JUDGMENT : No one appears on behalf of the petitioners. However, Mr. Saket Upadhyay, learned counsel for the Respondents is present. As both these matters are pending since last more than a decade, the same are being disposed of by this common order based on the materials available on record. 2. In W.P.C. No. 6535 of 2006, the petitioner has challenged the order dated 9.9.2006, passed by the learned Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Hazaribagh in Reference Case No. 7 of 2006, by which it has been held that Chhotanagpur Khadi Grammodyog Sansthan is an Industry within the meaning of Section 2 (g) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. 3. In W.P.L. No. 1221 of 2008, the petitioner is aggrieved by the Award dated 23.11.2007, passed by the learned Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Hazaribagh, wherein it has been held that dismissal of respondent no. 1 by the Secretary, Khadi Gramodyog Sansthan, Hazaribagh and Secretary, Chhotanagpur Khadi Gramodyog Sansthan, Sarbodaya Ashram Tiril, Ranchi is not justified and the workmen is entitled for reinstatement forthwith with full back wages and all other benefits to be paid to him within three months. 4. Since in the Award dated 23.11.2007, it was considered by the learned Labour Court, the question as to whether the Management is an Industry as defined in section 2(g) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1946 and therefore WPL No. 1221 of 2008 is being taken up for consideration as the order passed in the said case will ultimately guide WPC No. 6535 of 2006. 5. The concerned workman, who was employed as an Assistant Worker-Cashier under the Management of Khadi Gramodyog Sangh, Hazaribagh, was saddled with a criminal case and ultimately he was dismissed from service which led him to prefer WPS No. 3837 of 2002 and vide order dated 8.4.2004, the writ application was dismissed as not maintainable. Subsequently, the workman concerned raised an industrial dispute against the order of dismissal and the Department of Labour Employment & Training, Government of Jharkhand, Ranchi vide Notification dated 24.01.2006 referred the dispute for adjudication before the Labour Court and the terms of reference are as follows:- “Whether the dismissal of Sri Ashok Das, Cashier by Secretary, Khadi Gramodyog Sangh, Hazaribagh and Secretary, Chhotanagpur Khadi Gramodyog Sansthan, Sarbodaya Ashram, Tiril, Ranchi is justified? If not, what relief he is entitled to?” 6. If not, what relief he is entitled to?” 6. The case of the workman is that he was working under the Management since 1.1.1982 as an Assistant Worker (Cashier). Since the year 1995, the workman was posted at Bara Bazar, Hazaribagh in the establishment of the Management, in which on 8.10.1995, a theft was committed, which led to institution of an FIR in the police station against unknown persons. It has been stated that the workman concerned was suspended with effect from 17.10.1995 and he was directed to remain present at his headquarter at Hazaribagh during the period of his suspension. A chargesheet was issued to the concerned workman, who submitted an explanation to the chargesheet and in the meantime the workman continued to request the Management to allow him to join his duty but he was assured that after dismissal of the criminal case, he would be permitted to join duty. In the investigation, in the case of theft in the establishment, police had submitted final form, which was accepted by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Hazaribagh and on coming to know about the aforesaid fact, the concerned workman had requested the Management to permit him to join duty but he was communicated that he would be intimated in time about the joining of his duty. The workman claims that no departmental proceeding was ever initiated against him and infact the other employees, who were placed under suspension along with the concerned workman, were permitted to join duty. It has been claimed that he was informed vide letter dated 25.05.2002 that his services were terminated with retrospective effect from 17.10.1997 and the same was done in violation of the principles of natural justice as the workman concerned was never issued any notice nor he was given an opportunity to participate in the proceeding. The concerned workman has further asserted that the Management is an Industry within the meaning of Section 2 (g) of the Industrial Disputes Act. It has further been stated that termination of his service is a case of retrenchment in terms of section 2(00) of the Industrial Disputes Act and therefore he had prayed that he be reinstated with all back wages and other consequential benefits. 7. It has further been stated that termination of his service is a case of retrenchment in terms of section 2(00) of the Industrial Disputes Act and therefore he had prayed that he be reinstated with all back wages and other consequential benefits. 7. The Management had filed its written statement in which it has been asserted that the respondent is not a workman under the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and therefore he is not entitled to any remedy available under the said Act. Reference has been made to the theft committed in the establishment of Khadi Gramodyog Sangh, Hazaribagh and the concerned workman was placed under immediate suspension and thereafter he was given a show cause, to which he did not reply. It has been stated that an enquiry was conducted and it came to light that key of the main door was in possession of the concerned workman who in the night of occurrence had in a preplanned and premeditated manner misappropriated the cloths and other articles worth Rs.63,122/-and thereafter highlighted the fact that the said articles were stolen from the establishment. It has further been stated in the written statement that in course of enquiry, the concerned workman was given an opportunity to put forward his defence and ultimately in the enquiry report he was found guilty and on the basis of the same he was discharged from service with effect from 17.10.1995. 8. The learned Labour Court on consideration of the rival pleadings had framed the following issues:- (a) Whether the Management is an Industry as defined u/s 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947? (b) Whether the dismissal of the workman is justified? (c) To what relief the workman is entitled to? 9. Infact after the reference was made by the State Government for adjudication, a preliminary objection was raised by the Management regarding the maintainability of the application by claiming that it was not a State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. The preliminary objection raised by the Management was rejected by the learned Labour Court vide order dated 9.9.2006 by relying on a case reported in 1983 PLJR (SC) 21 Gopalji Jha Shastri Vs. State of Bihar. 10. The preliminary objection having been decided against the Management and in favour of the concerned workman was once again taken up for consideration as issue no. State of Bihar. 10. The preliminary objection having been decided against the Management and in favour of the concerned workman was once again taken up for consideration as issue no. 1, as indicated above, while deciding the dispute finally by the learned Labour Court, Hazaribagh. Whether an establishment is an Industry or not in terms of Section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act has been considered in the case of Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerages Board Vs. A. Rajappa and others along with analogous cases, reported in 1978 2 SCC 213 and the tests to be satisfied in coming within the definition of an industry has been laid down as follows:- “140.“Industry’, as defined in Section 2(j) and explained in Banerji, has a wide import. “(a) Where (i) systematic activity, (ii) organized by co-operation between employer and employee (the direct and substantial element is chimerical) (iii) for the production and/or distribution of goods and services calculated to satisfy human wants and wishes (not spiritual or religious but inclusive of material things or services geared to celestial bliss e.g. making, on a large scale prasad or food), prima facie, there is an ‘industry’ in that enterprise. (b) Absence of profit motive or gainful objective is irrelevant, be the venture in the public, joint, private or other sector. (c) The true focus is functional and the decisive test is the nature of the activity with special emphasis on the employer-employee relations. (d) If the organization is a trade or business it does not cease to be one because of philanthropy animating the undertaking.” 150. Each of us is likely to have a subjective notion about “industry”. For objectivity, we have to look first to the words used in the statutory provision defining industry in an attempt to find the meaning. If that meaning is clear, we need proceed no further. But, the trouble here is that the words found there do not yield a meaning so readily. They refer to what employers or workers may do as parts of their ordinary avocation or business in life. If that meaning is clear, we need proceed no further. But, the trouble here is that the words found there do not yield a meaning so readily. They refer to what employers or workers may do as parts of their ordinary avocation or business in life. When we turn to the meaning given of the term “worker” in Section 2(s) of the Act, we are once more driven back to find it in the bosom of “industry”, for the term “worker” is defined as one: “employed in any industry to do any skilled or unskilled manual, supervisory, technical or clerical work for hire or reward, whether the terms of employment be express or implied, and for the purposes of any proceeding under this Act in relation to an industrial dispute, includes any such person who has been dismissed, discharged or retrenched in connection with or as a consequence of, that dispute, or whose dismissal, discharge or retrenchment has led to that dispute”. The definition, however, excludes specifically those who are subject to the Army Act, 1950 or the Air Force Act, 1950, or the Navy Discipline Act, 1934, as well as those who are employed in the Police Service or officers and other employees of a prison, or employed in mainly managerial or administrative capacities or who, being employed in supervisory capacity, draw wages exceeding Rs 500 per mensem. 158. It seems to me that the definition was not meant to provide more than a guide. It raises doubts as to what could be meant by the “calling of employers” even if business, trade, undertaking or manufacture could be found capable of being more clearly delineated. It is clear that there is no mention here of any profit motive. Obviously, the word “manufacture” of employers could not be interpreted literally. It merely means a process of manufacture in which the employers may be engaged. It is, however, evident that the term “employer” necessarily postulates employees without whom there can be no employers. But, the second part of the definition makes the concept more nebulous as it, obviously, extends the definition to “any calling, service, employment, handicraft or industrial occupation or avocation of workmen”. I have already examined the meaning of the term “workmen” which refers us back to what is an “industry”. But, the second part of the definition makes the concept more nebulous as it, obviously, extends the definition to “any calling, service, employment, handicraft or industrial occupation or avocation of workmen”. I have already examined the meaning of the term “workmen” which refers us back to what is an “industry”. It seems to me that the second part, relating to workmen, must necessarily indicate something which may exclude employers and include an “industry” consisting of individual handicraftsmen or workmen only. At any rate, the meaning of industrial disputes includes disputes between workmen and workmen also. Therefore, I cannot see how we can cut down the wide ambit of last part of the definition by searching for the predominant meaning in the first part unless we were determined, at the outset, to curtail the scope of the second part somehow. If we do that, we will be deliberately cutting down the real sweep of the last part. Neither “noscitur a sociis” rule nor the “ejusdem generis” rule are adequate for such a case.” 11. Following the decision of Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerages Board (Supra), in the case of Gopalji Jha Shastri Vs. State of Bihar reported in 1983 2 SCC 4 , it was held as follows:- “2. The point raised in this appeal would be covered by the decision of the Constitution Bench composed of seven Judges of this Court in Bangalore Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. A. Rajappa. The wide sweep of expression “industry” as interpreted therein will comprehend Bihar Khadi Gramodyog Sangh and, therefore, following the decision it must be Held that Bihar Khadi Gramodyog Sangh is an industry within the meaning of the expression of Section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Consequently, the contention raised in this appeal must fail. That being the only point, the appeal fails and is dismissed.” 12. Thus on consideration of the aforesaid pronouncements, Chhotanagpur Khadi Gramodyog Sansthan, Ranchi and Khadi Gramodyog Sansthan, Hazaribagh are industry within the meaning of section 2 (j) of the Industrial Disputes Act 1947 and therefore the issue no. 1 as framed has rightly been decided against the Management. 13. So far as the issue no. Thus on consideration of the aforesaid pronouncements, Chhotanagpur Khadi Gramodyog Sansthan, Ranchi and Khadi Gramodyog Sansthan, Hazaribagh are industry within the meaning of section 2 (j) of the Industrial Disputes Act 1947 and therefore the issue no. 1 as framed has rightly been decided against the Management. 13. So far as the issue no. 2 is concerned, it appears that in the criminal case, which was instituted with respect to theft committed in the establishment of the Management, the police had submitted final form which was accepted by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Hazaribagh. The concerned workman was examined as C.W-2 who had stated that there was no black spot in his service record during the period 1982 to 1985 and he has further stated on recall that no domestic or departmental enquiry was ever conducted against him. The concerned workman was never cross-examined by the Management to controvert his contention regarding non holding of a departmental proceeding or being informed to take part in the departmental proceeding and therefore such assertion on the part of the concerned workman in absence of any cross-examination remained unrebutted. The Management has also failed to come out with any concrete evidence which would suggest that the workman concerned was given an opportunity to participate in the departmental proceeding and/or given an opportunity to defend his case prior to an order of discharge passed against the concerned workman. In absence of there being any evidence, to the contrary, the concerned workman was therefore dismissed from service without holding any departmental enquiry and therefore the learned Labour Court had rightly come to a conclusion that the action on the part of the Management was in violation of the Principles of Natural Justice and therefore issue no. 2 was correctly decided in favour of the workman concerned. 14. Since both the issues, as indicated above, were rightly decided in favour of the concerned workman as the Management has miserably failed to substantiate the contrary view, the concerned workman therefore is entitled for reinstatement along with back wages and that other benefits as directed in the Award dated 23.11.2007. In such view of the matter, therefore, I am not inclined to entertain WPL No. 1221 of 2008, which accordingly stands dismissed. 15. In such view of the matter, therefore, I am not inclined to entertain WPL No. 1221 of 2008, which accordingly stands dismissed. 15. So far as WPC No. 6535 of 2006 is concerned, since the issue, which has been raised in the said writ petition has already been decided in WPL No. 1221 of 2008, no separate order need be passed in the present writ petition, which also in view of the above stands dismissed.