JUDGMENT : B.N. KARIA, J. 1. The present appellant, who is original claimant before M.A.C.T. Of Bhavnagar, requested to pass an award for an amount of Rs. 2,46,914/- on the count of injuries sustained by the petitioner-appellant herein in connection with an accident, which occurred on 31.1.1990 when the appellant, who was riding on an elephant, at that point of time, respondent No.1 came driving Luxury Bus No.GJ-5T-8820 in a negligent manner, endangering the human life and dashed the Luxury Bus with the elephant, due to which the appellant fell down from the elephant and sustained injuries. 2. The Tribunal observed that the claim petition was time-barred and therefore, the application below Exh.14 was allowed and petitioner under Section 166 of the M.V. Act was dismissed. Being dissatisfied with the judgment and order passed by the M.A.C.T. of Bhavnagar, the present appeal is preferred by the original petitioner-appellant herein under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 ('the Act', for short) 3. Heard learned advocate Ms. Nidhi Vyas for Mr. Siddharth Dave for the appellant and Mr. Palak Thakkar for respondent No.2. No argument was advanced by the respondent No.1 as the appeal was dismissed against un-served respondent by this court on 2.8.2018. 4. It was submitted by learned counsel for the appellant that the accident had occurred in the year 1990 and the claim petition was filed in the year 1995. The Tribunal has committed serious error by not appreciating the amendment made in the Act w.e.f. 14.11.1994 in its true perspective. It was further submitted that w.e.f. 14.11.1994, time limit for filing claim petition under Section 166 of the Act was removed and therefore, after 14.11.1994, claim petition can be filed at any time, irrespective of date of accident. In the present case, even if it is filed with retrospective effect or not, the limitation would not apply. It is further submitted that, however, the claim petition was filed in 1995, after amendment, limitation aspect will not be applicable to the facts of the present case. 5. In support of her argument, learned counsel for the appellant has relied upon judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in the matter between The New India Assurance Co. Ltd. Vs. It is further submitted that, however, the claim petition was filed in 1995, after amendment, limitation aspect will not be applicable to the facts of the present case. 5. In support of her argument, learned counsel for the appellant has relied upon judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in the matter between The New India Assurance Co. Ltd. Vs. C. Padma & Anr., (2003) 7 SCC 713 , submitting that the claimant is entitled to the benefit of amended provision, irrespective of the fact that the cause of action arose prior to the enforcement of the amended Act or the old Act. Hence, it was requested to quash and set-aside the order passed below Exh.14 dated 19.11.2003 by way of preferring this First Appeal. 6. From the other side, learned counsel Mr. P.H. Thakkar for respondent No.2 submitted that, clearly the accident had occurred on 31.1.1990 and the claim petition was filed in the year 1995. That the amendment under Section 166 of the Act came into force from 14.11.1994. That this accident had occurred prior to amendment under Section 166 of the Act, wherein six months' period from the date of accident was fixed and therefore, as the time limit was fixed by the Legislature, the petition was required to be preferred on or before 31.1.1991, extending further six months', if any. The Tribunal has rightly passed an order, holding that the claim petition was preferred by the petitioner on 15.12.1995, which was time-barred and therefore, the award cannot be passed upon the time-barred application at Exh.1. That no irregularity was committed by the Tribunal in allowing the application of respondent No.2 at Exh.14 and therefore, it was requested by learned counsel for respondent No.2 to dismiss the First Appeal. 7. Having considered the facts of the case and perusing the order passed by the Tribunal below application at Exh.14 preferred by respondent No.2, stating that the accident in dispute had occurred on 31.1.1990 under Section 166 of the Act and therefore, at the relevant point of time, the claimant was required to prefer the petition within six months' from the date of accident, which can be extended for another six months' after extending the period by the Tribunal, in fact, the claim petition was preferred by the claimant on 15.12.1995. 8. 8. The learned Tribunal, after hearing the parties, was pleased to allow the application, holding that it was clearly time-barred. If we go through Section 166 of the Act, amended w.e.f. 14.11.1994, it appears that there is no time limit fixed by the Legislature for filing an application for compensation arising out of an accident for the nature specified in sub-section (1) of Section 165 of the Act. Prior to amendment, there was a time limit to prefer an application for compensation within a period of six months from the date of accident, but thereafter, upon making amendment by the Legislature w.e.f. 14.11.1994, the time limit for filing a claim petition from the date of accident was deleted. 9. In the instant case, indisputably, the accident had occurred on 31.1.1990 and application for compensation was preferred by the claimant on 15.12.1995. Now, the question of amendment carried out w.e.f. 14.11.1994 would be retrospective or prospective, in the facts and circumstances of present case. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of C. Padma (Supra), a similar situation was there, wherein the accident took place on 18.12.1989 and claim petition was filed on 2.11.1995, claiming compensation. The Claims Tribunal rejected the plea of limitation raised by the Insurance Company and awarded compensation to the claimant. The Revision Petition filed by the Insurance Company was also dismissed by the High Court. The Hon'ble Apex Court observed that Parliament realised the grave injustice and injury which was being caused to the heirs and legal representatives of the victims who died in accidents by rejecting their claim petitions only on ground of limitation, confirmed the orders. 10. In the instant case, considering the facts and circumstance of the case, the time limit before the amendment, would not be come in way as a hurdle on the part of the claimant, as the accident occurred on 31.1.1990. The Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 is a beneficial legislation aimed at providing relief to the victims or their families, if otherwise the claim is found genuine. Further, it is a self contained Act, which prescribes mode of filing the application, procedure to be followed and award to be made. The Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 is a beneficial legislation aimed at providing relief to the victims or their families, if otherwise the claim is found genuine. Further, it is a self contained Act, which prescribes mode of filing the application, procedure to be followed and award to be made. The Parliament, in its wisdom, realised the grave injustice and injury being caused to the heirs and legal representatives of the victims who suffer bodily injuries/die in accidents, by rejecting their claim petitions at the threshold on the ground of limitation, and purposely deleted sub-section (3) of Section 166, which provided the period of limitation for filing the claim petitions and this being the intendment of the Legislature to give effective relief to the victims and the families of the motor accidents untrammeled by the technicalities of the limitation. The submission by learned counsel for respondent No.2, does not have any substance. 11. The Hon'ble Supreme Court did not find any infirmity in the order under challenge, which would warrant any interference and the appeal was dismissed. Here also, as discussed above, as the Parliament has deleted sub-section (3) of Section 166, which provided the period of limitation for filing the claim petitions, the approach of the Tribunal in allowing the application submitted by respondent No.2 was not legal and proper and therefore, the present First Appeal is hereby allowed. 12. Thereby, the impugned order dated 19.11.2003 passed by the M.A.C.T. (Aux.), Bhavnagar in M.A.C.P. No.603 of 1995 below application at Exh.14, is hereby quashed and set-aside. Accordingly, the petition i.e. M.A.C.P. No.603 of 1993 shall be revived for fresh disposal in accordance with law. 13. Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted, under the instructions that claimant shall not claim for any interest before the Tribunal from the date of application i.e. 31.1.1990 to filing of the application on 15.12.1995 before the Tribunal. As the right of claiming the interest for the aforesaid period is waived by the present appellant, the Tribunal shall proceed and shall decide the petition afresh in accordance with law. 14. With this observation, the First Appeal is hereby allowed.