JUDGMENT Pushpendra Singh Bhati, J. - Petitioner has preferred the present writ petition claiming the following relief :- "It is therefore, respectfully prayed that this writ petition may kindly be allowed and the impugned order dated 05.03.2019 dismissing the application filed under Order 8, Rule 1 read with section 151 of CPC in Civil Misc. Case No.11/2017 pending before Additional District Judge No.1, Udaipur may kindly be quashed and set aside and the proposed reply to the temporary injunction application filed along with the application dated 31.01.2019 by the petitioner may kindly be taken on record." 2. Brief facts of the case, as noticed by this Court, are that the plaintiffs-respondents No.1 and 2 filed a suit for temporary injunction under Order 39, Rule 1 & 2 read with 151 of CPC alleging inter-alia that there is an agricultural land situated in Village Devali in Tehsil Badgaon, District Udaipur ad-measuring 0.75 Hectare and 0.2150 Hectare in Aaraji No.84 and 85 respectively, in which the defendant No.1 is having half share and the same land was agreed to be sold to the plaintiffs by way of an agreement to sale dated 10.03.2017. The defendant, however, allegedly overriding the agreement to sale executed a registered sale-deed on 05.04.2017 in favour of another party. 3. The suit was filed by respondents No.1 and 2 for specific performance along with temporary injunction of the agreement between them and the petitioner. The petitioner, who is defendant no.1 being an original owner of the property in question did not file his reply for temporary injunction and thus, his right to file the reply for temporary injunction was closed on 19.12.2017 without making any further efforts to bring the reply for temporary injunction on record. The petitioner engaged a new counsel on 17.01.2019 and moved an application under Order 8, Rule 1 read with section 151 of CPC on 31.01.2019 to set aside the order dated 19.12.2017 while seeking an opportunity to file a reply for temporary injunction. The learned court below has rejected the said application under Order 8, Rule 1 of CPC on the ground that the opportunity of filing the reply for temporary injunction was closed on 19.12.2017 and the petitioner is unable to make out any strong case as to why the power under Order 8, Rule 1 of CPC should be invoked at this belated stage after passage of long time. 4. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner has tried to impress upon this Court by saying that the petitioner did not come to know about the closure of the opportunity to file the reply for temporary injunction on 19.12.2017, and though earlier his counsel was regularly appearing but it was only on 17.01.2019 that he filed a fresh Vakalatnama of a new counsel and immediately proceeded to file an application on 31.01.2019 under Order 8, Rule 1 of CPC so as to get the adverse order dated 19.12.2017 set aside. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner has also submitted that no person can be rendered remediless and the chance of filing the reply for temporary injunction has to be mandatorily given even after imposing certain cost, as without filing the reply for temporary injunction the petitioner would virtually be stopped from contesting the suit in question. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner has also submitted that the Hon'ble Court has ample discretionary power to be exercised and in this case where the new counsel has been engaged on 17.01.2019, the petitioner was vigilant enough to file the application under Order 8, Rule 1 of CPC within a period of 30 days on 31.01.2019. 7. The petitioner was under the bonafide belief that his litigation was being appropriately pursued by the plaintiff and thus, did not take requisite steps for filing the reply. 8. Learned counsel for the respondent has, however, submitted that changing of counsel midway cannot become a ground for allowing the application under Order 8, Rule 1 of CPC. It is also contended that the order dated 19.12.2017 has attained the finality after number of dates and the petitioner who chose to sleep over his right cannot now come and claim a bonafide requirement of filing the reply for temporary injunction 9. Learned counsel for the respondent has further submitted that the petitioner has utterly failed to explain the delay from 19.12.2017 to 31.01.2019. 10. Learned counsel for the respondent has further reiterated that the only ground taken by the petitioner is that the petitioner has engaged a new counsel on 17.01.2019, and thereafter, within 30 days has filed the application under Order 8, Rule 1 of CPC on 31.01.2019, whereas he was actually supposed to explain the delay which has been caused in filing the reply for temporary injunction from 19.12.2017 onwards. 11. 11. Learned counsel for the respondent has relied upon the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the matter of Atcom Technologies Limited v. Y.A. Chunawala and Co. & Ors. (Civil Appeal No.4266-4267 of 2018) decided on 07.05.2018. The relevant portion of the said judgment reads as under :- "14. It has to be borne in mind that as per the provisions of Order 8, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, the defendant is obligated to present a written statement of his defence within thirty days from the date of service of summons. Proviso thereto enables the Court to extend the period up to ninety days from the date of service of summons for sufficient reasons. Order 8, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 reads as under: "1. Written statement.- The defendant shall, within thirty days from the date of service of summons on him, present a written statement of his defence: Provided that where the defendant fails to file the written statement within the said period of thirty days, he shall be allowed to file the same on such other day, as may be specified by the Court, for reasons to be recorded in writing, but which shall not be later than ninety days from the date of service of summons." 15. This provision has come up for interpretation before this Court in number of cases. No doubt, the words 'shall not be later than ninety days' do not take away the power of the Court to accept written statement beyond that time and it is also held that the nature of the provision is procedural and it is not a part of substantive law. At the same time, this Court has also mandated that time can be extended only in exceptionally hard cases. We would like to reproduce the following discussion from the case of Salem Advocate Bar Association, Tamil Nadu v. Union of India, (2005) 6 SCC 344 : "21. ...There is no restriction in Order 8, Rule 10 that after expiry of ninety days, further time cannot be granted. The court has wide power to "make such order in relation to the suit as it thinks fit". Clearly, therefore, the provision of Order 8, Rule 1 providing for the upper limit of 90 days to file written statement is directory. The court has wide power to "make such order in relation to the suit as it thinks fit". Clearly, therefore, the provision of Order 8, Rule 1 providing for the upper limit of 90 days to file written statement is directory. Having said so, we wish to make it clear that the order extending time to file written statement cannot be made in routine. The time can be extended only in exceptionally hard cases. While extending time, it has to be borne in mind that the legislature has fixed the upper time-limit of 90 days. The discretion of the court to extend the time shall not be so frequently and routinely exercised so as to nullify the period fixed by Order 8, Rule 1." 16. In such a situation, onus upon the defendant is of a higher degree to plead and satisfactorily demonstrate a valid reason for not filing the written statement within thirty days. When that is a requirement, could it be a ground to condone delay of more than 5 years even when it is calculated from the year 2009, only because of the reason that Writ of Summons were not served till 2009? 17. We fail to persuade ourselves with this kind of reasoning given by the High Court in condoning the delay, thereby disregarding the provisions of Order 8, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and the spirit behind it. This reason of the High Court that delay was condoned 'by balancing the rights and equities' is far fetched and, in the process, abnormal delay in filing the written statement is condoned without addressing the relevant factor, viz. whether the respondents had furnished proper and satisfactory explanation for such a delay. The approach of the High Court is clearly erroneous in law and cannot be countenanced. No doubt, the provisions of Order 8, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 are procedural in nature and, therefore, hand maid of justice. However, that would not mean that the defendant has right to take as much time as he wants in filing the written statement, without giving convincing and cogent reasons for delay and the High Court has to condone it mechanically. However, that would not mean that the defendant has right to take as much time as he wants in filing the written statement, without giving convincing and cogent reasons for delay and the High Court has to condone it mechanically. It is also to be borne in mind that when the matter was listed on January 29, 2015, it was specifically recorded that no written statement was filed and the two suits were adjourned for ex-parte decree. In other suit i.e. Suit No. 3813 of 2000, similar Notice of Motion seeking condonation of delay was rejected though it contained same kind of explanation and that order has been upheld till this Court. On this ground also, there was no reason to take a contrary view in the instant matter when both the suits were taken up together and proceed simultaneously. " 12. Learned counsel for the respondent has also relied upon the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the matter of SCG Contracts India Pvt. Ltd. v. K.S. Chamankar Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. (Civil Appeal No.1638 of 2019) decided on 12.02.2019. The relevant portion of the said judgment reads as under :- "8. The Commercial Courts, Commercial Division and Commercial Appellate Division of High Courts Act, 2015 came into force on 23.10.2015 bringing in their wake certain amendments to the Code of Civil Procedure. (Civil Appeal No.1638 of 2019) decided on 12.02.2019. The relevant portion of the said judgment reads as under :- "8. The Commercial Courts, Commercial Division and Commercial Appellate Division of High Courts Act, 2015 came into force on 23.10.2015 bringing in their wake certain amendments to the Code of Civil Procedure. In Order 5, Rule 1, sub-rule (1), for the second proviso, the following proviso was substituted: "Provided further that where the defendant fails to file the written statement within the said period of thirty days, he shall be allowed to file the written statement on such other days, as may be specified by the Court, for reasons to be recorded in writing and on payment of such costs as the court deems fit, but which shall not be later than one hundred twenty days from the date of service of summons and on expiry of one hundred and twenty days from the date of service of summons, the defendant shall forfeit the right to file the written statement and the court shall not allow the written statement to be taken on record." Equally, in Order 8, Rule 1, a new proviso was substituted as follows: "Provided that where the defendant fails to file the written statement within the said period of thirty days, he shall be allowed to file the written statement on such other day, as may be specified by the court, for reasons to be recorded in writing and on payment of such costs as the Court deems fit, but which shall not be later than one hundred and twenty days from the date of service of summons and on expiry of one hundred and twenty days from the date of service of summons, the defendant shall forfeit the right to file the written statement and the court shall not allow the written statement to be taken on record." This was re-emphasised by re-inserting yet another proviso in Order 8, Rule 10 CPC, which reads as under:- "Procedure when party fails to present written statement called for by Court.- Where any party from whom a written statement is required under Rule 1 or Rule 9 fails to present the same within the time permitted or fixed by the Court, as the case may be, the Court shall pronounce judgment against him, or make such order in relation to the suit as it thinks fit and on pronouncement of such judgment a decree shall be drawn up. Provided further that no Court shall make an order to extend the time provided under Rule 1 of this Order for filing of the written statement." A perusal of these provisions would show that ordinarily a written statement is to be filed within a period of 30 days. However, grace period of a further 90 days is granted which the Court may employ for reasons to be recorded in writing and payment of such costs as it deems fit to allow such written statement to come on record. What is of great importance is the fact that beyond 120 days from the date of service of summons, the defendant shall forfeit the right to file the written statement and the Court shall not allow the written statement to be taken on record. This is further buttressed by the proviso in Order 8, Rule 10 also adding that the Court has no further power to extend the time beyond this period of 120 days. 11. We are of the view that the view taken by the Delhi High Court in these judgments is correct in view of the fact that the consequence of forfeiting a right to file the written statement; non-extension of any further time; and the fact that the Court shall not allow the written statement to be taken on record all points to the fact that the earlier law on Order 8, Rule 1 on the filing of written statement under Order 8, Rule 1 has now been set at naught. 17. Clearly, therefore, the 05.12.2017 order which applies in the face of the amendments made to the Civil Procedure Code cannot be sustained. When we come to the second order dated 24.09.2019, the only reason for this order is that 05.12.2017 has attained finality. " 13. After hearing learned counsel for the parties and perusing the record of the case as well as the precedent law cited by learned counsel for the respondent, this Court is of the opinion that Order 8, Rule 1 of CPC gives 30 days to the defendant to file the reply for temporary injunction and thereafter in extraordinary circumstances, the same may be extended by 120 days. It is an admitted position in the present case that the time period in filing the reply for temporary injunction was exhausted way back on 19.12.2017 and thus, the opportunity to invoke Order 8, Rule 1 of CPC virtually was closed on 19.12.2017 itself. However, if the petitioner was a vigilant litigant then he could still have attempted to do so within days or weeks of the end of the time stipulated under Order 8, Rule 1 of the CPC but in fact the petitioner has filed the application under Order 8, Rule 1 of CPC only on 31.01.2019. 14. This Court also observes that only ground taken by the petitioner to explain the delay in filing the application under Order 8, Rule 1 after the chance of filing the reply for temporary injunction was closed on 19.12.2017 is that a new counsel has been engaged on 17.01.2019. This Court does not find any reason given by the petitioner to be sufficient to invoke the extraordinary powers to override the procedure provided in the Civil Procedure Code. Therefore, while being in total agreement with the impugned order and while following the precedent law as cited by learned counsel for the respondents, this Court does not find any reason to grant any indulgence to the petitioner in this writ petition 15 Consequently, the present writ petition is dismissed. Stay petition No.4341/2019 also stands dismissed accordingly.