clause under which the legislature wants to give overriding effect to a Section, the court must try to find out the extent to which the legislature had intended to give one provision overriding effect over another provision. Such intention of the legislature in this behalf is to be gathered from the enacting part of the Section. In Aswini Kumar Ghose vs. Arabinda Bose, AIR 1952 SC 369 , Patanjali Sastri, J. observed: “The enacting part of a statute must, where it is clear, be taken to control the non obstante clause where both cannot be read harmoniously.” 39. A non-obstante clause is generally appended to a Section with a view to give the enacting part of the Section, in case of conflict, an overriding effect over the provision in the same or other Act mentioned in the non-obstante clause. It is equivalent to saying that inspite of the provisions or Act mentioned in the non-obstante clause, the provision following it will have its full operation or the provisions embraced in the non-obstante clause will not be an impediment for the operation of the enactment or the provision in which the non-obstante clause occurs. [‘Principles of Statutory Interpretation’ 9th Edition by Justice G.P. Singh Chapter-V, Synopsis IV at pages 318 and 319] 40. [‘Principles of Statutory Interpretation’ 9th Edition by Justice G.P. Singh Chapter-V, Synopsis IV at pages 318 and 319] 40. When two or more laws or provisions operate in the same field and each contains a non-obstante clause stating that its provision will override those of any other provisions or law, stimulating and intricate problems of interpretation arise. In resolving such problems of interpretation, no settled principles can be applied except to refer to the object and purpose of each of the two provisions, containing a non-obstante clause. Two provisions in same Act each containing a non-obstante clause, requires a harmonious interpretation of the two seemingly conflicting provisions in the same Act. In this difficult exercise, there are involved proper consideration of giving effect to the object and purpose of two provisions and the language employed in each. [for relevant discussion in para-20 in Shri Swaran Singh and Another vs. Shri Kasturi Lal, (1977) 1 SCC 750 ] 41. Normally the use of the phrase by the Legislature in a statutory provision like ‘notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this Act’ is equivalent to saying that the Act shall be no impediment to the measure [Law Lexicon words ‘notwithstanding anything in this Act to the contrary’]. Use of such expression is another way of saying that the provision in which the non-obstante clause occurs usually would prevail over the other provisions in the Act. Thus, the non-obstante clauses are not always to be regarded as repealing clauses nor as clauses which expressly or completely supersede any other provision of the law, but merely as clauses which remove all obstructions which might arise out of the provisions of any other law in the way of the operation of the principle enacting provision to which the non-obstante clause is attached. [Bipathumma and Others vs. Mariam Bibi, 1966 (1) Mysore Law Journal 162, at page 165] 42. Thus, from the language of the definition of the term the “Court” under Section 2 (e) of the Act of 1996 the Parliament apparently intended to confer the power on the highest judicial authority in a district. It must certainly be taken to have been conscious of the object to be achieved while framing the definition of the term “Court.” Besides, it intended to minimize the supervisory role of the Courts in the arbitral process. It also intended to add the greatest credibility to this process. It must certainly be taken to have been conscious of the object to be achieved while framing the definition of the term “Court.” Besides, it intended to minimize the supervisory role of the Courts in the arbitral process. It also intended to add the greatest credibility to this process. We find support for the view in the judgments of the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court while dealing with the provisions of Section 11 of the Act of 1996, in S.B.P. and Company ( AIR 2006 SC 450 ) in paragraph 12 of the judgment has observed that “the Court is defined in the Act to be the principal Civil Court of original civil jurisdiction of the district and includes the High Court in exercise of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction. The principal Civil Court of original civil jurisdiction is normally the District Court. The High Courts in India exercising ordinary original civil jurisdiction are not too many. So in most of the States the concerned Court would be the District Court.” Similarly, the Supreme Court in Garhwal Mandal vs. M/s. Krishna Travel Agency in Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 18344 of 2004 decided on 24.1.2007, while dealing with the question whether it could entertain all the objections to the award and holding that even if the appointment of the Arbitrator is made by the High Court or the Supreme Court, the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction remains the same as contemplated under Section 2(e) of the Act of 1996, has observed that the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction remains the “District Court” even if the appointment of the Arbitrator is made by the High Court. It is thus clear that the Legislature clearly circumscribed and specifically narrowed down the definition of the term “Court” to mean only the Court of the principal civil original jurisdiction in a district and it is only the Court of “District Judge” in a district which is such a “Court” of principal civil jurisdiction. 43. It is very unfortunate that despite there being a guiding judgment of this Court on the subject, the 2nd Additional District Judge, Dahod has not even bothered to refer to the same far less discussing the same and trying to understand the principles of law as explained in the same. 43. It is very unfortunate that despite there being a guiding judgment of this Court on the subject, the 2nd Additional District Judge, Dahod has not even bothered to refer to the same far less discussing the same and trying to understand the principles of law as explained in the same. The decision of this Court is dated 13th September 2019, whereas, the impugned order is dated 22nd October, 2019. 44. Be that as it may, we are of the view that the application preferred by the applicant under Section 9 of the Act, 1996 could have been entertained only by the District Court at Dahod in view of the specific definition of the term ‘Court’ as defined under Section 2(e) of the Act, 1996 to be read with the Section 11 of the Act, 2015. 45. We appreciate the stance of the learned counsel Mr. Ruchir Patel appearing for the respondents. Even according to Mr. Patel, the Court below ought not to have passed the impugned order. 46. In the result, this application succeeds and is hereby allowed. The impugned order passed by the 2nd Additional District Judge, Dahod dated 22.10.2019 below Exh.7 in the Civil Misc. Application No. 45 of 2019 is hereby quashed and set aside. The Civil Misc. Application No. 45 of 2019 is ordered to be restored to the file of the 2nd Additional District Judge, Dahod. The Court concerned shall now decide the application preferred by the applicant herein under Section 9 of the Act, 1996 at the earliest on its own merits in accordance with law. Having regard to the nature of the dispute and the urgency, we direct the Court below to decide the application preferred by the applicant under Section 9 of the Act, 1996 within a period of one week from the date of the receipt of the writ of this order. 47. Rule is made absolute to the aforesaid extent. Direct service is permitted.