JUDGMENT : Heard Advocates S.Easwaran, A.S.P. Kurup and Madhu Radhakrishnan for parties. 2. The petitioners in these two writ petitions assail the legality of orders made by the DRAT under Section 18 of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (‘Act 2002’ for short). 2.1 Appellants in AIR 690 of 2018 before the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal (‘DRAT’ for short) are the petitioners in W.P.(C) No.9331 of 2019. The petitioners assail order dated 21.03.2019 in I.A. No.1218 of 2019 (Ext.P4) as illegal and beyond the jurisdiction or discretion conferred on DRAT by Act 2002. 2.2 Respondents 1 and 2 in AIR 691 of 2018 before the DRAT are the petitioners in W.P.(C) No.11506 of 2019. The petitioners challenge the order dated 21.03.2019 in I.A.No.1218 of 2019 as illegal and amounts to entertaining appeal under Sec.18, without complying with the condition of pre-deposit of debt due from petitioners. 3. The parties for convenience are adverted to as arrayed in W.P.(C) No.9331 of 2019. W.P.(C) No.9331 of 2019 4. The petitioners have availed financial assistance from respondent Nos. 1 and 2 herein. The petitioners have mortgaged immovable property as security for discharge of the loan availed by them. Respondent Nos.1 and 2, on 31.05.2006 by treating the petitioners as defaulters of loan account, issued notice under Section 13(2) of Act 2002 calling upon petitioners to discharge the liability in the loan account. Respondent nos.1 and 2, it is stated, on 14.08.2006 issued notice under Section 13(4) of Act 2002. On 29.08.2006 sale notice was issued proposing sale of mortgaged property. On 26.09.2006 the petitioners filed T.S.A. No.10 of 2016 (S.A. No.66 of 2006) before the Debts Recovery Tribunal (‘DRT’ for short) questioning the measures initiated under Section 13(4) of Act 2002. On 05.10.2006, sale of secured asset had taken place and sale was confirmed in favour of respondents 3 to 5. On 31.03.2007, respondents 3 to 5 credited Rs.138 lakh into the loan account. The events which have happened in quick succession between 31.5.2006 and 31.3.2007, have been the subject matters of litigation before this Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India and further appeal before the Supreme Court. For the purpose of disposing of these two writ petitions, the reference to anterior litigation between the parties in different Courts need not be adverted to. For the purpose of disposing of these two writ petitions, the reference to anterior litigation between the parties in different Courts need not be adverted to. The parties in these writ petitions as already noted are aggrieved by the exercise of jurisdiction by DRAT, either in putting the petitioners on condition under Section 18, second proviso of Act 2002 or likewise not directing pre-deposit while entertaining appeal in AIR No.691 of 2019. 5. To continue the narration, it is noted that on 29.09.2018 respondents 3 to 5 herein filed I.A. No.179 of 2016 in T.S.A. No.10 of 2016 before the DRT, with a prayer to hear and decide the maintainability of T.S.A. No.10 of 2016 as a preliminary issue. DRT in the order dated 29.9.2018 framed the following issues for consideration. 5.1. Issue No.1, firstly, whether the S.A. was maintainable on the date of filing. Issue No.2, secondly, whether the S.A. is maintainable after the sale of secured asset held on 05.10.2006, pursuant to Annexure VII, more so; when there is a categoric admission of applicants on affidavit that S.A. is rendered infructuous before the High Court. The operative portion of order dated 29.09.2018 reads as follows: “The Tribunal has considered the judgments relied upon by the Ld. Counsels and the rival submissions made by either side, it is an admitted status that the SA filed by the applicants stood concluded on the date of the scheduled auction sale held on 5.10.2006. further there was no challenge to sale at the first instant on the date of filing the SA and the only one ground raised at para 10 was with regard to the fixing the reserve price and the valuation fixed which the Tribunal had considered the said contentions elaborately in I.A. No.1791/2006 and dismissed the IA. In view of the law laid to rest by the dictum and ratio laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Oasis Dealcom Pvt. Ltd.(M/s) v. Khazana Dealcom Pvt. Ltd. And Others and by the Hon'ble High Court of Kerala in Sideek A.V. And others v. Authorised Officer, Federal Bank and Roshan Narayanan C.S. v. Authorized Officer, Central Bank of India concludes that the present SA is not maintainable after the sale of the scheduled sale held on 05.10.2006 pursuant to Annexure VII. The second issue is answered in negative. Accordingly, I.A, No.179/2016 is allowed. The second issue is answered in negative. Accordingly, I.A, No.179/2016 is allowed. Consequently, the TSA No.10/2016 (SA No.66/2006 is dismissed vide separate order.” 6. The petitioners aggrieved by the dismissal of T.S.A. No.10 of 2016 filed AIR No.690 of 2018 and aggrieved by the order in I.A. No.179 of 2016 filed AIR No.691 of 2018 before DRAT. Therefore the subject matter of these two appeals arises from a single loan account and measures initiated for realising the amount claimed in notice under Sec.13(2) of Act 2002. The petitioners in the pending appeals, filed application in I.A. No.1218 of 2018 for waiver of pre-deposit and prayed for entertaining AIR 690 of 2018. Respondent Nos.1 and 2 filed counter and opposed the prayer for waiver of pre-deposit for maintaining AIR No.690 of 2018. DRAT vide order dated 21.03.2019 while dealing with connected applications passed the following comprehensive order: “Mr. S. Easwaran, Advocate appeared for counsel for appellants, Mr.S.S.Rajesh. Mr.Sadchith P.Kurup, Advocate appeared for R1 and R2 and filed vakalat of counsel Mr.A.S.P.Kurup. Ms.Prem Rajakumari, counsel appeared for R3 to R5 and filed vakalat. Proof of service filed. The counsel for R1 and R2 filed counters in delay, waiver and stay petitions. The appellants are directed to supply type set of papers to the counsel for respondents. Heard IA 1217/2018, application to condone the delay of 32 days in filing the appeal. Considering the averments made in IA, delay appears to be unintentional, hence delay is condoned and IA is allowed and disposed of. Heard IA 1218/2018, which is an application for waiver. The appellants have challenged the order dated 29.09.2018, passed by DRT-II, Ernakulam by which TSA 10/2016 was dismissed and SARFAESI steps right from demand notice to sale were affirmed. The counsel for appellants submits that bank had issued demand notice on 31.05.2006 under Section 13(2) of SARFAESI Act for recovery of a sum of Rs.1.95 crores. It is a fact that no amount has been paid by appellants from their own pocket and the amount of Rs.1.95 crores in the year 2006 have become Rs.6 crores in last 13 years. It is a fact that no amount has been paid by appellants from their own pocket and the amount of Rs.1.95 crores in the year 2006 have become Rs.6 crores in last 13 years. In view of the fact that DRAT cannot entertain any Appeal unless and until the Appellant complies with the formalities on pre-deposit up to 50% of debt amount, which can be reduced to 25%, but not less than 25% in any case and in last thirteen years the amount has increased manifold, I hereby direct the Appellants to make pre-deposit of Rs.two crores with the Registrar of this Tribunal within a period of four weeks from today. In the event of failure in complying with the order on pre-deposit the Appeal shall stand dismissed automatically for want of mandatory compliance. IA is disposed of and closed. List for confirmation of pre-deposit on 24.04.2019.” Hence W.P.(C) No.9331 of 2019 by the petitioners/borrowers. 7. On 21.03.2019, DRAT in AIR No.691 of 2018 passed the following orders: “Mr. M.Easwaran, Advocate appeared for counsel for appellants. Mr.S.S. Rajesh. Mr. Sadchith P.Kurup, Advocate appeared for R1 and R2 and filed vakalat of counsel Mr.A.S.P. Kurup. Ms.Prem Rajakumari, counsel appeared for R3 to R5 and filed vakalat. Proof of service filed. The counsel for R1 and R2 filed counters in delay, waiver and stay petitions. Heard IA 1220/2018, application to condone the delay of 35 days in filing the appeal. Considering the averments made in IA, delay appears to be unintentional, hence delay is condoned and IA is allowed and disposed of. In view of the fact that order of pre-deposit has been passed in the connected appeal AIR:690/2018 no need to pass separate orders in this appeal. The appellants are directed to supply type set of papers to the counsel for respondents. List for analogous hearing with connected appeal AIR 690/2018 on 24.04.2019.” Hence W.P.(C) No.11506 of 2019 by the respondents herein/Banker. 8. As will be seen from the tenor of petitioners' grounds, the petitioners are aggrieved by the pre-deposit of Rs.Two crores on or before 20.04.2019 by DRAT. List for analogous hearing with connected appeal AIR 690/2018 on 24.04.2019.” Hence W.P.(C) No.11506 of 2019 by the respondents herein/Banker. 8. As will be seen from the tenor of petitioners' grounds, the petitioners are aggrieved by the pre-deposit of Rs.Two crores on or before 20.04.2019 by DRAT. The case of petitioners is that DRAT by calculating the interest on the loan amount claimed from the date of issue of notice (31.05.2006) till a future date, however the date upto which interest is calculated is not stated in the order determined and directed deposit of Rs.Two crores by the petitioners for entertaining AIR 690 of 2018. The case of petitioners is that the petitioners filed T.S.A. No.10 of 2016, challenging the measures taken up by respondents 1 and 2 against the secured asset for realising the overdue debt. The measures taken by respondent Bank, if are established as not conforming to the requirements of Act 2002 and the Rules, the measures so far taken by respondents 1 and 2 interdicted through adjudication by DRT/DRAT and the challenge to an order taking possession of secured asset from petitioners is accepted, the secured asset is restored to petitioners. Likewise, the challenge is laid successfully against sale initiated by Bank, then the sale conducted by the secured creditor is set aside. Therefore, the calculation of interest on the debt due and claimed by bank for any period posterior to notice under section 13(2) for continuing the challenge against measures initiated by respondents 1 and 2 is impermissible in law. Therefore DRAT misdirected its jurisdiction and discretion by directing pre-deposit of Rs.Two crores which is inclusive of ex post facto interest on amount claimed by respondent Bank. 9. The petitioners further argue that for the purpose of pre-deposit under Sec.18 of Act 2002, the DRAT ought to give credit to sale consideration deposited by auction purchaser and depending on the realised sale consideration, should have directed further deposit for numbering the appeal and hearing on merits. Next it is contended that the Bank Guarantee furnished for Rs.3 crores in O.A. 56/2008 should have also been given due consideration and thereby the pre-deposit completely waived or amount proportionately reduced. The non-consideration of Bank Guarantee already furnished vitiates the order impugned both in law and fact. Next it is contended that the Bank Guarantee furnished for Rs.3 crores in O.A. 56/2008 should have also been given due consideration and thereby the pre-deposit completely waived or amount proportionately reduced. The non-consideration of Bank Guarantee already furnished vitiates the order impugned both in law and fact. The petitioners contend that, in effect, to work out the legal remedies of appeal and contest the application under Sec.13(10) filed by respondents 1 and 2 before the DRT Ernakulam, the petitioners are made to deposit and furnish Bank Guarantee for a sum totaling Rs.Five crores. Such approach for all purposes negates and denies the statutory remedies available to aggrieved persons/petitioners. Hence the petitioners pray for setting aside the order dated 21.3.2019 in I.A.No.1218/2019 in AIR 690/2018. 10. Respondents 1 and 2 per contra argue that the condition imposed by DRAT in AIR No.691 of 2018 conforms to the letter and spirit of Section 18(1) proviso Nos.1 and 2. The respondents refer to definition of ‘debt’ in Section 2(ha) of Act 2002, which borrows/adopts the definition of ‘debt’ in clause (g) of Section 2 of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 ('Act 1993' for short) which definition reads thus: “(g) “debt” means any liability (inclusive of interest) which is claimed as due from any person by a bank of a financial institution or by a consortium of banks or financial institutions during the course of any business activity undertaken by the bank or the financial institution or the consortium under any law for the time being in force, in cash or otherwise, whether secured or unsecured, or assigned, or whether payable under a decree or order of any civil court or any arbitration award or otherwise or under a mortgage and subsisting on, and legally recoverable on, the date of the application; (emphasis added). From the above it is contended that interest is included in the meaning of ‘debt’. Therefore the Appellate Tribunal considers the total amount i.e. principal + interest as on the date of calculation, as due to respondent Bank and pre-deposit condition is imposed for entertaining the appeal. 11. It is further contended that T.S.A. No.10 of 2016 firstly is filed questioning the measures of taking possession by respondents 1 and 2, and the sale subsequently held by the Bank. 11. It is further contended that T.S.A. No.10 of 2016 firstly is filed questioning the measures of taking possession by respondents 1 and 2, and the sale subsequently held by the Bank. The petitioners, if accept the measures taken by respondent Bank as valid in law, resulting in securitization of asset, then the amount received by respondent Bank in the process of securitization of interest can be given due credit to challenge laid by petitioners before DRAT. Petitioners are primarily questioning the measures taken by respondent Bank under Section 13 of Act 2002. The petitioners while challenging the measures which resulted in realization of sale amount cannot, both in law and fact, insist upon crediting to loan account the amount realized by the Bank in auction held by Bank. Respondents 1 and 2 contend that the proceedings in T.S.A. No.10 of 2016 are different or distinct from the further proceedings initiated by respondents 1 and 2 under Section 13(10) against the petitioners herein for realizing the difference of debt due after receipt of sale price in the sale held on 05.10.2006. The attachment ordered by DRT in O.A. was raised by the DRT subject to petitioners giving Bank Guarantee for the difference of amount claimed by respondents 1 and 2 in said O.A. Hence reference to Bank Guarantee given in O.A.56/2008 is untenable and liable to be rejected. The respondents pray for dismissing the writ petition. W.P.(C) No.11506 of 2019 12. Senior Manager, Union Bank of India and another are the petitioners in W.P.(C) 11505/2019 The petitioners herein/respondents in AIR No.691 of 2019 are aggrieved by the order dated 21.03.2019 of DRAT, exempting pre-deposit by the borrowers/respondents 1 to 4 herein for entertaining AIR No.691/2019, have filed the instant writ petition. As already excerpted, DRAT did not put the borrowers/respondents 1 to 4 herein to pre-deposit for entertaining AIR No.691/2018 as well. The summary of petitioners’ case is that DRAT does not have jurisdiction or power to entertain an appeal unless pre-deposit of 50% or 25%, as the case may be, is made by appellants before it under Section 18. The direction to entertain appeal in AIR 691 of 2018 without pre-deposit amounts to illegal exercise of jurisdiction by DRAT. The summary of petitioners’ case is that DRAT does not have jurisdiction or power to entertain an appeal unless pre-deposit of 50% or 25%, as the case may be, is made by appellants before it under Section 18. The direction to entertain appeal in AIR 691 of 2018 without pre-deposit amounts to illegal exercise of jurisdiction by DRAT. Hence the petitioners pray for setting aside order dated 21.03.2019 and that respondents 1 to 4 herein are directed to deposit a further sum as may be decided in this behalf by this Court. 13. Respondents 1 to 4 (debtors) in response state that the order questioned by them in AIR No.691 of 2018 is not from an independent application moved by them before DRT. The background is that respondent Nos.5 to 7 (auction purchasers) filed I.A. No.179/2016 for a decision from DRT, on the preliminary issue viz. maintainability of TSA No.10/2016 (S.A.No.66/2006). I.A.No.174/2016 was allowed by DRT, resulting in dismissal of TSA No.10/2016. It is averred that at the first instance, respondents 1 to 4 herein filed single appeal before DRAT questioning both orders dt. 29.9.2018 and the office of DRAT objected to the maintainability of single appeal against both the orders made by DRT. Respondent Nos. 1 to 4 thereafter filed AIR Nos.690 and 691 of 2018. The totality of circumstances in these appeals relate to measures initiated by the Bank for realising the outstanding amount demanded in Section 13(2) notice. For the purpose of AIR No. 691 of 2018, the subject matter of appeal in AIR No.691 of 2018 ought not to be treated as a distinct appeal. Pre-deposit made as a condition precedent to work out the remedy of appeal in AIR No.690/2018, enures to the credit of AIR No.691/2018 as well. In brief the case of respondents 1 to 4 is that the mere filing of two appeals questioning inter-dependent orders, will not result in the debt due as debts due and pre-deposit condition is mandatory in each one of the appeals i.e. in AIR No.690 and 691 of 2018. The respondents herein pray for dismissing the writ petition. 14. In brief the case of respondents 1 to 4 is that the mere filing of two appeals questioning inter-dependent orders, will not result in the debt due as debts due and pre-deposit condition is mandatory in each one of the appeals i.e. in AIR No.690 and 691 of 2018. The respondents herein pray for dismissing the writ petition. 14. Advocate S. Easwaran appearing for petitioners in W.P.(C) No.9331 of 2019 and respondents 1 to 4 in W.P.(C) No.11506 of 2019 contends that the order dated 21.03.2019 in I.A. No.1218 of 2018 in AIR 690 of 2018 by DRAT, by any standard or circumstance is unsustainable in law. He argues that the DRAT committed a serious error, by not appreciating the grounds stated in the memorandum of appeal in AIR No.690 of 2018 and the circumstances in affidavit filed in I.A. No. 1218 of 2018 for waiver of pre-deposit. The said omission resulted in grave injustice to petitioners and the remedy of appeal, through impugned order rendered as an unworkable statutory remedy. 14.1 Section 18(1) provisos (1) and (2) deal with pre-deposit of amount for maintaining and consideration of appeal on merits filed against an order of DRT. The remedy of appeal ought not become illusory to a litigant through a fastidious or impermissible interpretation of Sec.18(1) proviso(s). Explaining the working of Act 2002, he argues that the measures taken by the respondent Bank under Section 13 of Act 2002 are assailed before DRT under Sec.17 of Act 2002. DRT not determines the actual debt due or liability of the debtors in cases arising under Sec.13(10). Where an appeal is filed against an order of DRT decided under Sec.13(2) to (4), the challenge of debtor is against the measures taken by bank and the challenge is not accepted by DRT. Therefore in such cases DRAT calls upon the appellants to deposit amount by referring to the amount demanded in Section 13(2) of SARFAESI Act, 2002 and not by adding interest on debt claimed in notice issued under section 13(3) of Act 2002 till the date of filing appeal. In the case on hand, Section 13(2) notice is dated 31.05.2006, the petitioners are duly and diligently working out the reliefs available to them in law by filing TSA No.10/2016 (S.A.No.66/2006). In the case on hand, Section 13(2) notice is dated 31.05.2006, the petitioners are duly and diligently working out the reliefs available to them in law by filing TSA No.10/2016 (S.A.No.66/2006). The delay in adjudication of challenge to measures should not become detrimental to petitioners by adding interest to the debt due and claimed by bank in Sec.13(2) notice. The abstract figure of Rs.Two crores in order dt.21.3.2019 does not furnish period of calculation of interest or rate of interest. Therefore, prima facie such decision resulting in pre-deposit of Rs.Two Cores amounts to illegal exercise of jurisdiction by DRAT. The bank through the notice issued under Section 13(2) to petitioners claimed Rs.195 lakhs as the debt due from petitioners. The pre-deposit could be on the debt due and claimed in Section 13(2) notice dated 31.5.2006. Adding interest to the debt due and claimed by secured creditor, particularly, when there is no adjudication by DRT on debt due etc. is contrary to the plain reading of proviso (1) to section 18(1) of Act 2002. He refers to the decisions reported in Narayan Chandra Gosh v. UCO Bank, 2011 (4) SCC 548 , Sivakumar textiles v. Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal, 2012 KHC 228 Poonam Manshani v. J & K Bank Ltd, MANU/DE/2954/2009 and Key Stone Constructions v. State Bank of India, MANU/MH/4095/2018. He distinguishes a few decisions both reported and unreported on the interpretation of proviso (1) to section 18(1) including future interest in the expression 'debt due' for the purpose of pre-deposit. According to him, the decisions which interpreted to include interest in debt due for pre-deposit have sidestepped from the well established principle of literal and/or noscitur a sociis interpretation of statute. The decisions including future interest for pre-deposit expand the proviso by adding words viz. debts due, claimed and payable as determined by DRAT. In appeals filed questioning measures taken by the bank, the deciding factor is the amount claimed by bank as debt due in Section 13(2) notice and addition of future interest on debt claimed is permissible under section 18(1). Through first principles of interpretation and by relying in Axis Bank case, he argues that deposit of impractical and higher amount before DRAT serves no purpose, except making the remedy of appeal a difficult or distant realization. 15. Through first principles of interpretation and by relying in Axis Bank case, he argues that deposit of impractical and higher amount before DRAT serves no purpose, except making the remedy of appeal a difficult or distant realization. 15. He further argues that while determining the pre-deposit condition DRAT should have given credit to Rs.138 lakh paid by auction purchasers pursuant to the sale held on 05.10.2006 and credited into the loan account on 31.03.2007. Due credit if is given to the sale consideration credited by auction purchasers, the amount payable by petitioners is substantially reduced and in such an event directing petitioners to deposit Rs.2 crore is untenable in fact and amounts to an arbitrary and onerous condition. 15.1 The words 'amount due' used in Section 18(1) have been interpreted by the Apex Court to mean the amount legally recoverable from the borrower. Therefore, the amount recoverable as on date is amount due minus sale consideration deposited by purchasers. In other words, the amount recovered by way of sales proceeds is more than 50% of debt due, in such case, pre-deposit condition is satisfied and no fresh deposit is necessary for maintaining the appeal. Therefore DRAT committed an illegality by not giving credit to the amount deposited by purchasers and secondly imposing condition to deposit Rs.2 crore results in depositing more than what is recoverable by bank from the petitioners. 16. He contends that AIR No.691 of 2018 is not an appeal filed against an independent order determining any issue or liability of petitioners or legality of measure taken by the respondent Bank. DRT decided the preliminary issue of maintainability of S.A. and ordered in I.A.No.179/2016. The decision on preliminary issue, as a consequence resulted in dismissal of TSA No.10/2016. The debt is one, one application was before DRT, but because of interlocutory order, to conform to the procedure insisted upon by DRAT, two separate appeals are filed by petitioners and filing of two appeals does not become plurality of debts to comply with pre-condition of deposit for filing Appeals in AIR No.690 and 691 of 2018. Appeals filed in AIR Nos.690 and 691 of 2018 arise out of the same loan transaction, question the measures initiated under Section 13(2) and 13(4) of Act 2002. The borrowers/petitioners are not under legal obligation to deposit further sum for maintaining AIR No.691 of 2018. Appeals filed in AIR Nos.690 and 691 of 2018 arise out of the same loan transaction, question the measures initiated under Section 13(2) and 13(4) of Act 2002. The borrowers/petitioners are not under legal obligation to deposit further sum for maintaining AIR No.691 of 2018. The argument of respondent Bank that for entertaining AIR No.691 of 2018, the petitioners pre-deposit further amount in terms of proviso is without understanding of the meaning of words 'debt', 'loan account', 'measures initiated' etc. and WPC No.11506 of 2019 is liable to be dismissed in limini. According to him, the argument of respondent Bank leads to meaning 'debt' as 'debts', thereby plurality is attached to single debt, by such understanding of debts, separate condition shall not be imposed or further amount is deposited by appellant. Such construction under Section 18(1) second proviso is impermissible. According to him, DRAT has rightly understood the meaning of debt int he present context and issues for decision pending in AIR 690 and 691 of 2018, did not call upon petitioners to pre-deposit in AIR No.691 of 2018 as well. He relies on the decisions in Parsn Medicinal Plants Pvt Limited v. Indian Bank, 2011 (15) SCC 253, Poonam Manshani v. J&K Bank Ltd, MANU/DE/29542/2009, Sristi Arogyadam v. Punjab National Bank, MANU/DE/4444/2018, Akash Ganga Airlines v. Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal, MANU/UP/1312/2015, Gopal Ji Gupta v. Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal, MANU/UP/1028/2013, S.R.Forging Ltd v. UCO Bank, MANU/PH/041/2013, Ind Bank Housing Limited v. Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal, MANU/TN/1320/2008, Atul Kumar Goel v. State Bank of India, MANU/PH/2909/2012 and Yes Yee Brithers v. Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal, MANU/TN/4095/2018 for the above legal propositions. 17. Adv.A.S.P.Kurup firstly the condition imposed by DRAT in AIR No.690 of 2018 and further challenges the order granting waiver of pre-deposit in AIR No.691 of 2018 as unsustainable. According to him, the language in Section 18 is unambiguous viz. that unless and until pre-deposit of amount is made, the appeal cannot be entertained and heard by DRAT on merits. The language fastens a duty or function on DRAT to subject an appellant before appellate tribunal to the condition of pre-deposit of 50% or 25% as the case may be. A few authorities are directly on the point that pre-deposit is mandatory and the pre-deposit can't be less than 25%. The language fastens a duty or function on DRAT to subject an appellant before appellate tribunal to the condition of pre-deposit of 50% or 25% as the case may be. A few authorities are directly on the point that pre-deposit is mandatory and the pre-deposit can't be less than 25%. Likewise calculation of interest on debt due ex post facto to section 13(2) notice is permissible in the scheme of Section 18 of Act 2002. 'Debt' is defined by Section 2(ha) of Act 2002, which adopts the definition of debt in Section 2(g) of Act 1993 which means and includes 'interest'. The pre-deposit amount must include interest payable by the borrower till the date of appeal. In the case on hand the DRAT has rightly calculated the interest from 2006 to 2019, and directed deposit of Rs.Two crores for entertaining AIR No.690 of 2018. In support of his argument that debt includes interest and DRAT is right in including interest, he relies on the judgment of the Bombay High Court in M/s. MRB Road const. Pvt Ltd v. Rupee Co-op. Bank Ltd, AIR 2016 (NOC) 334 (BOM.). The amount referred to in notice under Section 13(2) is referable to the date on which securitization measures were taken by the respondent Bank and the said amount is not a final figure or liability of debtor. Therefore, inclusion of interest in the amount payable by the petitioners as pre-deposit of Rs.two crores is sustainable in law. 17.1 He next contends that set off or adjustment from sale consideration deposited by respondent nos.3 to 5 is untenable. He explains by arguing that that the petitioners if accept the measures initiated by the Bank, then the fruits realized from the measures initiated by the Bank can be credited, and accepted by both the banker and the borrower. The petitioners, on one hand, challenge the measures initiated by the Bank as illegal and simultaneously claim credit of such efforts for complying with the pre-deposit condition. As long as the measures taken by Bank are under challenge, the respondent Bank cannot credit the amount realised from sale, for arriving at the balance or final figure of debt due from a borrower. In a given case, the challenge of borrowers if is accepted by DRT or DRAT, as the case may be, the sale consideration amount is returned to auction purchasers. In a given case, the challenge of borrowers if is accepted by DRT or DRAT, as the case may be, the sale consideration amount is returned to auction purchasers. The pre-deposit condition in Section 18 is a concomitant obligation to the right of appeal before DRAT. Therefore the set off pleaded by petitioners is unavailable contrary to the literal construction of Section 18(1) provisos 1 and 2. 17.2 Adv.Kurup argues that the order dated 21.03.2019 impugned in W.P.(C) No.11506 of 2019 is unsustainable and that no distinction in law is available between a final order or an interlocutory order so far as the pre-deposit condition referred to in Section 18(1) Provisos 1 and 2 is concerned. According to him, the petitioners/borrowers are required to deposit in terms of Section 18(1) in every appeal filed before DRAT, and waiver of deposit in AIR 691/2018 by DRAT is illegal and unsustainable. He refers to and relies on the judgment of this Court in Varghese A.P. v. Chief Manager (Authorised Officer) Vijaya Bank, 2019 (5) KHC 685 (DB) for the proposition of law that Section 18 of Act 2002 does not differentiate in terms between an appeal filed challenging interlocutory order or a final order. 18. Adv.Madhu Radhakrishnan appearing for auction purchasers supports the argument of respondent Bank and further contends that DRAT is entitled to calculate interest on the amount payable by the borrowers, and can certainly direct pre-deposit of amount with interest accrued subsequent to Section 13(2) notice. The definition of ‘debt’ includes interest as well, therefore it could be erroneous and illegal to exclude interest while determining the pre-deposit by borrowers for maintaining appeal. He relies on the decisions reported in Sekar Stores Home Mart v. The Authorised Officer, Pridhvi Asset Reconstruction & Securitisation Company Ltd., Judgment dated 9.10.2018 in W.P. Nos. 26249, 26230/2018, WMP Nos.30656 & 30471/2018 (High Court of Madras) Nathi Lal Rathore v. The Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal, Judgment dated 5.10.2016 in Writ-C No.32026/2016 (High Court of Allahabad), MRB Roadconst. Pvt. Ltd v. Rupee Co-op. Bank Ltd., Order dated 5.2.2016 in Review Petition No.78/2015 in Writ Petition No.6778/2014 (High Court of Bombay). 26249, 26230/2018, WMP Nos.30656 & 30471/2018 (High Court of Madras) Nathi Lal Rathore v. The Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal, Judgment dated 5.10.2016 in Writ-C No.32026/2016 (High Court of Allahabad), MRB Roadconst. Pvt. Ltd v. Rupee Co-op. Bank Ltd., Order dated 5.2.2016 in Review Petition No.78/2015 in Writ Petition No.6778/2014 (High Court of Bombay). Replying to the argument of petitioners that the sale consideration credited by auction purchasers can be given set off or credit to at the time of imposing the condition, is unsustainable in law because the sale consideration is credited to loan account subject to further steps under Sections 17 and 18. He argues that there are a few independent and intermittent stages between taking possession and conducting auction by the Bank. The sale consideration paid by an auction purchaser can be finally credited to the loan account firstly if there is no challenge to the measure initiated by the Bank or that the borrower accepts the sale in favour of third party/auction purchaser. In the case on hand, petitioners/borrowers are assailing the measures taken under Sections 13(2) and 13(4) of Act 2002. The amount deposited by auction purchasers cannot be given credit for any purpose till the challenge is finally decided. Therefore the sale consideration deposited by respondents 4 to 6 shall not be given credit while deciding pre-deposit condition. In support of above submissions, he refers to and relies on Shivalik Fibres (P) Ltd v. The Authorised Officer, Punjab National Bank, CWP No.1368/2019 (High Court of Himachal Pradesh), Pushpalatha Ravindran & Rani Ravindran v. Indian Bank, CRP(PD) No.2046/2016 & CRP(PD) No.84/2018 And CMP No.10662/2016 & CMP No.482/2018 (High Court of Judicature at Madras), Eskays Construction Pvt.Ltd v. Soma Papers & Industries Ltd, Judgment dated 30.11.2016 in Writ Petition No.1315/2014. and Narayana Chandra Ghosh v. UCO Bank, Judgment dated 18.3.2011 Civil Appeal No.2681/2011 (Arising out of SLP(C) No.5488/2011). 18.1 Finally he submits that the order in I.A.No.179/2016 in AIR No.691 of 2018 is contrary to law laid down by this Court and different High Courts. The principle of law according to him on pre-deposit is to the effect that the appellant is required to pre-deposit amount, even if the appeal is filed against interlocutory orders. He refers to and relies on Satnam Agri Products Ltd v. U.O.I, Judgment dated 10.12.2014 in W.P.(C) No.7158/2014 & CM No.16189/2014 (High Court of Delhi). The principle of law according to him on pre-deposit is to the effect that the appellant is required to pre-deposit amount, even if the appeal is filed against interlocutory orders. He refers to and relies on Satnam Agri Products Ltd v. U.O.I, Judgment dated 10.12.2014 in W.P.(C) No.7158/2014 & CM No.16189/2014 (High Court of Delhi). Keystone Constructions v. State Bank of India, Judgment dated 08.10.2013 in WP No.1382/2013 & WP No.1454/2013 (High Court of Bombay) and Vinay Container Services Pvt. Ltd v. Axis Bank, Judgment dated 16.11.2010 in WP No.8915/2010 (High Court of Bombay). 19. I have heard the learned Advocates appearing for parties, perused the record and the following point is framed for consideration and disposal of instant writ petitions. 19.1 Whether the orders dated 21.03.2019 in AIR Nos.690 and 691 of 2018 imposing the condition of pre-deposit of rupees two crores to entertain the appeal and not imposing a pre-deposit condition for entertaining appeal in AIR No.691 of 2018 are legal and conform to the mandate of Section 18 of Act 2002. 20. The argument of Adv. Easwaran stated briefly is that DRAT ought to have taken note of the sale consideration credited into the loan account on 31.03.2007 and thereafter a condition commensurate to a situation warranting pre-deposit of amount under provisos 1 and 2 ought to have been imposed on petitioners. The DRAT, it is evident from the direction to deposit rupees two crores, has calculated interest payable on the outstanding amount claimed in section 13(2) notice and such calculation of interest on debt due and claimed by Bank does not conform to the literal meaning of words used in second proviso to Section 18(1) of the Act. Secondly, Section 18(1) second proviso prohibits DRAT from entertaining an appeal against an order of DRT made under Section 17 of Act 2002, unless the borrower deposits with the Appellate Tribunal 50% of the amount of debt due from borrower, as claimed by the secured creditors or 50% of debt as determined by the DRT, whichever is less. Secondly, Section 18(1) second proviso prohibits DRAT from entertaining an appeal against an order of DRT made under Section 17 of Act 2002, unless the borrower deposits with the Appellate Tribunal 50% of the amount of debt due from borrower, as claimed by the secured creditors or 50% of debt as determined by the DRT, whichever is less. In the case on hand, DRT vide order dated 29.9.2018 did not determine the debt due from borrower and therefore the sentence in second proviso will have to be read, namely no appeal shall be entertained unless the borrower deposits with the Appellate Tribunal 50% of the amount of debt due from borrower, as claimed by the secured creditors i.e., in Section 13(2) notice dated 31.05.2006. The amount deposited with DRAT for maintaining an appeal as held in Axis Bank case by the Supreme Court, is not security given by the borrower in favour of the secured creditor and the pre-deposit amount is returned to borrower/appellant upon a disposal of appeal. The appeal, it is argued, is a creature of statute and he does not dispute that the aggrieved party intending to avail the remedy of appeal must conform to the conditions stipulated in this behalf. Therefore, the petitioners are not claiming total waiver of pre-deposit for hearing the appeals on merits. In other words, the condition of pre-deposit of rupees two crores is impermissible and beyond the jurisdiction of DRAT under Section 18. The petitioners, therefore, challenge the interpretation adopted by DRAT, i.e. as 'debt due claimed and payable' by the borrower and notionally decided the debt due and payable amount, thereafter the condition of pre-deposit of rupees two crores is imposed by the Appellate Tribunal. The said interpretation amounts to incorporating words into second proviso to Section 18(1) of Act 2002. Such interpretation of a section in a statute is impermissible in law. By keeping in view the nature of challenge against measures initiated by bank under Section 13 of Act 2002 in the remedy under Section 17 before DRT, the scope of appeal under Section 18 is appreciated. The application under Section 17 is filed questioning measures under Section 13(2) to (4), then the subject matter of appeal is the legality of DRT order and the measures taken by Bank. The application under Section 17 is filed questioning measures under Section 13(2) to (4), then the subject matter of appeal is the legality of DRT order and the measures taken by Bank. The situation is slightly different where the appeal under Section 18 is filed questioning outcome of an application moved by Bank under Section 13(10) of Act 2002. 20.1 He further argues that the Parliament did not assume infallibility to the action of secured creditor while operating the rights available to secured creditor for realizing the outstanding amount under SARFAESI Act, 2002. Therefore, remedies of judicial review in Sections 17 and 18 are provided for by the Parliament in Act 2002. The efficacy of these Sections 17 and 18 is lost or denied to a borrower, by an interpretation, i.e. inclusion of interest in the pre-deposit condition for filing appeal. He argues that the condition imposed by DRAT will have to be understood as a condition imposed, upon DRAT determining the debt due and payable by the borrower on the date of filing appeal. The DRAT is not conferred with jurisdiction at this stage of consideration of registering the appeal to undertake this function of determining the debt due from borrower. Therefore inclusion of interest accrued ex post facto to notice under Section 13(2) of Act 2002 is unavailable and amounts to illegal exercise of discretion. In the case on hand DRAT reckoned interest payable by borrower from 2006 to a date not clear in the order and called upon the borrower to deposit rupees two crores. 20.2 While exercising discretion under provisos 2nd and 3rd provisos, the Appellate Tribunal is guided by two situations, firstly by the amount claimed as debt in notice issued under Section 13(2) and secondly amount determined by DRT under Section 13(10). In appeals filed challenging orders arising out of first situation the guiding factor for pre-deposit is the debt claimed by the Bank in Section 13(2) notice and in the second situation the debt determined by DRT. There is no third situation where the Appellate Tribunal decides the amount payable by borrower and on that determination calls upon the petitioners/borrowers to deposit as in the case on hand rupees two crores. He further argues that second proviso of Section 18(1) takes care of all exigencies arising out of challenge to measures taken under Section 13 of Act 2002. He further argues that second proviso of Section 18(1) takes care of all exigencies arising out of challenge to measures taken under Section 13 of Act 2002. He illustrates that in a given case where the secured creditor is compelled to move an application under Section 13(10) of Act 2002 for realizing the balance debt due, in spite of sale of secured asset, the DRT decides the debt due from debtor and makes a decree in favour of the secured creditor. The borrower/debtor files appeal under Section 18 against such decree. In such cases the guiding factor for pre-deposit is the decree of DRT for calculating pre-deposit. Alternatively, take a case of unsuccessful challenge to the measures initiated by the Bank for realizing the outstanding amount. The subject matter before DRT and DRAT is challenge to the measures taken by bank whether are legal or not. In such cases calculating interest pendente lite by Appellate Tribunal is beyond its jurisdiction and contrary to plain reading of Section 18 of Act 2002. 21. Per contra, the argument of Advocates A.S.P. Kurup and Madhu Radhakrishnan is that the petitioners/borrowers cannot and could not be allowed to ask for credit or set off the amount credited to loan account by the auction purchasers. The logical reason being the debtors/petitioners question the measures initiated by the Bank including confirmation of sale, transfer of right etc. Therefore, crediting sale consideration received from auction purchaser is contingent to the outcome of challenge before DRT/DRAT as the case may be. Therefore it is nothing but trite to credit or set off to the amount deposited by way of sale consideration to the debt due from debtors. 21.1. In reply to the argument against inclusion of interest, post Section 13(2) notice, respondent/Bank relies on definitions of debt in Section 2(4a) which reads as follows: “(ha) "debt" shall have the meaning assigned to it in clause (g) of section 2 of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993.” The definition of debt as it stands specifically refers to debt as inclusive of interest. The words inclusive of interest are introduced by Amendment Act and the object and the scope of definition are satisfied only with the inclusion of interest while determining the pre-deposit amount. The words inclusive of interest are introduced by Amendment Act and the object and the scope of definition are satisfied only with the inclusion of interest while determining the pre-deposit amount. For the purpose of pre-deposit pendente lite interest is excluded from consideration, then the amendment to the definition of debt is defeated. The words 'debt due' in Section 18(1) Second proviso mean debt due from borrower when the appeal is entertained. Though the word 'payable' is absent in second proviso to Section 18(1) still debt due and claimed by secured creditor includes interest as a natural corollary to a commercial lending and borrowing transaction. 22. The counsel appearing for the parties have placed reliance on a few citations which are noted in the preceding paragraphs. However no binding precedent either of the Supreme Court or this Court directly on the point is brought to my notice. In the considered view of this Court, after perusing the citations referred to above, this Court is of the view that most of these decisions are rendered in the particular fact situation of the case. These decisions have dealt with the interpretation now proposed by petitioners, then the ratio will have persuasive effect on this Court. Therefore, at appropriate stage I intend to refer to such of the citations which are useful for the present purpose. Consideration 23. Section 13 of Act 2002, without reference to Court enables a Bank to enforce its rights against security interest as well as the balance of debt due from the borrower who is treated as defaulter in repayment of debt. In the said process, the Bank enforces security (a) without intervention of a Court (b) without intervention of a Tribunal, but in accordance with the provisions of Act 2002. Section 13(2) deals with the first stage of enforcement of security interest i.e. by classifying the debt as Non Performing Asset, borrower is demanded by notice in writing to discharge in full the debtor's liability to secured creditor within sixty days from the date of notice. Further in default of debtor repaying the debt, a secured creditor exercises all or any of the options in Section 13(4) of Act 2002. Further in default of debtor repaying the debt, a secured creditor exercises all or any of the options in Section 13(4) of Act 2002. Section 13(3) stipulates that the notice issued under sub section (2) shall give details of amount payable by the borrower and the secured assets intended to be enforced by the secured creditor in the event of non-payment of debt by the debtor. Section 13(4) provides for taking possession, management of business, granting lease, assignment, sale or appoint a person to manage the secured assets etc. 23.1 The Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules 2002 deal with ancillary and incidental matters relating to enforcement of security interest by Financial Institutions. Section 17 confers jurisdiction on DRT to examine the legality or otherwise of measures taken by secured creditor to realise security interest. The subject matter of adjudication before DRT under Section 17 is against the measures followed by secured creditor up to section 13(9) and also an application filed under Section 13(10) for realising the balance debt in the loan account. A person aggrieved by an order made by DRT under Section 17 on the challenge laid before DRT, can file appeal before the Appellate Tribunal under Section 18. The pre-deposit in terms of Section 18 is the core issue for decision in these writ petitions. 23.2 It is an axiomatic proposition of law that right to appeal is neither an absolute right nor is treated as part and parcel of natural justice principle. The right to appeal is a statutory right. Right to appeal can be certainly circumscribed by the very section or statute which confers a right of appeal to an aggrieved party. In other words, the right of appeal is a creature of statute. The debtors in default, in the absence of Sections 17 & 18 of Act 2002, which confer jurisdiction on DRT/DRAT to examine the legality of the measures ought to be content with the measures taken by bank under Section 13 for realisation of security interest. As rightly argued by Adv. Easwaran, the Parliament in its wisdom and also taking note of rights of debtor did not presume infallibility to the measures taken by the secured creditor while enforcing its right. Procedural safeguards are provided by Section 13 of Act 2002 and Rules to the debtor/borrower, the breach of procedural safeguards are matters for decision by DRT/DRAT. Easwaran, the Parliament in its wisdom and also taking note of rights of debtor did not presume infallibility to the measures taken by the secured creditor while enforcing its right. Procedural safeguards are provided by Section 13 of Act 2002 and Rules to the debtor/borrower, the breach of procedural safeguards are matters for decision by DRT/DRAT. The right of appeal and concomitant condition of pre-deposit to avail the remedy of appeal are read and appreciated by the first principles of interpretation. The arguments of petitioners for literal interpretation and conversely a purposive interpretation suggested by respondents are examined by this Court by applying First Principles on Interpretation. This Court after carefully examining the entire scheme of Act 2002 is of the view of that the remedies for review by Tribunals under Sections 17 and 18 are very valuable remedies to an aggrieved person against all or any measures initiated by a Bank for realisation of debt. Remedies under Sections 17 and 18 finally ensure that the realisation of security interest or debt is strictly in accordance with the provisions of Act 2002. 23.3 Section 17 enables filing an application by an aggrieved person before the DRT challenging the measures initiated by the secured creditor to recover debts. DRT under Section 17(2) would consider whether the measures referred to in Section 13(4), namely, taking possession of secured asset, management of business including the right to transfer by way of lease, assignment, sale etc. are taken by the secured creditor in accordance with the provisions of Act 2002 and the Rules made thereunder or not. DRT under Section 17(3) is conferred with the power to restore the management, possession etc. of secured asset to borrower or aggrieved person, as the case may be, if an illegality or breach of procedure complained of is accepted by DRT. Further Section 13(4) confers power on DRT to declare the legality of proceedings i.e. measures initiated under Section 13(4) by a secured creditor. For the present, the scope, jurisdiction and function of DRT under Section 17 need not be further examined, but is merely noted for the purpose of appreciating the scope of appeal filed under Section 18 before the DRAT in different scenarios. 23.4 A person aggrieved by an order made under Section 17 of the Act by the DRT may prefer an appeal under Section 18 to DRAT. 23.4 A person aggrieved by an order made under Section 17 of the Act by the DRT may prefer an appeal under Section 18 to DRAT. Section 18(1) confers statutory right of appeal on a person aggrieved by an order of DRT under Section 17. First proviso to Section 18(1) deals with the fee payable by the aggrieved person for availing the remedy of appeal. Section 18 for immediate reference is excerpted and reads thus: (1) Any person aggrieved, by any order made by the Debts Recovery Tribunal under section 17, may prefer an appeal along with such fee, as may be prescribed to an Appellate Tribunal within thirty days from the date of receipt of the order of Debts Recovery Tribunal.— Provided that different fees may be prescribed for filing an appeal by the borrower or by the person other than the borrower: Provided further that no appeal shall be entertained unless the borrower has deposited with the Appellate Tribunal fifty per cent. of the amount of debt due from him, as claimed by the secured creditors or determined by the Debts Recovery Tribunal, whichever is less: Provided also that the Appellate Tribunal may, for the reasons to be recorded in writing, reduce the amount to not less than twenty-five per cent of debt referred to in the second proviso. 23.5 Section 18(2) stipulates the time limit within which the appeal entertained is disposed of. 24. The petitioners contend that Rs.1,38,00,000/-was credited into loan account by the auction purchasers pursuant to the sale held on 5.10.2016. The credit of Rs.1,38,00,000/-is acknowledged by Respondent/Bank in the application filed under Section 13(10) of Act 2002 for realising the balance outstanding amount. The debt payable by the petitioners has been reduced, and the petitioners are entitled, firstly, to work out the remedy of appeal without further deposit as Rs.1,38,00,000/-represents more than 50% of the debt claimed by Respondent/Bank and alternatively, while stipulating the pre-deposit condition the amount already credited by auction purchasers shall be given credit, thereafter proportionate amount towards pre-deposit is imposed under Section 18(1) read with second proviso. Therefore the condition of pre-deposit of two crores is excessive, amounts to arbitrary and illegal exercise of discretionary jurisdiction conferred on DRAT by Section 18 of the Act. Therefore the condition of pre-deposit of two crores is excessive, amounts to arbitrary and illegal exercise of discretionary jurisdiction conferred on DRAT by Section 18 of the Act. Per contra, the argument of respondents is that the claim of petitioners for giving due credit to the amount deposited by auction purchasers both factually and legally cannot be countenanced at all. According to the argument of respondents, Section 18 is a right available to the aggrieved person, to file appeal and for the said purpose, the second and third provisos mandate pre-deposit, 50% or 25% of debt claimed or determined, as the case may be. The petitioners/borrowers, by filing an application under Section 17 of Act 2002, have called in question the measures initiated by the secured creditor to realise the debt through securitization. The petitioners/borrowers having availed the remedy under Section 17, are therefore seeking appropriate reliefs against measures initiated as invalid. The challenge to measures is finally accepted by DRT or DRAT, respondents 1 and 2/bank will have to necessarily refund the sale consideration realised by the banker under Section 13(4) of the Act. From simple logic and construction of the applicable provisions, this Court is of the view that the argument of petitioners that sale consideration credited into loan account is given due credit or included in the pre-deposit condition could be rejected without detailed discussion. The petitioners referred to and rely upon a few decisions in this behalf to argue that the deposit made by auction purchaser is given credit while imposing pre-deposit amount. After taking note of the circumstances of these writ petitions, I am of the view that orders are made by referring to concession given by the counsel in those cases, and cannot be treated as laying down a principle of law in this behalf or could have persuasive value on this Court. Section 18(1) confers right of appeal on an aggrieved person, second proviso is read directs DRAT to implement pre-deposit condition before the appeal is numbered. In this context, the words which have bearing in second proviso read thus: Unless the borrower has deposited with the appellate tribunal 50% of the amount of debt due from a borrower as claimed by the secured creditors or determined by the Debts Recovery Tribunal, whichever is less. In this context, the words which have bearing in second proviso read thus: Unless the borrower has deposited with the appellate tribunal 50% of the amount of debt due from a borrower as claimed by the secured creditors or determined by the Debts Recovery Tribunal, whichever is less. 24.1 Therefore, the debtor (principal/guarantor) deposits 50% or not less than 25% as the case may be, with the DRAT for availing the remedy of statutory appeal. The borrower once challenges the measures under Section 13(2) or (4), the amount deposited by the auction purchasers into loan cannot be given credit by DRAT, while deciding pre-deposit amount for purpose of second and third provisos to Section 18 of Act 2002. The literal construction of second proviso to Section 18(1) does not permit the petitioners to claim credit of amount deposited by the auction purchasers for a pre-deposit condition complied by borrower. The contention of petitioners that giving credit to sale consideration deposited by auction purchasers is not persuasive enough to accept is without merit and accordingly rejected. 25. The second argument of petitioners is that respondents 1 and 2 filed application under Section 13(10) in O.A.No.56 of 2008 for realising the balance outstanding after selling property on 5.10.2006 and the respondents in O.A.No.56 of 2008 obtained order of attachment of properties of petitioners. The petitioners for raising the attachment of immovable properties have furnished bank guarantee for Rs.3 crores. The bank guarantee now furnished by petitioners exceeds the amount claimed in the notice under Section 13(2) and the total debt due by petitioners to respondents. The bank guarantee furnished by the petitioners ought to be treated as compliance with precondition deposit under Section 18(1) second proviso. The imposition of Rs.two crores as pre-deposit is onerous, arbitrary and illegal. 25.1 Adv.Kurup contends that the application filed by the respondent bank under section 13(10) in O.A.No.56 of 2008 is still pending and can be proceeded with subject to the outcome of TSA No.10/2016. The respondent bank did not realise the total debt due from the petitioners in spite of sale of the property pursuant to notice dated 14.8.2006. For the balance of outstanding debt due from petitioners, the properties of petitioners were attached in O.A.No.56/2008 as there is no sufficient security available with the Bank. The petitioners have furnished bank guarantee for raising the attachment of immovable property effected by DRT in O.A.No.56/2008. For the balance of outstanding debt due from petitioners, the properties of petitioners were attached in O.A.No.56/2008 as there is no sufficient security available with the Bank. The petitioners have furnished bank guarantee for raising the attachment of immovable property effected by DRT in O.A.No.56/2008. The bank guarantee in O.A. No.56/2008 is independent of the condition under Section 18 of the Act. The order of DRT raising the attachment is not the subject matter of the writ petition or an issue before DRAT. Therefore, the petitioners having furnished bank guarantee got the attachment of immovable properties lifted, can't seek for adjustment of very same bank guarantee as part of pre-deposit in O.A.No.690 of 2018. The petitioners' can't be allowed to approbate and reprobate and simultaneously challenge every measure the respondent bank initiates in this behalf. 25.2 Section 13(10) is an additional remedy provided to a Financial Institution to recover the balance of outstanding debt with the realization of sale consideration in auction held by Bank. The application under Section 13(10) for all purposes is akin to a simple recovery suit of unsecured debt. The petitioner having furnished a bank guarantee for raising the attachment of properties effected in O.A.No.56 of 2008 cannot now argue for inclusion of said bank guarantee amount for any purpose under second and third provisos of Section 18(1) while calculating pre-deposit condition. The amount for which bank guarantee was furnished is not relevant before DRAT. The contention that bank guarantee is adequate compliance of pre-deposit of condition, hence, is without merit and rejected. 26. The petitioners' next argument is on calculation and inclusion of interest post sec.13(2) notice and that pre-deposit amounting to Rs.two crores directed by DRAT is illegal and beyond the jurisdiction of DRAT. The basis for determining Rs.two crores as is admitted by both the parties, is that the DRAT calculated interest on debt between 2006 till a date of appeal and imposed the pre-deposit condition of deposit of Rs.two crores. Adv.Easwaran argues that inclusion of interest in the pre-deposit condition under Section 18(1), when the appeal is filed questioning the measures taken under Section 13(4), is illegal and contrary to the literal construction of Section 18, second and third provisos. Adv.Easwaran argues that inclusion of interest in the pre-deposit condition under Section 18(1), when the appeal is filed questioning the measures taken under Section 13(4), is illegal and contrary to the literal construction of Section 18, second and third provisos. The borrower to work out the remedy of appeal deposits with appellate authority 50% or a sum not below 25% the debt due and as claimed by secured creditor or as determined by DRT whichever is less. The definition of debt in section 2 of SARFAESI Act, 2002 and section 2 of Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act includes interest as well. Notice is issued under Section 13(2) before initiating measures for security enforcement. The debt claimed by the secured creditors in Sec.13(2) notice is the debt by referring to which the condition ought to be imposed by DRAT. There is difference in meaning between debts due and payable on one hand and on other hand debt due and claimed by the secured creditor. The debt referred to in second proviso, in cases where the appeal is filed against an order from an application made under Section 17 questioning the measures initiated under sub sections 2 and 4 of Section 13, the available meaning to the word 'debt due' in the said proviso is the debt due and claimed by Bank in the notices issued before measures for securitization are implemented by secured creditor. Second proviso to Section 18(1) deals with a situation arising under Section 13(10) of the Act 2002 as well. In such cases the debt due from debtor is determined by the Tribunal, therefore by reference to such determination the condition of pre-deposit is imposed by DRAT in appeals filed against decree made under Section 13(10) of Act 2002. The second proviso does not enable determination of debt by the Appellate Tribunal by including interest post Sec.13(2) notice. In the case on hand, the Appellate Tribunal determined the debt together with interest as payable by borrowers on the date of appeal and upon the said determined amount pre-deposit condition of two crores is ordered. Stated slightly in a different or simple way, it is his argument that in appeals filed under Section 18(1) of the Act questioning the measures taken under Section 13(2), (4) etc. Stated slightly in a different or simple way, it is his argument that in appeals filed under Section 18(1) of the Act questioning the measures taken under Section 13(2), (4) etc. DRAT can stipulate the amount i.e. 50% or 25% by referring to the debt claimed from the borrower/debtor by bank, but can't include interest from the date of Section 13(2) notice. Likewise in cases where appeal is filed, aggrieved by the adjudication in an application under Section 13(10), the pre-deposit amount is determined by referring to the debt determined by DRT. 26.2 Adv.Kurup and Adv. Madhu Radhakrishnan, refer to the citations already noted above, contend that interest is a necessary concomitant to the debt due and payable by a borrower to a financial institution. The issue is no more res integra. The definition of 'debt' in Section 2 of Act 1993, is always inclusive of interest, hence to read 'debt' for the purpose of second proviso in isolation of interest accrued pendente lite or post section 13(2) notice would certainly dilute the pre-deposit condition mandated by second proviso to Section 18(1). The appeal being a statutory remedy, it is argued that the conditions will have to be interpreted and applied by giving literal meaning to all the words in the enabling section and interpretation which defeats plain and literal meaning must be avoided. The interpretation relied on by petitioners will dilute the meaning of debt due from a debtor and pre-deposit condition is made more liberal than what is envisaged by Section 18(1) of Act 2002. The pre-deposit condition is intended to prevent frivolous and vexatious appeals at the instance of defaulters. The pre-deposit condition, if is interpreted to include the element of interest as well, the same would serve the literal meaning, object, purpose and function of appeal made available under Section 18 before DRAT. Both the counsel appearing for respondents submit that while interpreting a provision of law, words ought not to be added to the text of a section and likewise, the words which are capable of natural and literal meaning ought not to be liberally construed. The decisions noted above are strongly relied on and contended that by following the principle laid down therein the arguments of petitioners need to be rejected in limine. Both the counsel pray for dismissing W.P.No. 9331 of 2019. The decisions noted above are strongly relied on and contended that by following the principle laid down therein the arguments of petitioners need to be rejected in limine. Both the counsel pray for dismissing W.P.No. 9331 of 2019. 26.3 I have carefully perused the decisions relied on by both sides. The argument now put forward for petitioners against inclusion of interest post to Section 13(2) notice ought not to be rejected by an off the cuff conclusion on the judgments relied on by respondents. This Court is also of the view that the argument now put forward by the petitioners is distinguishable from the contentions considered and decided in the decisions noted supra. Before adverting to decisions which have bearing on the interpretation of second proviso to Section 18(1) of SARFAESI Act, 2002, the following well established principle of interpretation of statutes are adverted to. 26.4 SARFAESI Act, 2002 is considered as a complete Code enacted by Parliament for realization of debts due to banks, and with this enactment the intervention of civil court for obtaining a Decree and filing E.P. etc. are done away with. Now, the debt due to bank is treated as an executable decree and for the said purpose of execution secured creditors are conferred powers by Section 13 of SARFAESI Act, 2002 and Rules to enforce the security interest in accordance with the provisions of Act 2002. The Parliament has not presumed infallibility or legality to all the measures taken by the secured creditor while exercising all or any of the rights the secured creditor has, viz. take possession, sell the property etc. Therefore, to the extent required procedural safeguards are provided without hampering expeditious realization of debts due to financial institution. A person aggrieved by any of the measures taken by financial institution has remedies viz. file original application under Section 17 before DRT and further file appeal under Section 18 before DRAT. In the scheme of SARFAESI Act, 2002 both the remedies are valuable redressal remedies against illegal or arbitrary enforcement of security interest by Financial Institutions. These measures resulting in securitization could be challenged before the DRT/DRAT as the case may be. A person aggrieved by an order of DRT has the statutory right of appeal under Section 18 before DRAT. The controversy deals with interpreting the pre-deposit condition mandated by second proviso to Section 18. These measures resulting in securitization could be challenged before the DRT/DRAT as the case may be. A person aggrieved by an order of DRT has the statutory right of appeal under Section 18 before DRAT. The controversy deals with interpreting the pre-deposit condition mandated by second proviso to Section 18. At the cost of repetition, this Court finds it useful to reproduce Section 18 of SARFAESI Act, 2002 here under for immediate reference. 18(1) Any person aggrieved, by any order made by the Debts Recovery Tribunal under section 17, may prefer an appeal along with such fee, as may be prescribed to an Appellate Tribunal within thirty days from the date of receipt of the order of Debts Recovery Tribunal. Provided that different fees may be prescribed for filing an appeal by the borrower or by the person other than the borrower: Provided further that no appeal shall be entertained unless the borrower has deposited with the Appellate Tribunal fifty per cent of the amount of debt due from him, as claimed by the secured creditors or determined by the Debts Recovery Tribunal, whichever is less: (emphasis applied) Provided also that the Appellate Tribunal may, for the reasons to be recorded in writing, reduce the amount to not less than twenty-five per cent of debt referred to in the second proviso. (emphasis added) (2) Save as otherwise provided in this Act, the Appellate Tribunal shall, as far as may be, dispose of the appeal in accordance with the provisions of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (51 of 1993) and rules made thereunder. 26.5 The consideration and interpretation of second proviso to Section 18(1) of SARFAESI Act, 2002 determine the extent of pre-deposit under second proviso to Sec.18(1) of the Act. According to golden rule or literal construction of statutes, the words of the statute are, first, understood in the natural, ordinary or popular sense and phrases, sentences are construed, according to their grammatical meaning unless such construction of words/phrases leads to some absurdity or that there is something in the context or in the object of the statute to suggest contrary. As Lord Brougham observed in Crowford vs Spooner (1846 (4) MIA 179 page 181 (6) MOOPC Moors Privy Council, to take words as the legislature has given them and to take the meaning which the words given natural imply, unless where the construction of those words is, either by the preamble or by the context of the words in question “controlled or altered”. The interpretative tools/principles viz. literal and “NOSCITUR A SOCIIS” are applied to the section under interpretation to derive the meaning of the words, particularly in the company in which the words are used by Parliament. 'Noscitur' means 'to know' and 'Sociis' means 'Association'. Therefore, the full meaning of latin expression "NOSCITUR A SOCIIS" is “to know the meaning of words by association which according to the context”. The often quoted expression of Lord Macmillion on the latin expression reads thus: “A word is known by the company, it keeps”. 26.6 The pre-deposit condition for maintaining appeal is covered by second and third provisos to Section 18(1) of Act 2002. The rules of interpretation of proviso are also elaborate and 'a proviso is interpreted in more than one form'. As discussed in Vepa P.Sarathi's Interpretation of Statutes, 5th Edition, there is no guideline in any judgment as to when a particular form is the proper form of interpretation. Interpretation depends upon the context, objects etc. (a) When one finds a proviso to a section the natural presumption is that, but for the proviso, the enacting part of the section would have included the subject-matter of the proviso. (b) A proviso must be construed with reference to the preceding parts of the clause to which it is appended. (c) Where the proviso is directly repugnant to a section, the proviso shall stand and be held to be a repeal of the section as the proviso speaks the later intention of the makers. (d) Where the section is doubtful, a proviso may be used as a guide to its interpretation; but when it is clear, a proviso cannot imply the existence of words of which there is no trace in the section. (e) The proviso is subordinate to the main section. (f) A proviso does not enlarge an enactment except for compelling reasons. (g) Sometimes an unnecessary proviso is inserted by way of abundant caution. (e) The proviso is subordinate to the main section. (f) A proviso does not enlarge an enactment except for compelling reasons. (g) Sometimes an unnecessary proviso is inserted by way of abundant caution. (h) A construction placed upon a proviso which brings it into general harmony with the terms of the section should prevail. (i) When a proviso is repugnant to the enacting part, the proviso will not prevail over the absolute terms of a later Act directed to be read as supplemental to the earlier one. (j) A proviso may sometimes contain a substantive provision. The above shows that a "proviso" can be interpreted in so many forms. But there is no guideline in any judgment as to when a particular form is the proper form. It all depends upon the context and object. 26.7 To the case on hand, this Court interprets proviso by keeping in mind the following broad principles of interpretation. (a) When one finds a proviso to a section the natural presumption is that but for the proviso the enacting part of the section could have included the subject matter of the proviso. (b) A proviso must be construed with reference to the preceding parts of the clause to which it is appended. A construction placed upon a proviso which brings into the general harmony with the terms of the section “ought to prevail”. While these are the broad guidelines on interpretation of proviso, I do not propose to burden the judgment with reported case law on these often stated interpretative tools of proviso”. 26.8 Cause of action as a lis between the parties in the present scheme of things under Act 2002, arises with the issue of notice by Financial Institution/Bank under section 13(2) of SARFAESI ACT, 2002. The default of borrower in complying with the demand in Section 13(2) notice, enables financial Institution to take one or any of the measures under sub section (4). A person aggrieved by the mode and manner in which measures are taken up by a financial Institutions moves under section 17, the DRT for all the reliefs stated in Section 17. In an application filed under section 17 against the measures so taken by Financial Institution, DRT decides whether the measures initiated by the banker/Financial Institution under Section 13 subsections (2) and (4) conform to the provisions of Act 2002. In an application filed under section 17 against the measures so taken by Financial Institution, DRT decides whether the measures initiated by the banker/Financial Institution under Section 13 subsections (2) and (4) conform to the provisions of Act 2002. A person aggrieved by the decision of DRT has statutory remedy of appeal under Section 18 of SARFAESI Act, 2002. The condition of pre-deposit arises while the statutory remedy of appeal is worked out by the unsuccessful party before DRT. The argument of petitioners as already noted is not against the condition of pre-deposit but on inclusion of interest post to section 13(2) notice by DRAT as part of pre-deposit under second or third provisos of Section 18. 26.9 Let me first examine a situation where an appeal is filed from an order in challenge to measures under Section 13(2) to (4) i.e. as in the present case and interpret the requirement of second proviso of section 18(1). The proviso imposes a restriction on the Appellate Tribunal to entertain an appeal presented under Section 18(1), unless the condition precedent i.e, pre-deposit is fulfilled by the borrower. The appellate tribunal while entertaining appeal reads second proviso by Noscitur a sociis and literal interpretation to important words in second proviso of Section 18. Interpreting so, the words 'debt due and as claimed' refer to the amount claimed by Financial Institution under section 13(2) of Act 2002. Therefore in the appeals arising from challenge to measures taken under Section 13(2) to 13(4), the DRAT imposes pre-deposit of 50% or 25% on the debt due and claimed in notice under Section 13(2), but can't calculate interest on the amount claimed and order pre-deposit. Therefore the debt referred and claimed by bank is the determining figure on which DRAT could order pre-deposit of 50% or 25% as the case may be. "Debt" claimed by Financial Institution in notice under Section 13(2) is inclusive of interest accrued on the sanctioned loan amount till the date of demand. Therefore the definition of debt in Sec.2 (g) of Act 1993 remains unaffected in any manner with the above interpretation of words debt due from borrower, as claimed by the secured creditor in second proviso. "Debt" claimed by Financial Institution in notice under Section 13(2) is inclusive of interest accrued on the sanctioned loan amount till the date of demand. Therefore the definition of debt in Sec.2 (g) of Act 1993 remains unaffected in any manner with the above interpretation of words debt due from borrower, as claimed by the secured creditor in second proviso. The second proviso, by literal interpretation and by applying associative coherence to all the words in second proviso, it can't be stated or understood to include pendente lite or post Section 13(2) notice interest on the outstanding amount claimed in the notice under Section 13(2). Let me take yet another illustration as readily available in the facts of these writ petitions, that Bank filed O.A. No.56 of 2008 under Section 13(10) of SARFAESI Act 2002 for realising the balance due upon giving credit to the sale consideration received in the sale held on 05.10.2006. The order of DRT finally is challenged by filing appeal under Section 18(1), then DRAT stipulates pre-deposit condition on the amount demanded by financial institutions or on the final determination of debt by DRAT whichever is less. In cases arising under Section 13(10) the DRT decides interest payable during the pendency of recovery claim till the date of realisation. Second proviso provides for the contingencies referred to above, i.e. firstly deals with situations arising on one hand under Section 13(2) to 13(4) and on another under section 13(10) separately. The Parliament, in its wisdom, provided for applicable condition for filing appeal in both the situations. The above interpretation satisfies the meaning of the word 'debt' used in second proviso as is defined by Section 2 of Act 1993. The definition clause is interpreted in the company of words i.e. "as claimed by the secured creditor" in which the words “debt due” are used. In the interpretative exercise undertaken by this court the words are given literal and also associative coherence is attained by not including interest post Section 13(2) notice. 26.10 The emphasis in second proviso is that the borrower deposits with the Appellate Tribunal 50% of the amount of debt due from the borrower as claimed by the secured creditors. So the 50% amount on the debt claimed by bank or determined by DRT. There is no third angle, i.e., as determined by DRAT. 26.10 The emphasis in second proviso is that the borrower deposits with the Appellate Tribunal 50% of the amount of debt due from the borrower as claimed by the secured creditors. So the 50% amount on the debt claimed by bank or determined by DRT. There is no third angle, i.e., as determined by DRAT. This Court is of the view that the calculation and inclusion of interest by DRAT amounts to determination of debt by DRAT, and the third angle is not available from the text or syntax of second proviso. 26.11 At this juncture, it is useful to refer to the judgment of Madras High Court in Sivakumar Textiles v Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal, Chennai and others, AIR 2012 MADRAS 57. 13. In the event the borrower is not satisfied as to the measures taken by the secured creditor by issuance of notice under Section 13(4), he may prefer appeal to the Debts Recovery Tribunal under Section 17 with a further provision of appeal under Section 18 to the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal, in case any order adversely affecting him is passed by the Debts Recovery Tribunal. Under Section 17, the borrower or any person, aggrieved by any of the measures referred to in sub-section (4) of Section 13, may appeal to the Debts Recovery Tribunal. That appeal is in respect of the amount claimed under Section 13(2) of the Act. The provision of Section 13(4) does not contemplate any indication as to the quantum of debt to be shown in the possession notice necessarily meaning thereby that for the purpose of challenging the recovery proceedings made under Section 13(4), the demand made under Section 13(2) is alone relevant. Section 18 contemplates a further appeal to the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal by a person who is aggrieved by the orders of the Debts Recovery Tribunal. In that sense, the amount demanded under Section 13(2) alone has relevance, as the proceedings under Section 13(4) which was questioned under Section 17 are the proceedings which culminated into one of further appeal under Section 18 of the Act. 16. The above interpretation is alone possible, as it is reasonable and is strengthened by further fact that there is an alternate provision namely that the amount could be as determined by the Debts Recovery Tribunal. 16. The above interpretation is alone possible, as it is reasonable and is strengthened by further fact that there is an alternate provision namely that the amount could be as determined by the Debts Recovery Tribunal. In the event, the Debts Recovery Tribunal determines the amount, then 50% of the amount must also be with reference to the amount as determined by the Debts Recovery Tribunal. However, there is a further rider in the said proviso that in the event the amount claimed by the secured creditor is less than the amount determined by the Debts Recovery Tribunal, 50% of the amount to be deposited would be with reference to the amount claimed by the secured creditor and not the amount determined by the Debts Recovery Tribunal. As the borrower has a remedy of appeal to the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal, which is the final fact-finding body, his right of appeal may be defeated in the event the second proviso to Section 18 is interpreted to mean that 50% of the amount to be deposited by the borrower would be with reference to the amount claimed by the secured creditor at the time when the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal considers the application for waiver. If such interpretation is given, it will lead injustice to the borrower while availing the appellate remedy and shall consequently result in undue hardship. 26.12 The Bombay High Court in MRB Roadconst.Pvt.Ltd. v Rupee Co-op.Bank Ltd., 2016(2) ABR 256 referred to Division Bench judgment of Madras High Court and the operative portion reads as follows: "18. On a plain reading of the 2nd proviso to section 18(1) of the SARFAESI Act read with the definition under the word "debt" as defined in section 2(g) of the RDDB Act, it is clear that before an appeal can be entertained by the DRAT, the borrower has to deposit 50% of the amount of debt due from him as claimed by the secured creditors or as determined by the DRT whichever is less. If there is no determination of the debt by the DRT under the provisions of the RDDB Act, then the borrower would have to deposit 50% of the amount of debt due from him as claimed by the secured creditors. If there is no determination of the debt by the DRT under the provisions of the RDDB Act, then the borrower would have to deposit 50% of the amount of debt due from him as claimed by the secured creditors. The provision on a plain reading does not in any way exclude taking into consideration the future interest that is accrued on the debt owed by the borrower to the secured creditor. In fact, the definition of the word "debt" means any liability (inclusive of interest) which is claimed as due from any person by a bank or a financial institution. Therefore, if the claim made by the secured creditor in the section 13(2) notice includes future interest, the same would certainly be included in the "amount of the debt due" from the VRD 14 of 26 RPW78.15 FINAL.doc borrower to the secured creditor as contemplated under the 2nd proviso to section 18(1) of the SARFAESI Act. There is therefore no justification to hold that it is only the figure that is mentioned in the section 13(2) notice that is to be taken into consideration and not the future interest accrued on the said sum, whilst determining the deposit amount under the 2nd proviso to section 18 of the SARFAESI Act. The amount of deposit would have to be determined on the basis of the amount of debt due by the borrower to the secured creditor on the date when the appeal is filed in DRAT. This would not only include the amount mentioned in the section 13(2) notice but also interest accrued thereon till the date of filing of the appeal under section 18 of the SARFAESI Act. To our mind, this is the only interpretation that is possible of the 2nd proviso to section 18 of the SARFAESI Act." 26.13 This Court is of the view that by allowing Appellate Tribunal to independently decide what is the debt due, would amount to adding words, viz "debts due, as claimed by bank and payable by the debtor" at the time of filing appeal to second proviso of section 18(1). Such course of interpretation is impermissible. In between the reported judgments in Sivakumar Textiles and MRB Road Constitutions Pvt.Ltd., I am convinced and persuaded to following the principles laid down in Sivakumar Textile case. Such course of interpretation is impermissible. In between the reported judgments in Sivakumar Textiles and MRB Road Constitutions Pvt.Ltd., I am convinced and persuaded to following the principles laid down in Sivakumar Textile case. This Court has perused both the judgments and the interpretation by Madras High Court in Sivakumar Textile case as additional reason for holding that debt due as debt due and claimed by secured creditor in Sec.13(2) notice and inclusion of interest post Sec.13(2) notice is unavailable to DRAT. Let me now refer to the principle of law laid down by the Apex Court in Axis Bank v SBS Organics Pvt.Ltd., 2016(12) SCC page 18 para.21 on how and to whom the pre-deposit is returned after DRAT pronounces judgment. The operative portion reads as follows: "The Appeal under Section 18 of the Act is permissible only against the order passed by the DRT under Section 17 of the Act. Under Section 17, the scope of enquiry is limited to the steps taken under Section 13(4) against the secured assets. The partial deposit before the DRAT as a pre-condition for considering the appeal on merits in terms of Section 18 of the Act, is not a secured asset. It is not a secured debt either, since the borrower or the aggrieved person has not created any security interest on such pre-deposit in favour of the secured creditor. If that be so, on disposal of the appeal, either on merits or on withdrawal, or on being rendered infructuous, in case, the appellant makes a prayer for refund of the pre-deposit, the same has to be allowed and the pre-deposit has to be returned to the appellant, unless the Appellate Tribunal, on the request of the secured creditor but with the consent of the depositors, had already appropriated the pre-deposit towards the liability of the borrower, or with the consent, had adjusted the amount towards the dues, or if there be any attachment on the pre-deposit in any proceedings under Section 13(10) of the Act read with Rule 11 of The Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002, or if there be any attachment in any other proceedings known to law.” (emphasis applied) 26.14 The statutory appeal with a concomitant condition of pre-deposit is not interpreted in such a way that the remedies within the four corners of the scheme of SARFAESI Act 2002 are shut out by onerous and burdensome interpretation. The delay, if any, in the proceedings should not be detrimental to a bona fide aggrieved person, pursuing available legal remedies. In the considered view of this Court, second proviso of Section 18(1) can be literally interpreted in the company of the other words i.e. "as claimed by secured creditor" in which the 'debt due' is positioned in the second proviso. Hence this Court holds that (a) The borrower in cases filed before DRT questioning measures issued under Sec.13(2) to (4) and appeal filed from such order, the borrower is required to deposit 50% or 25% of amount claimed as debt by secured creditor and interest post Section 13(2) can't be notionally calculated by DRAT. (b) In cases where an appeal is filed against a decision under Section 13(10), the pre-deposit condition is stipulated by referring to the amount determined by the Tribunal or debt claimed by secured creditor whichever is less. Thus interpreted, the remedy of appeal though not an absolute right on a borrower, but a statutory right is worked out within the scheme of the Act. WPC No.11506 of 2019 27. Adv.Kurup refers to and places reliance on the judgment of this Court in Varghese A.P. v Chief Manager (Authorised officer) Vijaya Bank and others, 2019(5) KHC 685 for the contention that the pre-deposit in every appeal filed is mandatory. The operative portion reads thus: "7. State does not distinguish an interim order or a final order made in the SARFAESI application filed under S.17 of the Act. S.18 starts with an opening sentence that any person aggrieved, by any order by the Debt Recovery Tribunal, shall make a pre-deposit of 50% of the debt referred to in 2nd proviso to S.18 of the Act. An order passed in an interim application is also falls within the ambit of S.18 of the Act. In view of the statutory provision of making pre-deposit as a requirement for entertaining an appeal under S.18 of the Act, we are not inclined to interfere with the order impugned in this writ appeal. Accordingly, writ appeal is dismissed." 27.1 It is argued that the impugned order in WPC No.11506 of 2019 hardly gives any reason for not putting the petitioner on pre-deposit condition and amounts to arbitrary exercise of discretion conferred on DRAT by second and third provisos. Accordingly, writ appeal is dismissed." 27.1 It is argued that the impugned order in WPC No.11506 of 2019 hardly gives any reason for not putting the petitioner on pre-deposit condition and amounts to arbitrary exercise of discretion conferred on DRAT by second and third provisos. Therefore, order impugned in WPC No.11506 of 2019 is liable to be set aside and appellants in AIR No.691 of 2018 are directed to deposit 50% of debt due to bank. 27.2 He further argues that waiver of deposit in AIR 691 of 2018 is illegal and per se appeal in AIR No.691 of 2018 is not maintainable. The petitioners/borrowers ought to be put to pre-deposit condition under second or third provisos to section 18(1). 27.3 Adv.Easwaran refers to the Division Bench judgment dated 11.4.2019 of Madras High Court in CRP (NPD) No.1492 of 2017 and batch, contends that pre-deposit condition is not applicable in all cases, particularly to the case on hand. Condition of pre-deposit is not mandatory in all appeals filed before DRAT and the case on hand is distinguishable from the facts and circumstances of the reported cases relied on by respondent including Varghese A.P. case. According to him, with the filing of two separate appeals questioning order in I.A.No.179 of 2016 and consequent order in TSA No.10 of 2016 when the original application filed questioning measures was one application before DRT. It is further argued that the petitioners at the first instance preferred one appeal, but on the office objection taken, two appeals are filed. The debt against which the measures were initiated is one and condition of pre-deposit in one appeal satisfies the pre-deposit condition in connected appeal. The debt due and claimed by the respondent bank remains one and condition of pre-deposit is not attracted to the second appeal filed questioning order in an interlocutory application filed by auction purchasers to non-suit the debtors. Stated in other words, the argument is that the subject matter of the appeals, i.e. AIR 690 and 691 of 2018 is indivisible, and the recovery of debt by respondent bank remains only a debt. Before proceeding further, reference to SD Bhoshkar company and another v Bank of Baroda and another, 2017(2) SCC 485 is useful and operative portion reads as follows: "2. Before proceeding further, reference to SD Bhoshkar company and another v Bank of Baroda and another, 2017(2) SCC 485 is useful and operative portion reads as follows: "2. According to the appellants, they had already approached DRAT and had deposited Rs.12.50 lakhs in respect of the same subject-matter, when proceedings were initiated under the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 and hence, it will be highly unjust to insist for a pre-deposit before DRAT in proceedings under the SARFAESI Act. 3. Though both the sides are prepared to address arguments on the issue, having regard to the fact that the appeals are pending before DRAT, we do not think that we should address the question of law as such. 4. Therefore, leaving the question of law open and in the peculiar facts of this case, we dispose of these appeals and direct DRAT, Mumbai to dispose of Appeal Nos.296 of 2006 and 139 of 2011 expeditiously and at any rate, within a period of six months from today. (emphasis applied) 5. We direct the parties to cooperate in the expeditious disposal of the appeals. The interim order granted by this Court staying the further deposit under the SARFAESI Act will continue till the disposal of the appeals by DRAT. Further, there shall be no coercive steps for recovery till the appeals are disposed of. No costs." 27.4 Therefore, in respect of the same recovery when a separate appeal is filed against an interlocutory order the condition of pre-deposit is appreciated with the condition already imposed by DRAT in the main appeal or substantive appeal. This Court is of the view that the insistence of further deposit by bank in WPC No.11506 of 2019 is unsustainable in fact and law. The prayer in WP(C) No.11506 of 2019 is unavailable and consequently the writ petition fails and liable to be dismissed. 28. As a consequence of above discussion, after weighing the merits in the arguments of both sides, this Court next considers the relief to which the parties are entitled to. 28.1 This Court from the statement of facts has noted that the starting point of litigation between the parties is 31.5.2006 and the dispute has been canvassed before this Court as well as the Apex Court both under Articles 226, 227 and also 136 of Constitution of India. 28.1 This Court from the statement of facts has noted that the starting point of litigation between the parties is 31.5.2006 and the dispute has been canvassed before this Court as well as the Apex Court both under Articles 226, 227 and also 136 of Constitution of India. Avoid delay in realisation is one of the objects sought to be achieved by SARFAESI Act, 2002. To what extent, Act 2002 has achieved the said purpose is not considered in this judgment. However, the delay in adjudication of disputes by Tribunal/Court ought not to result in onerous burden on appellant, shutting out the remedy of appeal before DRAT. This Court, for the purpose of deciding the pre-deposit amount does not prefer to send the appeals back to DRAT for fresh consideration and disposal. However taking note of the time spent by the parties and puts the petitioner to applicable condition. Therefore this Court directs petitioners in WP(C) No.9331 of 2019 to deposit 50% of the amount claimed by the respondent bank under section 13(2) notice on or before 31.1.2020. Either partial waiver or reduction in third proviso is dependant on the circumstances of the case. The plea of petitioners to apply third proviso is considered and accepted by this Court, then it would be a case of liberal and lenient application of proviso by this Court. Judiciously the proviso is applied and the petitioners/borrowers therefore deposits 50% on or before 31.1.2020 towards pre-deposit in AIR No.690 of 2018. Upon such deposit by petitioners the appeals are numbered and DRAT considers disposing of AIR No.690 & 691 of 2018 within six weeks thereafter. Having regard to above discussion, WP(C) No.9331 of 2019 is ordered and WP(C) No.11506 of 2019 stands dismissed.