JUDGMENT : 1. In this appeal under section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 ['M.V. Act' for short], the appellant-insurance company has assailed judgement and award dated 04.02.2011 passed by Chairman, MACT, Vadodara in MACT No. 248 of 2005 whereunder, the appellant-insurance company was directed to pay the compensation to respondent No.1-original claimant jointly and severally with respondent Nos. 2 and 3. 2. The facts in brief giving rise to the present appeal are that, on 21.11.2004, respondent No.1-original claimant was passing by bus depot on foot when respondent No.2 herein came on motorcycle bearing registration No. GJ-6-BD-1784 in a rash and negligent manner and dashed with respondent No.1-claimant. Respondent No.1-claimant fell down and suffered serious injuries on head and on other parts of the body. The offending motorcycle at the time of accident was being driven by respondent No.2 and it was of the ownership of respondent No.3 herein. The motorcycle, at the relevant time, was insured with the appellant-insurance company. The claimant therefore, filed MACP No. 248 of 2005 in the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal at Vadodara to recover Rs.2 lacs as compensation. 3. The appellant-insurance company resisted the claim petition by filing reply wherein inter alia it was contended that respondent No.2 was not possessing valid and effective driving license to drive two wheeler. The Tribunal, by the impugned judgement and award, partly allowed the claim petition and directed the appellant and respondent Nos. 2 and 3 to jointly pay a sum of Rs. 1,29,000/- with 7.5% interest and proportionate cost to respondent No.1 herein. The appellant-insurance company is aggrieved by the fastening of liability of payment of compensation and therefore, has approached this Court by way of present appeal. 4. I have heard Ms. Kirti Pathak, learned advocate for the appellant and Mr. Hakim, learned advocate for respondent No.1-original claimant. There is no representation on behalf of respondent Nos.2 and 3 despite service of notice of appeal. Perused the record of MACP No. 248 of 2005. 5. Ms. Kirti Pathak,learned advocate for appellant vehemently submitted that at the time of accident, respondent No.2 was not possessing effective and valid driving license to drive two wheeler. She therefore, submitted that not holding of valid driving license amounted to breach of terms of insurance policy warranting exoneration of the insurance company. 5. Ms. Kirti Pathak,learned advocate for appellant vehemently submitted that at the time of accident, respondent No.2 was not possessing effective and valid driving license to drive two wheeler. She therefore, submitted that not holding of valid driving license amounted to breach of terms of insurance policy warranting exoneration of the insurance company. She therefore, submitted that the Tribunal committed a grave error in fastening the liability of payment of compensation to respondent No.1 jointly and severally with respondent Nos.2 and 3. In support of her submission, she has relied upon judgement of Supreme Court dated 29.04.2008 in case of Oriental Ltd vs. Zaharulnisha and Ors. passed in Appeal (Civil) 3055 of 2008 and the judgement of High Court of Himachal Pradesh dated 24.12.2009 passed in F.A.O. (MVA) No. 259 of 2005 to buttress her submission. 6. Mr. Hakim, learned advocate for respondent No.1-original claimant has supported the impugned judgement. Relying upon the decision of the Supreme Court in case of Shamanna and Anr. vs. Divisional Manager, Oriental Insurance Company Ltd reported in 2018 ACJ 4163, he submitted that the Tribunal has not committed any error in fastening the liability of payment of compensation on the appellant-insurance company. He submitted that, in any case, if this Court feels that the liability of compensation cannot be fastened on the appellant-insurance company, it can be directed to pay the compensation to respondent No.1 at first instance and then to recover it from respondent Nos. 2 and 3. 7. The issue moves in a narrow compass. The crux of submission of Ms. Kirti Pathak for the appellant-insurance company is that the Tribunal ought not to have imposed the liability of payment of compensation on the shoulder of the appellant as not holding of valid driving license amounted to breach of terms of conditions. 8. It appears from perusal of the impugned judgement as well as the record that at the time of the accident, respondent No.2 was not holding valid license to drive two wheeler though it was possessing license to drive light motor vehicle (LMV). 8. It appears from perusal of the impugned judgement as well as the record that at the time of the accident, respondent No.2 was not holding valid license to drive two wheeler though it was possessing license to drive light motor vehicle (LMV). The Supreme Court in case of National Insurance Company Ltd vs. Swaran Singh reported in (2004) 3 SCC 297 has summarized the conclusions as under: “(102) The summary of our findings to the various issues as raised in these petitions is as follows: (i) Chapter XI of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 providing compulsory insurance of vehicles against third-party risks is a social welfare legislation to extend relief by compensation to victims of accidents caused by use of motor vehicles. The provisions of compulsory insurance coverage of all vehicles are with this paramount object and the provisions of the Act have to be so interpreted as to effectuate the said object. (ii) Insurer is entitled to raise a defence in a claim petition filed under Section 163-A or Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, inter alia, in terms of Section 149(2)(a)(ii) of the said Act. (iii) The breach of policy condition e.g. disqualification of the driver or invalid driving licence of the driver, as contained in sub-section (2)(a)(ii) of Section 149, has to be proved to have been committed by the insured for avoiding liability by the insurer. Mere absence, fake or invalid driving licence or disqualification of the driver for driving at the relevant time, are not in themselves defences available to the insurer against either the insured or the third parties. To avoid its liability towards the insured, the insurer has to prove that the insured was guilty of negligence and failed to exercise reasonable care in the matter of fulfilling the condition of the policy regarding use of vehicles by a duly licensed driver or one who was not disqualified to drive at the relevant time. (iv) Insurance companies, however, with a view to avoid their liability must not only establish the available defences raised in the said proceedings but must also establish "breach" on the part of the owner of the vehicle; the burden of proof wherefore would be on them. (iv) Insurance companies, however, with a view to avoid their liability must not only establish the available defences raised in the said proceedings but must also establish "breach" on the part of the owner of the vehicle; the burden of proof wherefore would be on them. (v) The court cannot lay down any criteria as to how the said burden would be discharged, inasmuch as the same would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. (vi) Even where the insurer is able to prove breach on the part of the insured concerning the policy condition regarding holding of a valid licence by the driver or his qualification to drive during the relevant period, the insurer would not be allowed to avoid its liability towards the insured unless the said breach or breaches on the condition of driving licence is/are so fundamental as are found to have contributed to the cause of the accident. The Tribunals in interpreting the policy conditions would apply "the rule of main purpose" and the concept of "fundamental breach" to allow defences available to the insurer under Section 149(2) of the Act. (vii) The question, as to whether the owner has taken reasonable care to find out as to whether the driving licence produced by the driver (a fake one or otherwise), does not fulfill the requirements of law or not will have to be determined in each case. (viii) If a vehicle at the time of accident was driven by a person having a learner's licence, the insurance companies would be liable to satisfy the decree. (ix) The Claims Tribunal constituted under Section 165 read with Section 168 is empowered to adjudicate all claims in respect of the accidents involving death or of bodily injury or damage to property of third party arising in use of motor vehicle. The said power of the Tribunal is not restricted to decide the claims inter se between claimant or claimants on one side and insured, insurer and driver on the other. In the course of adjudicating the claim for compensation and to decide the availability of defence or defences to the insurer, the Tribunal has necessarily the power and jurisdiction to decide disputes inter se between the insurer and the insured. In the course of adjudicating the claim for compensation and to decide the availability of defence or defences to the insurer, the Tribunal has necessarily the power and jurisdiction to decide disputes inter se between the insurer and the insured. The decision rendered on the claims and disputes inter se between the insurer and insured in the course of adjudication of claim for compensation by the claimants and the award made thereon is enforceable and executable in the same manner as provided in Section 174 of the Act for enforcement and execution of the award in favour of the claimants. (x) Where on adjudication of the claim under the Act the Tribunal arrives at a conclusion that the insurer has satisfactorily proved its defence in accordance with the provisions of Section 149(2) read with sub-section (7), as interpreted by this Court above, the Tribunal can direct that the insurer is liable to be reimbursed by the insured for the compensation and other amounts which it has been compelled to pay to the third party under the award of the Tribunal. Such determination of claim by the Tribunal will be enforceable and the money found due to the insurer from the insured will be recoverable on a certificate issued by the Tribunal to the Collector in the same manner under Section 174 of the Act as arrears of land revenue. The certificate will be issued for the recovery as arrears of land revenue only if, as required by sub-section (3) of Section 168 of the Act the insured fails to deposit the amount awarded in favour of the insurer within thirty days from the date of announcement of the award by the Tribunal. (xi) The provisions contained in sub-section (4) with the proviso there under and sub-section (5) which are intended to cover specified contingencies mentioned therein to enable the insurer to recover the amount paid under the contract of insurance on behalf of the insured can be taken recourse to by the Tribunal and be extended to claims and defences of the insurer against the insured by relegating them to the remedy before regular court in cases where on given facts and circumstances adjudication of their claims inter se might delay the adjudication of the claims of the victims.” 9. In a recent decision in case of Shaamanna and Anr. In a recent decision in case of Shaamanna and Anr. (supra) after adverting to various earlier decisions, the Supreme Court has held as under: “12. Since the reference to the larger bench in Parvathneni case has been disposed of by keeping the questions of law open to be decided in an appropriate case, presently the decision in Swaran Singh case followed in Laxmi Narain Dhut and other cases hold the field. The award passed by the Tribunal directing the insurance company to pay the compensation amount awarded to the claimants and thereafter, recover the same from the owner of the vehicle in question, is in accordance with the judgment passed by this Court in Swaran Singh and Laxmi Narain Dhut cases. While so, in our view, the High Court ought not to have interfered with the award passed by the Tribunal directing the first respondent to pay and recover from the owner of the vehicle. The impugned judgment of the High Court exonerating the insurance company from its liability and directing the claimants to recover the compensation from the owner of the vehicle is set aside and the award passed by the Tribunal is restored.” 10. In the present case, as per the summary of findings recorded by the Supreme Court in case of Shamanna and Anr. (supra) there is no evidence on record that the appellant insurance company, in order to avoid liability, had led any evidence to establish that respondent No.3-owner of the offending vehicle had, in fact, knowledge that respondent No.2 did not have valid driving license to drive two wheeler and still however, allowed him to ply his offending two wheeler vehicle. Moreover, there is no iota of evidence led by the appellant-insurance company to avoid its liability to show that not holding of valid driving license was so far fundamental as was found to have contributed to the cost of the accident. I am therefore, of the view that the appellant-insurance company cannot escape from the liability of payment of compensation to respondent No.1-original claimant. However, it is manifestly clear from Exh-50-driving license of respondent No.2 that he was not holding valid driving license to drive two wheeler though he was possessing license to drive LMV vehicle. Hence, in view of the decisions relied upon by the learned advocate for the appellant and the decision of the Supreme Court in case of Shamanna and Anr. However, it is manifestly clear from Exh-50-driving license of respondent No.2 that he was not holding valid driving license to drive two wheeler though he was possessing license to drive LMV vehicle. Hence, in view of the decisions relied upon by the learned advocate for the appellant and the decision of the Supreme Court in case of Shamanna and Anr. (supra) it would be just and in the interest of justice to direct the appellant-insurance company to pay the compensation to respondent No.1 at the first instance and then to recover the same from respondent Nos. 2 and 3 by instituting appropriate proceedings before the concerned executing court. In light of the decision of Supreme Court in case of Khenyei V/s. New India Assurance Co. Ltd reported in AIR 2015 SC 2361 . 11. For the foregoing reasons, the appeal succeeds in part. The judgement and award dated 04.02.2011 passed by the Chairman, MACT, Vadodara in MACT No. 248 of 2005 is hereby modified and the appellant-insurance company is directed to pay the compensation in terms of the award respondent No.1 at the first instance and then to recover it from respondents No.2 and 3 by instituting appropriate proceedings in the executing Court as per law. 12. In the facts of the case, there shall be no order as to costs. R & P be transmitted to the Trial Court forthwith.