ORDER : Heard Mr. Anjani Kr. Pandey, who is appearing in person on behalf of Engineering Mazdoor Sabha and Mr. A.K. Das, learned counsel appearing for the respondents. 2. In this writ application, the petitioner has prayed for quashing the order dated 15.12.2014 passed in Reference Case No. 03 of 2014 by the learned Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal, Ranchi by which the objection of the petitioner with respect to appearance of a legal practitioner for the management of M/s. Usha Martin Ltd., has been rejected and Mr. Satish Bakshi and Mr. A.K. Verma had been permitted to represent the management of M/s Usha Martin Ltd., in Reference Case No. 03 of 2014. 3. The factual aspects of the case reveal that an Industrial dispute was raised by the petitioner in terms of Section 10 (1) (d) of the Industrial Disputes Act and the same was referred for adjudication by the Government of Jharkhand, Department of Labour Employment and Training dated 01.09.2014 before the Industrial Tribunal, Ranchi. Since a legal practitioner was appearing on behalf of the management of M/s. Usha Martin Ltd., the petitioner had filed an objection on 29.09.2014 in terms of Section 36(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act and vide order dated 15.12.2014 the same was rejected and M/s. Usha Martin Ltd., was permitted to be represented in the Reference Case by Mr. Satish Bakshi and Mr. A.K. Verma with which the petitioner being aggrieved has preferred the present writ application. 4. It has been stated by Mr. Anjani Kr. Pandey, the petitioner in-person while referring to Section 36(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act that no legal practitioner can be permitted to take part in a conciliation proceeding or any proceeding before the Tribunal. It has been submitted that the certificate given by the association is itself disputed and the signatory of the said certificate is now no more. He has further stated that the certificate does not bear any letter number and therefore it is a forged and fabricated document submitted by the management to wriggle out from the constraints put forth in view of Section 36(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act. Learned counsel in support of his contention has referred to an order passed by this Court in W.P.(L) Case No. 7458 of 2012. 5. Mr. Learned counsel in support of his contention has referred to an order passed by this Court in W.P.(L) Case No. 7458 of 2012. 5. Mr. A.K. Das, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents has referred to the counter affidavit as well as the supplementary counter affidavit and has stated that the question which has been raised by the petitioner has already been settled in the case of “Paradip Port Trust, Paradip versus Their Workmen” reported in (1977) 2 SCC 339 . It has also been stated that the petitioner in-person in a representative capacity is regularly appearing before the learned Labour Court and the learned Tribunal and he is the office-bearer of six different units. It has further been stated that Jharkhand Industries Development Association is registered under the Societies Registration Act and the governing body had extended the tenure of the office-bearers originally named in the memorandum of association vide resolution dated 12.10.2013 and Mr. Satish Bakshi as well as Mr. A.K. Verma are the office-bearers of the association and therefore in terms of Section 36(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act the said persons can represent M/s. Usha Martin Ltd., and therefore the learned Tribunal had rightly overruled the objection preferred on behalf of the petitioner and permitted the said persons to appear before the learned Tribunal in Reference Case No. 03 of 2014. 6. On consideration of the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the respective parties the only point for determination in this present application is as to whether the learned Tribunal had committed an error in rejecting the objections submitted by the petitioner with respect to appearance of Mr. Satish Bakshi and Mr. A.K. Verma who have been permitted to appear before the learned Tribunal. 7. In order to appreciate the rival contentions it would be apt to refer to Section 36 of the Industrial Disputes Act. Section 36 of the Industrial Disputes Act deals with representation of parties and so far as sub-section 3 of Section 36 is concerned the same reads as follows: (3) No party to a dispute shall be entitled to be represented by a legal practitioner in any conciliation proceedings under this Act or in any proceedings before a Court. 8. Section 36 of the Industrial Disputes Act deals with representation of parties and so far as sub-section 3 of Section 36 is concerned the same reads as follows: (3) No party to a dispute shall be entitled to be represented by a legal practitioner in any conciliation proceedings under this Act or in any proceedings before a Court. 8. It is thus clear from a plain reading of Section 36(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act that either in any conciliation proceeding or any proceeding before a Court no party to a dispute shall be entitled to be represented by a legal practitioner. The question as to who can represent the workmen as well as the employer has been dealt with in subsection 1 and 2 of Section 36 of the Industrial Disputes Act. 9. So far as the present case is concerned the same is related to the representation of the employer which is dealt with in sub-section 2 of Section 36 of the Industrial Disputes Act and which reads as follows: (2) An employer who is a party to a dispute shall be entitled to be represented in any proceeding under this Act by- (a) an officer of an association of employers of which he is a member; (b) an officer of a federation of associations of employers to which the association referred to in clause (a) is affiliated; (c) where the employer is not a member of any association of employers, by an officer of any association of employers connected with, or by any other employer engaged in, the industry in which the employer is engaged and authorised in such manner as may be prescribed. 10. Sub-Section 2 therefore clearly delineates as to who can represent the employer who is a party to a dispute. However, if, there is consent of the other parties in the proceeding and with the leave of the learned Labour Court or the learned Tribunal a party to a dispute may be represented by a legal practitioner. Since the petitioner has vehemently opposed the presence of Mr. Satish Bakshi and Mr. A.K. Verma during the proceedings the main provisions which would decide the issue at hand would be sub-section 2 and sub-section 3 of Section 36 of the Industrial Disputes Act. 11. Since the petitioner has vehemently opposed the presence of Mr. Satish Bakshi and Mr. A.K. Verma during the proceedings the main provisions which would decide the issue at hand would be sub-section 2 and sub-section 3 of Section 36 of the Industrial Disputes Act. 11. Petitioner in-person has referred to the case of “M/s. Hindalco Industries Ltd., versus Their Workmen, represented by Sri Anjani Kumar Pandey, Mahamantri, Jharkhand General Kamgar Union” in W.P.(L) No. 7458 of 2012, wherein challenge was made by the management on account of the rejection of the plea of the management to be represented by a member/officer on an association who was a practicing lawyer. It has been held in the aforesaid order as follows: “So far as representation through an officer of an association of employers is concerned, the same is permissible under sub-section(2) of section 36 of the said Act. The said provision, however, is silent about representation through an officer of an association or federation of association, if he happens to be a practicing lawyer. As noticed above, sub-section(4) of section 36 of the Act provides that in any proceeding before a Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal, a party to a dispute may be represented by a legal practitioner with the consent of the other parties and with the leave of the court. In the instant case, there is no consent of the other parties to the management for representation through a legal practitioner. There was, thus, no scope for learned Tribunal to grant leave to the management for their representation through a legal practitioner or an office bearer of their association- who also happens to be a practicing lawyer.” 12. The order which has been referred to by the petitioner in-person seems not to have taken into consideration the judgment passed in the case of “Paradip Port Trust, Paradip versus Their Workmen”, (supra) and the relevant part of the aforesaid judgment reads as follows: “26. A lawyer, simpliciter, cannot appear before an Industrial Tribunal without the consent of the opposite party and leave of the tribunal merely by virtue of a power of attorney executed by a party. A lawyer can appear before the tribunal in the capacity of an office-bearer of a registered trade union or an officer of associations of employers and no consent of the other side and leave of the tribunal will, then, be necessary.” 13. A lawyer can appear before the tribunal in the capacity of an office-bearer of a registered trade union or an officer of associations of employers and no consent of the other side and leave of the tribunal will, then, be necessary.” 13. Recently in the case of “Alok Kumar Sinha (in-Person) versus Labour Court” in L.P.A. No. 491 of 2011, the Hon'ble Patna High Court while following the case of “Paradip Port Trust, Paradip versus Their Workmen” (supra) has held as follows: “6. Further in the case of Paradip Port Trust, Paradip (supra) para-26 of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court goes to record this finding and conclusion in the manner which clearly shows that a lawyer simpliciter cannot appear before the Industrial Disputes Tribunal without the consent of the opposite party and leave of the tribunal but by virtue of his being an office-bearer of a registered trade Union or an officer of association of employer no consent or leave is required and he can appear. If that is the law laid down by the Supreme Court, we are unable to accept the observations made and the principles crystallized by the learned Writ Court in the order impugned and the finding recorded by the Writ Court in paras 11 and 12 as indicated hereinabove being contrary and inconsistent to the judgment of the Apex Court, we have no hesitation in allowing the appeal and quashing the aforesaid finding. That apart we may take not of the fact that this issue has also been decided by the Bombay High Court in identical situation in the case of Associated Cement Staff Union v. Associated Cement Companies Limited, 2002 (94) FLR 244 wherein after taking note of the law laid down in various cases the judgment in the case of Paradip Port Trust, Paradip (supra) has been considered and similar principle has been approved and therefore, we have no hesitation in approving the aforesaid principles also. That apart far back as in the year 1964 in the case of The Behar Journals Ltd., Patna v. H.K. Chaudhuri, AIR 1954 Patna 532 the Court has permitted the practising lawyer to represent a party namely, the employer in an industrial dispute before the Industrial Disputes Tribunal in his capacity as office-bearer of the Trade Union in an industrial dispute.” 14. Section 36 (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act has a wide import. Section 36 (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act has a wide import. It delineates the categories of persons who can represent an employer who is a party to the dispute. Mr. Satish Bakshi and Mr. A.K. Verma are indisputably members of the Jharkhand Industries Development Association with which M/s. Usha Martin Ltd., is affiliated. Thus they cannot be termed to be within the confines of Section 36(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act. The learned Tribunal has correctly decided the issue at hand while rejecting the objection filed on behalf of the Union and permitting Mr. Satish Bakshi and Mr. A.K. Verma to represent the management of M/s. Usha Martin Ltd., in Reference Case No. 03 of 2014. 15. Applying the ratio in the case of “Paradip Port Trust, Paradip versus Their Workmen” (supra) and the subsequent decision of the Hon'ble Patna High Court it is held that Mr. Satish Bakshi and Mr. A.K. Verma being members of the governing body of the association can represent the employer affiliated with such association and Section 36 (3) of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot operate as a bar to such representation. The submissions advanced by the petitioner in-person therefore is wholly without substance and accordingly having found no merit in this writ application the same is hereby dismissed.