JUDGMENT : JASPREET SINGH, J. 1. With the consent of learned counsel for the parties, the aforesaid second appeal has been finally heard at the admission stage. 2. The appellants have preferred the above second appeal being aggrieved against the judgment and decree dated 20.11.2018 passed by Additional District Judge/Special Judge, P.C. Act, Court No. 4, Lucknow in Regular Civil Appeal No. 9/2018 whereby it allowed the appeal of the plaintiff-respondents and decreed the suit, reversing the judgment and decree passed by the Additional Civil Judge (Junior. Division), Room No. 37, Lucknow passed in Regular Suit No. 938/2000 by which the suit of the plaintiff-respondents had been dismissed. 3. Shri Ashok Kumar Pandey, learned counsel for the appellants has vehemently urged that the first appellate Court has committed grave error in allowing the appeal and decreeing the suit of the plaintiffs-respondents without meeting the reasons given by the trial court for dismissing the suit. His submissions is that the plaintiffs had instituted a suit for permanent injunction in respect of Khasra Plot No. 2318 and Plot No. 2319, situated at Village Kanausi, Paragna, Tehsil and District Lucknow. It has been submitted that though the suit was filed indicating the khasra number, but nowhere in the entire plaint, the boundaries have been disclosed. In absence of any boundaries, the property could not be identified and, therefore, the institution of the suit was hit by provision of Order VII, Rule 3, CPC which mandates while filing a suit the property in question must be properly identified by giving boundaries. It has further been urged that since the controversy primarily involved the fact that according to the plaintiffs, they were the owners of Khasra Plot No. 2318 and Plot No. 2319 of Village Kanausi and while the defendants-appellants are the exclusively owners of Khasra Plot No. 2295 of Village Kanausi, therefore, it primarily involved a boundary dispute and as such it was necessary for the Court to have got a commission executed and only after identifying the location and boundaries could the suit be decreed. Since, no commission was executed, therefore, the first appellate Court was no right in decreeing the suit. 4. Since, no commission was executed, therefore, the first appellate Court was no right in decreeing the suit. 4. It has also been urged that the plaintiffs in the plaint had urged that they were the owners of the 3/4th of Khasra Plot No. 2318 and Plot No. 2319 of Village Kanausi and had also received the possession of the remaining 1/4th. However, in the garb of the aforesaid, it was the plaintiffs, who were trying to encroach upon the land of the U.P. Power Corporation Ltd., over Khasra Plot No. 2295 and therefore, since, the plaintiffs had no come before the Court with clean hand, they are not entitled to a decree of injunction. 5. It has also been submitted that the plaintiffs, who had instituted a suit initially had sold the property to the plaintiff No. 4 which is a Co-operative Housing Society and from the evidence available on record, it was established that the Society had already sold its plots to its Members and, therefore, admittedly, the plain-tiffs were neither the owners or in possession as the ownership vested with the Member as well as the possession, therefore, the plaintiffs were not entitled to maintain the suit and this aspect of the matter which had been considered by the trial court while dismissing the suit has been ignored by the first appellate Court while reversing the judgment and, therefore, it is prayed that the appeal requires consideration and also deserves to be allowed. 6. Per contra, Shri Pritish Kumar, learned counsel appearing for the respondents has submitted that the plaintiffs had instituted a suit in respect of Khasra Plot No. 2318 and Plot No. 2319. It is not in dispute that the plaintiffs are the exclusive owners thereof. It is also not in dispute that the appellants, who were the defendants before the trial court had in their written statement, had clearly stated that U.P. Power Corporation Ltd., did not have any concern with the Khasra Plot No. 2318 and Plot No. 2319, rather the entire emphasis was that it was the plaintiffs, who were trying to encroach upon the land of the defendants. The plaintiffs also clearly stated that they do not have any concern with Khasra Plot No. 2295. 7. The plaintiffs also clearly stated that they do not have any concern with Khasra Plot No. 2295. 7. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the respondents that the entire emphasis made by the appellants that the plaintiffs in the garb of the injunction granted by the first appellate Court were attempting to encroach upon the land of the appellants is also incorrect inasmuch as the aforesaid aspect of the matter has been considered by the first appellate Court in great detail and also noticing the evidence which was led by the parties, it was amply established from the record that the plaintiffs never attempted to encroach. 8. It has also been urged that if at all the defendants had any grievance and they were threatened at the behest of the plaintiffs then they ought to have instituted either a fresh suit or a counter claim or sought a counter injunction. However, they failed to do so. Once they have taken a defence that they had no right or interest in respect of the Khasra Plot No. 2318 and Plot No. 2319 and in respect thereto, the plaintiffs have been able to establish their possession and rights, therefore, they were entitled to a decree of injunction. 9. Replying to the submissions of the learned counsel for the appellants, Shri. Pritish Kumar has contended that the plaintiff No. 4 is a Cooperative Housing Society. It has carved out plots for its Members and has sold the plots to its Members, therefore, the Members derive the ownership as well as the possession from the plaintiffs and this exercise was done during the pendency of the suit and, therefore, it can-not be said that the plaintiffs lost its ownership and possession and was not entitled to maintain the suit or seek a decree of injunction. 10. It has further been contended by Shri Pritish Kumar that the trial court had specifically framed Issue No. 4 which was to the effect as to whether the disputed property was part of Plot Nos. 2318 and 2319 or Plot No. 2295. It was clearly noted by the trial court that the aforesaid Issue No. 4 was framed on the pleadings of the defendants-appellants. 2318 and 2319 or Plot No. 2295. It was clearly noted by the trial court that the aforesaid Issue No. 4 was framed on the pleadings of the defendants-appellants. However, they failed to lead any evidence in respect thereto and since it was incumbent upon the defendants to discharge their burden in respect of the aforesaid issue and the trial court found that the defendants had failed to establish the aforesaid plea and the said issue was decided against the defendants. However, while the plaintiffs preferred the regular civil appeal before the first appellate Court even then the defendants did not prefer any cross objections against the findings held against the defendants in respect of the Issue No. 4. Thus, the finding on Issue No. 4 has attained finality and now it is not open for the appellants to raise this issue at the second appellate stage. Since, the defendants themselves could not prove or establish that the plaintiffs were attempting to encroach upon the property of the defendants. Thus, the entire submission of the appellants fails. 11. It has also been urged that all the grounds which have been raised by the appellants are in the domain of the first appellate Court which is final court of fact and all the issues raised are nothing but questions of fact which cannot be considered by this Court under Section 100, CPC. 12. The Court has heard learned counsel for the parties at length and also perused the record. 13. In order to consider the aforesaid issues raised by the parties and whether a substantial question of law is raised to enable this Court to admit the appeal, brief facts giving rise to the above second appeal are being noted first. 14. The plaintiffs-respondents instituted a Regular Suit No. 238/2000 seeking a decree of injunction restraining the U.P. Power Corporation Ltd., from interfering in the peaceful possession of the plaintiffs or from dispossessing them in respect of the property in suit, which has been indicated as Khasra Plot No. 2318 and Plot No. 2319 situated in Village Kanausi, Paragna, Tehsil and District Lucknow. In the plaint, it was stated that the plaintiffs Nos. 1 to 3 are co-tenure holders of Khasra Plot No. 2318 and Plot No. 2319. The plaintiff No. 1 possessed 1/4th share therein while the plaintiff Nos. 2 and 3 possessed 1/4th share. 15. In the plaint, it was stated that the plaintiffs Nos. 1 to 3 are co-tenure holders of Khasra Plot No. 2318 and Plot No. 2319. The plaintiff No. 1 possessed 1/4th share therein while the plaintiff Nos. 2 and 3 possessed 1/4th share. 15. It was also alleged that the plaintiff Nos. 1 to 3 had already executed a registered Power of Attorney in favour of Mohd. Anwar, who was the Secretary of the Plaintiff No. 4 i.e. M/s. Hasrat Sahkari Awas Samiti Ltd., in pursuance, thereof, the plaintiff Nos. 1 to 3 after receiving sale consideration also executed registered sale deed in respect of their share in favour of the plaintiff No. 4 by means of sale deeds dated 27.06.2001 and 23.05.2001, therefore, the entire rights of the plaintiffs Nos. 1 to 3 stood vested with the plaintiff-respondents. It was also stated that another co-owner had executed a receipt after receiving a part of the sale consideration and handed over the possession of his share in the plot in question. 16. At this stage, it will be relevant to point out that one Shri. Surendra Kumar Srivastava moved an application bearing Civil Misc. Application No. 43465/2019 seeking his impleadment in the above second appeal. It was his case that he has 1/4th share in Plot No. 2318 and Plot No. 2319 and since he has not been made party to the above proceedings, his rights have, been affected. 17. This Court had directed Shri. Surendra Kumar Srivastava to file his affidavit indicating whether he had executed any document in favour of the plaintiff No. 4 and whether he has received any part consideration or handed over the possession of his share of 1/4th of Khsara Plot No. 2318 and Plot No. 2319: In pursuance of the aforesaid order, Shri Surendra Kumar Srivastava filed his supplementary affidavit dated 23.04.2019, which was taken on record and wherein he denied executing any document or receipt bearing Paper No. C-82/44 which was filed before the trial court and further denied having accepted any consideration from the respondent No. 1 arrayed before this Court. 18. In view of the above, Shri. Surendra Kumar Srivastava disputed the transaction which is set up by the respondent No. 1 in respect of the 1/4th share of Shri Surendra Kumar Srivastava. 18. In view of the above, Shri. Surendra Kumar Srivastava disputed the transaction which is set up by the respondent No. 1 in respect of the 1/4th share of Shri Surendra Kumar Srivastava. Since, Surendra Kumar Srivastava was neither a party to the proceedings and he disputed his transaction with respondent No. 1 thus without entering further into merits it is provided that the outcome of the proceedings in the present second appeal as well as the matter arising out of the Regular Suit No. 938/2000 shall not be binding on Shri. Surendra Kumar Srivastava and he shall be at the liberty of ventilating his grievances by approaching the appropriate Court if he so desires. The order passed by this Court shall be only in respect of the parties to the proceedings of Regular Suit No. 938/2000 and in light thereof the impleadment application of Shri. Surendra Kumar Srivastava bearing Civil Misc. Application No. 43465/2019 shall also stands disposed of in above terms. 19. That U.P. Power Corporation Ltd., after service of notice filed their written statement. In the entire written statement, the title of the plaintiffs has not been assailed rather in Paragraph 3 of the written statement bearing Paper No. A-16, which is reply to Paragraph-6 of the plaint where the plaintiffs have set up their title, it has not been denied rather it says that it is not in the knowledge of the defendants, hence, unable to reply. Even after the plaint was amended, the defendant U.P. Power Corporation Ltd., preferred their additional written statement and in Paragraph-2 thereof, it also did not specifically deny the contents of Paragraphs-6B, 6C and 6D of the plaint. Thus, it would seen that so far as the defence is concerned, there is no denial regarding the title of the plaintiffs in respect of Khasra Plot No. 2318 and Plot No. 2319, however the entire emphasis as set up by the defendants in their written statement appears to be that the plaintiffs were attempting to encroach upon the land of the defendants, who are the owners of Plot No. 2295. However, the date on which, the alleged attempt of encroachment, is, 05.04.2000 and 03.06.2000. Both these dates are prior to the institution of the suit by the plaintiffs. However, the date on which, the alleged attempt of encroachment, is, 05.04.2000 and 03.06.2000. Both these dates are prior to the institution of the suit by the plaintiffs. It will be relevant to mention that despite having taken the plea that it was the plaintiffs, who were trying to encroach upon the land and the dates mentioned therein i.e. 05.04.2000 and 03.06.2000 are both prior to the date of the institution of the suit by the plaintiffs yet at no point of time, the defendants ever tried to protect their rights by filing a suit against the plaintiffs or the persons, who were attempting to encroach the property of the U.P. Power Corporation Ltd. 20. It is in this backdrop that the trial court framed eight issues. The trial court upon considering the Issue No. 8, whether the plaintiffs are the owners in possession and entitled to a relief of injunction was swayed by the fact that since the plaintiffs had sold the property to its Members and the Members were in possession, who had raised construction. Thus, the trial court found that it was actually the Members, who were the affected party and since they are not parties to the suit, therefore, the plaintiffs are neither the owners or in possession and, therefore, they are not entitled to maintain the suit for injunction. However, while dealing with the Issue No. 4, it clearly noted that the defendants were unable to establish the fact that the plaintiffs were attempting to encroach their property nor could establish that the disputed property was part of Khasra Plot No. 2295. With the aforesaid, the trial court by means of its judgment and decree dated 18.02.2017 dismissed the suit. 21. The plaintiffs being aggrieved preferred Regular Civil Appeal No. 9/2018 under Section 96, CPC which was admitted and thereafter transferred to the Court of Additional District Judge/Special Judge, P.C. Act, Court No. 4, Lucknow. The first appellate Court after hearing the parties, considering the controversy, framed two points of determination. (i) Whether the disputed property is part of Khasra Plot No. 2318 and Plot No. 2319 of Village Kanausi or of Plot No. 2295, and (ii) Whether the plaintiffs are the owners in possession and are entitled for injunction. 22. The first appellate Court after hearing the parties, considering the controversy, framed two points of determination. (i) Whether the disputed property is part of Khasra Plot No. 2318 and Plot No. 2319 of Village Kanausi or of Plot No. 2295, and (ii) Whether the plaintiffs are the owners in possession and are entitled for injunction. 22. The first appellate Court upon reappraisal of the evidence found that so far as the plaintiffs are concerned, it was a clear case that they are the owners of Plot No. 2318 and Plot No. 2319. It also found that the defendants did not dispute the rights of the plaintiffs in respect of Khasra Plot No. 2318 and Plot No. 2319. The entire defence set up was that the plaintiffs were trying to encroach upon the land of the defendants in respect of Plot No. 2295. Despite the same, the defendants had not instituted any suit and, therefore, it found that the allegations of the defendants were unfounded especially upon considering the" evidence of the witnesses which were examined on behalf of the U.P. Power Corporation, who admitted that the plaintiffs were not attempting to encroach upon the land of the defendants over Khasra Plot No. 2295. 23. In view of the above, it found that there was primarily no dispute between the respective parties and each clearly stated that they are not concerned with the property of the other and the defendants saying that they are not encroaching over the land of the plaintiffs, therefore, there was no impediment for grant of injunction in favour of the plaintiffs whereas if the defendants were aggrieved that the plaintiffs were attempting to encroach upon the Khasra Plot No. 2295 but failed to institute counter claim even a suit to protect their rights over the land nor their witnesses could establish any such attempt of the plaintiffs. Thus, in the totality of the circumstances, it found that the plaintiffs were entitled to grant of injunction and accordingly it reversed the decree passed by the trial court and by means of the judgment and decree dated 20.11.2018 allowed the appeal and decreed the suit. It is this judgment and decree dated 20.11.2018, which has been assailed by the defendants-appellants by means of the present second appeal. 24. It is this judgment and decree dated 20.11.2018, which has been assailed by the defendants-appellants by means of the present second appeal. 24. In light of the submissions and upon perusal of the record, the submission of the defendants-appellant is that the property was not identified and it was hit by the provision of Order VII, Rule 3 CPC. This Court is unable to accept the aforesaid contention. In the present case, both the parties are not in dispute over their respective rights over their respective properties. The plaintiffs have alleged that they are aggrieved by the action of the defendants, who have alleged that the plaintiffs are attempting to encroach, however, from the record it indicates that the defendants has not made any effort to seek the protection of their rights. Even assuming if the suit of the plaintiffs is dismissed, yet it will not stop encroaching over the property of the defendants. For the defendants to protect their rights against any encroachment, it was its duty to institute either a counter claim against the plaintiffs or institute a fresh suit which they have not done. Moreover, it is upon their pleadings that the Issue No. 4 was framed before the trial court and the defendants could not lead any evidence by which it could be establish that the plaintiffs ever attempted to encroach upon the land of the U.P. Power Corporation Ltd., nor that the disputed property was part of the Plot No. 2295. Once, the aforesaid findings have been returned which is based on appreciation of evidence in light of the submissions, which were given by the witnesses of the defendants itself, there is no manner of doubt that the findings returned by the first appellate Court cannot be faulted nor there is any fault in the suit regarding the identification of the property and in the plaint the property has been described by the khasra numbers which is sufficient to identify and the defendants also do not dispute it. 25. The submission that there is no identification of the property also pales into insignificance inasmuch as since the defendants were raising a dispute, the burden lay upon the defendants to have actually approached the proper court for getting the land measured and demarcated moreover it ought to have got a survey commission appointed before the trial court. 25. The submission that there is no identification of the property also pales into insignificance inasmuch as since the defendants were raising a dispute, the burden lay upon the defendants to have actually approached the proper court for getting the land measured and demarcated moreover it ought to have got a survey commission appointed before the trial court. Having failed in its attempt and not even a single endeavour was made, now it is not open for the defendants to raise this issue to persuade this Court in second appeal regarding identification which is not seriously disputed by defendants and moreover as it involves pure question of fact and the defendants missed the boat before the courts below to get a commission executed if they were aggrieved and wanted to get the identification done. 26. Learned counsel for the appellants could not give any satisfactory reply to the fact that once the trial court had recorded a finding against the defendants that the disputed property was not part of Khasra No. 2295 nor the defendants could establish the same and it failed to prefer any cross appeal before the first appellate Court, therefore, the findings having been attained finality. Now it was not open for the defendants-appellants to raise this issue in second appeal and cry foul that it is actually the plaintiffs, who are attempting to encroach upon the land of defendants-U.P. Power Corporation Ltd. 27. It is trite law that in a suit for injunction prima facie the possession and title is to be ascertained. Since, the defendants did not assail the title of the plaintiffs and moreover the possession is also not disputed, therefore, the first appellate Court was absolutely justified in granting the decree of injunction. The fact that the defendants were aggrieved on account of any action on the part of the plaintiffs, it was always open for them to have instituted a suit for protection of their rights. However, the defendants cannot allege merely because the plaintiffs are alleged to encroach upon the land of the defendants which they could not prove nor attempted to seek any relief against the plaintiffs thus when the plaintiffs have been able to establish their rights as well their possession over the property which the defendants failed to disprove and dispute and then expect that the plaintiffs may not get an injunction is not something called for. 28. 28. The title and possession of the plaintiffs is not in serious dispute and it entitles the plaintiff for injunction and it at all the defendants had any grievance they too could have filed a suit, however, they did not, now, only the case of the plaintiffs is to be examined. The defendants did not dispute the title of the plaintiffs over Khasra Plot No. 2318 and Plot No. 2319 nor its possession. Thus, the reasoning and fining of the first appellate Court cannot be faulted and being based on evidence are pure finding of facts to which no perversity could be pointed out by the learned counsel for the appellants. 29. In view of the detailed discussions, this Court finds that no substantial question of law arises in the above second appeal. The issue raised by the appellants including the questions as formulated in the memo of appeal are based on findings of fact which cannot be entertained until and unless any perversity is shown in the findings recorded by the first appellate Court and the learned counsel for the appellants could not establish any perversity. 30. This Court is satisfied that no substantial question of law arises nor the learned counsel for the appellants could point out any perversity in the judgment. 31. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Gurnam Singh (D) by L.Rs. and others v. Lehna Singh (D) by L.Rs., reported in AIR 2019 SC 1441 has held as under:-- "14. When a substantial question of law can be said to have arisen, has been dealt with and considered by this Court in the case of Ishwar Dass Jain ( AIR 2000 SC 426 ). In the aforesaid decision, this Court has specifically observed and held: "Under Section 100, CPC, after the 1976 amendment, it is essential for the High Court to formulate a substantial question of law and it is not permissible to reverse the judgment of the first appellate court without doing so. There are two situations in which interference with findings of fact is permissible. The first one is when material or relevant evidence is not considered which, if considered, would have led to an opposite conclusion. There are two situations in which interference with findings of fact is permissible. The first one is when material or relevant evidence is not considered which, if considered, would have led to an opposite conclusion. The second situation in which interference with findings of fact is permissible is where a finding has been arrived at by the appellate court by placing reliance on inadmissible evidence which if it was omitted, an opposite conclusion was possible. In either of the above situations, a substantial question of law can arise." 15. Applying the law laid down by this Court. in the aforesaid decisions to the facts of the case on hand, we are of the opinion that the High Court has erred in re-appreciating the evidence on record in the second appeal under. Section 100 of the CPC. The High Court-has materially erred in interfering with the findings recorded by the First Appellate Court, which were on re-appreciation of evidence, which was permissible by the First Appellate. Court in exercise of powers under Section 96 of the CPC. Cogent reasons, on appreciation of the evidence, were given by the First Appellate Court. First Appellate Court dealt with, in detail, the so called suspicious circumstance which weighed with the learned Trial, Court and thereafter it came to the conclusion 18 that the Will, which as such was a registered Will, was genuine and do not suffer from any suspicious circumstances. The findings recorded by the First Appellate Court are reproduced hereinabove. Therefore, while passing the impugned judgment and order, the High Court has exceeded in its jurisdiction while deciding the second appeal under Section 100, CPC. 15.1 As observed hereinabove and as held by this Court in a catena of decisions and even as per Section 100, CPC, the jurisdiction of the High Court to entertain the second appeal under Section 100, CPC is confined only to such appeals which involve a substantial question of law. On going through the substantial questions of law framed by the High Court, we are of the opinion that the question of law framed by the High Court while deciding the second appeal, cannot be said to be substantial questions of law at all. On going through the substantial questions of law framed by the High Court, we are of the opinion that the question of law framed by the High Court while deciding the second appeal, cannot be said to be substantial questions of law at all. The substantial questions of law framed by the High Court are as under: "(i) Whether the Appellate Court can reverse the findings recorded by the learned trial court without adverting to the specific finding of the trial Court? (ii) Whether the judgment passed by the learned lower Appellate Court is perverse and outcome of misreading of evidence?" The aforesaid cannot be said to be substantial questions of law at all. In the circumstances, the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court cannot be sustained and the same deserves to be quashed and set aside. At this stage, decision of this Court in the case of Madamanchi Ramappa v. Muthaluru Bojappa, AIR 1963 SC 1633 , is required to be referred to. In the aforesaid decision, this Court has observed and held as under: "Whenever this Court is satisfied that in dealing with a second appeal, the High Court has, either unwittingly and in a casual manner, or deliberately as in this case, contravened the limits prescribed by S. 100, it becomes the duty of, this Court to intervene and give effect to the said provisions. It may be that in some cases, the High Court dealing with the second appeal is inclined to take the view that what it regards to be justice or equity of the case has not been served by the findings of fact recorded by Courts of fact; but on such occasions it is necessary to remember that what is administered in Courts is justice according to law and considerations of fair play and equity however important they may be, must yield to clear and express provisions of the law. If in reaching its decisions in second appeals, the High Court contravenes the express provisions of S. 100, it would inevitably introduce in such decisions an element of disconcerting unpredictability which is usually associated with gambling; and that is a reproach which judicial process must constantly and scrupulously endeavour to avoid." 16. If in reaching its decisions in second appeals, the High Court contravenes the express provisions of S. 100, it would inevitably introduce in such decisions an element of disconcerting unpredictability which is usually associated with gambling; and that is a reproach which judicial process must constantly and scrupulously endeavour to avoid." 16. Therefore, we are of the opinion that this is a fit case to interfere with the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court, as, as observed hereinabove, the High Court has exceeded in its jurisdiction, while allowing the second appeal under Section 100 of the CPC. 18. Before parting with the present judgment, We remind the High Courts that the jurisdiction of the High Court, in an appeal under Section 100 of the CPC, is strictly confined to the case involving substantial question of law and while deciding the second appeal under Section 100 of the CPC, it is not permissible for the High Court to re-appreciate the evidence on record and interfere with the findings recorded by the Courts below and/or the First Appellate Court and if the First Appellate Court has exercised its discretion in a judicial manner, its decision cannot be recorded as suffering from an error either of law or of procedure requiring interference in Second Appeal. We have noticed and even as repeatedly observed by this Court and even in the case of Narayanan Rajendran v. Lekshmy Sarojini (2009) 5 SCC 264 : (2009 AIR SCW 2357), despite the catena of decisions of this Court and even the mandate under Section 100 of the CPC, the High Courts under Section 100, CPC are disturbing the concurrent, findings of facts and/or even the findings recorded by the First Appellate Court, either without formulating the substantial question of law or on framing erroneous substantial question of law." 32. In view of the above, no substantial question of law is involved in the above second appeal, therefore, the second appeal deserves to be dismissed under Order XLI, Rule 11, CPC. The judgment and decree dated 22.11.2018 passed in Regular Civil Appeal No. 9/2018 is affirmed. There shall be no order as to costs. 33. The record of lower court be remitted to the court concerned within two weeks from today.