JUDGMENT : Heard Mr. M.A. Khan, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. Manish Kumar, learned counsel appearing for the respondent. 2. In this writ application, the petitioner has prayed for quashing of the order dated 30.10.2009 passed by the learned Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jamshedpur in M.J. Case No. 12 of 2007, by which the claim of the petitioner for 100 months wages in the basic wages of Rs. 3090/-per month and dearness allowances plus V.D.A amounting to Rs. 2038/-per month in place of 60 months wages has been rejected. 3. The petitioner had submitted a statement of demand before the competent authority of the respondent-company and subsequently had filed an application under Section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act in which it has been stated that he was employed in the respondent-company from 21.04.1989 in sheerer opener department. It has been stated that under threat, coercion and duress the petitioner was forced to accept the Voluntary Retirement Scheme even though the petitioner had a few years of service left as per the contract of employment under the Certified Standing Orders. It has also been claimed that at the time of cessation of service the petitioner was drawing a basic wage of Rs. 3090/-per month and D.A. + VDA @ Rs. 2038/-per month besides other allowances and benefits. The petitioner has further claimed in his application that he was entitled to receive the difference of monetary benefits on the basis of a pre-existing right. 4. The management had filed its written statement in which it was revealed that it is totally wrong on the part of the petitioner to claim that the Voluntary Retirement Scheme was accepted by him under compelling situation and also under duress. It has been stated that the Hot Dip Plant Unit of the respondent had become economically unviable and prior to its closure with effect from 14.10.1999 a Voluntary Retirement Scheme, 1999 was introduced and those workmen of Hot Dip Mills who did not opt for the Voluntary Retirement Scheme had to be retrenched and 268 retrenched workmen had filed C.W.J.C. No. 2933 of 2000 and by order dated 14.08.2002 the benefits were extended and it was confined only with respect to the 268 retrenched workmen. The management further claims that since the petitioner is not a retrenched worker and had already taken voluntary retirement under the scheme of 1998 he is not entitled to any difference of emoluments as has been claimed by him. 5. It has been stated by Mr. M.A. Khan, learned counsel for the petitioner that the Voluntary Retirement Scheme through which the petitioner was paid the monetary benefits was a forcible act on the part of the company as through threat and duress the petitioner was made to accept voluntary retirement under the said scheme. It has further been submitted that the discrimination would be evident from the fact that the conditions of the 1999 Voluntary Retirement Scheme of the company was in contrast to the conditions in the scheme floated in 1998 and therefore the petitioner who was an employee of the respondent-company had a legal and vested right to be paid the difference of emoluments arising out of the 1998 scheme and the 1999 scheme. 6. Mr. Manish Kumar, learned counsel appearing for the respondent has made his initial thrust of argument with respect to the maintainability of the application preferred under Section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. It has been submitted that since on account of the acceptance of the voluntary retirement of the petitioner in the year 1998 there was no employer employee relationship between the respondent-management and the petitioner and therefore the application preferred under Section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act was rightly held to be not maintainable. It has further been submitted that if the petitioner was aggrieved with respect to the alleged threat and coercion imposed upon him by the management the petitioner could have raised his grievance earlier rather than to wait for so many years and make allegation which on the face of it is baseless and had rightly been not considered by the learned Labour Court. 7. The crux of the issue with which this Court is seized is whether the petitioner who was a beneficiary of the Voluntary Retirement Scheme floated in the year 1998 would be entitled to the difference of monetary benefits which had arisen on account of the subsequent Voluntary Retirement Scheme floated in the year 1999 or not. 8. 7. The crux of the issue with which this Court is seized is whether the petitioner who was a beneficiary of the Voluntary Retirement Scheme floated in the year 1998 would be entitled to the difference of monetary benefits which had arisen on account of the subsequent Voluntary Retirement Scheme floated in the year 1999 or not. 8. The issue which has been raised is therefore directly connected with the subject regarding the maintainability or otherwise of the application preferred by the petitioner under Section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. It has to be seen as to whether there was cessation of service, absence of employer employee relationship and any pre-existing right which would entail consideration of such application under Section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. In the case of “D. Krishnan and Another versus Special Officer, Vellore Cooperative Sugar Mill and Another” reported in (2008) 7 SCC 22 , it was held as follows: “12. We have considered the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the parties. The fact that proceedings under Section 33-C(2) are in the nature of execution proceedings is in no doubt, and such proceedings presuppose some adjudication leading to the determination of a right, which has to be enforced. Concededly there has been no such adjudication in the present case. It will be seen that the reliance of the appellant workmen is exclusively on documentary evidence placed on record which consisted primarily of the punch time cards and the representations that had been filed from time to time before the respondents. It is also true that the claim raised by the appellants had been hotly disputed by the respondents. The question that arises in this situation is whether reliance only on the documentary evidence was sufficient to prove the case.” 9. The fact that the proceeding under Section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act is in the nature of an execution proceeding has been further reiterated in the case of “State of U.P. And Another versus Brijpal Singh” reported in (2005) 8 SCC 58 , the relevant portion of which is quoted herein under: “10. The fact that the proceeding under Section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act is in the nature of an execution proceeding has been further reiterated in the case of “State of U.P. And Another versus Brijpal Singh” reported in (2005) 8 SCC 58 , the relevant portion of which is quoted herein under: “10. It is well settled that the workman can proceed under Section 33-C(2) only after the Tribunal has adjudicated on a complaint under Section 33-A or on a reference under Section 10 that the order of discharge or dismissal was not justified and has set aside that order and reinstated the workman. This Court in the case of Punjab Beverages (P) Ltd. v. Suresh Chand held that a proceeding under Section 33-C(2) is a proceeding in the nature of execution proceeding in which the Labour Court calculates the amount of money due to a workman from the employer, or, if the workman is entitled to any benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money, proceeds to compute the benefit in terms of money. Proceeding further, this Court held that the right to the money which is sought to be calculated or to the benefit which is sought to be computed must be an existing one, that is to say, already adjudicated upon or provided for and must arise in the course of and in relation to the relationship between the industrial workman, and his employer. This Court further held as follows: (SCC p. 150, para 4) “It is not competent to the Labour Court exercising jurisdiction under Section 33-C(2) to arrogate to itself the functions of an Industrial Tribunal and entertain a claim which is not based on an existing right but which may appropriately be made the subject-matter of an industrial dispute in a reference under Section 10 of the Act.” 10. In the case of “A. Satyanarayana Reddy and Others versus Presiding Officer, Labour Court and Others, reported in (2016) 9 SCC 462 , the question which was to be answered was as to whether when lay off compensation was not covered under the Voluntary Retirement Scheme could the workmen have approached the Labour Court in a claim under Section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. In the said case it was finally concluded thus: “17. In the said case it was finally concluded thus: “17. We think it appropriate to say that though there is cessation of relationship between the employee and the employer in VRS but if it does not cover the past dues like lay-off compensation, subsistence allowance, etc., the workman would be entitled to approach the Labour Court under Section 33-C(2) of the Act. If it is specifically covered, or the language of VRS would show that it covers the claim under the scheme, no forum will have any jurisdiction.” 11. It would thus mean that if there were some past dues which were not included in the Voluntary Retirement Scheme in such case in spite of cessation of relationship of employer and employee the workmen concerned would still be entitled to claim such benefits under Section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. 12. A similar question fell for consideration regarding the maintainability of Section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act and the guidelines which cover such provision in the case of “Vijay Kumar versus Whirlpool of India Ltd.” reported in (2008) 1 SCC 119 in which it was held as follows: “14. …........................................ 8. In SBI v. Ram Chandra Dubey ….......... 7. ….................................... 8. The principles enunciated in the decisions referred by either side can be summed up as follows: whenever a workman is entitled to receive from his employer any money or any benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money and which he is entitled to receive from his employer and is denied of such benefit can approach Labour Court under Section 33-C(2) of the Act. The benefit sought to be enforced under Section 33-C(2) of the Act is necessarily a preexisting benefit or one flowing from a pre-existing right. The difference between a pre-existing right or benefit on one hand and the right or benefit, which is considered just and fair on the other hand is vital. The former falls within jurisdiction of Labour Court exercising powers under Section 33-C(2) of the Act while the latter does not. It cannot be spelt out from the award in the present case that such a right or benefit has accrued to the workman as the specific question of the relief granted is confined only to the reinstatement without stating anything more as to the back wages. It cannot be spelt out from the award in the present case that such a right or benefit has accrued to the workman as the specific question of the relief granted is confined only to the reinstatement without stating anything more as to the back wages. Hence that relief must be deemed to have been denied, for what is claimed but not granted necessarily gets denied in judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding. Further when a question arises as to the adjudication of a claim for back wages all relevant circumstances which will have to be gone into, are to be considered in a judicious manner. Therefore, the appropriate forum wherein such question of back wages could be decided is only in a proceeding to whom a reference under Section 10 of the Act is made. To state that merely upon reinstatement, a workman would be entitled, under the terms of award, to all his arrears of pay and allowances would be incorrect because several factors will have to be considered, as stated earlier, to find out whether the workman is entitled to back wages at all and to what extent. Therefore, we are of the view that the High Court ought not to have presumed that the award of the Labour Court for grant of back wages is implied in the relief of reinstatement or that the award of reinstatement itself conferred right for claim of back wages.” 13. Viewed thus in the context of the applicability of an application under Section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act this Court now refers to the case of “HEC Voluntary Retd. Employees Welfare Society & Another versus Heavy Engineering Corporation Ltd., & Others” reported in (2006) 3 SCC 708 , wherein the basic issue was whether the employees who had voluntarily retired before 01.01.1992 will be entitled for the benefit of revision of wages including arrears of wages. The scheme of voluntary retirement and its precursor which leads a company to grant premature retirement to its employees on certain beneficial conditions were taken note of as follows: “11. An offer for voluntary retirement in terms of a scheme, when accepted, leads to a concluded contract between the employer and the employee. In terms of such a scheme, an employee has an option either to accept or not to opt there for. An offer for voluntary retirement in terms of a scheme, when accepted, leads to a concluded contract between the employer and the employee. In terms of such a scheme, an employee has an option either to accept or not to opt there for. The scheme is purely voluntary, in terms whereof the tenure of service is curtailed, which is permissible in law. Such a scheme is ordinarily floated with a purpose of downsizing the employees. It is beneficial both to the employees as well as to the employer. Such a scheme is issued for effective functioning of the industrial undertakings. Although the Company is “State” within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India, the terms and conditions of service would be governed by the contract of employment. Thus, unless the terms and conditions of such a contract are governed by a statute or statutory rules, the provisions of the Contract Act would be applicable both at the formulation of the contract as also the determination thereof. By reason of such a scheme only an invitation of offer is floated. When pursuant to or in furtherance of such a Voluntary Retirement Scheme an employee opts there for, he makes an offer which upon acceptance by the employer gives rise to a contract. Thus, as the matter relating to voluntary retirement is not governed by any statute, the provisions of Indian Contract Act, 1872, therefore, would be applicable too. (See Bank of India v. O.P. Swarnakar.) 12. It is also common knowledge that a scheme of voluntary retirement is preceded by a financial planning. Finances for such purpose, either in full or in part, might have been provided for by the Central Government. Thus financial implications arising out of implementation of a scheme must have been borne in mind by the Company, particularly when it is a sick industrial undertaking. Offers of such number of employees for voluntary retirement, in that view of the matter, were to be accepted by the Company only to the extent of finances available therefor. 13. We have noticed hereinbefore the benefits admissible under the Scheme. The employee offering to opt for such voluntary retirement not only gets his salary for the period mentioned therein but also gets compensation calculated in the manner specified therein, apart from other benefits enumerated thereunder. 22. 13. We have noticed hereinbefore the benefits admissible under the Scheme. The employee offering to opt for such voluntary retirement not only gets his salary for the period mentioned therein but also gets compensation calculated in the manner specified therein, apart from other benefits enumerated thereunder. 22. Financial considerations are, thus, a relevant factor both for floating a scheme of voluntary retirement as well as for revision of pay. Those employees who opted for voluntary retirement, make a planning for the future. At the time of giving option, they know where they stand. At that point of time they did not anticipate that they would get the benefit of revision in the scales of pay. They prepared themselves to contract out of the jural relationship by resorting to “golden handshake”. They are bound by their own act. The parties are bound by the terms of contract of voluntary retirement. We have noticed hereinbefore that unless a statute or statutory provision interdict, the relationship between the parties to act pursuant to or in furtherance of the Voluntary Retirement Scheme, is governed by contract. By such contract, they can opt out for such other terms and conditions as may be agreed upon. In this case the terms and conditions of the contract are not governed by a statute or statutory rules.” 14. Therefore the floating of a Voluntary Retirement Scheme is based on various factors and it is for the employees' concerned to accept such scheme and therefore he is bound by the terms of contract once such scheme is accepted by an employee. 15. In the case of “ITI Limited versus ITI EX/VR Employees/Officers Welfare Association and Others” reported in (2010) 12 SCC 347 , it was held that if an employee has got the benefit under the Voluntary Retirement Scheme whether right or wrong it cannot be reopened and an employee cannot claim any higher amount on account of subsequent revision in the wages retrospectively. 16. The necessity of citing the aforesaid judgments both with respect to the Voluntary Retirement Scheme as also the maintainability of application filed under Section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act is primarily to focus as to whether in view of acceptance of the voluntary retirement subsequent application can be entertained by the learned Labour Court or not. 17. 16. The necessity of citing the aforesaid judgments both with respect to the Voluntary Retirement Scheme as also the maintainability of application filed under Section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act is primarily to focus as to whether in view of acceptance of the voluntary retirement subsequent application can be entertained by the learned Labour Court or not. 17. The Voluntary Retirement Scheme as has been stated above depends on various factors including the health of the company and the financial implications and the losses sustained if the company is to continue to run apart from streamlining of work forces which might have burgeoned in course of time. The respondent-company had floated the Voluntary Retirement Scheme in the year 1998 which the petitioner had accepted and the benefits accruing thereto was paid to the petitioner. Once the petitioner had accepted and availed of premature retirement under the scheme floated by the company the relationship of an employer and employee ceases to operate. It is not the case of the petitioner that there was an existing right which was in the service conditions but which was not included in the Voluntary Retirement Scheme, 1998. If that be the case an application under Section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act would have been very much maintainable in view of the judgment rendered in the case of “A. Satyanarayana Reddy and Others” (supra). The case of the petitioner in fact is fully concentrated on the Voluntary Retirement Scheme of the year 1999 and the benefits accruing thereto to such persons who had availed of the said scheme and which are financially detrimental to the petitioner. As has been held in the various pronouncements of the Hon'ble Supreme Court as referred to above a proceeding under Section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act is in nature of execution proceeding for executing a pre determined right of a workmen. The pre-determination has to be made by the Labour Court and for the amount which is to be computed in terms of money can then be pursued by filing an application under Section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. The pre-determination has to be made by the Labour Court and for the amount which is to be computed in terms of money can then be pursued by filing an application under Section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. Even a pre-existing right makes an application under Section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act maintainable but where there has already been a cessation of relationship of employer and employee coupled with the fact that there was no pre-exisiting right in favour of the petitioner no such application under Section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act could be maintainable. It is to be noted herein that the petitioner has raised his claim after a considerable length of time from the settlement of his dues and during the intervening period nothing could be brought on record by the petitioner to suggest that there was a threat or duress on the part of the management to forcibly make the petitioner accept the Voluntary Retirement Scheme, 1998 floated by the company. Another factor which has to be noted herein is that the Voluntary Retirement Scheme, 1999 was introduced prior to closure of the HOT dip Plant Unit as it had become economically unviable to continue with production. It also appears that 268 retrenched workmen who had not opted for the Voluntary Retirement Scheme had filed a writ application being C.W.J.C. No. 2933 of 2000 in which the benefits under the Voluntary Retirement Scheme, 1999 were increased. However, the some also does not pertain to the petitioner as the petitioner was never a party in the said writ application and he had taken voluntary retirement in the earlier scheme and therefore such claim on the part of the petitioner also is not tenable in the eye of law. 18. To sum up therefore since the petitioner was neither having any pre-determined right on account of cessation of employer employee relationship or any preexisting right or incidental thereto the benefits of a subsequent scheme floated by the company could in no way entitle the petitioner to legally claim such difference of monetary benefits through an application preferred under Section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. 19. 19. In such view of the matter, therefore, the learned Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jamshedpur had rightly decided issue no.1 with respect to the maintainability of the application preferred under Section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act against the workman and in favour of the respondent-management. 20. In view of the discussions made hereinabove, I do not find any merit in this writ application, which accordingly, stands dismissed.