JUDGMENT : M. Seetharama Murti, J. 1. This Central Excise Appeal, under Section 35G of the Central Excise Act, 1944, is filed by the unsuccessful applicant/appellant assailing the order, dated 24-5-2018, passed in Application No. S.T./COD/30509/2017 in Appeal. No. S.T./30882/2017. 2. The facts, which lead to the filing of this appeal, are as follows: A show cause notice, dated 16-7-2009 vide No. IV/5/91/2008 AE-1 was issued to the appellant by the Additional Commissioner of Central Excise & Service Tax, Visakhapatnam Commissionerate, requiring the appellant to show cause to the Additional Commissioner as to why- (i) The services of renting of shopping complexes and other immovable properties as discussed above provided by him should not be classified as "Renting of Immovable Property Service" under Section 65(90a) read with Section 65A of the Chapter V of the Finance Act, 1994; (ii) An amount of Rs. 7,26,523/- (Rs. Seven lakhs twenty six thousand five hundred and twenty three only), being the Service Tax payable under 'Renting of Immovable Property Services' provided by him during the period from 1-6-2007 to 30-6-2009 should not be demanded from him under proviso to Section 73(1) of the Chapter V of the Finance Act, 1994 and the amount of Rs. 3,60,347/- (rupees three lakhs sixty thousand three hundred and forty seven only) already paid by him as discussed above should not be appropriated towards the service tax demanded; (iii) An amount of Rs. 14,531/- (Rs. fourteen thousand five hundred and thirty one only, being the Education Cess payable under 'Renting of Immovable Property Services' provided by him during the period from 1-6-2007 to 30-6-2009 should not be demanded from him under proviso to Section 73(1) of the Chapter V of the Finance Act, 1994 and the amount of Rs. 7,208/- (Rs. Seven thousand two hundred and eight only) already paid by him and discussed above should not be appropriated towards the service tax demanded; (iv) An amount of Rs. 7,265/- (Rs. Seven thousand two hundred and sixty five only) being the Secondary and Higher Education Cess payable under 'Renting of Immovable Property Services' provided by him during the period from 1-6-2007 to 30-6-2009 should not be demanded from him under proviso to Section 73(1) of the Chapter V of the Finance Act, 1994 and the amount of Rs. 7,265/- (Rs. Seven thousand two hundred and sixty five only) being the Secondary and Higher Education Cess payable under 'Renting of Immovable Property Services' provided by him during the period from 1-6-2007 to 30-6-2009 should not be demanded from him under proviso to Section 73(1) of the Chapter V of the Finance Act, 1994 and the amount of Rs. 3,603/- (Rupees three thousand six hundred and three only) already paid by him as discussed above should not be appropriated towards the service tax demanded; (v) Interest as applicable under the provisions of Section 75 of the Chapter V of the Finance Act, 1994, should not be demanded; and (vi) Penalty should not be imposed on him under Section 76, Section 77 and Section 78 of the Chapter V of the Finance Act, 1994 for failure to pay service tax by suppressing the fact of providing of taxable service, failure to take registration within the time prescribed and failure to file periodical returns as discussed above. [Reproduced verbatim] Thereafter, the adjudicating authority, by an order, dated 12-12-2012, in Original No. VIZ STX 001 ADC 001 12 confirmed the demand in the show cause notice to the extent indicated in the said order. Aggrieved of the orders of the adjudicating authority, the appellant herein filed appeal No. 69/2012(V-1) S.T. before the appellate authority - the Commissioner : Customs, Central Excise and Service Tax (Appeals), Visakhapatnam. The said authority dismissed the said appeal by an order, dated 9-12-2013. Thus, the order of the original adjudicating authority was upheld. Aggrieved of the said order of the appellate authority, the appellant filed an appeal before the Customs, Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal [CESTAT] in Appeal No. 30882/2017. Since delay had occasioned in filing the said appeal, the appellant also filed Misc. Application No. 30509 of 2017 for condonation of 1164 days in filing the said appeal. On merits and by the order impugned, the CESTAT dismissed the said application for condonation of delay. As a sequel to the said order, the appeal before CESTAT stood dismissed. Aggrieved thereof, the present appeal is filed before this Court. 3. In the grounds of appeal, the following substantial question of law is raised:- 'Whether the Tribunal was right in holding that no cogent reason was found for the delay of 1164 days, when the appellant has already paid an amount of Rs. Aggrieved thereof, the present appeal is filed before this Court. 3. In the grounds of appeal, the following substantial question of law is raised:- 'Whether the Tribunal was right in holding that no cogent reason was found for the delay of 1164 days, when the appellant has already paid an amount of Rs. 4,08,878/- out of the total tax demand of Rs. 7,48,319/- (which is 55% of the demand, while the appellant is required to pay only Rs. 74,831/- being 10% of the tax demanded) but handicapped because of mishandling by an employee who left the job without intimation.' 4. On the above substantial question of law, which is involved, we have heard the submissions of Learned Counsel for the appellant and of the Learned Standing Counsel appearing for the respondents. 5. The short but important question is - 'Whether sufficient cause is shown for the condonation of delay?' 6. The case of the appellant in support of the request for condonation of delay, as stated in the petition filed before the CESTAT, in brief, is as follows: The appeal ought to have been filed before the CESTAT on or before 22-3-2014, as the order in the appeal, which is dated 9-12-2013, was received on 23-12-2013, by the appellant. The issue involved in the main proceeding is demand of service tax and education cess under the category of leasing/renting of immovable property services. The Additional Commissioner has confirmed the demand on the ground that the amount received as refundable deposit attracts liability under the category of 'renting of immovable property service'. He did so without appreciating the applicable factual and statutory position on the issue. The appellant is the proprietor of the proprietary concern. He looks after the matters pertaining to the liaison with the principals and other bank matters etcetera. One V. Dhanaraju, accountant, aged 56 years, used to look after the accounts and matters relating to payment of taxes. He received a copy of the order impugned in the appeal and placed it in the audit file. He was suffering from severe sciatica since the end of January, 2014. Hence, he could not attend the office regularly. As he was finding it difficult to attend to his duties, he suddenly left the job in June, 2014, without any intimation. He received a copy of the order impugned in the appeal and placed it in the audit file. He was suffering from severe sciatica since the end of January, 2014. Hence, he could not attend the office regularly. As he was finding it difficult to attend to his duties, he suddenly left the job in June, 2014, without any intimation. As there was no letter or other correspondence from the Department, the appellant was not aware of the issuance of the order. The petitioner became aware of the order only on receiving a letter from the department seeking to know the details of appeal filed. The delay is neither willful nor wanton. The delay may kindly be condoned. 7. No counter is filed to this application. 8. In this appeal, the grounds urged and the contentions raised by the appellant are as follows:- The Division Bench of CESTAT has not considered the full and peculiar facts relevant to the case which warranted condonation of delay. The reason for the delay is explained in the petition filed for condonation of delay. Even before the issuance of show cause notice, the appellant paid an amount of Rs. 3,71,158/-. The appellant further paid, by way of a challan, dated 2-3-2017, Rs. 37,720/- as pre-deposit for filing the appeal before the CESTAT. Thus, out of the total tax demand of Rs. 7,48,319/-, the appellant has already paid an amount of Rs. 4,08,878/-. The appellant duly discharged the service tax obligations as per the rental amounts received. However, the Revenue treated the interest free security deposit of Rs. 38,53,984/- as rental income received by way of future rentals and levied service tax for short payment. Acceptance of security deposits is a business practice common to the renting of immovable property service, which is a cushion for the service provider against the possible default in payment of rentals and damages to the property, if any, committed by the tenant/occupant. The security deposit is returnable, when the premises is vacated by the tenant/occupant and cannot be treated as consideration for service rendered under renting of immovable property. Hence, demand for short payment of service tax is not sustainable. The security deposit is returnable, when the premises is vacated by the tenant/occupant and cannot be treated as consideration for service rendered under renting of immovable property. Hence, demand for short payment of service tax is not sustainable. The appellant has got fair chance of success in the intended appeal in view of the legal position obtaining and as the facts of appellant's case are identical to the facts in various decided cases, wherein the very same afore-stated issue was decided. This appellant does not stand to benefit by lodging the appeal with delay. Refusing to condone delay results in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the threshold and justice being denied. Even if the delay is condoned, the highest that may happen is that the appeal would be decided on merits, after hearing the parties. The delay is non-deliberate delay. There are no mala fides, as substantial portion of demand is paid already. The doctrine of every day's delay must be explained must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner. There is no material to hold that the delay had occasioned deliberately or on account of culpable negligence or on account of mala fides. 9. In support of the said contentions, Learned Counsel for the petitioner relied upon the following decisions: (1) Improvement Trust, Ludhiana v. Ujagar Singh & Others [2010 TIOL 46 (S.C.) LMT] (2) Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and Another v. Mst. Katiji and Others [2002 TIOL 444 (S.C.) LMT- 1987 (28) E.L.T. 185 (S.C.)] (3) P. Venugopal Naidu v. The Commissioner of Customs, Central Excise & Service Tax [2016 TIOL 422 (H.C.) A.P. S.T.] (4) Satackline Systems Pvt. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Customs and Central Excise [2016 TIOL 2369 (H.C.) AP CX]. 10. Per contra, the case of the Revenue in this appeal as per the contents of the counter filed before this Court and submissions made in line with the said contentions, in brief, is as follows:- "The appellant had not declared the details of services provided and the amounts received in connection with the rental services provided. The undisclosed facts came to light after investigation. The appellant has not fully discharged the service tax liability in respect of the taxable services provided. The appellant failed in the above regard even after the officers of the department appraised the appellant of the legal provisions. The undisclosed facts came to light after investigation. The appellant has not fully discharged the service tax liability in respect of the taxable services provided. The appellant failed in the above regard even after the officers of the department appraised the appellant of the legal provisions. Under self assessment regime, a statutory obligation is upon every person providing service in terms of Section 70 of Finance Act, 1994 whereunder the appellant is legally required to assess and accordingly discharge the service tax liability within the time limits prescribed under law. In the statement of the authorized representative, it was stated that the advance deposit of Rs. 38,53,984/- paid to the appellant was towards future rentals of the premises. As per Section 65(105) of the Finance Act, 1994, 'taxable service' includes any service provided or to be provided. The works 'to be provided' were inserted in the definition with effect from 16-6-2005, vide Finance Act, 2005. Taxable service includes service intended to be provided in future also. The condonation of delay is a matter of discretion of the Court and one cannot claim it as a right. Only on sufficient cause being shown, the delay is condonable. Delay in filing the appeal is a long delay of 1164 days. In the facts and circumstances, the explanation offered for condonation of the said delay cannot be said to be justified. The CESTAT rightly held that the explanation seems to be very sketchy. During the 1164 days of period, the appellant carried its business without any interruptions. Such a long delay cannot be viewed leniently. The reasons offered for the delay are not rational and justifiable." 11. In support of the said contentions, Learned Standing Counsel relied upon the following decisions: (1) Singh Enterprises v. CCE, Jamshedpur [ 2008 (221) E.L.T. 163 (S.C.)] (2) R.K. Ispat Ltd., (Textile Division) v. CCE [2017 (346) E.L.T. 245 (P & H)] (3) CCE, Mumbai v. Punjab Fibres Ltd. [ 2008 (223) E.L.T. 337 (S.C.)] (4) M/s. Singh Enterprises v. CCE, Jamshedpur [ 2008 (221) E.L.T. 163 (S.C.)] (5) P. Mody, Chairman, Indian Sulphacid Industries Ltd. v. Commissioner [2015 (320) E.L.T. A271 (S.C.)] 12. We have gone through all the decisions. 13. Before proceeding further, it is apt to refer to the following settled propositions on the settled legal aspects regarding condonation of delay. We have gone through all the decisions. 13. Before proceeding further, it is apt to refer to the following settled propositions on the settled legal aspects regarding condonation of delay. "The statutory provision mandates that while considering the applications for condonation of delay, the applicants are required to show sufficient cause for condonation of such delay. Condonation of delay is a matter of discretion of the Court. The words 'sufficient cause' under Section 5 of the Limitation Act should receive liberal construction so as to achieve substantial justice. However, while condoning the delay, the Court should not forget the opposite party altogether. A liberal approach is to be adopted on considering the application for condonation of delay on the ground of sufficient cause under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The concept of such a liberal approach cannot be equated with doing injustice to the other party. The Court cannot condone delay in a case, where the Court concludes that there is no justification for the delay. The discretion has to be exercised within the reasonable bounds known to the law. Whims or fancies, prejudices or predilections could not form the basis for exercising the discretionary power. When the delay is directly a result of negligence or default or inaction of a party, such delay cannot be condoned on mere asking of that party. Length of delay is no matter and the acceptability of the explanation is the only criterion. If there is no acceptable explanation, sometimes a delay of shorter length may also be uncondonable whereas in certain other times, the delay of a very long range can be condoned provided sufficient cause is shown." "The expression 'sufficient cause' is a cause for which the defendant could not be blamed, [vide the decision of the Supreme Court in Parimal v. Veena, AIR 2011 SUPREME COURT 1150]. In this decision, it was also held as follows: However, the facts and circumstances of each case must afford sufficient ground to enable the Court concerned to exercise discretion for the reason that whenever the Court exercises discretion, it has to be exercised judiciously." 14. Dealing with the issue as to whether the cause shown is a sufficient cause for condonation of delay, it is to be restated that the explanation for the delay is as follows:- 'The appellant is the proprietor of the proprietary concern. Dealing with the issue as to whether the cause shown is a sufficient cause for condonation of delay, it is to be restated that the explanation for the delay is as follows:- 'The appellant is the proprietor of the proprietary concern. He looks after the matters pertaining to the liaison with the principals and other bank matters etcetera. One V. Dhanaraju, accountant, aged 56 years, used to look after the accounts and matters relating to payment of taxes. He received a copy of the order impugned in the proposed appeal and placed it in the audit file. He was suffering from severe sciatica since the end of January, 2014. Hence, he could not attend the office regularly. As he was finding it difficult to attend to his duties, he suddenly left the job in June, 2014, without any intimation. As there was no letter or other correspondence from the Department, the appellant was not aware of the issuance of the order. The petitioner became aware of the order only on receiving a, letter from the department seeking to know the details of appeal filed. The delay is neither willful nor wanton.' 15. Before the CESTAT no counter is filed by the Revenue. 16. The main submissions of the appellant are as follows:- 'The security deposit is returnable when the premises is vacated by the tenant/occupant. It cannot be treated as consideration for service rendered under renting of immovable property; and, the acceptance of security deposit is a business practice common to the renting of immovable property service. It is a cushion for the service provider against the possible default in payment of rentals and damages to the property, if any, committed by the occupant/tenant. The said security deposit cannot form part of service provided by the appellant. The said position is well supported by precedents. Therefore, the appellant has got fair chances of success in the appeal. In that view of the matter, refusal of condonation of delay results in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and justice being defeated. 17. The said position is well supported by precedents. Therefore, the appellant has got fair chances of success in the appeal. In that view of the matter, refusal of condonation of delay results in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and justice being defeated. 17. Based on the above submissions, it is sought to be contended that in the intended appeal, which is filed with delay, the appellant has got a fair chance of success and that, therefore, if the delay is not condoned and the appeal is dismissed at the threshold, the appellant suffers serious and irreparable loss and it would tantamount to denying an opportunity to have the grievance redressed in accordance with the procedure established by law. 18. Per contra, Learned Standing Counsel would submit that the period of delay is more than three years and that such a long delay cannot be condoned for mere askance and on a sketchy explanation as observed by the CESTAT in the impugned order. 19. In the first place, it is to be noted that out of total tax demand of Rs. 7,48,319/-, the appellant has already paid an amount of Rs. 4,08,878/- is not in dispute. Therefore, a substantial amount of the tax demand is already paid. As rightly contended, the delay deserves to be condoned, in the light of the contentions of the appellant that the reason for the delay is beyond the control of the appellant and that the said reason for the delay is on account of the ill health of the accountant and his leaving the job in June, 2014, without intimation, after having received the copy of the impugned order and placing it in audit file, which is not within the knowledge of the appellant. If the explanation is accepted and an opportunity is provided to have the cause in the proposed appeal decided on merits, the highest that would happen is that the cause would be decided on its merits after hearing the parties and in that view of the matter, it cannot be said that if the delay is condoned after accepting the explanation as a sufficient cause prejudice would be caused to the revenue/respondent herein. While considering the applications for condonation of delay, what is to be seen is whether, the interest of revenue will stand protected, even while recognizing the right of the assessee to exercise the statutory remedies available to the assessee and the statutory right of appeal cannot be made redundant by dismissing the application for condonation of delay on technical grounds. In our considered view when substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preserved as held by the Supreme Court. 20. In the light of the above discussions, we find that this is a fit case for condonation of delay and affording an opportunity to the appellant to have the intended appeal decided on its merits by the CESTAT. Hence, we hold that the impugned order is liable to be set aside and that such a course subserves the ends of justice. 21. In the result, the Central Excise Appeal is allowed and the order, dated 24-5-2008 passed in Application No. S.T./COD/30509/2017 in Appeal No. S.T./30882/2017 is set aside and the said application is allowed and the delay in filing Appeal No. S.T./30882/2017 is condoned with a direction to the CESTAT to now take up the appeal for hearing and disposal on its merits, as per the procedure established by law, however, uninfluenced by the observations, if any, made in this order. 22. There shall be no order as to costs. 23. Miscellaneous petitions pending, if any, shall stand closed.