JUDGMENT : Heard Mr. R.S. Mazumdar, learned senior counsel for the petitioners in all the cases, Mr. Mahesh Tewari, learned counsel for the respondent nos. 3 and 4 and Mr. Basav Chatterjee, learned counsel for the respondent no. 2-NTPC. 2. Since common questions of law and fact are involved in all these writ applications the same are being disposed of by this common order. 3. In W.P.(L) No. 5039 of 2010 the petitioner is aggrieved by the order dated 16/17.08.2010 passed by the Regional Labour Commissioner, Patna in Case No. MW Claim 47/10, by which the application preferred on behalf of the workmen under Section 20(3) of the Minimum Wages Act has been allowed exparte and the petitioner has been directed to deposit the claimed amount of Rs. 1,40,505.66 and an equivalent amount as one time compensation totaling an amount of Rs. 2,81,011.32. 4. In W.P.(L) No. 5080 of 2010 the petitioner has challenged the order dated 16/17.08.2010 passed by the Regional Labour Commissioner, Patna in Case No. MW Claim 50/10 by which the application preferred on behalf of the workmen under Section 20(3) of the Minimum Wages Act has been allowed exparte and the petitioner has been directed to deposit the claimed amount of Rs. 1,79,905.78 and an equivalent amount as one time compensation totaling an amount of Rs. 3,59,811.56. 5. In W.P.(L) No. 5081 of 2010 the petitioner is aggrieved by the order dated 16/17.08.2010 passed by the Regional Labour Commissioner, Patna in Case No. MW Claim 51/10 by which the application preferred on behalf of the workmen under Section 20(3) of the Minimum Wages Act has been allowed exparte and the petitioner has been directed to deposit the claimed amount of Rs. 3,40,516.56 and an equivalent amount as one time compensation totaling an amount of Rs. 6,81,033.12. 6. In W.P.(L) No. 5099 of 2010 the petitioner is aggrieved by the order dated 16/17.08.2010 passed by the Regional Labour Commissioner, Patna in Case No. MW Claim 47/10 by which the application preferred on behalf of the workmen under Section 20(3) of the Minimum Wages Act has been allowed exparte and the petitioner has been directed to deposit the claimed amount of Rs. 2,71,736.08 and an equivalent amount as one time compensation totaling an amount of Rs. 5,43,472.16. 7. 2,71,736.08 and an equivalent amount as one time compensation totaling an amount of Rs. 5,43,472.16. 7. The factual aspects of the case reveal that the petitioners are partnership/proprietorship firms and it has been carrying out various contractual jobs under NTPC from time to time since last more than one decade and as per legal requirement had also taken Labour license from the Assistant Labour Commissioner, Govt. of Jharkhand, Sahibganj. It has been stated that NTPC is a premier power generation company of the country and its prime area of operation is generation of power. Amongst other places NTPC has a Thermal Power Station at Farakka which is known as Farakka Super Thermal Power Station. 8. A wage agreement was entered into on 18.03.1997 by the petitioners and the respondent-MGR Workers Union and as per the terms of the said agreement the payment of wages was to be made to the contract Laborers taking into account the minimum wages notified from time to time by the then Government of Bihar and later the Government of Jharkhand. The said practice continued till the same was replaced by a new agreement dated 29.12.2009 in which it was agreed upon that the wages notified by the Central Government or that notified by the State Government shall be paid whichever is higher. The petitioners claims that the Labour license obtained by the petitioners from the Assistant Labour Commissioner, Government of Jharkhand, Sahibganj continued to operate. In 2008 the petitioners were awarded the contract of MGR Track Maintenance by NTPC Limited, Farakka Super Thermal Power Station and the Labour license which were obtained by the petitioners earlier remained valid through out the period of contract awarded to it by NTPC. The petitioners have further referred to the conciliation proceedings held between the petitioners, MGR Workers Union before the Assistant Labour Commissioner (Central), Kolkata which resulted in the tripartite agreement as noted above on 29.12.2009. The said agreement was made effective from 01.12.2009 and the wage structure was finalized through this agreement which was implementable for a period of seven years from 01.12.2009. The said agreement was made effective from 01.12.2009 and the wage structure was finalized through this agreement which was implementable for a period of seven years from 01.12.2009. After the agreement was executed an application was preferred by the Assistant Secretary of the Union before the Regional Labour Commissioner (Central), Patna under Section 21(1) of the Minimum Wages Act on account of less payment of minimum rate of wages from 20.05.2009 to 30.11.2009 and the wages which the Union claimed was with respect to individual workman. On such application having been filed the respondent no. 1 had issued notice to the petitioners who claims that they had attended the hearing on 19.05.2010 being represented through their association. The NTPC, Farakka (respondent no. 2 herein) had already filed a detailed reply and the petitioners claim that the representative of the petitioners had made a submission before the respondent no. 1 to treat the reply filed by NTPC as the reply of the petitioners also. The petitioners were surprised on coming to know that the respondent no. 1 had kept the application for exparte order at which the petitioners had filed an application on 09.08.2010 for recalling of the exparte order dated 05.08.2010. However, no order was passed on the said application and ultimately vide impugned order dated 16/17.08.2010 in all the cases which are the subject matter of the present writ applications an exparte order was passed directing the petitioners to make payment of the claimed amount along with an equivalent amount as compensation to the concerned workmen. 9. It has been submitted by Mr. R.S. Mazumdar, learned senior counsel for the petitioners while referring to the tripartite agreement dated 29.12.2009 that the wages and benefits were agreed to be drawn w.e.f. 01.12.2009 as full and final disposal of all the disputes. While referring to the tripartite agreement it has been stated that if in future the Central Government includes NTPC, Farakka in “A Area or B Area” of their wage notification the same shall be applicable to that extent. Learned senior counsel has also referred to the individual applications preferred under Section 20(3) of the Minimum Wages Act while stating that the applicants claimed to have been paid less wages fixed for their category of employment. Learned senior counsel has also referred to the individual applications preferred under Section 20(3) of the Minimum Wages Act while stating that the applicants claimed to have been paid less wages fixed for their category of employment. In such context reference has also been made to Section 20 of the Minimum Wages Act and it has been submitted that the same is meant for lesser payment of wages and considering the grievance of the applicants the same can be redressed by invoking the provisions of the Payment of Wages Act or under Section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. In support of his contention learned senior counsel has referred to the case of “Binod Kumar versus Union of India” reported in 2000 (2) PLJR 313 . Mr. Mazumdar arguing further has contented that although prior to passing of the impugned order an application for recall was submitted by the petitioners but no order was passed and without assigning any reason the impugned order dated 16/17.08.2010 was passed. Reference has also been made to Rule 29 of the Minimum Wages (Central) Rules, 1950 which relates to setting aside an order passed under sub-Rule 2 or 3 if sufficient cause is shown by the defaulting party. It has also been argued that there is no dispute about the agreement since the respondent no. 2-NTPC had also accepted the said fact in their counter affidavit. It has been stated that the claim raised on behalf of the applicants by the Union was prior to the settlement and it has been specifically indicated in the agreement dated 29.12.2009 that all the disputes were resolved. It has also been stated that the nature of work of the workmen is not a schedule employment within the meaning of Minimum Wages Act and therefore the statute does not have applicability in the case of the said workmen. Apprehending that the respondent nos. 3 and 4 may raise the issue of alternative remedy available to the petitioners it has been submitted that if the order impugned is perverse on the face of it the same is amenable to writ jurisdiction and in support of its contention learned senior counsel has referred to the case of “Whirlpool Corporation versus Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai and Others” reported in (1998) 8 SCC 1 . 10. Mr. Mahesh Tewari, learned counsel appearing for the respondent nos. 10. Mr. Mahesh Tewari, learned counsel appearing for the respondent nos. 3 and 4 has at the first instance referred to the alternative remedy of appeal available to the petitioners. It has been stated that the petitioners cannot be permitted to bypass such remedy by directly approaching this Court in its writ jurisdiction and on such ground itself all the writ applications are liable to be dismissed. Referring to the merits of the case Mr. Tewari, submits that Minimum Wages cannot be waived merely because of a settlement arrived at as the right vested on the contract labour continues to operate irrespective of the subsequent agreement. Drawing the attention of the Court to the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the respondent nos. 3 and 4 it has been stated that the Ministry of Labour and Employment, Govt. of India vide notification dated 20.05.2009 had increased the minimum wages and variable dearness allowance. He has submitted that the respondent no. 3 had sent the representation to the General Manager, NTPC along with the gazette notification dated 20.05.2009 to implement the minimum wages as per the gazette notification among the workmen employed in MGR Railway. Consequent to the same the contractors were intimated by NTPC to pay the new rate of minimum wages to the workers as per the notification. Mr. Tewari, submits that the tripartite agreement dated 29.12.2009 had clearly indicated that wages were to be paid as notified by the Central Government or by the Government of Jharkhand whichever is higher. Refuting the contention of the learned senior counsel for the petitioners that appropriate Government is the State Government it has been submitted that NTPC is a Central Government organization and the appropriate Government would in such case be always the Central Government. 11. Mr. Basav Chatterjee, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent no. 2-NTPC has admitted about the conciliation and the resultant tripartite agreement dated 29.12.2010. 12. Before addressing the various issues raised by the petitioners and countered by the respondent nos. 3 and 4 it would be pertinent to consider as to whether these writ applications are maintainable or not in view of an alternative remedy available which though has been opposed by the learned senior counsel for the petitioners. 12. Before addressing the various issues raised by the petitioners and countered by the respondent nos. 3 and 4 it would be pertinent to consider as to whether these writ applications are maintainable or not in view of an alternative remedy available which though has been opposed by the learned senior counsel for the petitioners. Reference in this context is made to the case of “Whirlpool Corporation” (supra) wherein while considering the question of alternative remedy it was held as follows: “14. The power to issue prerogative writs under Article 226 of the Constitution is plenary in nature and is not limited by any other provision of the Constitution. This power can be exercised by the High Court not only for issuing writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari for the enforcement of any of the Fundamental Rights contained in Part III of the Constitution but also for “any other purpose”. 15. Under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court, having regard to the facts of the case, has a discretion to entertain or not to entertain a writ petition. But the High Court has imposed upon itself certain restrictions one of which is that if an effective and efficacious remedy is available, the High Court would not normally exercise its jurisdiction. But the alternative remedy has been consistently held by this Court not to operate as a bar in at least three contingencies, namely, where the writ petition has been filed for the enforcement of any of the Fundamental Rights or where there has been a violation of the principle of natural justice or where the order or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or the vires of an Act is challenged. There is a plethora of case-law on this point but to cut down this circle of forensic whirlpool, we would rely on some old decisions of the evolutionary era of the constitutional law as they still hold the field. 17. A specific and clear rule was laid down in State of U.P. v. Mohd. There is a plethora of case-law on this point but to cut down this circle of forensic whirlpool, we would rely on some old decisions of the evolutionary era of the constitutional law as they still hold the field. 17. A specific and clear rule was laid down in State of U.P. v. Mohd. Nooh as under: “But this rule requiring the exhaustion of statutory remedies before the writ will be granted is a rule of policy, convenience and discretion rather than a rule of law and instances are numerous where a writ of certiorari has been issued in spite of the fact that the aggrieved party had other adequate legal remedies.” 13. Three contingencies have been indicated in the said order. If the order impugned is perused in the aforesaid background it would appear to be an order in which the principles of natural justice has been clearly violated. The petitioners on coming to know that the matter has been posted for an exparte order had filed an application for recall but without considering the same the impugned order was passed. 14. The application which was preferred under Section 20(3) of the Minimum Wages Act was on behalf of several workmen. The grievance was payment of wages less than the minimum rate of wages fixed and details of the dues thereof had been given in a separate sheet. The learned senior counsel for the petitioners has ventilated his grievance by stating that in spite of submitting that petitioners are relying on the reply filed by the respondent no. 2 an exparte order was passed. The said reply of NTPC (respondent no. 2) has been brought on record. It has been stated therein that the work of the applicants do not come under schedule employment within the meaning of the Minimum Wages Act. For the contractors the appropriate Government is the State Government and therefore the wages were paid to the applicants as per the State Government notification. The dispute therefore is primarily as to what rate of wages would govern the applications. In the case of “Binod Kumar versus Union of India” (supra) the factual aspects revealed that there was no dispute regarding the rates of wages and therefore the authority under the Minimum Wages Act was held to be not having any jurisdiction in exercising the powers under the Minimum Wages Act. In the case of “Binod Kumar versus Union of India” (supra) the factual aspects revealed that there was no dispute regarding the rates of wages and therefore the authority under the Minimum Wages Act was held to be not having any jurisdiction in exercising the powers under the Minimum Wages Act. In the said case reference was made to the case of “Manganese Ore (India) Ltd. vs. Chandi Lal Saha and Ors.” reported in AIR 1991 SC 520 , wherein it was held that if there is no dispute as to the rates of wages between the employer and the employee Section 20(1) of the Minimum Wages Act would not be attracted and the appropriate remedy would lie either under Section 15(1) of the Payment of Wages Act or under Section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. 15. The judgment under reference denotes therefore that where there is no dispute as to the rate of wages between the employer and the employee an application under Section 20(1) of the Minimum Wages Act is not maintainable. But if a dispute arises as to the rate of wages as is the situation in the present cases such application under the Minimum Wages Act is maintainable and accordingly it is held that the applications preferred on behalf of the workmen by the Union under the provisions of the Minimum Wages Act is maintainable. 16. Certain other points have been raised by the petitioners that the order does not indicate application of mind and that the work of the applicants do not fall under the schedule employment as envisaged under the provisions of the Minimum Wages Act. The authority (respondent no. 1) when the respondent no. 2-NTPC had already filed its response to the applications preferred on behalf of the concerned workmen could have at least considered the same instead of unduly relying on the claim of the applicants. Not a single issue raised by the respondent no. 2 herein has been appropriately dealt with by the respondent no. 1. Whether the wages as claimed by the applicants could have been allowed in view of the subsequent tripartite settlement dated 29.12.2009 was also an important issue raised which was necessary to be considered by the respondent no. 1. 17. Not a single issue raised by the respondent no. 2 herein has been appropriately dealt with by the respondent no. 1. Whether the wages as claimed by the applicants could have been allowed in view of the subsequent tripartite settlement dated 29.12.2009 was also an important issue raised which was necessary to be considered by the respondent no. 1. 17. In view of the aforesaid findings though it is held that the applications preferred under Section 20(3) of the Minimum Wages Act is maintainable but the respective impugned orders dated 16/17.08.2010 suffers from patent illegality and perversity as the same apart from being in violation of the principles of natural justice also lacks appropriate consideration to the reply submitted by the respondent no. 2 herein and the respondent no. 1 has merely accepted the version of the concerned workmen as the gospel truth and in such fact situation therefore none of the orders under challenge in these writ applications are sustainable in the eye of law and accordingly the orders are hereby quashed and set aside and the matter is remanded back to the respondent no. 1 to pass fresh orders on such individual applications after giving an opportunity of hearing to the respective parties. The exercise indicated above should be considered and disposed of expeditiously. 18. These writ applications stand disposed of in view of the findings recorded above.