JUDGMENT : A.K. Mishra, J. In this Lis U/s.482 Cr.P.C. prayer has been made to quash the proceeding as well as cognizance order dtd.07.01.2005 passed by the learned S.D.J.M., (Sadar) Cuttack in I.C.C. Case No.335 of 2001. 2. The petitioner was accused in the aforesaid complaint case while opposite party was the complainant. 3. The case of petitioner, in brief, is that on 14.02.1994 the complainant had entered in to a lease/tenancy agreement with the present petitioner - accused to let out a piece of land in Mouza - Ramgarh appertaining to Plot No.58 under Khata No.1005 measuring an area Ac.0.055 decimals and Plot No.1313/1458, area Ac.0.010 decimals, (total Ac.0.065 decimals) for a period of fifteen years at a monthly rent of Rs. 1000/- with an understanding that the rent would get incremental increase by Rs. 100/- annually. The accused - petitioner had installed a petrol filling station under the name and style “FILL & FLY” with the permission of the dealer IBP Company Ltd. The complainant had taken advance of Rs. 10,000/-. 3-(a). The complainant issued Lawyer's notice on 05.02.2001 U/s.106 of the Transfer of Property Act for termination of tenancy. The complainant filed Title Suit No.149 of 2001 in the court of Civil judge, (Sr. Division) 1st Court, Cuttack for permanent injunction. In that case prayer for interim injunction was dismissed on 08.08.2003. The opposite party - complainant filed Miscellaneous Appeal No.98 of 2003 before the learned District Judge, Cuttack and the same was dismissed on 08.10.2004. Complainant also filed Title Suit No.306 of 2001 in the court of Civil Judge (Sr. Division) 1st Court, Cuttack for eviction and damages which was subjudice. In December 2001 the present complaint I.C.C. No.335 of 2001 was filed but the accused petitioner received notice from the court to appear on 31.3.2005. The further case of the petitioner is that in the complaint petition, the induction of tenancy, termination thereof by notice dtd.5.2.2001 U/s.106 of the Transfer of Property Act and filing of Title Suit No.149 of 2001 and Title Suit No.306 of 2001 have been averred. Learned S.D.J.M., Cuttack had taken cognizance, after making enquiry U/s.202 Cr.P.C. U/s.447 IPC read with section 34 of the Indian penal Code. The accused petitioner has specifically asserted that he had not received any notice U/s 441 of the I.P.C. (Orissa Amendment) dtd.14.11.2001. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner Mr. Learned S.D.J.M., Cuttack had taken cognizance, after making enquiry U/s.202 Cr.P.C. U/s.447 IPC read with section 34 of the Indian penal Code. The accused petitioner has specifically asserted that he had not received any notice U/s 441 of the I.P.C. (Orissa Amendment) dtd.14.11.2001. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner Mr. Banshidhar Baug buttressed his submission that in view of the admitted position that a lease deed vide Annexure-1 was executed between the parties on 14.2.1994 for a period of fifteen years, the land lord - complainant should not have resorted to the criminal proceeding U/s.441 of the Indian Penal Code (Odisha Amendment) after filing of two civil suits. In support of his contention, he has relied upon the Division bench decision of this court in the case of Akapati Bhaskar Patro Vrs. Trinath Sahu and Another reported in, (2001) 1 OrissaLR 502. He also relied upon two other decisions reported in the case of Sri Kumar Debasish Vrs. State of Orissa and Another, (2008) CriLJ 2397 and in the case of Akapati Bhaskar Patro Vrs. Trinath Sahu and Another, (2002) 1 OrissaLR 498 (Single Bench). 5. Per Contra, learned counsel for opposite party - complainant Mr. G. Mukherji contended that the lease agreement under Annexure-1 was an unregistered document for which it is not admissible. Relying upon same Division Bench judgment in the case of Akapati Bhaskar Patro (supra) submitted that Section 441 of I.P.C. (Odisha Amendment) is applicable to the person who was permitted to possess the property for a particular period and after lapse of the said period, he was called upon to handover possession by issuance of quit notice. 6. Both parties having relied upon the Division Bench decision of this court in the case of Akapati Bhaskar Patro (supra), it is apt to refer the ratio laid down therein which is as follows:- “12. On the basis of the discussions made in the preceding paragraphs, we are of the opinion that the rigors of section 441 of I.P.C. as amended by the Orissa Act 22 of 1986 shall not be applicable to the following cases:- (i) Statutory tenants whose tenancy is governed by any statute. [They are protected by tenancy laws like Public Premises Eviction Act, etc.] (ii) Tenant who has entered into possession by virtue of a lease. [They are protected by tenancy laws like Public Premises Eviction Act, etc.] (ii) Tenant who has entered into possession by virtue of a lease. [Rights of such tenant is governed under the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act and the Specific Relief Act and he acquires a right of possession. After determination of tenancy by notice, he would become “Tenant holding over”, “Tenant on sufferance” or “Tenant at will” as the case may be. His possession being juridical, is protected He can be evicted only in due process of law. The possession of such tenant cannot be equated with that of trespassers.] (iii) Person who has entered into possession by virtue of some covenant like, agreement to sell, will etc. and/or put forth a genuine right over the property possessed. [If a person claims a right of title coupled with possession, till the dispute is adjudicated, his possession cannot be conclusively said to be that of a trespasser and his right to possess would be subject to the result of the suit or legal proceeding.] However, the said section shall be applicable to the following category of persons ; (i) Person who was permitted to possess a property for a particular period and after lapse of the said period, he was called upon to handover possession by issuance of quit notice, (ii) Person who was put in possession by means of a 'licence' and who fails to handover possession after expiry of the term of licence and/or after receiving quit notice from the landlord, (iii) Persons who was in “permissive possession” and who fails to handover possession even after receiving a notice to quit] The reference made by the learned Single Judge is answered accordingly. Before parting, we feel constrained to observe that there cannot be an iron tight jacket to fit in all cases or tenants. It should be borne in mind that judicial process should not be permitted to be used as an instrument of oppression or needless harassment. The court should be circumspect and judicious in exercising discretion and should take all the relevant facts and circumstances into consideration before issuing process, lest it would be an instrument in the hands of private complainant as vendetta to harass the persons needlessly. The court should be circumspect and judicious in exercising discretion and should take all the relevant facts and circumstances into consideration before issuing process, lest it would be an instrument in the hands of private complainant as vendetta to harass the persons needlessly. In a given case, the court adjudicating the dispute has to take a pragmatic view keeping in mind the discussions made in this judgment and other provisions of law and arrive at a subjective satisfaction as to whether the mischief as stipulated under section 441, I. P. C. (Amended) has been intentionally committed or not and pass necessary orders.” 6-(a). It is noteworthy that the aforesaid Division Bench decision was the outcome of a reference by a Single Bench on the point as to the applicability of Section 441 of I.P.C. (Odisha Amendment) to a tenant whose tenancy has been terminated. 7. Facts admitted obviate debate, Annexure-1 Agreement to let out premises was executed on 14.2.1994 between the parties and clause-1 of the said agreement shows that the lease was for a period of fifteen years from the date of taking possession of the premises. Clause 12 provides that the agreement may be terminated by either party by giving six months notice of his intention to do so and/or on due approval of I.B.P. Company Ltd. for re- phasing. It is not registered. The relationship between the parties on the basis of this agreement is stated to be land lord and tenant. 7-(a). The copy of complaint petition (Annexure-4) had referred to such agreement. It mentions about termination of tenancy by issuance of notice on 14.11.2001 U/s.106 of the Transfer of Property Act. Thus, the parties have acted by the agreement treating the same to be a lease and accused - petitioner was given possession for the purpose mentioned in the said document. 8. Learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon clause 2 of paragraph 12 of the Division bench judgment, i.e. “Tenant who had entered into possession by virtue of a lease” to submit that rigor of section 441 of I.P.C. as amended by Orissa Act 22 of 1986 is not applicable. 8. Learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon clause 2 of paragraph 12 of the Division bench judgment, i.e. “Tenant who had entered into possession by virtue of a lease” to submit that rigor of section 441 of I.P.C. as amended by Orissa Act 22 of 1986 is not applicable. Learned counsel for opposite party relied upon the later part clause 1 which says that a person who was permitted to possess a property for a particular period and after lapse of the said period, he was called upon to handover possession by issuance of quit notice. 8-(a) In the aforesaid judgment the Court clarified the position of possession between “tenant-holding over” and “tenant-on sufferance” and has held that where continuance of occupation is in assertion of a right, the tenant could not be held guilty under this provision. To constitute the essence of the offence of criminal trespass under Section 441 (Orissa amendment) the basic ingredient is the intention and not simple occupation after service of notice to vacate. In all these cases, the bona fide claim advanced by the tenant has to be carefully considered before taking cognizance. 9. The judgment is not required to be read like a statute. Precedential authority cannot be construed like legislative enactments. For reading a judgment “the very words” found therein are to be referred to, i.e. ipsossima verba - “the very words”. Reference in this regard may be made to the decision of Hon'ble Apex Court reported in the case of State of Rajasthan Vrs. Ganeshi Lal, (2008) 2 SCC 533 wherein their Lordships stated as follows:- “12. Courts should not place reliance on decisions without discussing as to how the factual situation fits in with the fact situation of the decision on which reliance is placed. Observations of Courts are neither to be read as Euclid's theorems nor as provisions of the statute and that too taken out of their context. These observations must be read in the context in which they appear to have been stated. Judgments of Courts are not to be construed as statutes. To interpret words, phrases and provisions of a statute, it may become necessary for judges to embark into lengthy discussions but the discussion is meant to explain and not to define. Judges interpret statutes, they do not interpret judgments. They interpret words of statutes; their words are not to be interpreted as statutes. To interpret words, phrases and provisions of a statute, it may become necessary for judges to embark into lengthy discussions but the discussion is meant to explain and not to define. Judges interpret statutes, they do not interpret judgments. They interpret words of statutes; their words are not to be interpreted as statutes. In London Graving Dock Co. Ltd. V. Horton, (1951) AC 737 at p.761), Lord Mac Dermot observed: “The matter cannot, of course, be settled merely by treating the ipsissima vertra of Willes, J as though they were part of an Act of Parliament and applying the rules of interpretation appropriate thereto. This is not to detract from the great weight to be given to the language actually used by that most distinguished judge.” 13. In Home Office v. Dorset Yacht Co., (1970) 2 AllER 294 Lord Reid said, “Lord Atkin's speech.....is not to be treated as if it was a statute definition. It will require qualification in new circumstances.” Megarry, J in (1971) 1 WLR 1062 observed: “One must not, of course, construe even a reserved judgment of Russell L.J. as if it were an Act of Parliament.” And, in Herrington v. British Railways Board, (1972) 2 WLR 537 Lord Morris said: “There is always peril in treating the words of a speech or judgment as though they are words in a legislative enactment, and it is to be remembered that judicial utterances made in the setting of the facts of a particular case.” 14. Circumstantial flexibility, one additional or different fact may make a world of difference between conclusions in two cases. Disposal of cases by blindly placing reliance on a decision is not proper. 15. The following words of Lord Denning in the matter of applying precedents have become locus classicus: “Each case depends on its own facts and a close similarity between one case and another is not enough because even a single significant detail may alter the entire aspect, in deciding such cases, one should avoid the temptation to decide cases (as said by Cordozo) by matching the colour of one case against the colour of another. To decide therefore, on which side of the line a case falls, the broad resemblance to another case is not at all decisive.” *** *** *** “Precedent should be followed only so far as it marks the path of justice, but you must cut the dead wood and trim off the side branches else you will find yourself lost in thickets and branches. My plea is to keep the path to justice clear of obstructions which could impede it.” 9-(a) In another decision reported in Goan Real Estate & Constrn. Ltd. Vrs. Union of India, (2010) 5 SCC 388 their Lordships have held that “A judgment, it is well settled, cannot be read as a statute. Construction of a judgment should be made in the light of the factual matrix involved therein. What is more important is to see the issues involved therein and the context wherein the observations were made. Observation made in a judgment, it is trite, should be read in isolation and out of context.” 10. In the light of above principle, on reading of the Division Bench decision in Akapati Bhaskar Patro (supra), it is found that the later is applicable to the following category of persons while the earlier part refers that it shall not be applicable to the following cases. The dividing line between following category of persons and following cases is distinct and clear. Both are neither inconsistent nor intersecting. The very words ipsissima vertra dispels the doubt raised here. 10-(a) Presently, for the facts unfolded by the parties, the legal embargo for the tenancy which was entered into by virtue of a lease is found not overcome. The case does not come under the four corners of the Section 441 of I.P.C. as amended by Orissa Act 22 of 1986. In view of the legal position clarified in the aforesaid Division Bench judgment, the cognizance order, on being tested suffers from illegality. 11. In the decision reported in the case of Anand Kumar Mohatta and Another Vrs. State (Government of NCT of Delhi), 2019 1 OrissaLR 234 (SC) their Lordships of Hon'ble Apex Court have stated about the scope of the inherent power U/s. 482 Cr.P.C. to quash the proceeding in the following words:- “27. 11. In the decision reported in the case of Anand Kumar Mohatta and Another Vrs. State (Government of NCT of Delhi), 2019 1 OrissaLR 234 (SC) their Lordships of Hon'ble Apex Court have stated about the scope of the inherent power U/s. 482 Cr.P.C. to quash the proceeding in the following words:- “27. We are of the opinion that the present case falls under the 1st, 3rd and 5th category set out in the para 102 of the judgment in the case of Bhajan Lal (supra). In such a situation, the High Court erred in dismissing the petition of the Appellants filed under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. This was a fit case for the High Court to exercise its inherent power under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. to quash the FIR. 28. It is necessary here to remember the words of this Court in State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamyand others which read as follows: - “7. ..In the exercise of this wholesome power, the High Court is entitled to quash a proceeding if it comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceeding to continue would be an abuse of the process of the Court or that the ends of justice require that the proceeding ought to be quashed. The saving of the High Court's inherent powers, both in civil and criminal matters, is designed to achieve a salutary public purpose which is that a court proceeding ought not to be permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassment or persecution. In a criminal case, the veiled object behind a lame prosecution, the very nature of the material on which the structure of the prosecution rests and the like would justify the High Court in quashing the proceeding in the interest of justice ..” 12. For the reasons stated about, continuance of proceeding in I.C.C. Case No.335 of 2001 would be an abuse of the process of Court and to secure the ends of justice the same is required to be quashed. Accordingly the proceeding as well as cognizance order dtd.07.01.2005 passed by the learned S.D.J.M., (Sadar) Cuttack in I.C.C. Case No.335 of 2001 is hereby quashed. The CRLMC is accordingly disposed of.