JUDGMENT : 1. The instant Criminal Acquittal Appeal has been filed by the State against the judgment dated 05.02.2007 passed by the learned 3rd Additional Sessions Judge, Jammu by virtue of which the accused Naresh Kumar Parwakar has been acquitted. 2. Briefly prosecution case before the trial Court was that the respondent while posted as Deputy Director, Libraries prepared papers of fictitious meeting of DPC and forged the signatures of Utter Kumar and SC Vohra, including his own signatures the members of said DPC on 22/23 March 1999 and thereby conferred undue benefit to Irvin Kour, Swarn Kanta, Bihari Lal, Paras Ram, Ashok Kumar and Subash Kour by clearing their names for promotion to higher ranks. In view of the fictitious DPC convened the above said beneficiaries were promoted. The respondent knowingly concealed and destroyed the record of said DPC with a view to destroy the evidence. The beneficiaries were demoted after some time by Director Libraries. One of the beneficiaries Swarn Kanta challenged the order of demotion and sought a direction to implement the DPC convened before the Hon’ble Court. Dy Director S.C. Vohra appeared in the Court and claimed that his signatures have been forged and he has never attended any DPC. The High Court vide its judgement dated 17.04.2000 passed in writ petition directed a probe in the matter. 3. The case stood registered and investigation taken in hand. During the course of investigation police came to the conclusion that a fictitious DPC was convened by the respondent in which signatures of S.C.Vohra and Utter Kumar Sharma inclusive of accused were forged by the accused himself and undue benefit was conferred upon the beneficiaries by the minutes of this DPC by promoting the above said candidates to the higher rank on 23-03-1999, therefore, the investigating officer concluded the investigation established that prima facie case under section 420/468/467/120-B RPC stood proved against the accused and the challan was presented before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jammu. The offence under section 467 RPC being exclusively triable by the Court of learned Sessions Judge, the challan was committed to learned Sessions Judge, Jammu who ultimately transferred the same to the 3rd Additional Sessions Judge, Jammu for disposal. 4. After investigation of the case, offences u/s 471/420/201RPC were found proved against the accused and accordingly the charge was framed against him. Accused denied the charge and claimed trial of the case. 4. After investigation of the case, offences u/s 471/420/201RPC were found proved against the accused and accordingly the charge was framed against him. Accused denied the charge and claimed trial of the case. The prosecution was accordingly directed to lead evidence in support of its case. The prosecution examined PWs Sushil Chand, Balwant Raj, Romesh Chand, Gulshan Lal, Bansi Lal, Ashwani Kumar, Paras Ram, Rakesh Magotra, Gulzar Ahmed, Swarn Kanta, Irvin Kour, Ashok Sharma and Dy.SP in the sustenance of the charge. 5. The court below after conclusion of trial and hearing the parties acquitted the accused. Before re appreciating the evidence on record, the brief resume of the statements made by the prosecution witnesses and recorded by court below reads as under: PW-Shushil Chand Vohra stated that he retired as Dy. Director, Libraries. Jammu. He was promoted as Dy. Director on 05.08.1999. The Director Libraries had forwarded a Departmental Promotion Committee. The order whereof is on record and he as a Assistant Director was the member of that committee along with the Chief Librarian, Kathua and Dy. Director was the Chairman. At the relevant time accused was Dy. Director. He was not summoned for meeting of DPC nor did he ever attend any such meeting. The DPC was formed to clear the case of Jammu Province. There was no meeting of DPC; he does not know anything about the meeting held on 23.03.1999. Further stated that he has seen the photo copy on record of the file and he had not signed the same. He was shown the promotion orders dated 13.04.99 and 10.05.1999 also and stated that these were not issued according to DPC as no meeting of DPC took place. Govt. Advocate had called him in the High Court and he appeared there on 04.12.2000; the Hon’ble High Court showed him (witness) his signatures on a photocopy which he denied to have signed and stated that he had no knowledge about any DPC; on this, the High Court wrote to IGP to investigate the matter; during the investigation Dy. SP recorded his statement and got his signatures for comparison. That he does not know as to in whose possession the DPC file was. Record of the DPC was not seized in his presence. That when accused was placed under suspension. He (witness) became Assistant Director. On cross-examination by the learned Defence counsel stated that he became Dy. SP recorded his statement and got his signatures for comparison. That he does not know as to in whose possession the DPC file was. Record of the DPC was not seized in his presence. That when accused was placed under suspension. He (witness) became Assistant Director. On cross-examination by the learned Defence counsel stated that he became Dy. Director in year 1986. Accused came as Dy. Director in 1998 and before that accused was not in the library department. The witness admitted that copies of promotion order dated 10.05.1999 and 13.04.1999 were endorsed to him also, but he did not receive the copies. Assistant Director, Dy. Director and the Director had separate offices in the same building; he did not know in what connection the accused was suspended; by the same order vide which accused was suspended he was given charge, I/C Dy. Director and he remained Dy. Director till the accused remained under suspension; ultimately he retired from the post on 31.03.2002; that from August 1999 til1 4th September 2000 he did not inform the Director that DPC, was held in his absence; he did not complain to the Director because Director knew that all was done in a wrong way but he did not have any talk about this matter with the Director. The copy shown to him in the High Court was photocopy; from whom Swarn Kanta had obtained it he cannot say; he also does not know whether she had copied it from the original order or not; he does not know whether the photo copy obtained was in the office or not, nor does he know when the file was misplaced from the office. On suggestion from the defence the witness denied that it was he who concealed the document. PW Balwant Raj stated that on 14.10.2000 he was posted in the office of Director; Police came there enquired about two files and register comprising of order file also; the seizure memo of the files was prepared, it is marked as EXPW-BR. it bears his signatures, the files were taken by police department, the register and file are same which were seized by the police. In cross-examination stated that the police seized this file from storekeeper of the office. PW-Romesh Chander states that in March, 1999 he was Jr. it bears his signatures, the files were taken by police department, the register and file are same which were seized by the police. In cross-examination stated that the police seized this file from storekeeper of the office. PW-Romesh Chander states that in March, 1999 he was Jr. Librarian in Kathua; he does not know anything about the case; police went to District Library Kathua, inspected the record and took the photocopy from the concerned; he does not know for what record police obtained photocopy; he was declared hostile. On cross examination by APP states that Utter Kumar died on 01.06.1999, his statement was not recorded by police; he does not remember whether Uttar Kumar was on duty on 23.03.1999 or not; no record was shown to him in this connection. PW-Gulshan Lal stated that he was posted in the office of Dy. Director, Libraries, Jammu and accused N.C. Parbarkar was Dy. Director; he had charge of files but he was not having DPC file with him; it remains in the possession of officer, the witness was declared hostile. In cross-examination by the APP stated that police came in connection with FIR registered against the accused and also enquired from him; he got nervous whey Dy. SP started enquiry; he went to the house of officer but he refused to give the file; the police asked him about file; he refused to have any knowledge about that; police did not record his statement; the accused has issued promotion orders of Class-IV employees in the DPC meeting; some employees filed writ petition in the High Court and it came to light that DPC was wrong; he further states that DPC file was not traced in office but it was with the accused. On cross examination by learned defence counsel the prosecution witness stated that he did not know as to whether Director Libraries had issued orders for convening DPC because the file was not with him, so the witness says that file might be with the accused; he has no personal knowledge about the case or the file. PW-Bansi Lal states that he was appointed in library in 1989 and in 1999 he was confirmed. In 2001 also he was in library; the accused Dy. PW-Bansi Lal states that he was appointed in library in 1989 and in 1999 he was confirmed. In 2001 also he was in library; the accused Dy. Director made his permanent order which lasted for 7/8 months and later on he was reverted; they filed a case in Hon’ble High Court; the Hon’ble High Court ordered for DPC again and he is now working on consolidated pay; he has not become permanent employee now yet; he was reverted by Director; he does not know why he was not made permanent. PW-Ashok Kumar states that in the year 2000 he was posted as Assistant Librarian at Batote; the accused promoted him as Assistant Librarian but after six months he was reverted by the order of Mr. Soz (Director) he got the stay order from the Hon’ble High Court against this reversion; he was eligible so he was again promoted in the next DPC also by the order of Hon’ble High Court. On cross-examination stated that when he was promoted accused was Dy. Director and Charanjit Singh was Director; he does not know about the DPC but he was rightly promoted; he was senior; his reversion was absolutely wrong, so he filed the writ petition before Hon’ble High Court. PW-Paras Ram stated that he knows the accused who was Dy. Director Libraries; he was promoted as Assistant Librarian by the Senior Officers he means Assistant Director, Dy. Director and Director, after six months; he was reverted by new Director; he filed the writ petition and got stay order from Hon’ble High Court. In cross examination states that before his promotion DPC was held; all the officials assembled; 5/6 other employees were also promoted along with him; the reversion made was wrong. PW-Rakesh Hangloo Scientific Officer, FSL has stated that he was posted as Scientific Assistant FSL on 17.07.2001 when documents of case FIR No.238/2000 offence u/s 420/467/468/120-B RPC, Police Station Pacca Danga, Jammu was forwarded by Dy. SP to police Head Quarter, Jammu for examination vide his letter No.1448/SDH dated 14.07.2001. After putting the document to scientific examination, he has issued opinion bearing report No.755/FSL dated 21.08.2001. The report was signed by him counter signed by his Director on 18.08.2001; the report is marked as EXPW-RH. SP to police Head Quarter, Jammu for examination vide his letter No.1448/SDH dated 14.07.2001. After putting the document to scientific examination, he has issued opinion bearing report No.755/FSL dated 21.08.2001. The report was signed by him counter signed by his Director on 18.08.2001; the report is marked as EXPW-RH. On cross examination by the counsel for accused he stated that signatures marked as D, E and F were reproduction copies i.e., Xeroxed copies; the red enclosed standard signatures stamped and marked D, E and F could not be connected with standard signatures marked as B1 to B12, C1, J1 to J10, G1 to G10 and H1 respectively; it is definite opinion as mentioned above. PW-Gulzar Ahmed, SP stated that in the year 2000 he was Dy SP, Head Quarter, Jammu; the case was registered in Police Station, Pacca Danga and he has conducted the part investigation, he prepared site plan EXPW-GA and also prepared seizure memo of record of the office EXPW-BR; the further investigation was conducted by Dy SP Ashok Sharma. In cross-examination states that he recorded statement of witnesses who were witnesses to the seizure memo. PW-Swaran Kanta stated that she was Librarian in 2001; she joined the Department in 1981 as Library bearer; she got first promotion in 1988 and second in 1994 as Jr. Librarian. In 1999 she was promoted as Librarian by the accused; after six months she was reverted so she filed writ petition in the Hon’ble High Court; the Hon’ble High Court decided the writ petition in her favour and the reversion order was stayed. In cross-examination states that at the time of promotion in 1999 she was eligible for the same; she was rightly promoted; when Director Mr. Soz tried to revert her, she filed a writ petition in the High Court on the plea that she was promoted in accordance to DPC; she never paid any bribe to the accused for her promotion when the accused was Dy. Director, at that time S.C.Vohra was Asstt. Director Libraries. PW-Irvin Kour stated that she does not know why she was called in the court; accused was Dy. Director Libraries; she was promoted as cataloguer by him; afterwards the promotion order was kept up held by the Director also. In cross-examination by the defence counsel stated that when she was promoted she was senior most, she was senior most even now. PW-Ashok Sharma, Dy. Director Libraries; she was promoted as cataloguer by him; afterwards the promotion order was kept up held by the Director also. In cross-examination by the defence counsel stated that when she was promoted she was senior most, she was senior most even now. PW-Ashok Sharma, Dy. S.P, I/O of the case stated that he investigated the case and seized the concerned record of the DPC; he also recorded the statements of witnesses u/s 161 CrPC; the allegations against the accused were that he fabricated the order of DPC by forging the signatures of members and thus gave promotion to the employees; it was further an allegation against the accused that he destroyed the original record of the DPC; from its investigation offence u/s 467/417/201/420/468 RPC stood proved against the accused. In cross-examination stated that specimen signatures and admitted signatures of the accused were also taken and sent for examination to FSL. Letter No.1563 dated 06.07.2001 and Letter No.1090 dated 22.06.2001 bear his signatures, these letters were sent to FSL. On page no.2 of letter No.1563 dated 06.07.2001 in para 8 he has written correctly that till then it was not known as who had concealed the file; the result of FSL came in his presence and no definite opinion was given and expert could not tell who had signed the photocopy; he cannot say whether photocopy was appended in High Court also with the file. S.C.Vohra was Asstt. Director and accused was Dy. Director Libraries. All the three officers along with Director sit in one office. It is correct that the Director vide his letter No.DL/ADM-33/99/1518-20 dated 09.02.1999 had constituted a DPC in the year 98/99 and copy was sent to all. The promotions were ordered on 22.03.99 but the Asstt. Director never made a complaint up to 16.09.2000 that DPC does not bear his signatures; when the accused was placed under suspension on some charge, S.C. Vohra took over the charge as Dy. Director. He presented the challan in the court of law on the basis of circumstantial evidence. 6. Law with regard to acquittal appeal has been enumerated recently in Mohd. Akhtar @ Kari & Ors. Vs. State of Bihar & ANR. reported in 2018 0 Supreme (SC) 1211 decided on 4.12.2018, wherein it has been held as under;- “8. Director. He presented the challan in the court of law on the basis of circumstantial evidence. 6. Law with regard to acquittal appeal has been enumerated recently in Mohd. Akhtar @ Kari & Ors. Vs. State of Bihar & ANR. reported in 2018 0 Supreme (SC) 1211 decided on 4.12.2018, wherein it has been held as under;- “8. The question that falls for determination in this case is whether the High Court was right in setting aside the acquittal of the Appellants and convicting them for an offence of murder. While holding that there is no limitation placed on the power to review the evidence in an appeal against acquittal, Lord Russell in Sheo Swarup v. King-Emperor (1934) 36 BOM LR 1185 held: "9. .. .. the High Court should and will always give proper weight and consideration to such matters as (1) the views of the trial Judge as to the credibility of the witnesses; (2) the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused, a presumption certainly not weakened by the fact that he has been acquitted at his trial; (3) the right of the accused to the benefit of any doubt; and (4) the slowness of an appellate Court in disturbing a finding of fact arrived at by a Judge who had the advantage of seeing the witnesses." 9. The approach of the High Court in an appeal against acquittals was explained by this Court in Surajpal Singh & Ors. v. The State (1952) 3 SCR 193 as follows: "It is well-established that in an appeal under section 417 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the High Court has full power to review the evidence upon which the order of acquittal was founded, but it is equally well settled that the presumption of innocence of the accused is further reinforced by his acquittal by the trial court, and the findings of the trial court which had the advantage of seeing the witnesses and hearing their evidence can be reversed only for very substantial and compelling reasons." 10. This Court in Muralidhar @ Gidda & Anr. v. State of Karnataka, (2014) 5 SCC 730 referred to several earlier judgments dealing with appeals against acquittals and observed that the appellate court must bear in mind the following : "12. .. .. This Court in Muralidhar @ Gidda & Anr. v. State of Karnataka, (2014) 5 SCC 730 referred to several earlier judgments dealing with appeals against acquittals and observed that the appellate court must bear in mind the following : "12. .. .. (i) There is presumption of innocence in favour of an accused person and such presumption is strengthened by the order of acquittal passed in his favor by the trial court; (ii) The accused person is entitled to the benefit of reasonable doubt when it deals with the merit of the appeal against acquittal; (iii) Though, the powers of the appellate court in considering the appeals against acquittal are as extensive as its powers in appeals against convictions but the appellate court is generally loath in disturbing the finding of fact recorded by the trial court. It is so because the trial court had an advantage of seeing the demeanour of the witnesses. If the trial court takes a reasonable view of the facts of the case, interference by the appellate court with the judgment of acquittal is not justified. Unless, the conclusions reached by the trial court are palpably wrong or based on erroneous view of the law or if such conclusions are allowed to stand, they are likely to result in grave injustice, the reluctance on the part of the appellate court in interfering with such conclusions is fully justified; and (iv) Merely because the appellate court on re-appreciation and re-evaluation of the evidence is inclined to take a different view, interference with the judgment of acquittal is not justified if the view taken by the trial court is a possible view. The evenly balanced views of the evidence must not result in the interference by the appellate court in the judgment of the trial court." 11. It is relevant to refer to another judgment of this Court in Ghurey Lal v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2008) 10 SCC 450 in which the principles to be followed by the appellate courts to overrule or otherwise disturb the trial court's acquittal were crystallised as under: "70. ... 1. The appellate court may only overrule or otherwise disturb the trial court's acquittal if it has "very substantial and compelling reasons" for doing so. A number of instances arise in which the appellate court would have "very substantial and compelling reasons" to discard the trial court's decision. ... 1. The appellate court may only overrule or otherwise disturb the trial court's acquittal if it has "very substantial and compelling reasons" for doing so. A number of instances arise in which the appellate court would have "very substantial and compelling reasons" to discard the trial court's decision. "Very substantial and compelling reasons" exist when: (i) The trial court's conclusion with regard to the facts is palpably wrong; (ii) The trial court's decision was based on an erroneous view of law; (iii) The trial court's judgment is likely to result in "grave miscarriage of justice"; (iv) The entire approach of the trial court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal; (v) The trial court's judgment was manifestly unjust and unreasonable; (vi) The trial court has ignored the evidence or misread the material evidence or has ignored material documents like dying declarations/report of the ballistic expert, etc. (vii) This list is intended to be illustrative, not exhaustive. 2. The appellate court must always give proper weight and consideration to the findings of the trial court. 3. If two reasonable views can be reached-one that leads to acquittal, the other to conviction-the High Courts/appellate courts must rule in favour of the accused." 12. Interference with the judgment of the trial court in this case by the High Court is on a re-appreciation of evidence which is undoubtedly permissible. Though the High Court was aware of the well-settled principles of law in matters relating to appeals against acquittals, it failed to apply the same in their proper perspective. Interference with an order of acquittal is not permissible on the ground that a different view is possible. If the acquittal is justified on a probable view taken by the trial court, it should not be interfered with. The reasons given by the trial court for acquittal mainly pertain to the delay in lodging the FIR, untrustworthy eye witnesses, improbability of identification of the accused, non- examination of independent witnesses, previous enmity between the accused and the witnesses, non-production of important prosecution witnesses and improper investigation of the case. On a thorough examination of the entire evidence on record and the judgment of the trial court, we are of the considered view that the judgment of acquittal by the trial court is justified which ought not to have been interfered with by the High Court. On a thorough examination of the entire evidence on record and the judgment of the trial court, we are of the considered view that the judgment of acquittal by the trial court is justified which ought not to have been interfered with by the High Court. The High Court could not have reversed a judgment of acquittal merely because another view is possible. The High Court brushed aside the findings recorded by the trial court relating to certain omissions as being minor and held the omissions should not have been the basis on which the Appellants have been acquitted. The High Court ignored the fact that the presumption of innocence in favour of the Appellants is further strengthened by an order of acquittal. No perversity in the judgment of the trial court in acquitting the Appellants has been demonstrated by the High Court for interfering with the judgment of the trial court. 13. For the aforementioned reasons, the Appeals are allowed. The judgment of the High Court is set aside and the judgment of the trial court is restored. The Appellant No.3 was released on bail on 30.01.2017. His bail bonds are discharged.” 7. In present case accused was charge sheeted for offence under section 420/471/201 RPC with allegation that he being Deputy Director of Library prepared fictitious paper of minute of meeting of DPC thereby forging the signatures of Utter Kumar and S.C. Vohra and himself, the members of meeting on 22/23 march 1999; and thereby conferred undue benefit to six employees by giving them undue benefit; there was further allegation that he destroyed the papers of DPC meetings. 8. Section 471 of the Ranbir Penal Code reads as under: “471. Using as genuine a forged document or electronic record.—Whoever fraudulently or dishonestly uses as genuine any document which he knows or has reason to believe to be a forged document , shall be punished in the same manner as if he had forged such document or electronic record.” 9. The essential ingredients of Section 471 are thus (i) Fraudulent or dishonest use of document as genuine (ii) knowledge or reasonable belief on the part of person using the document that it is a forged one. Section 471 is intended to apply to persons other than forger himself, but the forger himself is not excluded from the operation of the Section. 10. Section 471 is intended to apply to persons other than forger himself, but the forger himself is not excluded from the operation of the Section. 10. To attract Section 471, it is not necessary that the person held guilty under the provision must have forged the document himself or that the person independently charged for forgery of the document must necessarily be convicted, before the person using the forged document, knowing it to be a forged one can be convicted, as long as the fact that the document used stood established or proved to be a forged one. The act or acts which constitute the commission of the offence of forgery are quite different from the act of making use of a forged document. The expression ‘fraudulently and dishonestly’ is defined in Sections 25 and 24 RPC respectively. For an offence under Section 471, one of the necessary ingredients is fraudulent and dishonest use of the document as genuine. The act need not be both dishonest and fraudulent. The use of document as contemplated by Section 471 must be voluntary one. For sustaining conviction under Section 471 it is necessary for the prosecution to prove that accused knew or had reason to believe that the document to be a forged one. Whether the accused knew or had reason to believe the document in question to be a forged has to be adjudicated on the basis of materials and the finding recorded in that regard is essentially factual. 11. Under the RPC, guilt in respect of almost all the offences is fastened either on the ground of "intention" or "knowledge" or "reason to believe". We are now concerned with the expressions "knowledge" and "reason to believe". "Knowledge" is an awareness on the part of the person concerned indicating his state of mind. "Reason to believe" is another facet of the state of mind. "Reason to believe" is not the same thing as "suspicion" or "doubt" and mere seeing also cannot be equated to believing. 12. "Reason to believe" is a higher level of state of mind. 13. Likewise "knowledge" will be slightly on higher plane than "reason to believe". A person can be supposed to know where there is a direct appeal to his senses and a person is presumed to have a reason to believe if he has sufficient cause to believe the same. "Reason to believe" is a higher level of state of mind. 13. Likewise "knowledge" will be slightly on higher plane than "reason to believe". A person can be supposed to know where there is a direct appeal to his senses and a person is presumed to have a reason to believe if he has sufficient cause to believe the same. Section 26 RPC explains the meaning of the words "reason to believe" thus: "26. Reason to believe": A person is said to have 'reason to believe' a thing, if he has sufficient cause to believe that thing but not otherwise." 14. In substance what it means is that a person must have reason to believe if the circumstances are such that a reasonable man would, by probable reasoning, conclude or infer regarding the nature of the thing concerned. Such circumstances need not necessarily be capable of absolute conviction or inference; but it is sufficient if the circumstances are such creating a cause to believe by chain of probable reasoning leading to the conclusion or inference about the nature of the thing. These two requirements i.e. "knowledge" and "reason to believe" have to be deduced from various circumstances in the case. 15. Section 420 reads as under:- “420. Cheating and dishonestly inducing delivery of property.—Whoever cheats and thereby dishonestly induces the person deceived to deliver any property to any person, or to make, alter or destroy the whole or any part of a valuable security, or anything which is signed or sealed, and which is capable of being converted into a valuable security, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine.” 16. The essential ingredients to attract Section 420 RPC are : (i) Cheating; (ii) Dishonest inducement to deliver property or to make, alter or destroy any valuable security or anything which is sealed or is capable of being converted into a valuable security and (iii) mens rea of the accused at the time of making the inducement. 17. The essential ingredients to attract Section 420 RPC are : (i) Cheating; (ii) Dishonest inducement to deliver property or to make, alter or destroy any valuable security or anything which is sealed or is capable of being converted into a valuable security and (iii) mens rea of the accused at the time of making the inducement. 17. In the present case, the court below after appreciating the evidence produced by prosecution has held that PW Swarn Kanta filed the writ when she was demoted; she never alleged that DPC was wrong or the signatures of members were forged rather she has acknowledged that by virtue of DPC she was promoted and she has never paid any bribe to the accused. PW-Irvin Kour has also deposed that the DPC to be correct and she never supported the fact that the accused ever forged the signatures of the other members and used in genuine DPC papers. PW Romesh Chander has stated that he does not know anything about the case; he was Jr. Librarian in Kathua at that relevant time; the police inspected the record and took the photocopy from the concerned. PWs Bansi Lal, Paras Ram and Ashok Kumar did not utter a whisper in their statements against the accused; rather they have stated that the demotion made by the new Director was illegal so they filed the writ petition. The court below has further concluded that from the statements of these witnesses it is apparent that the accused had no criminal intention to cause wrongful gain to any person or wrongful loss to another. The court below also did not believe the statement of S.C.Vohra, the alleged member of the DPC because his statement was not supported by any independent witness; his statement was also not supported with FSL report. According to FSL witness Rakesh Hangloo, the red enclosed signatures stamped and marked as D, E and F cannot be connected with standard signatures and marked B1 to B12, C1, J1 to J10, G1 to G10 and H1 due to the reason difference were observed between execution of signatures. The court below thus held that the forgery of signature of S.C.Vohra on minute of DPC held on 23.3.1999 was not proved by prosecution. Another member of minute of DPC Utter Kr. Sharma had died. The court below thus held that the forgery of signature of S.C.Vohra on minute of DPC held on 23.3.1999 was not proved by prosecution. Another member of minute of DPC Utter Kr. Sharma had died. I.O Ashok Sharma has categorically stated that the Director Libraries had issued an order and constituted DPC vide its order dated 09.02.1999; photocopy of which is in the file would clearly reveals that this fact is correct. He has further stated that the promotion orders were also issued on 22.03.1999 but at that time S.C.Vohra Assistant Director never made any complaint that his signatures were forged by the accused upto 06.09.1999, the said Vohra took over the charge as Dy. Director when the accused was suspended at the time of assuming the charge as Dy Director, S.C.Vohra never complained that his signatures have been forged so the statement of Vohra cannot be believed to be true. All these findings of the court below are not perverse in nature and are supported with the evidence recorded by the court below during trial. So far as the offence u/s 201 RPC is concerned, the court below has held that the evidence adduced does not speak a whisper about causing disappearance of the evidence by the accused. This finding is also correct, because from perusal of evidence on record, I do not find any evidence in this regard. Further for convicting a person under section 471 RPC, there should be allegation of forgery as defined under section 463 RPC, which is punishable under section 465 RPC; but there is no such charge framed against respondent/accused. 18. In view of above, this appeal is dismissed as essential ingredient of offences for which accused/respondent was charged has not been proved by prosecution beyond reasonable doubts, which is cardinal principle of criminal jurisprudence.