JUDGMENT : Harsha Devani, J. 1. By this petition under article 227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner has challenged the order dated 10.1.2019 passed by the Commercial Court, City Civil Court, Ahmedabad in Commercial Review Application No.1 of 2018 whereby the review application filed by the petitioner has been rejected. 2. The facts stated briefly are that, in connection with certain disputes between the petitioner (original plaintiff) and the respondent, the petitioner instituted a suit being Commercial Civil Suit No.154 of 2017 in the Commercial Court, City Civil Court, Ahmedabad (hereinafter referred to as the “Commercial Court”) established under the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 (hereinafter referred to as “the Commercial Courts Act”). It is the case of the petitioner that it had purchased a chiller plant by placing a purchase order with TRANE India Private Limited. The chiller plant RTWA-215 so installed, had defects in its origin and even the installation thereof was not duly and properly done by the engineers of TRANE. It appears that there were several difficulties in the functioning of the plant on account of improper installation resulting in periodical abrupt shut downs of the plant. Soon after the installation of the chiller plant, the company viz. TRANE India Private Limited merged with Service First Aircon Private Limited which took over all the responsibilities and liabilities of TRANE and subsequently, the name Service First Aircon Private Limited was changed to Ingersoll Rand Climate Solutions Private Limited. According to the petitioner, there were frequent breakdowns and the efficiency of the plant was deteriorating even after incurring huge expenses as advised by the respondent. Moreover, irrespective of charging huge amount for a number of years, when the petitioner asked for detailed explanation about the circumstances, basic reasons for such problems as well as the periodical steps taken to cure the problems that had taken place as well as preventive measures taken by the respondent, for the first time in the year 2007- 2008, the respondent came out with an offer of a Comprehensive Annual Maintenance Contract (CAMC), which would include charges for regular periodical services as well as costs of repairing and spares. It is the case of the petitioner that since it had spent a huge amount and as the respondent had once again assured to put the plant in fully and long lasting working condition with complete efficiency, the petitioner accepted the offer of CAMC. On account of various disputes arising, as according to the petitioner, the respondent failed to perform its obligation of maintaining, repairing the plant and discharging the obligation to the satisfaction of the petitioner even under the CAMC, the petitioner ultimately filed the suit which was registered as Commercial Civil Suit No.154 of 2017 in the Commercial Court, City Civil Court at Ahmedabad praying for a declaration, direction and damages against the respondent. The Commercial Court, however, was of the view that the transaction in question would not fall within the scope and ambit of section 2 of the Commercial Courts Act and, accordingly, called upon the petitioner to justify as to whether the transaction in question would fall within the ambit of a “commercial dispute” as contemplated under section 2(1)(c) of the Commercial Courts Act. 3. After affording the petitioner a reasonable opportunity of hearing, by an order dated 24.8.2017 passed below Exhibit-1, the Commercial Court held that the dispute involved in the present case is not a commercial dispute as contemplated in section 2(1)(c) of the Commercial Courts Act and ordered that the plaint along with the court fee stamp used thereon be returned to the petitioner for presentation before the court having competent jurisdiction to try and entertain the same. 4. Being aggrieved, the petitioner preferred an appeal from order before this court being Appeal from Order No.283 of 2017 which came to be disposed of by a judgment and order dated 5.5.2018 wherein it was recorded thus: “[4.0] After elaborate submissions, Shri Bharda, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the original plaintiff has fairly conceded that before the learned Commercial Court the plaintiff wrongly invoked section 2(1)(c)(vii) and (xii) of the Commercial Courts Act. Shri Bharda, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the original plaintiff has further submitted that according to the original plaintiff the dispute in the suit can be said to be commercial dispute in view of section 2(1)(c)(xviii) of the Commercial Courts Act as the agreement / contract between the original plaintiff and original defendant was with respect to the service and maintenance also and therefore, such a dispute between the original plaintiff and the original defendant would fall under Section 2(1)(c)(xviii) of the Commercial Courts Act. He has fairly conceded that however no proper submissions were made on behalf of the original plaintiff on applicability of section 2(1)(c) (xviii) of the Commercial Courts Act and case on behalf of the original plaintiff that the contract between the original plaintiff and original defendant was also a contract for service and maintenance. Shri Bharda, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the original plaintiff has submitted that therefore, the appellant would like to submit an appropriate application afresh before the learned Commercial Court by way of review application pointing out that the dispute in the suit can be said to be commercial dispute as per clause 2(1)(c) (xviii) of the Commercial Courts Act as the dispute between the original plaintiff and original defendant can be said to be “commercial dispute”. Therefore, Shri Bharda, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the appellant seeks permission to withdraw the present appeal with a liberty to approach the learned Commercial Court with an appropriate application and pray for review and recall of the impugned order. [5.0] Shri Nanavati, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the original defendant has stated at the Bar that he has no objection if the appellant is permitted to withdraw the Appeal From Order with above liberty, however has requested to make suitable observation that this Court has not expressed anything on merits on the aforesaid and all the contentions / defences which may be available to the parties be kept open. [6.0] In view of the above and the request made by Shri Bharda, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the original plaintiff, recorded herein above, present Appeal From Order stands dismissed as withdrawn with above liberty. [6.0] In view of the above and the request made by Shri Bharda, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the original plaintiff, recorded herein above, present Appeal From Order stands dismissed as withdrawn with above liberty. As and when such application is made to reconsider, recall and/or review the impugned order on the grounds set out herein above, the same be considered in accordance with law and on merits for which this Court has not expressed anything on merits in favour of either of the parties.” 5. The petitioner, therefore, filed a review application before the Commercial Court being Commercial Review Application No.1 of 2018 for reconsidering, recalling and or reviewing the order dated 24.8.2017 passed by the Commercial Court. By the impugned order dated 10.1.2019, the Commercial Court rejected the application filed by the petitioner and held that the review application was not maintainable. Being aggrieved, the petitioner has filed the present petition. 6. Mr. Mehul Shah, Senior Advocate, learned counsel with Mr. Zubin Bharda, learned advocate for the petitioner, invited the attention of the court to the provisions of rule 1 of Order XLVII of the First Schedule to the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as “the Code”), to submit that sub-rule (1) thereof, inter alia provides for a review on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record or for any other sufficient reason. It was submitted that in the facts of the present case, the Commercial Court has failed to take into consideration the documents produced in support of the plaint and the specific averments made in the plaint and by absolutely ignoring the averments, has failed to appreciate the same. It was submitted that the petitioner had contended that the dispute in question falls within the ambit of the expression “commercial dispute” as contemplated under sub-clauses (vii), (xviii) and (xxii) of clause (c) of sub-section (1) of section 2 of the Commercial Courts Act. However, insofar as the contention of the petitioner regarding the case falling within the ambit of section 2(1)(c) (xviii), namely, “agreements for sale of goods or provision of services” is concerned, the Commercial Court failed to consider the same. However, insofar as the contention of the petitioner regarding the case falling within the ambit of section 2(1)(c) (xviii), namely, “agreements for sale of goods or provision of services” is concerned, the Commercial Court failed to consider the same. Reference was made to paragraph 28 of the order dated 24.8.2017 passed by the Commercial Court, to point out that the Commercial Court has observed that “Thus, the fingers laid by the learned Advocate for the plaintiff in the aforesaid provisions, more particularly while referring to Section 2(1)(c)(xviii) of the Commercial Courts Act which pertains to sale of goods or provision of services, while considering the case on hand, it is not the case of the plaintiff which can be carved out so as to fall under the sale of goods or even the provision of services supposed to have been provided with regard to the product and property in question said to have been used exclusively in trade or commerce”. It was submitted that these are the only findings in respect of the applicability of section 2(1)(c)(xviii) of the Commercial Courts Act. It was argued that clause (xviii) of section 2(1)(c) of the Commercial Courts Act relates only to “agreements for sale of goods or provision of services” and the same has no connection with whether the property is used exclusively in trade or commerce. Therefore, the Commercial Court has failed to consider the provisions of section 2(1)(c)(xviii) of the Commercial Courts Act in proper perspective and has erred in linking the same with the property said to have been used exclusively in trade or commerce. It was submitted that no reasons have been recorded as to why the present dispute does not fall within the ambit of section 2(1)(c)(xviii) of the Commercial Courts Act, despite the fact that in the present case there is a maintenance service contract between the petitioner and the respondent. It was submitted that the Commercial Court missed the wordings of sub-clause (xviii) which does not speak of the terms “exclusively used in trade or commerce” and thus, overlooked the statutory provisions which is a valid ground for review. 6.1 It was submitted that under rule 1 of Order XLVII of the Code another ground for review is any other sufficient cause. 6.1 It was submitted that under rule 1 of Order XLVII of the Code another ground for review is any other sufficient cause. Reference was made to the order dated 5.5.2018 passed by this court, to submit that the petitioner withdrew the appeal from order because of a concession on the basis of what fell from the court and upon that he withdrew with liberty to file review on the grounds set out in the order. It was submitted that, therefore, the present case clearly falls within the third ground, namely that there was sufficient reason. It was submitted that when this court had granted liberty to the petitioner to file a review application on the grounds set out in the order dated 5.5.2018 passed in Appeal from Order No.283 of 2017, the Commercial Court was not justified in rejecting the application on the ground that it did not fall within the parameters of review, inasmuch as, this was the very cause for filing the review. In support of such submission, the learned counsel placed reliance upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Rajender Singh v. Lt. Governor, Andaman & Nicobar Islands, (2005) 13 SCC 289 , wherein the court expressed the opinion that review jurisdiction was available since the impugned judgment was a clear case of an error apparent on the face of the record and non-consideration of relevant documents. The court further held that the courts should not hesitate to review their own earlier order when there exists an error on the face of the record and the interest of justice so demands in appropriate cases. It was submitted that in the present case there is non-consideration of relevant documents and pleadings and hence, the Commercial Court ought to have exercised review jurisdiction. 6.2 Reliance was also placed upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Green View Tea & Industries v. Collector, Golaghat, (2004) 4 SCC 122 , for the proposition that it is the duty of the court to rectify, revise and recall its orders as and when it is brought to its notice that certain of its orders were passed on a wrong or mistaken assumption of facts and that implementation of those orders would have serious consequences. It was submitted that in the facts of the present case, the Commercial Court has proceeded on a mistaken assumption of facts as it has failed to take into consideration the CAMC while holding that the dispute does not fall within the scope of commercial dispute which has serious consequences, inasmuch as, the petitioner is no suited from availing of the remedy under the Commercial Courts Act. 6.3 Reliance was also placed upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India v. Namit Sharma, (2013) 10 SCC 359 , wherein the court placed reliance upon its earlier decision in the case of CST v. Pine Chemicals Ltd., (1995) 1 SCC 58 , for the proposition that if the reasoning in the judgment under review is at variance with the clear and simple language in a statute, the judgment under review suffers from a manifest error of law, an error apparent on the face of the record, and is liable to be rectified. It was submitted that in the facts of the present case, it is clear that the judgment under review suffers from a manifest error of law, inasmuch as, the judgment is at variance with the clear and simple language in the statute, namely, sub-clause (xviii) of section 2(1)(c) of the Commercial Courts Act. Referring to findings recorded by the Commercial Court in paragraph 28 of the order dated 24.8.2017, it was submitted that the Commercial Court has read into sub-clause (xviii) of section 2(1)(c) of the Commercial Court Act something which is not there. 6.4 Reliance was placed upon the decision of this court in the case of Gujarat Cooperative Bar Association v. State of Gujarat, (2016) 1 GLR 679 , wherein the court has referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India v. Namit Sharma, (supra) and held that the proposition of law discernible from the said decision of the Supreme Court is that if the reasoning in the judgment under review is at variance with the clear and simple language in a statute, the judgment under review could be said to be suffering from a manifest error of law, and an error apparent on the face of the record, and is liable to be rectified. 6.5 Reliance was also placed upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Board of Control for Cricket in India v. Netaji Cricket Club, (2005) 4 SCC 741 , for the proposition that the words “sufficient reason” in Order XLVII rule 1 of the Code are wide enough to include a misconception of fact or law by a court or even an advocate. It was submitted that in the facts of the present case clear grounds for review had been made out and hence, the Commercial Court was not justified in rejecting the review application filed by the petitioner. 6.6 Lastly, it was urged that in any case, the operative part of the judgment was not warranted whereby the Commercial Court has placed a limitation for presenting the plaint before the appropriate court. 7. Vehemently opposing the petition, Mr. Devang Nanavati, Senior Advocate, learned counsel with Ms. Prachiti Shah and Krishal Patel, learned advocates for Nanavati & Nanavati, learned advocates for the respondent, submitted that the Code of Civil Procedure is a complete code. Therefore, for the purpose of invoking the review jurisdiction under section 114 of the Code, the petitioner is required to fall within the parameters laid down under rule 1 of Order XLVII of the Code. It was submitted that the power of judicial review under article 227 of the Constitution of India against an order passed by the Commercial Court on an application for review is limited. 7.1 Dealing with the contention raised on behalf of the petitioner that in paragraph 28 of the order dated 24.8.2017, the commercial court has misread section 2(1)(c)(xviii) of the Commercial Courts Act by linking the services provided by the respondent with property said to have been used exclusively in trade or commerce, it was submitted that there is no error apparent on the face of the record insofar as the findings recorded by the Commercial Court are concerned. It was submitted that the Commercial Court has not used the expression, “trade or commerce” in conjunction with services but with property inasmuch as the case of the petitioner throughout was that the chillers in question were immovable property which were used for trade and commerce. It was submitted that the Commercial Court has not used the expression, “trade or commerce” in conjunction with services but with property inasmuch as the case of the petitioner throughout was that the chillers in question were immovable property which were used for trade and commerce. Reference was made to paragraph 10 of the judgment, to point out that there was a conscious argument that the sub-clauses (vii), (xviii) and (xxii) of section 2(1)(c) of the Commercial Courts Act are applicable in the facts of the present case and that while making submissions with regard to the applicability of the above three sub-clauses, submissions were focused on the applicability of sub-clause (vii) of section 2(1)(c) of the Commercial Courts Act and no effective submission was made as regards the applicability of sub-clause (xviii) thereof. 7.2 Referring to section 2 of the Commercial Courts Act which is the definition section, it was pointed out that the expression “commercial” has not been defined under that Act. Reference was made to the Statement of Objects and Reasons, to submit that the Commercial Courts Act has been enacted to provide for speedy disposal of high value commercial disputes involving complex facts and question of law. Reference was made to the findings recorded by the Commercial Court, to submit that the Commercial Court has duly considered as to when a dispute would fall within the ambit of “commercial dispute” and to the meaning of the term ‘commercial dispute” by placing reliance upon the various decisions of the Delhi High Court. It was submitted that the Commercial Court has duly applied its mind to the dispute in question and observed that every dispute arising from a commercial transaction without the same falling in any of the clauses of section 2(1)(c) of the Commercial Courts Act, cannot constitute a “commercial dispute” within the meaning of the Commercial Courts Act. It was submitted that the Commercial Court has duly considered the contention of the petitioner regarding the dispute falling within the ambit of section 2(1)(c)(xviii) of the Commercial Courts Act and has repelled the contention of the petitioner and that mere disagreement with the view adopted by the Commercial Court would not be a ground for review. It was submitted that the Commercial Court has duly considered the contention of the petitioner regarding the dispute falling within the ambit of section 2(1)(c)(xviii) of the Commercial Courts Act and has repelled the contention of the petitioner and that mere disagreement with the view adopted by the Commercial Court would not be a ground for review. 7.3 The learned counsel referred to the memorandum of Appeal from Order No.283 of 2017 which has been filed along with the affidavit in reply of the respondent, to submit that none of the grounds stated therein bring out the contention with regard to the dispute in question falling within the ambit of section 2(1)(c)(xviii) of the Commercial Courts Act. Referring to the order dated 5.5.2018 passed by this court in appeal from order preferred by the petitioner, it was submitted that the petitioner has not sought any leave to revive the appeal and that the ground for filing the review application was that, at the first instance, it did not present the case in a proper manner before the Commercial Court. It was submitted that not having presented the case properly before the Commercial Court cannot be a ground for review. It was submitted that there may be an error of law in the reasons recorded by the Commercial Court while dismissing the suit on the ground of maintainability; however, there is no error apparent on the face of the record warranting review of the order passed by the Commercial Court. It was submitted that having regard to the nature of the order passed by the Commercial Court, the petitioner should have pursued the appeal and that the ground on which the review has been preferred, is clearly not error apparent on the face of the record. It was submitted that having regard to the nature of the order passed by the Commercial Court, the petitioner should have pursued the appeal and that the ground on which the review has been preferred, is clearly not error apparent on the face of the record. 7.4 In support of his submission, the learned counsel placed reliance upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Haridas Das v. Usha Rani Banik, (2006) 4 SCC 78 , wherein the court held that in order to appreciate the scope of a review, section 114 of the Code has to be read, but this section does not even adumbrate the ambit of interference expected of the court since it merely states that it "may make such order thereon as it thinks fit." The parameters are prescribed in Order XLVII of the CPC and for the purposes of the lis, permit the defendant to press for a rehearing "on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the records or for any other sufficient reason". The court held that the former part of the rule deals with a situation attributable to the applicant, and the latter to a jural action which is manifestly incorrect or on which two conclusions are not possible. The court further held that neither of the conditions postulates a rehearing of the dispute because a party had not highlighted all the aspects of the case or could perhaps have argued them more forcefully and/or cited binding precedents to the court and thereby enjoyed a favourable verdict. The court placed reliance upon its earlier decision in the case of in M/s. Thungabhadra Industries Ltd. v. the Government of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1964 SC 1372 , wherein it was held thus: “There is a distinction which is real, though it might not always be capable of exposition, between an erroneous decision and a decision which could be characterized as vitiated by ‘error apparent’. A review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous decision is reheard and corrected, but lies only for patent error……… where without any elaborate argument one could point to the error and say here is a substantial point of law which stares one in the face, and there could reasonably be no two opinions entertained about it, a clear case of error apparent on the face of the record would be made out." The court further held that the power of review may not be exercised on the ground that the decision was erroneous on merits. That would be the province of a court of appeal. A power of review is not to be confused with appellate power which may enable an appellate court to correct all manner of errors committed by the subordinate court. It was, accordingly, submitted that the view taken by the Commercial Court can be corrected in appeal but not in review. 7.5 Reliance was also placed upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Kamlesh Verma v. Mayawati, (2013) 8 SCC 320 , wherein the court held that a review of a judgment is a serious step and reluctant resort to it is proper only where a glaring omission or patent mistake or like grave error has crept in earlier by judicial fallibility. A mere repetition, through different counsel, of old and overruled arguments, a second trip over ineffectually covered ground or minor mistakes of inconsequential import are obviously insufficient. 7.6 Reliance was also placed upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Parsion Devi v. Sumitri Devi, (1997) 8 SCC 715 , for the proposition that under Order XLVII rule 1 CPC, a judgment may be open to review inter alia if there is a mistake or an error apparent on the face of the record. An error which is not self-evident and has to be detected by a process of reasoning can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record justifying the court to exercise its power of review under Order XLVII rule 1 CPC. In exercise of the jurisdiction under Order XLVII rule 1 CPC, it is not permissible for an erroneous decision to be “reheard and corrected”. A review has a limited purpose and cannot be allowed to be “an appeal in disguise”. In exercise of the jurisdiction under Order XLVII rule 1 CPC, it is not permissible for an erroneous decision to be “reheard and corrected”. A review has a limited purpose and cannot be allowed to be “an appeal in disguise”. The court held that there is a clear distinction between an erroneous decision and an error apparent on the face of the record. While the first can be corrected by the higher forum, the latter can only be corrected by exercise of the review jurisdiction. It was submitted that in the present case, the decision rendered by the Commercial Court can at best be said to be an erroneous decision which can be corrected by the higher forum in appeal and review jurisdiction has rightly not been exercised by the Commercial Court. 7.7 Mr. Nanavati further submitted that the contention that the petitioner would be rendered remediless is also not correct, inasmuch as, an ordinary suit would still lie in the context of the cause of action in respect of which the suit was instituted before the Commercial Court. Reference was made to the order dated 5.5.2018 passed by this court in Appeal from Order No.283 of 2017, to point out that the learned advocate for the petitioner had withdrawn the appeal without reserving any liberty, and hence, the only option now available to the petitioner is to institute an ordinary suit before the court of competent jurisdiction. 7.8 Dealing with the decisions cited on behalf of the petitioner, it was submitted that the decision of the Supreme Court in Rajender Singh v. Lt. Governor, Andaman & Nicobar Islands (supra), would have no applicability to the facts of the present case as it was rendered in the context of review in a case where the order which was subject matter of review was passed in a petition under article 226 of the Constitution of India. It was submitted that the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Green View Tea & Industries v. Collector, Golaghat (supra) is also distinguishable on facts. Referring to paragraph 15 of the said decision wherein the court has referred to its earlier decision in the case of S. Nagaraj v. State of Karnataka, 1993 Supp (4) SC 595, it was pointed out that the same refers to the scope of review by the Supreme Court. Referring to paragraph 15 of the said decision wherein the court has referred to its earlier decision in the case of S. Nagaraj v. State of Karnataka, 1993 Supp (4) SC 595, it was pointed out that the same refers to the scope of review by the Supreme Court. As regards the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India v. Namit Sharma (supra), it was submitted that the said case involved review under article 137 of the Constitution of India. Referring to the decision of this High Court in the case of Gujarat Cooperative Bar Association v. State of Gujarat (supra), it was submitted that the said decision deals with the scope of review under article 226 of the Constitution of India. Referring to paragraph 10 of the said decision, it was pointed out that the court has specifically observed that the Supreme Court in Shivdeo Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1963 SC 1909 , held that it is sufficient to say that there is nothing in article 226 of the Constitution to preclude a High Court from exercising the power of review which inheres in every court of plenary jurisdiction to prevent miscarriage of justice or to correct grave and palpable errors committed by it. Thus, although the Supreme Court by necessary implication negatived the attraction of the provisions of Order XLVII of the Civil Procedure Code to the writ jurisdiction of the High Court, it firmly established the existence of such powers, but had clarified that such inherent powers could be invoked “to prevent miscarriage of justice” or to correct grave and palpable errors committed by the High Court. It was submitted that therefore, the said decision does not in any manner further the case of the petitioner. It was submitted that in the facts of the present case it would require an exercise of reasoning to come to the conclusion that the dispute involved in the suit is a commercial dispute and hence, in the light of the settled legal position, a review is not maintainable. It was, accordingly, urged that the petition being devoid of merits deserves to be dismissed. 8. In rejoinder, Mr. Mehul Shah, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that it is not the request of the petitioner to disturb the order passed by the Commercial Court on merits. It was, accordingly, urged that the petition being devoid of merits deserves to be dismissed. 8. In rejoinder, Mr. Mehul Shah, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that it is not the request of the petitioner to disturb the order passed by the Commercial Court on merits. Reference was made to rule 8 of Order XLVII of the Code, to submit that when an application for review is granted, a note thereof shall be made in the register and the court may at once re-hear the case or make such order in regard to the rehearing as it thinks fit. It was submitted that, therefore, once the court comes to the conclusion that the review is required to be allowed, it is not required to decide on the merits as to whether the dispute is in fact a commercial dispute or not, as the same would be decided by the Commercial Court when the matter is reheard. It was submitted that, therefore, to what extent the service provisions would apply would be considered after the review application is decided. It was submitted that in this case, the Commercial Court suo motu took on the question of jurisdiction. It is a settled proposition of law that consent does not confer jurisdiction and that at the threshold all the questions are required to be considered after allowing the review. It was further submitted that when the petitioner has stated that it would become remediless in case review is not allowed, what the petitioner meant was that the petitioner would become remediless qua the commercial suit and not qua the ordinary suit. 9. The facts are not in dispute. The petitioner herein had instituted a suit being Commercial Suit No.154 of 2017 before the Commercial Court at Ahmedabad for declaration, direction and damages. The Commercial Court suo motu called upon the petitioner to satisfy it as regards whether the case would fall within the ambit of section 2(1)(c) of the Commercial Courts Act, namely, whether the dispute involved in the suit was a “commercial dispute”. The Commercial Court suo motu called upon the petitioner to satisfy it as regards whether the case would fall within the ambit of section 2(1)(c) of the Commercial Courts Act, namely, whether the dispute involved in the suit was a “commercial dispute”. After affording a reasonable opportunity of hearing to the petitioner (original plaintiff), the Commercial Court, by an order dated 24.8.2017, held that the dispute involved in the present case is not a commercial dispute and in the absence of fulfillment of the requirements of section 2(1) (c) of the Commercial Courts Act, the court was not vested with the jurisdiction to hear and dispose of the claim of the parties to the suit. However, instead of rejecting the plaint under Order VII rule 10 and 11 of the Code, the Commercial Court thought it appropriate in the interest of justice to exercise powers under Order VII rule 10 of the Code while directing the petitioner (plaintiff) to present the plaint before the appropriate court having jurisdiction to try and entertain the same. Being aggrieved, the petitioner preferred an appeal from order before this court being Appeal from Order No.283 of 2017, which came to be disposed of by an order dated 5.5.2018, the relevant part whereof has already been reproduced hereinabove. Thereafter, the petitioner filed a review application before the Commercial Court being Commercial Review Application No.1 of 2018. By the impugned order dated 10.1.2019, the review application has been dismissed. The Commercial Court has further observed that if the plaintiff would like to approach the appropriate court, he may approach within thirty days from the date of the order to file the plaint before the appropriate court. 10. Before adverting to the merits of the rival contentions, a brief reference may be made to the contents of the review application. A perusal of the review application filed by the petitioner before the Commercial Court reveals that it has been styled as an application for review/recall of the order dated 24.8.2017 under the provisions of section 114 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Paragraphs (1), (2) and (3) of the application set out the facts leading to the filing of the review application. Paragraphs (1), (2) and (3) of the application set out the facts leading to the filing of the review application. In paragraph (4), it has been stated that the dispute between the plaintiff and the defendant is a commercial dispute attracting the provisions of section 2(1)(c) (xviii) of the Commercial Courts Act as the agreement/contract in the form of Comprehensive Annual Maintenance Contract (CAMC) between the plaintiff and the defendant was also with respect to service and maintenance of the air conditioning plant and, therefore, would become a commercial dispute and would attract the provisions of the Commercial Courts Act. The petitioner has thereafter, referred to various paragraphs of the plaint wherein there is a reference to the service and maintenance contract that was executed between the plaintiff and the defendant in the form of CAMC and which, according to it, the defendant had failed to fulfill and not only caused breach of the same after accepting consideration towards annual maintenance charge but also recovered exorbitant repair charges under different heads by taking undue advantage of monopolistic position that the defendant enjoyed with respect to the air conditioning plant supplied by it to the plaintiff. Thereafter, in paragraph (5) of the application, it has been averred that perusing the averments and the contentions raised in the paragraphs of the plaint as reproduced in the application, it would become crystal clear that the dispute raised in the suit is a commercial dispute falling under the purview of section 2(1)(c)(viii) of the Commercial Courts Act as the CAMC that came to be executed and other agreements which came to be executed between the original plaintiff and the defendant and of which the breach is alleged in the suit, would fall within the ambit and purview of the Commercial Courts Act and, therefore, would be exclusively triable by the Commercial Court, Ahmedabad. Paragraphs (6) and (7) are formal paragraphs and paragraph (8) contains the relief clause. 11. These, in sum and substance, are the contents of the review application. In the entire application, except for the grounds stated hereinabove, no other grounds have been stated as to how the case falls within the parameters of rule 1 of Order XLVII of the First Schedule to the Code and as to why the review application should be entertained and allowed. In the entire application, except for the grounds stated hereinabove, no other grounds have been stated as to how the case falls within the parameters of rule 1 of Order XLVII of the First Schedule to the Code and as to why the review application should be entertained and allowed. Except for stating on merits that the case would fall within the ambit of section 2(1)(c)(viii) of the Commercial Courts Act, no ground worth the name has been set out in the application. It may be noted that while the appeal from order came to be withdrawn as it was the case of the petitioner that the dispute in the suit can be said to be a commercial dispute as per section 2(1)(c)(xviii) of the Commercial Courts Act, in the entire application, reference is made to clause (viii) instead of clause (xviii). Thus, it appears that the application for review has been drafted in a perfunctory manner. 12. A perusal of the order dated 24.8.2017 passed by the Commercial Court reveals that it was the case of the petitioner/plaintiff that it had purchased the chilling plant from the defendant which had been installed in the premises of the plaintiff. However, due to defects arising in the plant, correspondence came to be exchanged between the parties to either repair or replace the same. The plant was installed and fastened in the premises of the plaintiff which is meant to provide luxury, rather for the betterment and effective services to the customers. Therefore, the plant so installed can be said to be immoveable property used exclusively in trade and commerce and, therefore, the same amounts to and the issue pertains to commercial transaction and attracts the provisions of section 2(1)(c)(vii), (xviii) and (xxii) of the Commercial Courts Act. In paragraph 23 of the said order, the Commercial Court has observed thus: “23. Therefore, the plant so installed can be said to be immoveable property used exclusively in trade and commerce and, therefore, the same amounts to and the issue pertains to commercial transaction and attracts the provisions of section 2(1)(c)(vii), (xviii) and (xxii) of the Commercial Courts Act. In paragraph 23 of the said order, the Commercial Court has observed thus: “23. In view of the aforesaid provisions, whether the contention raised by the plaintiff while relying on several correspondence in the form of CAMC and the plaint in question so installed in the premises of the plaintiff for which the dispute has arisen, as averred by the plaintiff, can be said to be in respect of immoveable property used exclusively for “trade and commerce” and for that purpose, the word “trade and commerce” and meaning and purpose thereof while applying the same as to whether the same attracts and falls within the ambit of section 2(1)(c) of the Commercial Courts Act is required to be considered.” The Commercial Court has thereafter referred to the decisions of the Supreme Court in respect of the primary meaning of expression “trade” as well as the expression “commerce and industry”. 13. In paragraph 27 of the order dated 24.8.2017, the Commercial Court has observed thus: “27. Admittedly, considering the provisions of the Commercial Courts Act, nowhere the term “commercial dispute” has been defined as dispute arising out of the commercial transactions, instead in the said provisions, 22 types of transactions have been specified and listed in clauses (i) to (xxii) of Section 2(1)(c) (as reproduced hereinabove), as the disputes arising wherefrom will constitute a “commercial dispute”. 14. In paragraph 28 of the order, the Commercial Court has observed that every dispute arising from a commercial transaction without the same falling in any of the clauses of section 2(1)(c) of the Commercial Courts Act, cannot constitute a “commercial dispute” within the meaning of the Commercial Courts Act. 14. In paragraph 28 of the order, the Commercial Court has observed that every dispute arising from a commercial transaction without the same falling in any of the clauses of section 2(1)(c) of the Commercial Courts Act, cannot constitute a “commercial dispute” within the meaning of the Commercial Courts Act. The court has thereafter observed thus:- “Thus, the fingers laid by the learned Advocate for the plaintiff in the aforesaid provisions, more particularly while referring to Section 2(1)(c)(xviii) of the Commercial Courts Act which pertains to sale of goods or provision of services, while considering the case on hand, it is not the case of the plaintiff which can be carved out as fall under the sale of goods or even provision of services supposed to have been provided and is being provided with regard to the product and property in question said to have been used exclusively in trade or commerce.” 15. The question as to whether or not, the dispute falls within the ambit of section 2(1)(c)(xviii) of the Commercial Courts Act has been discussed only in paragraph 28. It is the case of the petitioner that the Commercial Court has read into section 2(1) (c)(xviii) of the Commercial Courts Act something which is not provided in the said clause. It was submitted that while sub-clause (xviii) of section 2(1)(c) of the Commercial Courts Act provides that “commercial dispute” means a dispute arising out of agreements for sale of goods or provision of services, the Commercial Court has associated the words “provision of services” with property used exclusively in trade and commerce. It is the case of the petitioner that the words “exclusively used in trade and commerce” relates to agreement relating to immovable property whereas sub-clause (xviii) does not provide for sale of goods or provision of services to be used exclusively in trade or commerce. It is, accordingly, the case of the petitioner that the Commercial Court has read something more into sub-clause (xviii) than actually provided therein, which amounts to a manifest error of law and is, therefore, an error apparent is on the face of the record as held by the Supreme Court in Union of India v. Namit Sharma (supra). 16. It is, accordingly, the case of the petitioner that the Commercial Court has read something more into sub-clause (xviii) than actually provided therein, which amounts to a manifest error of law and is, therefore, an error apparent is on the face of the record as held by the Supreme Court in Union of India v. Namit Sharma (supra). 16. On the other hand, it has been contended on behalf of the respondent that the fulcrum of the submissions of the learned advocate for the petitioner before the Commercial Court was that the chiller plant being affixed to the land was an immovable property and the agreements related to immovable property exclusively used for trade and commerce and it is in that context the Commercial Court has made the said observations. 17. By its order dated 5.5.2018 passed in Appeal from Order No.283 of 2017, this court in paragraph (6) of the order has observed that in view of the above and the request made by the learned advocate appearing on behalf of the original plaintiff, recorded hereinabove, present appeal from order stands dismissed as withdrawn with above liberty. As and when such application is made to re-consider, recall and/or review the impugned order on the grounds set out hereinabove, the same may be considered in accordance with law and on merits for which the court has not expressed anything on merits in favour of either of the parties. 18. From the above order passed by this court, it is clear that whether it fell from the court or from the learned advocate for the petitioner, it had been submitted by the learned advocate for the petitioner that no proper submissions had been made on behalf of the original plaintiff on the applicability of section 2(1)(c)(xviii) of the Commercial Courts Act and the case on behalf of the plaintiff that the contract between the plaintiff and the defendant was also a contract for service and maintenance, and it is, therefore, that the learned advocate for the petitioner withdrew the appeal with a view to submit appropriate application before the Commercial Court. 19. 19. In the impugned order, the Commercial Court has reproduced extracts from paragraphs 28 and 29 of the earlier order dated 24.8.2017 and has observed that it is apparent on record that the court had taken the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the plaintiff that the dispute would fall within the ambit of section 2(1)(c)(xviii); and has expressed the view that therefore, it cannot be held that the said plea was not raised by the learned advocate for the plaintiff at the relevant time of arguments and that the said plea was not appreciated by the Commercial Court. 20. From the averments made in the memorandum of appeal from order preferred before this court by the petitioner against the order dated 24.8.2017 of the Commercial Court, a copy whereof has been placed on record by the learned counsel for the respondent, it appears that the case of the petitioner was that the AC plant in question has been used exclusively in trade and commerce, that is, hotel business. It was the case of the petitioner that the immovable property (fitted AC plant) in the premises of the petitioner is used exclusively for trade and commerce. The entire thrust of the case of the petitioner was that the AC plant having been fitted in the premises of the hotel was an immovable property which is used exclusively for the purpose of trade and commerce. Reliance was placed upon the decision of this court in Ujwala Raje Gaekwar D/o. Udaysinghrao Shivajirao Gaekwar and W/o Jay Vikram Shah v. Hemaben Achyut Shah and others, 2017 (1) GLR 360 , to contend that in the present case the AC plant in question has been put to actual and exclusive use for hotel business and in connection with the AC plant, the petitioner’s business suffered continuously and thus it is a commercial dispute as defined under section 2(1)(c) of the Commercial Courts Act. 21. From the averments made in the above memorandum of appeal, it emerges that no specific contention was raised that the dispute related to the comprehensive annual maintenance contract falling within the ambit of section 2(1)(c)(xviii) of the Commercial Courts Act. 21. From the averments made in the above memorandum of appeal, it emerges that no specific contention was raised that the dispute related to the comprehensive annual maintenance contract falling within the ambit of section 2(1)(c)(xviii) of the Commercial Courts Act. Thus, it appears that during the course of hearing of the appeal from order, it must have transpired that probably section 2(1)(c)(xviii) of the Commercial Courts Act would be attracted, but as this issue was not properly urged before the Commercial Court, the learned advocate for the petitioner sought permission to withdraw the appeal with a view to file an appropriate application. During the course of hearing of the review application, it was submitted by the learned advocate for the petitioner that the dispute falls within the ambit of section 2(1)(c)(xviii) of the Commercial Courts Act as the agreement entered into between the parties was for service, repairing and maintenance of the chiller plants. 22. In the impugned order the Commercial Court on a perusal of paragraphs 27 and 28 of its order dated 24.8.2017, has found that the predecessor court has taken the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner/plaintiff that the dispute would fall within the ambit of section 2(1)(c) (xviii) of the Commercial Courts Act and was of the view that, it, therefore, cannot be held that the said plea was not raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner/plaintiff at the relevant time of arguments and that the said plea was not appreciated by the Commercial Court. The Commercial Court was further of the view that whether the plea is rightly appreciated or wrongly appreciated, cannot be a ground of review. The Commercial Court has thereafter referred to the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in Kamlesh Verma (supra), Haridas Das (supra) and Radhekrishna Cooperative Housing Society Limited v. State of Maharashtra, 2017(6) Maharashtra Law Journal 932, and held that in the light of the ratio laid down in the said decisions, a review cannot lie on the ground that the plea could not be placed forcefully before the earlier court or that a second view is also possible. The Commercial Court was further of the view that considering the fact that in paragraphs 28 and 29 of its judgment dated 24.8.2017, that court had appreciated the plea regarding the maintainability of the suit under sub-clause (xviii) of section 2(1)(c) of the Commercial Courts Act, it cannot sit in appeal over the said order. 23. In the light of the above findings recorded by it, the Commercial Court has dismissed the review petition. However, while dismissing the review petition it has further observed that if the plaintiff would like to approach proper court, he may approach within thirty days from the date of that order to file the plaint before the appropriate court. 24. At this juncture, it may be germane to refer to the decisions cited by the learned counsel for the respective parties. Insofar as the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Rajender Singh v. Lt. Governor, Andaman & Nicobar Islands (supra) is concerned, the court was of the view that review jurisdiction was available in the said case since the impugned judgment was a clear case of error apparent on the face of the record and non-consideration of the relevant documents. The case before the Supreme Court was a case where during the course of review, documents which were not in the possession of the appellant at the time of hearing were produced, and it was these documents which were not considered by the High Court and it was in this context that the Supreme Court had held that “non-consideration of the relevant documents” was a ground for review. 25. In Green View Tea & Industries v. Collector, Golaghat (supra), the court emphasised what was already held in the earlier decision in the case of State of Nagaraj v. State of Karnataka, (1993) Supp (4) SCC 595, wherein it was held that it is the duty of the court to rectify, revise and recall its orders as and when it is brought to its notice that certain of its orders were passed on a wrong or mistaken assumption of facts and that implementation of those orders would have serious consequences. In the facts of the said case though there was material on record, the High Court had observed that there was no material available on record to hold that the land in question fell within a rural area with paddy field and tea cultivation area. 26. In Union of India v. Namit Sharma (supra), the court held that if the reasoning in the judgment under review is at variance with the clear and simple language in a statute, the judgment under review suffers from a manifest error of law, an error apparent on the face of the record, and is liable to be rectified. It may be pertinent to note that this case involved a review under article 137 of the Constitution of India. 27. In Board of Control for Cricket in India v. Netaji Cricket Club (supra), the court held that the words “sufficient reason” in Order XLVII rule 1 of the Code are wide enough to include a misconception of fact or law by a court or even an advocate. The court also referred to its earlier decision in the case of Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos v. Most Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasius, AIR 1954 SC 526 , for the proposition that the words ‘any other sufficient reason’ must mean ‘a reason sufficient on grounds, at least analogous to those specified in the rule’ but at the same time observed that the said rule is not universal. 28. In Haridas Das v. Usha Rani Banik (supra), the Supreme Court held thus: “13. In order to appreciate the scope of a review, Section 114 CPC has to be read, but this section does not even adumbrate the ambit of interference expected of the Court since it merely states that it "may make such order thereon as it thinks fit." The parameters are prescribed in Order 47 CPC and for the purposes of this lis, permit the defendant to press for a rehearing "on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the records or for any other sufficient reason". The former part of the rule deals with a situation attributable to the applicant, and the latter to a jural action which is manifestly incorrect or on which two conclusions are not possible. The former part of the rule deals with a situation attributable to the applicant, and the latter to a jural action which is manifestly incorrect or on which two conclusions are not possible. Neither of them postulate a rehearing of the dispute because a party had not highlighted all the aspects of the case or could perhaps have argued them more forcefully and/or cited binding precedents to the Court and thereby enjoyed a favourable verdict. This is amply evident from the explanation in Rule 1 of the Order 47 which states that the fact that the decision on a question of law on which the judgment of the Court is based has been reversed or modified by the subsequent decision of a superior Court in any other case, shall not be a ground for the review of such judgment. Where the order in question is appeal able the aggrieved party has adequate and efficacious remedy and the Court should exercise the power to review its order with the greatest circumspection. This Court in M/s. Thungabhadra Industries Ltd. v. Govt. Of A.P.; [AIR 1964 1372] held as follows: "There is a distinction which is real, though it might not always be capable of exposition, between a mere erroneous decision and a decision which could be characterized as vitiated by "error apparent". A review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous decision is reheard and corrected, but lies only for patent error. Where without any elaborate argument one could point to the error and say here is a substantial point of law which states one in the face and there could reasonably be no two opinions entertained about it, a clear case of error apparent on the face of the record would be made out." 14. In Meera Bhanja v. Smt. Nirmala Kumari Choudary [ AIR 1995 SC 455 ] it was held that: "8. It is well settled law that the review proceedings are not by way of an appeal and have to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order XLVII, Rule 1, CPC. In Meera Bhanja v. Smt. Nirmala Kumari Choudary [ AIR 1995 SC 455 ] it was held that: "8. It is well settled law that the review proceedings are not by way of an appeal and have to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order XLVII, Rule 1, CPC. In connection with the limitation of the powers of the Court under Order XLVII, Rule 1, while dealing with similar jurisdiction available to the High Court while seeking to review the orders under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, this Court, in the case of Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma v. Aribam Pishak Sharma speaking through Chinnappa Reddy, J. has made the following pertinent observations: It is true there is nothing in Article 226 of the Constitution to preclude the High Court from exercising the power of review which inheres in every Court of plenary jurisdiction to prevent miscarriage of justice or to correct grave and palpable errors committed by it. But, there are definitive limits to be exercise of the power of review. The power of review may be exercised on the discovery of new and important matter of evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence was not within the knowledge of the person seeking the review or could not be produced by him at the time when the order was made; it may be exercised where some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record is found, it may also be exercised on any analogous ground. But, it may not be exercised on the ground that the decision was erroneous on merit. That would be in the province of a court of appeal. A power of review is not to be confused with appellate power which may enable an appellate Court to correct all manner of error committed by the Subordinate Court." 15. A perusal of the Order 47, Rule 1 show that review of a judgment or an order could be sought : (a) from the discovery of new and important matters or evidence which after the exercise of due diligence was not within the knowledge of the applicant; (b) such important matter or evidence could not be produced by the applicant at the time when the decree was passed or order made; and (c) on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of record or any other sufficient reason. 16. In Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma v. Aribam Pishak Sharma ( AIR 1979 SC 1047 ) this Court held that there are definite limits to the exercise of power of review. In that case, an application under Order 47, Rule 1 read with Section 151 of the Code was filed which was allowed and the order passed by the judicial Commissioner was set aside and the writ petition was dismissed. On an appeal to this Court it was held as under: "It is true as observed by this Court in Shivdeo Singh v. State of Punjab (AIR 1963 SC1908) there is nothing in Article 226 in of the Constitution to preclude a High Court from exercising the power of review which inheres in every Court of plenary jurisdiction to prevent miscarriage of justice or to correct grave and palpable errors committed by it. But, there are definitive limits to the exercise of the power of review. The power of review may be exercised on the discovery of new and important matter of evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence was not within the knowledge of the person seeking the review or could not be produced by him at the time when the order was made, it may be exercised where some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record is found; it may also be exercised on any analogous ground. But, it may not be exercised on the ground that the decision was erroneous on merits. That would be the province of a Court of appeal. A power of review is not to be confused with appellate power which may enable an Appellate Court to correct all manner of errors committed by the Subordinate Court." 29. In Kamlesh Verma v. Mayawati (supra), the Supreme Court held that a review of a judgment is a serious step and reluctant resort to it is proper only where a glaring omission or patent mistake or like grave error has crept in earlier by judicial fallibility. A mere repetition, through different counsel, of old and overruled arguments, a second trip over ineffectually covered ground or minor mistakes of inconsequential import are obviously insufficient. 30. A mere repetition, through different counsel, of old and overruled arguments, a second trip over ineffectually covered ground or minor mistakes of inconsequential import are obviously insufficient. 30. In Parsion Devi v. Sumitri Devi (supra), the court held that an error which is not self-evident and has to be detected by a process of reasoning can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record justifying the court to exercise its power of review under Order XLVII rule 1 CPC. In exercise of the jurisdiction under Order XLVII rule 1 CPC, it is not permissible for an erroneous decision to be “reheard and corrected”. The court held that there is a clear distinction between an erroneous decision and an error apparent on the face of the record. While the first can be corrected by the higher forum, the latter can only be corrected by exercise of the review jurisdiction. 31. Examining the order dated 24.8.2017 of the Commercial Court in the light of the above principles, the question that arises for consideration is as to whether it can be said that the said order suffers from any error apparent on the face of the record so as to warrant exercise of review jurisdiction. 32. As noted hereinabove, in paragraph 28 of the said order, the Commercial Court has referred to the applicability of the provisions of section 2(1)(c)(xviii) of the Commercial Courts Act which pertains to sale of goods or provision of services. The court has observed in the context of the said provision that it is not the case of the plaintiff which can be carved out as to fall under the sale of goods or even provision of services supposed to have been provided and is being provided with regard to the product and property in question said to have been used exclusively in trade or commerce. Thus, the Commercial Court has considered the applicability or otherwise of the provisions of sub-clause (xviii) of section 2(1)(c) of the Commercial Courts Act. In the opinion of this court, while the issue may not have been discussed in detail and the decision may be erroneous, it cannot be said that the same suffers from any error apparent on the face of the record, which can be corrected without a lengthy process of reasoning. 33. In the opinion of this court, while the issue may not have been discussed in detail and the decision may be erroneous, it cannot be said that the same suffers from any error apparent on the face of the record, which can be corrected without a lengthy process of reasoning. 33. Moreover, the review application would entail rehearing of the applicability of the provisions of section 2(1)(c) (xviii) of the Commercial Courts Act. As held by the Supreme Court in Parsion Devi v. Sumitri Devi (supra), an error which is not self-evident and has to be detected by a process of reasoning can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record justifying the court to exercise its power of review under Order XLVII rule 1 CPC. In exercise of the jurisdiction under Order XLVII rule 1 CPC, it is not permissible for an erroneous decision to be “reheard and corrected”. In the considered opinion of this court, any error in the judgment dated 24.8.2017 of the Commercial Court can only be corrected by the higher forum and not by invoking the review jurisdiction of that court. 34. From the facts which have come on record, it is apparent that before this court in the appeal from order, it was the case of the learned counsel for the petitioner that no proper submissions were made on behalf of the original plaintiff on the applicability of section 2(1)(c)(xviii) of the Commercial Courts Act and the case on behalf original defendant that the contract between the original plaintiff and the original defendant was also a contract of service and maintenance. Thus, it is an admitted position that while a contention was raised with regard to the applicability of section 2(1)(c)(xviii) of the Commercial Courts Act, such contention was not put forward properly and it is for this reason that the learned advocate for the petitioner sought permission to withdraw the appeal from order with a view to file appropriate application before the Commercial Court. 35. As held by the Supreme Court in the case of Kamlesh Verma v. Mayawati (supra), a review of a judgment is a serious step and reluctant resort to it is proper only where a glaring omission or patent mistake or like grave error has crept in earlier by judicial fallibility. 35. As held by the Supreme Court in the case of Kamlesh Verma v. Mayawati (supra), a review of a judgment is a serious step and reluctant resort to it is proper only where a glaring omission or patent mistake or like grave error has crept in earlier by judicial fallibility. A mere repetition, through different counsel, of old and overruled arguments, a second trip over ineffectually covered ground or minor mistakes of inconsequential import are obviously insufficient. The present case is evidently a second trip over ineffectually covered ground, namely, the applicability of section 2(1)(c)(xviii) of the Commercial Courts Act and hence, in the light of the principles laid down in the above decision, the review application was not maintainable on such ground. 36. As regards the contention that the order passed by this court in appeal from order permitting the learned advocate for the petitioner to withdraw the appeal from order with a view to file appropriate application before the Commercial Court as the contention with regard to the applicability of section 2(1)(c) (xviii) of the Commercial Courts Act was not properly put up before the court during the course of the original proceeding would fall within the ambit of “any other sufficient reason” as contemplated in sub-rule (1) of rule (1) of Order XLVII of the Code, a perusal of the operative part of the order dated 5.5.2018 passed in Appeal from Order No.283 of 2017 reveals that the court has observed that the appeal from order stands dismissed as withdrawn with liberty to the petitioner to approach the Commercial Court with appropriate application and pray for review and recall of the impugned order. The court has further observed that as and when such application is made to re-consider, recall and/or review the impugned order on the grounds set out in the said order, the same be considered in accordance with law and on merits for which the court has not expressed anything on merits in favour of either of the parties. Thus, the court had left it open for the Commercial Court to consider the review application in accordance with law and on merits. Thus, the court had left it open for the Commercial Court to consider the review application in accordance with law and on merits. When the expression, “in accordance with law” is employed, it would also refer to the maintainability of the review application and it cannot be said that merely because the court had permitted the learned advocate for the petitioner to withdraw the appeal from order, ipso facto review petition would be maintainable without the parameters laid down in rule 1 of Order XLVII of the Code being satisfied. The said contention, therefore, does not merit acceptance. 37. In the light of the above discussion, this court does not find any legal infirmity in the impugned order dated 10th January, 2019 passed by the Commercial Court in Commercial Review Application No.1 of 2018, warranting interference in the exercise of powers under article 227 of the Constitution of India. 38. However, as noticed earlier, the Commercial Court while dismissing the review application has observed that if the plaintiff would like to approach proper court, he may approach within thirty days from the date of this order to file the plaint with appropriate court. In the opinion of this court, such observations were not warranted and are required to be set aside. 39. For the foregoing reasons, the petition fails and is, accordingly, dismissed with no order as to costs. However, paragraph (2) of the operative part of the impugned order dated 10.1.2019 whereby it has been observed that “if the plaintiff would like to approach proper court, he may approach within 30 days from the date of this order to file the plaint with appropriate court” is hereby deleted and it is hereby clarified that the operative part of the order dated 24.8.2017 passed by the Commercial Court, Ahmedabad in Commercial Civil Suit No.154 of 2017 directing the return of the plaint along with the court fees stamp used thereon shall continue to operate and accordingly the plaint along with the court fees stamp used thereon is directed to be returned to the plaintiff within a period of 30 days from the date of receipt of a copy of this order for presentation before the appropriate court, in terms of the said order. Rule is discharged with no order as to costs.