JUDGMENT : 1. Petitioner-workman in a bank has challenged award dated 27th February, 2008 made in reference no. 38 of 1999 (Employers in relation to the management of Central Bank of India And Their workmen) pursuant to order of reference dated 29th September, 1999 made by Central Government in exercise of powers under clause (d), sub section(1) of section 10 and section 2A of Industrial Disputes Act, 1997. Issue referred is quoted below:- “Whether the action of the management of Central Bank of India, 33, Netaji Subhas Road, Calcutta –1 in dismissing Sh. Dulal Chandra Santra, Electrician of Brabourne Road Branch, Calcutta from the services on the charges of fraud is justified? If not, what relief the workman is entitled?” (Emphasis supplied). 2. Facts are, by memo dated 8th January, 1996, petitioner was discharged from bank’s service without notice as per clause 19.6(e) of Bipartite Settlement dated 19th October, 1966. Memo says above punishment was inflicted on him with immediate effect. This had come about because petitioner was involved in an incident whereby Rs.9,500/-was withdrawn from a customer’s account without authorisation. Petitioner had returned the money and disciplinary proceedings ended as above. Challenge in the writ petition was taken forward by Mr. Bhattacharya, learned advocate appearing on behalf of petitioner, on submission that punishment was disproportionate. Court felt necessity of further assistance and had appointed Mr. Soumya Majumdar, learned advocate as Amicus Curiae. 3. Amicus Curiae filed a note and made submission. Copy of this note was made over to respondent-bank by petitioner on such direction being made. This was necessitated since bank had stopped appearing. Court sees this continued absence as a conscious choice by the bank to go unrepresented. At this point, it would be relevant to quote text of order dated 20th December, 2018. “This writ petition has been listed under heading “For Orders”. Mr. Bhattacharya, learned advocate appears on behalf of petitioner and demonstrates compliance with direction made in order dated 11th December, 2018, by handing up copy of note filed by Amicus Curiae containing endorsement of receipt on 14th December, 2018 by learned advocate who earlier appeared on behalf of bank. Copy report is returned. Bank goes unrepresented. This writ petition is likely to be dealt with on adjourned date or whenever thereafter business of Court permits it to be taken up for hearing and disposal, irrespective of bank choosing to remain absent. Copy report is returned. Bank goes unrepresented. This writ petition is likely to be dealt with on adjourned date or whenever thereafter business of Court permits it to be taken up for hearing and disposal, irrespective of bank choosing to remain absent. List this writ petition under heading “For Orders” on 3rd January, 2019.” 4. Learned Amicus Curiae has pointed out that bank issued said memo dated 8th January, 1996, inflicting punishment of discharge from bank’s service without notice, as per clause 19.6(e) of Bipartite Settlement dated 19th October, 1966. As on that date the bank was covered by 6th Bipartite Settlement dated 14th February, 1995. Thus, the bank inflicted punishment on petitioner which was not prescribed. On query from Court Mr. Bhattacharya submits, petitioner crossed the age of superannuation in year 2014. As such, interference cannot result in reinstatement. 5. The award is clearly based on irrelevant consideration since provisions applicable to the facts and circumstances were not looked into in the proceeding. Bank choosing to go unrepresented is presumed to admit its non-application of mind in the matter. So it is that Court also enquired of Amicus Curiae for remedy. Amicus Curiae brought to notice of Court a judgement of Supreme Court in Ruby Tour Services (P.) Ltd. vs. Union of India reported in (2018) 9 SCC 537 , to paragraphs 33 to 36 in which Apex Court dealt with award of compensation in exercise of writ jurisdiction. Said paragraphs are reproduced below:- “33. Now, we come to the question of relief, which is to be granted to the petitioner, in view of our above decision that rejection of claim of the petitioner for Haj 2018 was unfounded. The learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on the judgement of this Court in Jeddah Travels & Jeddah Hajj Group v. Union of India, wherein this Court laid down the following in para 7 (SCC p.380) “7. Having considered the contentions advanced on behalf of the rival parties, we are of the view that the petitioners who had approached the Court well in time cannot be denied the benefit of an adjudication as urged by the learned ASG. The time-frame still available, in our considered view, is adequate to enforce the rights of the petitioners if they are found so entitled” 34. The time-frame still available, in our considered view, is adequate to enforce the rights of the petitioners if they are found so entitled” 34. The learned counsel submits that since the petitioners has filed this petition on 4-6-2018, which was the date for allocation of Haj quota to the eligible PTOs, the petitioner is entitled for relief. Shri Santosh Krishnan submitted that even if the quota is allotted to all the PTOs, the number of passengers allotted to each PTO may be reduced by one, which may be reallotted to the petitioner and another eligible person. This Court in United Air Travel Services v. Union of India decided on 7-5-2018 came to consider the question of relief to be granted to PTO, whose application for grant of registration for Haj Pilgrimage 2016 was rejected. In the present writ petition, one of the reliefs claimed by the petitioner is for grant of compensation. In prayer (c), following has been prayed: “(c) Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus commanding and directing the respondent to pay compensation to the petitioner for the loss occurred to it by not granting registration for Haj 2018;” 35. This Court in United Air Travel Services considered the question of grant of relief and has laid down the following in paras 13 to 18: “13. The question, however, arises what relief can be granted in such a situation. The passage of time has made certain reliefs infructuous. The time period for conducting Haj tours for 2016 as well as 2017 is over. Thus, even the alternative relief prayed for 2017 has become infructuous. In three of the writ petitions i.e. WPs (C) Nos. 631 of 2016; 634 of 2016 & 636 of 2016, there is a specific alternative plea for compensation to the petitioners for the loss accrued due to non-grant of registration for the Haj of 2016. While there is no such specific plea in the other writ petitions, given the identical situation, we are of the view that the same principle ought to be applied in all these cases. The petitioners cannot be left remediless. While there is no such specific plea in the other writ petitions, given the identical situation, we are of the view that the same principle ought to be applied in all these cases. The petitioners cannot be left remediless. The mindless action of the respondents in rejecting the eligibility of the petitioners for the year 2016 on the very grounds on which they were exempted necessitates that the petitioners should be entitled to damages in public law so that they are compensated, at least, to some extent for not having been able to carry on with their business on account of illegal action of the respondents. 14. The principles of damages in public law have to, however, satisfy certain tests. In Nilabati Behera v. State of Orissa, it was observed that public law proceedings serve a different purpose than private law proceedings. In that context, it was observed as under : (SCC pp.768-69, para 34) ‘34…The purpose of public law is not only to civilise public power but also to assure the citizen that they live under a legal system which aims to protect their interests and preserve their rights. Therefore, when the court moulds the relief by granting “compensation” in proceedings under Article 32 or 226 of the Constitution seeking enforcement or protection of fundamental rights, it does so under the public law by way of penalising the wrongdoer and fixing the liability for the public wrong on the State which has failed in its public duty to protect the fundamental rights of the citizen. The payment of compensation in such cases is not to be understood, as it is generally understood in a civil action for damages under the private law but in the broader sense of providing relief by an order of making “monetary amends” under the public law for the wrong done due to breach of public duty, of not protecting the fundamental rights of the citizen. The compensation is in the nature of “exemplary damages” awarded against the wrongdoer for the breach of its public law duty and is independent of the rights available to the aggrieved party to claim compensation under the private law in an action based on tort, through a suit instituted in a court of competent jurisdiction or/and prosecute the offender under the penal law.’ It was also emphasised that it is a sound policy to punish the wrongdoer and it is in that spirit that the courts have moulded the relief by granting compensation in exercise of writ jurisdiction. The objective is to ensure that public bodies or officials do not act unlawfully. Since the issue is one of enforcement of public duties, the remedy would be available under public law notwithstanding that damages are claimed in those proceedings. 15. The aforesaid aspect was, once again, emphasised in Common Cause v. Union of India. We may also usefully refer to N. Nagendra Rao & Co. Vs. State of A.P. qua the proposition that the determination of vicarious liability of the State being linked with the negligence of its officer is nothing new if they can be sued personally for which there is no dearth of authority. 16. In the facts of the present case, the arbitrariness and illegality of the action of the authority is writ large. The petitioners have been deprived of their right to secure the quota on a patently wrongful order passed for reasons, which did not apply to them and for conditions, which had been specifically exempted. What could be a greater arbitrariness and illegality? Where there is such patent arbitrariness and illegality, there is consequent violation of the principles enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution of India. The facts of the present case are, thus, undoubtedly giving rise to the satisfaction of parameters as a fit case for grant of compensation. 17. On a conspectus of the aforesaid facts including the number of pilgrims for whom the petitioners would have been entitled to arrange the Haj pilgrimage, an amount of Rs.5 lakhs per petitioners would be adequate compensation for the loss suffered by them and subserve the ends of justice. We are conscious of the fact that there is no quantification based on actual loss, but then the award by us is in the nature of damages in public law. 18. We are conscious of the fact that there is no quantification based on actual loss, but then the award by us is in the nature of damages in public law. 18. The amount for each of the petitioners be remitted by the respondents within two months from the date of this order failing which the amount would carry interest @ 15 per cent per annum apart from any other remedy available to the petitioners. It will be open to the respondents to recover the amount of damages and costs from the delinquent officers responsible for passing such unsustainable orders.” 36. We are of the view that the petitioner is also entitled for same compensation of Rs.5 lakhs, which is adequate compensation for the loss suffered by the petitioner and shall subserve the ends of justice. We further direct that the aforesaid amount be paid within two months from this date, failing which the amount would carry simple interest @15 per cent per annum. Writ Petition (C) No.646 of 2018 is allowed to be above extent.” 6. Clearly petitioner is entitled to relief but such can only be in terms of compensation. For assessment of compensation Court required parties, in particular, the bank to make calculation of petitioner’s differential salary in period of suspension and salaries for period commencing from date of termination till his superannuation. For differential salary bank’s calculation puts differential of salary in period of suspension at aggregate Rs.12,090.94. This amount, Court finds, is payable to petitioner since bad termination goes to root of the matter wiping out the order of suspension. This amount was payable as on 8th January, 1996. Petitioner will also be entitled to interest at 6% per annum simple on and from 9th January, 1996 till date of payment, which must be on or before 31st January, 2019. 7. Supreme Court has said that in cases of reinstatement full payment of back-wages is not automatic. Applicable 6th Bipartite Settlement dated 14th February, 1995 provides for punishment, inter alia, of compulsory retirement/removal from service/discharge with superannuation benefits as would be due otherwise at that stage and without disqualification from future employment. While superannuation benefits at petitioner’s stage of service as on 8th January, 1996 can be ascertained but it appears to be an admitted position that petitioner did not find employment elsewhere. There is no mention in impugned award to the contrary. While superannuation benefits at petitioner’s stage of service as on 8th January, 1996 can be ascertained but it appears to be an admitted position that petitioner did not find employment elsewhere. There is no mention in impugned award to the contrary. Bank’s calculation of aggregate salaries petitioner could have earned in the period he stood discharged from service is at Rs.32,58,924.57. There will be further direction upon bank to pay Rs.10,00,000/- as compensation for salaries lost. This amount along with Provident Fund dues accrued to petitioner up to 8th January, 1996 must also be paid to petitioner by 31st January, 2019 failing which said aggregate amount will carry commercial compounded rate of interest being charged by the bank as lending rate for commercial transactions, commencing from 1st February, 2019 till date of payment. 8. Court expresses deep appreciation and gratitude to Amicus Curiae for assistance in adjudication of this writ petition. With above directions and expression of gratitude, this writ petition is disposed of.