JUDGMENT : 1. Heard learned counsel for the parties. 2. Counsel for the petitioners submits that in all the writ petitions, similar reliefs have been prayed for and accordingly they have been tagged for final disposal. 3. At the outset, counsel for the respondents do not dispute the aforesaid submission of the counsel for the petitioners and submits that respondents have filed counter affidavit in only one case i.e. W.P. (C) No. 4708 of 2016 and separate counter affidavits have not been filed in other cases, as identical issues are involved in all the cases which have been tagged for final disposal. 4. Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners submits that he has no objection, if the counter affidavit filed in W.P. (C) No. 4708 of 2016, is considered for the purposes of disposal of the entire batch of writ petitions. However, he submits that some of the documents which are relevant for the purposes of these cases, have been filed in W.P. (C) No. 4703 of 2016 and accordingly the documents which have been annexed in W.P. (C) No. 4703 of 2016 may also be permitted to be referred for the purposes of disposal of the batch of the writ petitions. 5. In the light of the aforesaid submissions, the prayer of one of the writ petitions i.e. W.P. (C) No. 4708 of 2016 is quoted hereinbelow for ready reference: - “(i) For issuance of an appropriate writ/order/direction, including Writ of Certiorari, for quashing/setting aside the Notice contained in Memo No. 1172 (ii) dated 13.07.2016 whereby and whereunder the petitioner has given notice to deposit rent in respect of the shop allotted in his favor within 15 days, or else, it has been stated inter alia that proceeding shall be initiated for vacation of the shop in question. (ii) For issuance of an appropriate writ/order/direction, including Writ of Certiorari for quashing the order contained in Memo No. 1119(ii) dated 22.11.2012 passed by Sub-Divisional Officer, Simdega, whereby and whereunder rent of shops allotted at Market Complex, Simdega has been increased from Rs. 2/- per sq. ft. to Rs. 10/- per sq. ft. in a most arbitrary manner with effect from November, 2012. (iii) For issuance of a further appropriate writ/order/direction including Writ of Mandamus, directing the Respondents to accept rent from the petitioner @ Rs. 2/- per sq. ft. 2/- per sq. ft. to Rs. 10/- per sq. ft. in a most arbitrary manner with effect from November, 2012. (iii) For issuance of a further appropriate writ/order/direction including Writ of Mandamus, directing the Respondents to accept rent from the petitioner @ Rs. 2/- per sq. ft. in respect of Shop No. 207 situated at Simdega Market Complex which has been allotted to the petitioner by the Respondents-authorities. (iv) For issuance of any other appropriate writ(s)/order(s)/direction(s) as Your Lordships may deem fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case.” Arguments of the Petitioners 6. Counsel for the petitioners submits as under: - (a) In the District of Simdega, pursuant to removal of encroachment drive undertaken by District Administration, several persons were displaced. In order to rehabilitate the displaced persons, the district administration had proposed to construct certain shops in market complex, Simdega which is popularly known as Simdega Market Complex. (b) Earlier the District of Simdega was a part of District of Gumla. Pursuant to aforesaid decision taken by the then Deputy Commissioner, Gumla, applications were invited for allotment of the shops in Simdega Market Complex and the allotment was to be made on monthly rental basis and the rent of the shop was fixed adopting the guidelines issued by the Member, Board of Revenue, Government of Bihar, Patna as contained in Letter No. 17/ xks0 iz0 fu0 l0 1981-82 ( vaa’k )-6612 dated 18.11.1987. (c) For the purposes of allotment of shops to the prospective allottees, depending upon the size of the shop, a condition money, was determined and was to be deposited by the various prospective allottees. The condition money was to be utilized for construction of shops in question. Pursuant to such decision the prospective allottes deposited the condition money which in most of the cases was to the tune of Rs. 32,000/-. In most of the cases the total area of the shop was 120 sq. ft., although in W.P. (C) No. 4708 of 2016, the area of the shop was only 48 sq. ft. (d) Prior to issuance of allotment order, process for rent determination of the rent of the shop had taken place, and a report was also called for. On the basis of such report, and taking into consideration the aforesaid letter of Member, Board of Revenue dated 18.11.1987, a monthly rent in all the cases was fixed @ Rs. ft. (d) Prior to issuance of allotment order, process for rent determination of the rent of the shop had taken place, and a report was also called for. On the basis of such report, and taking into consideration the aforesaid letter of Member, Board of Revenue dated 18.11.1987, a monthly rent in all the cases was fixed @ Rs. 2 per sq. ft. for the allotment of shop. The enquiry report and the order-sheet has been filed along with the writ petition as Annexure-3 in W.P. (C) No. 4703 of 2016. The learned counsel for the petitioners submits that there was a specific column, as to whether the monthly rent in connection with the allotted shops is to be revised or not, and against this column, it was simply mentioned that the allotment is to be renewed every year. The counsel submits that a public notice was issued by the Office of Sub-Divisional Officer, Simdega, wherein detailed conditions governing the allotment was prescribed which has been annexed as Annexure-4 in W.P. (C) 4708 of 2016. By referring to Annexure-4 of W.P. (C) No. 4708 of 2016, the learned counsel has drawn the attention of this Court to clause 2, wherein it has been mentioned that the allotment will be valid till it is cancelled by the competent authority i.e. Sub-Divisional Officer. It was categorically mentioned that the allotment of shop would be governed by the provisions of Bihar Government Premises Act, 1956. It was also categorically mentioned that the amount deposited towards condition money will be adjusted against the monthly rent and after the entire adjustment is completed, the rent would be realized from the shop owners by issuing rent receipt. He further submits that in the said notice, it was also mentioned that a Model Draft Agreement was prepared by the respondent authority and the agreement was to be entered into between the allottees and the Circle Officer, Simdega. (e) A copy of the agreement, which was in similar lines for all the shops, is annexed as Annexure-6 in W.P. (C) No. 4703 of 2016, entered into between the allottees and Circle Officer, Simdega. (f) Counsel for the petitioners by referring to Annexure-2, which is letter of allotment, submits that even in this letter of allotment, the rate of rent has been prescribed at Rs. 2 per sq. ft. and there is no provision for revision of rent. (f) Counsel for the petitioners by referring to Annexure-2, which is letter of allotment, submits that even in this letter of allotment, the rate of rent has been prescribed at Rs. 2 per sq. ft. and there is no provision for revision of rent. He further submits that even as per the agreement which was entered into between the allottees and the respondent, there was no provision for revision of rent. The counsel accordingly submits that, as there was no provision for revision of rent, the allotment was to continue till cancellation by the Sub-Divisional Officer. Admittedly, there has been no cancellation of allotment, therefore, there was no occasion for the respondents to increase the rent, as has been done in the instant case. (g) The learned counsel has also submitted that the rent was itself fixed on the basis of a letter issued by Member, Board of Revenue dated 18.11.1987, wherein rate of such kind of allotment was fixed @ Rs. 2 per sq. ft., but there has been no subsequent revision of rent by the Member, Board of Revenue and under such circumstances, the respondents could not have unilaterally revised the rent without there being a corresponding revision of rent by the Member, Board of Revenue. (h) Counsel for the petitioner submits that the Member, Board of Revenue, was made a party in this writ petition and in spite of order passed by this Court, no specific reply has been filed by the Member, Board of Revenue. (i) The learned counsel submits that the Circle Officer as well as the Sub-Divisional Officer, Simdega had suddenly stopped accepting rent from the allottees from November 2012 on the pretext that the monthly rent of the shop has been enhanced from Rs. 2 per sq. ft. to Rs. 10 per sq. ft. The learned counsel submits that allottees were not communicated about the decision of the respondent authority in respect of enhancement of rent and the rent being offered by the petitioners @ Rs. 2 per sq. ft., was not accepted by the Circle Officer/Sub-Divisional Officer, Simdega and that the petitioners were all along ready and willing to pay the monthly rent of the shop @ Rs. 2 per sq. ft. He further submits that on the one hand the respondents stopped accepting the rent @ Rs. 2 per sq. ft. 2 per sq. ft., was not accepted by the Circle Officer/Sub-Divisional Officer, Simdega and that the petitioners were all along ready and willing to pay the monthly rent of the shop @ Rs. 2 per sq. ft. He further submits that on the one hand the respondents stopped accepting the rent @ Rs. 2 per sq. ft. from November 2012 and on the other hand vide notice contained in Memo No. 1172 (ii) dated 13.07.2016, the allottees have been directed to deposit the revised rent within a period of 15 days for the respective shops. It was also mentioned that if the amount is not deposited, then proceeding for vacating the shop in question would be undertaken against the petitioners. He submits that the notice as contained in Memo No. 1172(ii) dated 13.07.2016 as well as the decision contained in Memo No. 1119(ii) dated 22.11.2012 passed by Sub-Divisional Officer, Simdega are under challenge in this writ petition. These two communications are contained in Annexure-5 and 6 respectively of the writ petition (W.P. (C) No. 4708 of 2016). (j) Learned Counsel for the petitioners submits that there has been unilateral revision of rent by the concerned respondent from Rs. 2 per sq. ft. to Rs. 10 per sq. ft. which enhances the rent to the extent of five times i.e. 500%. He submits that as there has been an arbitrary and unilateral enhancement of rent by the concerned respondent, the petitioners had no option, but to challenge the action of the respondents by filing this writ petition as ex-facie the Annexure- 5 and 6 of the writ petition indicates unfair and arbitrary exercise of power and hence violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. He submits that these are the circumstances under which the reasonableness of the action of the respondents, is to be tested in the touchstone of Article 14 of the Constitution of India in spite of the fact that the dispute arises out of landlord tenant relationship between the parties. (k) The learned counsel submits that the petitioners do not have any alternative remedy, in as much as, the provisions of Jharkhand Building (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 2011 is not applicable, to the premises involved in these cases. (k) The learned counsel submits that the petitioners do not have any alternative remedy, in as much as, the provisions of Jharkhand Building (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 2011 is not applicable, to the premises involved in these cases. The premises involved in these cases are government premises and there is an exclusion clause under Section 3 of the said Act of 2011 indicating that the said Act of 2011 is not applicable to government premises. He has further submitted that not only the enhancement of rent is unilateral, arbitrary and excessive, but the same is without any reason and the respondents have not brought on record any reason for the purposes of enhancement of rent, particularly when there was no clause for enhancement of rent as per the agreement itself. (l) The learned counsel has referred to three judgments passed by Hon’ble Supreme Court reported in (1999) 7 SCC 89 (style (dress land) vs. union territory, Chandigarh and another) Para 10 and 12; (2004) 3 SCC 214 (Jamshed Hormusji Wadia vs. Board of Trustees, port of mumbai and another) Para 13, 14, 16 to 19 and (2011) 13 SCC 446 (Banatwala and Company vs. Life Insurance Corporation of India and another) Para 63 to 70 to submit that the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that in such circumstances, a writ petition is to be entertained to examine the action of the respondents in the touchstone of Article 14 of the Constitution of India even in contractual matters. (m) The learned counsel has also referred to the order passed by this Court on 05.09.2016 and submits that at the stage of entertaining this writ petition, an elaborate order was passed and considering the submissions of the parties the petitioners were directed to deposit the arrear of rent from November 2012 @ Rs. 4/- per sq. ft. till the date of the order i.e. 05.09.2016 within a period of six weeks from that date without prejudice to their rights and the parties were directed to make endeavor to arrive at a negotiated settlement of the dispute relating to enhancement of rent within a period of eight weeks from that date. It was also observed that the petitioners on being called by the Competent Authority/Simdega Municipal Council, shall participate in such exercise jointly. It was also observed that the petitioners on being called by the Competent Authority/Simdega Municipal Council, shall participate in such exercise jointly. The counsel submits that pursuant to the interim order passed by this Court, all the petitioners in these cases deposited the rent @ Rs. 4/- per sq. ft. from November 2012 till the date of the order i.e. 05.09.2016 and have made all endeavors to enter into to settlement of the dispute through negotiation. (n) The learned counsel has also referred to the supplementary affidavit filed on behalf of the petitioner in W.P. (C) 4708 of 2016 and has submitted that an offer was made by the petitioner to settle the rent @ Rs. 4/- per sq. ft. and an offer was also made by the respondents to settle the rent @ Rs. 7/- per sq. ft., but no agreement could be arrived at between the parties and ultimately the matter has not been settled. He also submits that in order to show their bona fide, the petitioners have also offered that the rent may be enhanced and increased at periodic interval at a particular rate, although there is no such stipulation in the agreement so far as the enhancement of rent is concerned. (o) Again, by referring to the supplementary affidavit, the learned counsel has also submitted that by way of illustration, a few other government premises and other premises were referred to demonstrate that the enhancement of rent in the instant cases is exorbitant and ex facie arbitrary, illegal and also an abuse of power which calls for interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India as the action of the respondents is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Arguments of the Respondents 7. Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents, submits as under: - A. The entire property which is involved in this case, is now vested with the Simdega Municipality in view of the provisions of Section 126 (c) of the Jharkhand Municipal Act, 2011 and accordingly, the State or the Member, Board of Revenue has nothing much to do in the matter of fixation or revision of rent. B. He has raised a serious objection regarding the maintainability of the instant writ petition. B. He has raised a serious objection regarding the maintainability of the instant writ petition. It is submitted that the contract involved in this case, is a non-statutory contract involving dispute between landlord and tenant which cannot be adjudicated under writ jurisdiction, as they require detail evidence, both oral and documentary. C. He further submits that the matter relates to enhancement of rent and the rent which was fixed at the time of allotment was by referring to a letter issued by Member, Board of Revenue, Government of Bihar, Patna dated 18.11.1987. He submits that merely because a reference was made to the said letter dated 18.11.1987 at the time of fixation of rent, the same does not mean that the rent, is to be guided by the various circulars issues by the Member, Board of Revenue. D. He submits that as per the notice which is contained in Annexure-4 to the writ petition, it is clear that the agreement was to be entered into for a period of one year and was to be renewed every year. It was also indicated that at the time of renewal, the up to date rate of rent was to be realized and the renewal itself was subject to fulfilling the terms and conditions of the agreement. He further submits that it was clearly contemplated in the general notice which was issued to the public that the agreement would be renewed and the same would be subject of revision of rent. E. Learned Counsel for the respondents submits that pursuant to aforesaid notice, the agreement was entered into between the parties. Although there was no stipulation regarding revision of rent from time to time, but the same agreement has to be read along with the general notice and merely because there is no stipulation regarding revision of rent, that does not debar the respondents from revising the rate from time to time. He further submits that in the instant cases the agreement was not renewed even once and accordingly the petitioners herein cannot be said to be the authorized occupant of the premises and they had enjoyed the premises without complying with the condition of the general notice. He further submits that in the instant cases the agreement was not renewed even once and accordingly the petitioners herein cannot be said to be the authorized occupant of the premises and they had enjoyed the premises without complying with the condition of the general notice. F. He further submits that although the provisions of Jharkhand Building (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 2011 does not apply, but at the same time the disputed questions of fact cannot be decided under writ jurisdiction. He submits that certainly the petitioners can file a suit for redressal of their grievances. The counsel submits that the action of the petitioners is not bona fide, in as much as, the petitioners were aware about enhancement of rent as back as in the year 2012, but they have filed the writ petition only in the year 2016 and remained defaulter from 2012 to 2016 without any proper explanation, in as much as, there is no material on record to suggest that the petitioners have ever approached the respondents for the purposes of tendering the rent. G. The petitioners have not annexed any letter or any representation or any cheque issued in the name of the respondent authority showing tendering of rent. Accordingly, he submits that no relief can be granted to the petitioners under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. H. Counsel for the respondents further submits that the agreement having expired and not renewed, the petitioners do not have any legal right to continue with the premises and accordingly the question of any adjudication upon the rent, cannot be undertaken by this Court. I. He also submits that there is no element of any discrimination against the petitioners vis-à-vis any other person and accordingly, in absence of any such allegation by the petitioners, the writ petition itself is not maintainable, as all the petitioners have been treated equally. J. He refers to Annexure-B to the counter affidavit dated 22.04.2019 filed in W.P. (C) No. 4708 of 2016 to submit that the reason of enhancement of rent is increase in the cost of living. He submits that the rate of rent was fixed on the basis of rate mentioned in the letter of the year 1987 and in the meantime, there has been much increase in the wholesale price index. He submits that the rate of rent was fixed on the basis of rate mentioned in the letter of the year 1987 and in the meantime, there has been much increase in the wholesale price index. K. He also submits that the landlord is under a legal obligation to maintain the premises with all its amenities etc. and in order to fulfil such obligation, the enhancement of rent is an integral part of all the tenancies including those which are being let out by the Government. L. He also submits that in compliance of the order passed by this Court, the respondents have fully cooperated and a meeting was convened and during the meeting the respondents had made an offer of rate of Rs. 7/- per sq. ft. which was not acceptable to the petitioners and ultimately, the matter could not be settled out of the Court. M. The learned Counsel for the respondents further submits that it has been recorded in the order dated 05.09.2006 that in some of the writ petitions such as W.P. (C) No. 4763 of 2016, the petitioner is not the original allottee, rather claims to have purchases the shop from the original allottee. He submits that vide order dated 05.09.2006, an attempt was made by this Court to amicably resolve the dispute amongst the parties and nothing more and it cannot be said that the writ petitions are maintainable. Rejoinder by the counsel for the petitioners 8. In response, counsel for the petitioners has referred to judgment passed by Hon’ble Supreme Court reported in 2017 SCC OnLine SC 1829 (Indian Explosives Ltd. and Another vs. Coal India Ltd. and Others) and has referred to Para 6 thereof to submit that the terms and conditions of the agreement cannot be changed unilaterally and that the State cannot be expected to conduct its affairs, even in commercial matters, in a manner which do not satisfy the mandate of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. He submits that merely because there is no discrimination, the same does not mean that the action of the respondents-State cannot be arbitrary. The mere fact that there has been an enhancement of rent to the extent of 5 times i.e. 500% without any justification and without any reason, itself indicates arbitrary exercise of power at the hand of the respondents. The mere fact that there has been an enhancement of rent to the extent of 5 times i.e. 500% without any justification and without any reason, itself indicates arbitrary exercise of power at the hand of the respondents. He has also relied upon judgment passed by Hon’ble Supreme Court reported in (2008) 2 SCC 672 (Delhi development authority and another vs. Joint Action Committee Allottee of SFS flats and others) and has referred to para 12, 25, 26, 43, 62, 66, 80, 81 and 87 to submit that unilateral change in terms and conditions of contract is not permissible in law. 9. The counsel for the petitioner submits that the contention of the respondents that as there has been no renewal of the agreement, there is no relationship of landlord and tenant, is also falsified by the fact that it is the respondents who are demanding rent from the petitioners, though at the enhanced rate. He further submits that merely because the agreement has not been renewed, the parties have not joined issues on such point and the cause of action for filing these writ petitions, is unilateral enhancement of rent only. He submits that the sole reason for the enhancement of rent is contained in Para-11 of the counter affidavit to show that price index and inflation have increased in many folds since 1987/1995 and it is the rate fixed in the year 1987, which is to be revised. He further submits that this ground cannot be a reason for enhancement of rent. Findings of this Court 10. After hearing the counsel for the parties and after considering the materials on record, this Court finds as follows: - The main issues to be decided in the present case is whether there could be any enhancement of rent in absence of any such clause in the agreement? Whether there has been arbitrary exercise of power by the respondents while enhancing the rent by 5 times i.e. 500%, so as to attract violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India and call for any interference in writ jurisdiction? AND In case this court does not find the action of the respondents arbitrary and unfair, what is the appropriate remedy available to the petitioners? I. In the present District of Simdega, pursuant to removal of encroachment drive undertaken by District Administration, several persons were displaced. AND In case this court does not find the action of the respondents arbitrary and unfair, what is the appropriate remedy available to the petitioners? I. In the present District of Simdega, pursuant to removal of encroachment drive undertaken by District Administration, several persons were displaced. In order to rehabilitate the displayed persons, the District Administration had proposed to construct certain shops in market complex, Simdega and the same were to be allotted to the various displaced persons on monthly rental basis. One of the conditions which was imposed for the purposes of allotment of shop was that certain “condition money” was to be deposited by the displaced persons, depending upon the size of the shop, and the said condition money was to be utilized for the purposes of construction of shopping complex. Further, the condition money was to be adjusted against the monthly rent of the various shops. II. It is not in dispute that the displaced persons had applied for allotment of shops pursuant to public notice and had deposited the condition money. The public notice was issued by the Office of Sub-Divisional Officer, Simdega, wherein detailed conditions governing the allotment, were prescribed. The notice was in Memo No. 412 (II) dated 01.07.1995 and has been annexed with the writ petition being W.P. (C) No. 4708 of 2016. As per the public notice, it was clearly indicated that the allotment of shop was to be guided by letter No. 6612 dated 18.11.1987 as well as letter No. 1437 dated 30.12.1994 issued by the Member, Board of Revenue, Bihar, Patna and the Deputy Commissioner, Gumla respectively. Further the allotment of shop was to be done by the Sub-Divisional Officer, Simdega under the provisions of Bihar Government Premises Act, 1956. The allotment was to continue till its cancellation by the competent authority i.e. the Sub-Divisional Officer, Simdega. It was also indicated that the process of cancellation of allotment will be the same as provided under the Bihar Government Premises Act, 1956 by filing eviction case before the competent authority. The amount already deposited by the shop owners, was to be adjusted against the rent on yearly basis. It was also indicated that after the allotment, the records of allotment will be handed over to the Circle Officer and thereafter the allottee was required to enter into an agreement in the prescribed form. The amount already deposited by the shop owners, was to be adjusted against the rent on yearly basis. It was also indicated that after the allotment, the records of allotment will be handed over to the Circle Officer and thereafter the allottee was required to enter into an agreement in the prescribed form. The first agreement was to be made on 31.03.1996, which was required to be renewed every year and for this purpose, time of three months was granted to the shop allottees. The agreement was to be executed every year and the Circle Officer was to represent the Government. The renewal of the agreement was also made subject to the condition that the allottees continues to abide by the terms and conditions of the agreement. The Circle Officer was competent to renew the agreement at current rate of rent. III. It further appears that the allottees entered into an agreement and the Model Draft Agreement is annexed with the writ petition being W.P. (C) No. 4703 of 2016, wherein it was clearly mentioned that the Circle Officer would enter into an agreement for on behalf of the Government and that the condition money will be adjustable towards the monthly rent. It was further mentioned in the agreement that the provisions of Bihar Government Premises Act, 1956, would be applicable. As per clause-4 of the agreement, it was stipulated that the agreement will be in force for a period of one year commencing from the date of occupation of the premises and tenant was also at liberty to take the facilities of electricity and water connection. It is not in dispute that the rent was fixed @ Rs. 2 per sq. ft. as per the aforesaid letter issued by the Member, Board of Revenue dated 18.11.1987. This Court also finds that this letter dated 18.11.1987 has been mentioned in the general notice issued by the respondents. The public notice refers to one more letter, bearing letter no. 1437 dated 30.12.1994, issued by the Deputy Commissioner, Gumla, but the said letter is not on record. IV. This Court also finds that this letter dated 18.11.1987 has been mentioned in the general notice issued by the respondents. The public notice refers to one more letter, bearing letter no. 1437 dated 30.12.1994, issued by the Deputy Commissioner, Gumla, but the said letter is not on record. IV. This Court further finds that so far as the letter dated 18.11.1987 is concerned, the same has been annexed with the writ petition being W.P. (C) No. 4703 of 2016, which is quoted as follows: - ^^fo"k;& vfrdze.k gVkvksa vfHk;ku ds vUrxZr fufeZr NksVh&NksVh nqdkuksa ds fdjk;k fu/kkZj.k ds lEcU/k esaA mi;qZDr fo"k; ds lEcU/k esa dguk gS fd vfrØe.k gVkvks vfHk;ku ds vUrxZr fofHkUu LFkyksa ij tks nqdkusa foLFkkfirksa dks iquZLFkkfir djus gsrq fuekZ.k dh x;h gS] mlds fdjk;k ds lEcU/k esa i"kZn ds fnukad 19&10&87 dh cSBd esa ;g fu.kZ; fy;k x;k gS fd nqdkuksa ds fdjk;s dk nj 2@& :Ik;s izfr oxZQqV tks fnukad 1-6-84 ls fu/kkZfjr fd;k x;k Fkk] mls la'kksf/kr djrs gq, funs'kd&e.My }kjk ;g vkns'k fn;k x;k gS fd nqdku n[ky dh frfFk ls gh fdjk;k dk ;g nj izHkkfor gksxkA vr% mi;qZDr fu.kZ; ds vkyksd esa vkidks vkns'k fn;k tkrk gS fd lHkh nqdku vkoafV;ksa ls muds n[ky dh frfFk ls gh mDr nj ij fdjk;k dh olwyh dh tk;s rFkk vuqikyu izfrosnu Ik"kZn dks Hkh Hkstk tk;A ^^i=kad 17@xks0 iz0 fu0 la0@1981&82 ¼va'k½&6612] fnukad 18&11&1987½ V. From perusal of this letter dated 18.11.1987, it appears that the rate of rent, for the purposes of rehabilitation of displaced persons, was fixed in the decision of the Board of Revenue dated 01.06.1984, wherein it was decided to fix the rent @ Rs. 2 per sq. ft. and the said decision dated 01.06.1984 was modified/amended by the letter dated 18.11.1987, by indicating that the rent would be payable from the date when the possession of the shop is handed over to the allottee of the shop. VI. This Court finds that the said decision dated 01.06.1984, wherein the rate of rent was fixed @ Rs. 2 per sq. ft., is not on record. Accordingly, it is not clear from the records, as to whether the original decision dated 01.06.1984, by which the rate for rent was fixed at Rs. 2 per sq. ft. provided for any revision of rate. VII. 2 per sq. ft., is not on record. Accordingly, it is not clear from the records, as to whether the original decision dated 01.06.1984, by which the rate for rent was fixed at Rs. 2 per sq. ft. provided for any revision of rate. VII. Another document which has been brought on record by the petitioners is the enquiry report submitted by the official of the respondents with respect to determination of monthly rent which is annexed with W.P. (C) 4703 of 2016. From perusal of this document, it appears that at the stage of fixation of rent also the rate was fixed at Rs. 2 per sq. ft. by referring to the letter dated 18.11.1987 and there was a column, which indicates that the rent would be fixed on yearly basis. It is apparent from the said document that a query was made in the background in the same column, as to whether there would be a provision for renewal, and against this query, it was indicated that there should be provision for renewal every year. VIII. Upon conjoint reading of the aforesaid documents, i.e. general notice, enquiry report regarding fixation of rent, the agreement and the decision of Board of Revenue contained in letter dated 18.11.1987 (which refers to fixation of rate in the year 1984), it is clear that the shops were allotted at the monthly rent of Rs. 2 per sq. ft., the condition money was adjustable against future rent and the agreement was to be renewed every year and the rent was to be paid at the current rate, to be determined, at the stage of renewal of agreement by the Circle Officer. IX. This Court finds that it is not in dispute that the agreement which was entered into between the various allottees and the respondents, was never renewed. However, the allottees continued to pay rent @ Rs. 2 per sq. ft. till the year 2012 and in the meantime Jharkhand Municipal Act, 2011 came into force and as per the provisions of the Said Act of 2011 Simdega Municipality has management and control over the building complex in which the concerned shops are situated. There is no dispute that this rent is a source of revenue for the municipality who are discharging various functions under the Jharkhand Municipal Act, 2011. There is no dispute that this rent is a source of revenue for the municipality who are discharging various functions under the Jharkhand Municipal Act, 2011. This Court further finds that vide Memo dated 22.11.2012, the rate of rent was increased from Rs. 2 per sq. ft. to Rs. 10 per sq. ft. with effect from November, 2012 and this decision was taken in the meeting of the respondents held on 30.08.2012. The Memo dated 22.11.2012 was issued by the Office of Sub-Divisional Officer, Simdega (Revenue Division). X. This Court finds that the property involved in these cases has been transferred to the Municipal Corporation by virtue of a decision taken by the State Government under the provisions of Government Municipal Act, 2011. Such decision has been annexed as Annexure-C to the counter affidavit dated 22.04.2019. XI. The arguments of the counsel for the petitioners that there has been unilateral change in the terms of the agreement, in as much as, rent has been unilaterally enhanced although there is no clause in the agreement for enhancement of rent, is devoid of any merit, as in the instant case, the agreement was only for a period of one year and as per the general notice, the agreement was to be renewed every year and the rent was to be fixed at the current rate every year, to be determined at the stage of renewal of agreement by the Circle Officer. Admittedly, the agreement was never renewed and accordingly the current rate of rent was also not fixed every year and the allottees continued to be in possession of the shop even after expiry of the initial period of agreement. It is important to note that in some of the writ petitions the shop is in occupation of such petitioners, who are not the allottees of the concerned shop. The counsel for the petitioners has relied upon the judgments passed by the Hon’ble Supreme court in the case reported in 2017 SCC OnLine SC 1829 (Indian Explosives Ltd. and Another vs. Coal India Ltd. and Others) and (2008) 2 SCC 672 (Delhi development authority and another vs. joint action committee allottee of SFS flats and others) to submit that there cannot be unilateral change in the terms of contract by way of enhancement of rent. The ratio of these judgments do not apply to the facts and circumstances of this case. The ratio of these judgments do not apply to the facts and circumstances of this case. In the instant case, the agreement was only for a period of one year and was to be renewed every year and the rent was to be fixed at the current rate every year, to be determined at the stage of renewal of agreement by the Circle Officer. The respondents were entitled to revise the rent every year, but the same was not done for years together for the reasons best known to the respondents and it appears that such exercise of revision of rent, was undertaken in the year 2012 which resulted in issuance of the impugned decision of enhancement of rent. XII. In the aforesaid factual background and the analysis of the aforesaid materials on record, the arguments of the learned counsel for the petitioners that there cannot be any enhancement of rent in absence of any such clause in the agreement, is hereby rejected. The agreement itself was to be renewed every year and the rent was to be fixed at the current rate every year, to be determined at the stage of renewal of agreement by the Circle Officer. Admittedly the agreement was never renewed for years together. XIII. Having held as aforesaid, this Court has been further called upon to examine the enhancement of rent on the touch stone of Article 14 of the Constitution. This Court is of the considered view that even in the matters of contract, the State has to act fairly and not arbitrarily so as to satisfy the requirements of Article 14 of the Constitution of India, although the scope of interfered in contractual matters is very limited. XIV. This Court further finds that admittedly the agreement was entered into between the parties as back as in the year 1996 for a period of one year which itself was fixed on the basis of the decision of Board of Revenue contained in letter dated 18.11.1987 (which refers to fixation of rate of rent in the year 1984) and the rent was never revised, as the agreement itself was never renewed from year to year. The enhancement of rent by 5 times i.e. 500% in the year 2012, cannot be said to whimsical or arbitrary or unfair as there are valid and discernible reasons for such enhancement of rent. The enhancement of rent by 5 times i.e. 500% in the year 2012, cannot be said to whimsical or arbitrary or unfair as there are valid and discernible reasons for such enhancement of rent. The decision to enhance the rent has been filed by way of counter affidavit which clearly indicates that it has been done taking into consideration that the rent was fixed long back, which was never revised and the cost have gone up. XV. There is no dispute that even where the landlord is Government or its instrumentality, they are under legal obligation to maintain the building let out to the tenants and such cost of maintenance has to come from realization of rent. Further there is no dispute that the cost including maintenance of building has increased many folds over the years. The decision to enhance the rent, which has been filed by the respondents in the counter affidavit, clearly mentions that the rent has been enhanced on account of increase in cost. Accordingly, this Court finds that there are sound reasons to increase the rent, which in the considered view of this Court, is neither unfair nor arbitrary nor unreasonable. XVI. In the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court reported in (2004) 3 SCC 214 , it has been held that that even in contractual field the State has to be just, fair and reasonable and even while playing the role of a landlord or a tenant the State and its authorities cannot be seen causing displeasure or discomfort to Article 14 of the Constitution of India. XVII. In the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court reported in (2004) 3 SCC 214 , the Hon’ble Court has also considered the fact that several rent legislation were enacted all over the country due to post world war scarcity of accommodation and often the legislations exempt their applicability to properties owned and controlled by Government with the hope and trust that the Government would not act unreasonably and arbitrarily and would act in public interest and for public purpose. It was also held that a balance has to be struck between ensuring a fair return on investment and charging exorbitant rent. It has been held in Para 18 and 19 of the aforesaid judgment as follows: - “18. It was also held that a balance has to be struck between ensuring a fair return on investment and charging exorbitant rent. It has been held in Para 18 and 19 of the aforesaid judgment as follows: - “18. In our opinion, in the field of contracts the State and its instrumentalities ought to so design their activities as would ensure fair competition and non-discrimination. They can augment their resources but the object should be to serve the public cause and to do public good by resorting to fair and reasonable methods. The State and its instrumentalities, as the landlords, have the liberty of revising the rates of rent so as to compensate themselves against loss caused by inflationary tendencies. They can - and rather must - also save themselves from negative balances caused by the cost of maintenance, payment of taxes and costs of administration. The State, as the landlord, need not necessarily be a benevolent and good charitable Samaritan. The felt need for expanding or stimulating its own activities or other activities in the public interest having once arisen, the State need not hold its hands from seeking eviction of its lessees. However, the State cannot be seen to be indulging in rack-renting, profiteering and indulging in whimsical or unreasonable evictions or bargains. 19. A balance has to be struck between the two extremes. Having been exempted from the operation of rent control legislation, the courts cannot hold them tied to the same shackles from which the State and its instrumentalities have been freed by the legislature in their wisdom and thereby requiring them to be ruled indirectly or by analogy by the same law from which they are exempt. Otherwise, it would tantamount to defeating the exemption clause consciously enacted by the legislature. At the same time the liberty given to the State and its instrumentalities by the statute enacted under the Constitution does not exempt them from honouring the Constitution itself. They continue to be ruled by Article 14. The validity of their actions in the field of landlord-tenant relationship is available to be tested not under the rent control legislation but under the Constitution. The rent control legislations are temporary, if not seasonal; the Constitution is permanent and an all-time law.” XVIII. They continue to be ruled by Article 14. The validity of their actions in the field of landlord-tenant relationship is available to be tested not under the rent control legislation but under the Constitution. The rent control legislations are temporary, if not seasonal; the Constitution is permanent and an all-time law.” XVIII. Similar view has been taken by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the Judgment reported in (1999) 7 SCC 89 at Para 10 which is quoted as under: - “10. In the absence of the rules, the action of the respondents regarding imposition of the terms and conditions of the lease including the enhancement of rent is required to be fair and reasonable and not actuated by considerations which could be termed as arbitrary or discriminatory. The Government cannot act like a private individual in imposing the conditions solely with the object of extracting profits from its lessees. Governmental actions are required to be based on standards which are not arbitrary or unauthorised. This Court………………” XIX. In Para-21 to 25 of the judgment reported in (1989) 3 SCC 293 , it has been clearly held as follows: “21. We are unable to accept the submissions. Being a public body even in respect of its dealing with its tenant, it must act in public interest, and an infraction of that duty is amenable to examination either in civil suit or in writ jurisdiction. 22. Our attention was drawn to the observations of this Court in Radhakrishna Agarwal v. State of Bihar. Reliance was also placed on the observations of this Court in Life Insurance Corpn. of India v. Escorts Ltd., in support of the contention that the public corporations dealing with tenants is a contractual dealing and it is not a matter for public law domain and is not subject to judicial review. However, it is not the correct position. The Escorts decision reiterated that every action of the State or as instrumentality of the State, must be informed by reason. Indubitably, the respondent is an organ of the State under Article 12 of the Constitution. In appropriate cases, as was observed in the last mentioned decision, actions uninformed by reason may be questioned as arbitrary in proceedings under Article 226 or Article 32 of the Constitution. Indubitably, the respondent is an organ of the State under Article 12 of the Constitution. In appropriate cases, as was observed in the last mentioned decision, actions uninformed by reason may be questioned as arbitrary in proceedings under Article 226 or Article 32 of the Constitution. But it has to be remembered that Article 14 cannot be construed as a charter for judicial review of State action, to call upon the State to account for its actions in its manifold activities by stating reasons for such actions. 23. The contractual privileges are made immune from the protection of the Rent Act for the respondent because of the public position occupied by the respondent authority. Hence, its actions are amenable to judicial review only to the extent that the State must act validly for a discernible reason not whimsically for any ulterior purpose. Where any special right or privilege is granted to any public or statutory body on the presumption that it must act in certain manner, such bodies must make good such presumption while acting by virtue of such privileges. Judicial review to oversee if such bodies are so acting is permissible. 24. The field of letting and eviction of tenants is normally governed by the Rent Act. The Port Trust is statutorily exempted from the operation of the Rent Act on the basis of its public/governmental character. The legislative assumption or expectation as noted in the observations of Chagla, C.J. in Rampratap Jaidayal case cannot make such conduct a matter of contract pure and simple. These corporations must act in accordance with certain constitutional conscience and whether they have so acted, must be discernible from the conduct of such corporations. In this connection, reference may be made on the observations of this Court in Som Prakash Rekhi v. Union of India, reiterated in M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, wherein at p. 148 this Court observed: (SCC p. 480, para 55) “It is dangerous to exonerate corporations from the need to have constitutional conscience; and so, that interpretation, language permitting, which makes governmental agencies, whatever their mien, amenable to constitutional limitations must be adopted by the court as against the alternative of permitting them to flourish as an imperium in imperio.” 25. Therefore, Mr Chinai was right in contending that every action/activity of the Bombay Port Trust which constituted “State” within Article 12 of the Constitution in respect of any right conferred or privilege granted by any statute is subject to Article 14 and must be reasonable and taken only upon lawful and relevant grounds of public interest. Reliance may be placed on the observations of this Court in E.P. Royappa v. State of T.N., Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, R.D. Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India, Kasturi Lal Lakshmi Reddy v. State of J&K and Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi. Where there is arbitrariness in State action, Article 14 springs in and judicial review strikes such an action down. Every action of the executive authority must be subject to rule of law and must be informed by reason. So, whatever be the activity of the public authority, it should meet the test of Article 14. The observations in paras 101 and 102 of the Escorts case read properly do not detract from the aforesaid principles.” XX. Considering the ratio of the aforesaid judgments, this Court does not agree with the submission of the petitioners that the action of the respondents in taking steps for increasing the rent of the premises by five times, under the facts and circumstances of this case, is unfair or unreasonable or an arbitrary exercise of power so as to attract Article 14 of the Constitution of India. A balance has to be struck between ensuring a fair return on investment and charging exorbitant rent. There is no doubt that the State has to be reasonable and fair even in the matter of landlord-tenant relationship under the contract. But considering the facts and circumstances of this case, the impugned action of the State is neither unfair nor unreasonable and arguments of the petitioners alleging unfair and arbitrary exercise of power by the respondents so as to attract Article 14 of the Constitution of India, are hereby rejected. It is neither the case of the petitioners nor it could have been their case that the enhancement of rent by itself is against any public interest or against any public policy. XXI. It is neither the case of the petitioners nor it could have been their case that the enhancement of rent by itself is against any public interest or against any public policy. XXI. The petitioners have tried to show rent in connection with certain other premises to suggest arbitrary exercise of power by the respondents, but it is neither possible nor desirable for this court to enter into such investigation in writ jurisdiction as the matter regarding fixation of fair rent/standard rent requires not only documentary evidence, but also oral evidence which cannot be appreciated in writ jurisdiction. XXII. This Court finds that the provisions of Jharkhand Building (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 2011 deals with the subject of regulation of rent in Section 6 to 15. Section 8 thereof deals with enhancement of rent and clearly provides that notwithstanding anything contained in agreement or law to the contrary, it shall not be lawful for any landlord to increase or claim any increase in the rent except in accordance with the provision of the said Act. Section 9 thereof deals with the concept of standard rent. Section 10 thereof deals with other charges payable besides the rent relating to amenities, maintenance, charge and property tax and the tenant is made responsible for payment of electricity and water charges payable for the building. Section 11 thereof deals with enhancement of rent and it clearly provides that the standard rent fix for any building shall be enhanced every year at 75% of annual inflation rate based on wholesale price index in the case of residential building and 100% of such rate in the case of non-residential building. Section 12 of the said Act deals with the power of controller to fix the standard rent. XXIII. Counsel for the petitioners has raised a specific plea that the provisions of Jharkhand Building (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 2011 does not apply to the Government premises and accordingly the petitioners have no alternative remedy than to move this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India against the arbitrary exercise of power by the respondents. He has referred to Section 3 of the aforesaid Act of 2011 and has submitted that there is a mandate that the provisions of the aforesaid Act of 2011 will not apply to the Government premises. He has referred to Section 3 of the aforesaid Act of 2011 and has submitted that there is a mandate that the provisions of the aforesaid Act of 2011 will not apply to the Government premises. It is to be noted that even the respondents during the course of argument have clearly stated that the petitioners cannot have a remedy before the authorities under the provisions of Jharkhand Building (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 2011 in view of the specific bar under Section 3 of the aforesaid Act of 2011 in connection with Government premises. Accordingly, this Court finds that it is the case of both the parties that the petitioners cannot not have their remedy regarding fixation of standard rent/ fair rent under the provisions of Jharkhand Building (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 2011. However, the counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents has still raised a plea that the remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, is not available to the petitioners, in as much as, they have efficacious and appropriate remedy before the regular civil court, as the determination of rent itself requires evidence, both oral and documentary, which cannot be gone into in writ jurisdiction. XXIV. The aforesaid view is supported by the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court dealing with the maintainability of the writ petition in the matter of landlord tenant relationship in (2011) 13 SCC 446 (BANATWALA AND COMPANY VS. LIFE INSURANCE CORPORATION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER), it has been held in Para 97 of the said judgment as follows: - “It was submitted on behalf of the respondents that if the appellant or the tenants are aggrieved by the fixation of the rent, their remedy is to invoke the writ jurisdiction of the High Court. In making this submission, the respondents are ignoring that the writ jurisdiction is a discretionary jurisdiction. Besides, normally oral evidence is not recorded while exercising the writ jurisdiction. Although part of the evidence to be examined in the process of rent fixation would be documentary, such as the provisions of the contract between the parties, there would also be many other factors which may require oral evidence, particularly with respect to the comparable properties. An appropriate remedy, forum and procedure are therefore necessary in the interest of fairness and proper adjudication. An appropriate remedy, forum and procedure are therefore necessary in the interest of fairness and proper adjudication. That apart, there is no reason to insist upon such an interpretation which will deny to the tenants of the public premises, a remedy and a forum which are otherwise available to the tenants under the MRC Act.” XXV. In the aforesaid judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court it has been observed that an appropriate remedy, forum and procedure are necessary in the interest of fairness and proper adjudication in the matter of landlord tenant relationship. This Court is of the considered view that such issues regarding landlord tenant relationship arise, not only in the matter of private premises, but also in the matter of Government premises. XXVI. In Para-21 of the judgment reported in (1989) 3 SCC 293 , it has been clearly held as follows: - “………. Being a public body even in respect of its dealing with its tenant, it must act in public interest, and an infraction of that duty is amenable to examination either in civil suit or in writ jurisdiction.” XXVII. Thus, this Court is of the considered view that the point regarding exact determination of fair rent/standard rent cannot be decided in writ proceedings and in view of bar under Section 3 of Jharkhand Building (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 2011, the petitioners cannot be even asked to move before the authorities under the Jharkhand Building (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 2011 for redressal of grievance. In such circumstances, the only remedy available to the petitioners, is to move the competent civil court for the purposes of fixation of rent. XXVIII. This Court is of the considered view that if the petitioners still have any grievance in connection with enhancement of rent when compared to the other premises of similar nature depending on location, facilities, nature of building, condition of building etc. , it is open to the petitioners to raise such grievance in a suit by adducing oral as well as documentary evidences. XXIX. In the judgment passed by Hon’ble Supreme court reported in (2011) 13 SCC 446 (BANATWALA AND COMPANY VS. , it is open to the petitioners to raise such grievance in a suit by adducing oral as well as documentary evidences. XXIX. In the judgment passed by Hon’ble Supreme court reported in (2011) 13 SCC 446 (BANATWALA AND COMPANY VS. LIFE INSURANCE CORPORATION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER) Para 64, the Hon’ble Supreme Court clearly observed that the provision regarding exemption granted to Government from applicability of Rent Control Act was challenged as unreasonable classification hit by Article 14 of the Constitution of India and the same was repelled by holding that the legislature in sense, was not exempting the Government from the operation of the Act in order to permit the Government to do the very thing which the legislature was prohibiting in the case of landlord, who were not local authority/State Government/Central Government. It was also held that there is an underline assumption that the Government would not increase rents and would not eject tenants, unless it was absolutely necessary in public interest and unless a particular building is required for the public purpose. It was held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that all the exercises of discretion of power by public authorities in respect of dealing with tenant, is on the assumption that they would not act as private landlords. XXX. This Court finds that by the coming into force of Jharkhand Building (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 2011, the concept of standard rent has been introduced and it is the authority under the act who has to fix the standard rent, as per the guidelines given in the act itself. The act not only provides fixation of standard rent, but also provides, the other charges, which are payable by the tenant and modalities regarding enhancement of rent. This Court further finds that the broad principles regarding fixation of standard rent what has been prescribed under the provisions of Jharkhand Building (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 2011 would apply for the purposes of fixation of standard rent in the Government premises as well. XXXI. In the judgment passed by Hon’ble Supreme Court reported in (2011) 13 SCC 446 (BANATWALA AND COMPANY VS. XXXI. In the judgment passed by Hon’ble Supreme Court reported in (2011) 13 SCC 446 (BANATWALA AND COMPANY VS. LIFE INSURANCE CORPORATION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has taken note of the bar regarding applicability of rent control act to Government premises and has held that the application regarding fixation of fair rent in connection with the respondent Life Insurance Corporation in the said case would lie under Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has taken into consideration that the Public Premises Act, 1971 did not cover the field of standard rent and restoration of essential supplies and services. Para 97 to 99 of the said judgment is quoted for ready reference: - “97. It was submitted on behalf of the respondents that if the appellant or the tenants are aggrieved by the fixation of the rent, their remedy is to invoke the writ jurisdiction of the High Court. In making this submission, the respondents are ignoring that the writ jurisdiction is a discretionary jurisdiction. Besides, normally oral evidence is not recorded while exercising the writ jurisdiction. Although part of the evidence to be examined in the process of rent fixation would be documentary, such as the provisions of the contract between the parties, there would also be many other factors which may require oral evidence, particularly with respect to the comparable properties. An appropriate remedy, forum and procedure are therefore necessary in the interest of fairness and proper adjudication. That apart, there is no reason to insist upon such an interpretation which will deny to the tenants of the public premises, a remedy and a forum which are otherwise available to the tenants under the MRC Act. 98. In view of what is stated above, the interpretation as canvassed by the respondents will deny the appropriate remedy to the petitioner and the like tenants, to have the rent of their premises being fixed by filing a standard rent application, and also to get the essential services restored in the event of any difficulty. There is no reason to accept any such interpretation because as stated above there is no conflict between the provisions of the MRC Act with those under the Public Premises Act, when it comes to fixation of standard rent and restoring the essential supplies. There is no reason to accept any such interpretation because as stated above there is no conflict between the provisions of the MRC Act with those under the Public Premises Act, when it comes to fixation of standard rent and restoring the essential supplies. Otherwise it will expose the provisions of the Public Premises Act to the vires of unreasonableness also. The interpretation canvassed by the respondents is not in consonance with the welfare State that is contemplated under the Constitution. Accordingly, we hold that the impugned judgment of the learned Single Judge of the Bombay High Court does not lay down the correct position in law. As against that we approve the approach and the interpretation adopted by the Karnataka High Court in Bharath Gold Mines Ltd. 99. In the circumstances, we hold as follows: (a) The provisions of the Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999 with respect to fixation of standard rent for premises, and requiring the landlord not to cut off or withhold essential supply or service, and to restore the same when necessary, are not in conflict with or repugnant to any of the provisions of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971. (b) The provisions of the Public Premises Act, 1971 shall govern the relationship between the public undertakings covered under the Act and their occupants to the extent they provide for eviction of unauthorised occupants from public premises, recovery of arrears of rent or damages for such unauthorised occupation, and other incidental matters specified under the Act. (c) The provisions of the Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999 shall govern the relationship between the public undertakings and their occupants to the extent this Act covers the other aspects of the relationship between the landlord and tenants, not covered under the Public Premises Act, 1971. (d) The application of the appellant and similar applications of the tenants for fixation of standard rent or for restoration of essential supplies and services when necessary, shall be maintainable under the Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999.” XXXII. (d) The application of the appellant and similar applications of the tenants for fixation of standard rent or for restoration of essential supplies and services when necessary, shall be maintainable under the Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999.” XXXII. In the instant case also, as per the agreement, the parties are governed by the Bihar Government Premises (Allotment, Rent, Recovery and Eviction) Act, 1956 [At Present- The Jharkhand Government Premises (Allotment, Rent, Recovery and Eviction Act, 2002] ,and upon perusal of the said act and the rules framed thereunder , it is clear that it also does not cover the field of standard rent and restoration of essential supplies and services. Accordingly the issue in connection with standard rent is not covered by Bihar Government Premises (Allotment, Rent, Recovery and Eviction) Act, 1956 as applicable to the state of Jharkhand. Thus in view of the arguments advanced by the parties and considering the facts and circumstances of this case, the only efficacious remedy for the petitioners is to move the competent court of civil jurisdiction for redressal of their grievances. 11. As a cumulative effect of the aforesaid findings , these writ petitions are disposed of with the observation that if the petitioners still have any grievance in connection with enhancement of rent, when compared to the other premises of similar nature depending on location, facilities, nature of building, condition of building etc., it is open to the petitioners to raise such grievance in a suit and adducing oral as well as documentary evidences, but no relief can be granted in the writ jurisdiction . It has already been held above that the impugned action and order are not hit by Article 14 of the constitution of India. 12. Accordingly, these writ petitions are disposed of. 13. Interim orders, if any, stands vacated. 14. Pending Interlocutory applications, are dismissed as not pressed.